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ABSTRACT 
Commercial interest and technological advancements (such as modern 
biotechnology) in plant research have led to the affirmation of sovereign and 
proprietary rights over plant genetic resources (PGRs). The result is an 
increasingly complex national regulatory system for rights in PGRs, shaped by 
a dense web of international law instruments regulating trade, intellectual 
property, food and agriculture, environmental, and human rights law.  
The narrative of the international trade and intellectual property instruments, 
buttressed by the liberal rhetoric of property, is one of long-term, sustainable, 
economic and social development, although the strength of this argument is 
increasingly challenged.  This thesis adds to the body of critical literature by 
exploring the socio-economic impact of the current regulatory regime on a 
vulnerable farming community growing genetically modified cotton in KwaZulu 
Natal, South Africa.  The thesis questions whether greater limitations on 
proprietary rights in modern biotechnology would improve matters.  
The outcome of the study (completed in 2009) of these vulnerable cotton 
farmers implicates the IP-protected technology in the destruction of many 
livelihoods and in the stifling of technology transfer to aid local innovation. The 
thesis acknowledges the negative role played by other external factors, such 
as low rain fall, but suggests that some seemingly external factors, such as 
poor agricultural policy, and falling world prices for cotton, are consequences 
of the prevailing regime. The thesis proposes that this regime overly prioritises 
private rights at too high a social cost. In order to rein in these rights the thesis 
argues, through the lens of the South African Constitution, for law and policy 
reform.  
On a theoretical level, the property concept, including the notion of 
excludability, the idea of common and public property, sovereign rights, and 
the public trust doctrine are explored as mechanisms within the property 
paradigm to aid the case for limiting proprietary rights. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
v 
 
A NOTE ON REFERENCING STYLE AND PUBLISHED WORKS 
The style of referencing in the thesis footnotes and bibliography generally 
complies with the UCT Faculty of Law’s Research, writing, style and 
referencing guide.  
In the case of several select textbooks, for example François du Bois (ed) 
Wille’s principles of South African law (2007) and Badenhorst, Pienaar and 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property (2006), the first 
citation of the text within a chapter is given in full form and subsequent 
references refer to the title of the book (for example Wille’s principles of South 
African law and Silberberg and Schoeman) and not the author. In the case of 
most other sources and textbooks, subsequent references generally refer to 
the author. 
Reference is made in the thesis to two articles I have authored, and co-
authored, which were published prior to submission of the thesis.  These are 
Debbie Collier ‘Access to and control over plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture in South and southern Africa: how many wrongs before a 
right?’ (2006) 7 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 529-564, 
and Debbie Collier and Charles Moitui ‘Africa’s regulatory approach in 
biotechnology in agriculture: an opportunity to seize socio-economic concerns’ 
(2009) 17 RADIC 29-56. Material contained in the thesis that has been drawn 
from these articles is referenced to this effect.  Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION...............................................................................................II 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..............................................................................III  
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................... IV 
A NOTE ON REFERENCING STYLE AND PUBLISHED WORKS ............... V 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................ VI 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................... X 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS........................................................... XI 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................1 
1.1 Agriculture, modern biotechnology, and the law .............................1 
1.1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................1 
1.1.2 Introducing the case study .............................................................4 
1.2 Broader thesis context .......................................................................5 
1.2.1 Putting plants into context ..............................................................5 
1.2.2 A complex regulatory regime .........................................................8 
1.3 Thesis question, method and structure ..........................................18 
1.3.1 Broader research question and its relevance...............................18 
1.3.2 Method of research ......................................................................21 
1.3.3 Structure of thesis ........................................................................22 
1.4 Using the language of property as an instrument of reform .........23 
1.4.1 Brief overview of property and IP law in South Africa...................24 
1.4.2 Roman law classifications ............................................................28 
1.4.3 Theoretical approaches to property..............................................29 
1.5 Concluding remarks..........................................................................30 
CHAPTER 2 PROPERTY IN THEORY: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT ........32 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................32 
2.2 What is property? .............................................................................33 
2.2.1 Gray’s model of excludability .......................................................35 
2.3 Differences between physical and intellectual property................39 
2.4 Justifying property: traditional frameworks ...................................41 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
vii 
 
2.4.1 A natural rights approach to property and intellectual property ....41 
2.4.2 A utilitarian approach to property and intellectual property ..........46 
2.5 Transformation, property and the South African Constitution .....50 
2.5.1 Transformative ways of thinking about property...........................50 
2.5.2 The South African Constitution ....................................................55 
2.5.3 African jurisprudence and property in African customary law.......61 
2.6 If it’s not (private) property, what is it? ...........................................65 
2.6.1 Revisiting the Roman / Roman-Dutch law categories ..................66 
2.6.2 Property within a modern constitutional democracy.....................69 
2.6.3 The public trust doctrine...............................................................74 
2.7 Concluding remarks..........................................................................77 
CHAPTER 3 PROPERTY IN PRACTICE: A CASE STUDY OF PGRS ....78 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................78 
3.2 Agriculture and threats to sustainable agriculture ........................78 
3.2.1 The importance of agriculture ......................................................78 
3.2.2 The dumping of subsidised products............................................82 
3.2.3 International intellectual property law...........................................84 
3.2.4 Monsanto’s operations in South Africa.........................................85 
3.2.5 Monsanto’s patents in respect of genetically engineered cotton ..88 
3.3 Genetic modification and its regulation..........................................94 
3.3.1 Definitions ....................................................................................94 
3.3.2 Extent of cultivation......................................................................96 
3.4 Cotton and the South African cotton market................................100 
3.4.1 Cotton: not just a textile fibre......................................................100 
3.4.2 The Makhathini farmers: triumph or tragedy? ............................103 
3.4.3 Monsanto/ government: a relationship detrimental to public 
interest? ...................................................................................................114 
3.5  Concluding remarks........................................................................117 
CHAPTER 4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK (1): THE MONSANTO AGREEMENT
 ............................................................................................119 
4.1 Introduction .....................................................................................119 
4.2 The South African legal system.....................................................120 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
viii 
 
4.3 The Monsanto Agreement: private law in perspective.................123 
4.3.1 Property and the theory of subjective rights ...............................125 
4.3.2 Personal rights in performance: the Monsanto Agreement ........132 
4.3.3 Private and Constitutional property ............................................136 
4.4 Legislation and the Monsanto Agreement ....................................142 
4.4.1 IP (patent and plant breeders’) rights derived from statute ........142 
4.4.2 Competition law..........................................................................145 
4.4.3 Legislation regulating the marketing of agricultural products .....148 
4.4.4 Consumer protection law ...........................................................149 
4.5 The Monsanto Agreement: third party rights and obligations ....151 
4.5.1 Monsanto’s IP rights against third parties ..................................151 
4.5.2 Do third parties have rights against Monsanto? .........................155 
4.5.3 Liability and redress in international and domestic law ..............156 
4.6 Concluding remarks........................................................................157 
4.6.1 The chapter in brief summary ....................................................157 
4.6.2 Conclusion .................................................................................158 
CHAPTER 5 LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2): THE STATE’S REGULATORY 
POWERS ............................................................................................159 
5.1 Introduction .....................................................................................159 
5.2 International law in the South African context .............................161 
5.2.1 The UN, the AU and the WTO ...................................................164 
5.2.2 Conflicting treaty obligations ......................................................169 
5.3 Human rights law ............................................................................173 
5.3.1 Property and other rights in human rights law............................174 
5.3.2 Socio-economic rights................................................................176 
5.3.3 Rights to dignity, equality and life...............................................177 
5.3.4 Rights to culture, development and farmers’ rights ....................179 
5.4 Environmental and agricultural law...............................................185 
5.4.1 Sustainable development...........................................................186 
5.4.2 Biosafety law..............................................................................193 
5.5 Trade and IP law..............................................................................216 
5.5.1 The GATT Agreement (GATT 1994) and the Biotech Products 
dispute ...................................................................................................218 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
ix 
 
5.5.2 The SPS Agreement and the Biotech Products dispute.............223 
5.5.3 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)....227 
5.5.4 Intellectual property and the TRIPS Agreement.........................228 
5.6 Concluding remarks........................................................................241 
CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS...........................................................................243 
6.1 Introduction .....................................................................................243 
6.2 Is the current practice sustainable?..............................................243 
6.2.1 An assessment of economically sustainable development criteria...
 ...................................................................................................245 
6.2.2 An assessment of social sustainability .......................................248 
6.2.3 An assessment of environmental sustainability..........................250 
6.3 Reining in private rights: how?......................................................251 
6.4 Reining in private rights: its impact ..............................................252 
6.5 Concluding remarks........................................................................254 
CHAPTER 7 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THESIS CONCLUSION.......255 
7.1 Introduction .....................................................................................255 
7.2 Theoretical tools for limiting private rights ..................................255 
7.2.1 The Constitution and its impact on legal theory and practice .....255 
7.2.2 Ideas in customary and contemporary property theory ..............257 
7.2.3 Gray’s notion of excludability and PGRs....................................261 
7.2.4 Building on the common law ......................................................261 
7.3 Practical tools for limited private rights........................................263 
7.3.1 An overarching inclusive authority and framework for PGRs .....263 
7.3.2 Ensuring public participation ......................................................265 
7.3.3 Practical measures in international and regional fora.................267 
7.3.4 Practical measures in domestic law ...........................................272 
7.4 Concluding remarks........................................................................281 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................283 
ANNEXURE A: EXTRACTS FROM THE BILL OF RIGHTS (SS 7-39) ......327 
ANNEXURE B: MONSANTO COTTON TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT ....333 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: The public / private binary...............................................................69 
Figure 2:  A public-centred notion of private and public property ...................71 
Figure 3: Global area of GM crops by country in 2008...................................97 
Figure 4: Genetically modified crops in South Africa (2004/5) .......................98 
Figure 5: Small-scale cotton production in KwaZulu-Natal (1996-2008) ......109 
Figure 6: Total dryland cotton yield statistics per hectare ............................109 
Figure 7: Patrimonial rights and their objects...............................................126 
Figure 8: The three pillars of sustainable development................................244 
Figure 9: Elements in assessing the sustainability of GM crops ..................245 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
xi 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
A Appellate Division 
AATF African Agricultural Technology Foundation 
Agrekon J Agrekon Journal 
Amer J Agr 
Econ 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
Am U Intl L Rev American University International Law Review 
Annu Rev Sociol Annual Review of Sociology 
ARIPO African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation 
AsgiSA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa 
AU African Union 
 
 
BGD Bophuthatswana General Division 
BIP Burrell’s Intellectual Property Law Reports 
BP Burrell’s Patent Law Reports 
Bt Bacillus thuringiensis 
  
C Cape Provincial Division 
CAAPD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme 
CAB Conservation Advisory Board 
CAC Competition Appeal Court 
Can J L & 
Jurisprudence 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
CARA Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 
Cardozo J Int’l & 
Comp L 
Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CC Constitutional Court 
CEC Committee for Environmental Coordination 
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research 
CILSA Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 
CIPR Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
CIPRO Companies and Intellectual Property Office 
COGEM Commission on Genetic Modification 
COP/MOP Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
CP Court of the Commissioner of Patents 
CPT Chloroplast transit peptide 
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
  
D Durban and Coast Local Division 
DAFF Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
xii 
 
Duke LJ Duke Law Journal 
DWEA Department of Water and Environmental Affairs 
  
EC European Commission 
ECA Economic Commission for Africa 
EDC Eastern Districts Court 
Ecology LQ Ecology Law Quarterly 
EPC European Patent Convention 
EPO European Patent Office 
EPSPS 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase 
ESR Review Economic and Social Rights in South Africa Review 
EU European Union 
Envtl Environmental 
  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
  
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GE Genetically engineered  
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy 
GlyR Glyphosate-resistant 
GM Genetically modified 
GMO Genetically modified organism 
  
Hofstra LR Hofstra Law Review 
  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development 
Ind J Global 
Legal Stud 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
ILEIA Centre for Information on Low External Input and 
Sustainable Agriculture 
ILM International Legal Materials 
Int J 
Biotechnology 
International Journal of Biotechnology 
Intl International 
IOWALR Iowa Law Review 
IP Intellectual property 
IPRs Intellectual property rights 
ISAAA International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications 
ITPGRFA  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture 
  
J Journal 
  
KZN KwaZulu-Natal 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
xiii 
 
  
L Law 
LCC Land Claims Court 
LJ Law Journal 
LMO Living modified organism 
  
MCC Makhathini Cotton (Pty) Ltd 
Mich St L Rev Michigan State Law Review 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
  
NAFU National African Farmers Union of South Africa 
NARCOC National African Chamber of Commerce and 
Industries 
Nat Biotechnol Nature Biotechnology 
NBI National Botanical Institute 
NEAF National Environmental Advisory Forum  
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council 
NEMA National Environmental Management Act 
NEMBA National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 
NEPAD The New Partnership for Africa's Development 
NGO Nongovernmental organisation 
NO Nomine officio 
NYU  New York University  
  
OAPI The African Intellectual Property Organization 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
OJEPO Official Journal of the European Patent Office 
  
PAIA Promotion of Access to Information Act 
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
PER Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
PGRs Plant genetic resources 
  
R&D Research and development 
RA Rhodesia Appellate Division 
RADIC African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
RECIEL Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme 
RR Roundup Ready® 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
  
SA South Africa 
SACU Southern Africa Customs Union 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SAJHR South African Journal on Human Rights 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
xiv 
 
SANBI South African National Biodiversity Institute 
SAPR/PL SA Publiekreg/Public Law 
SARA Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill 
SAYIL South African Yearbook of International Law 
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal 
SCC Supreme Court of Canada 
SCM Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
SKCA The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan 
SPS Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 
Stell LR Stellenbosch Law Review 
  
TBT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
TPD Transvaal Provincial Division 
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
TSAR Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
TUL L Rev Tulane Law Review 
  
UBCL Rev University of British Columbia Law Review 
UC Davies L 
Rev 
UC Davies Law Review 
UCLA LR University of California, Los Angeles Law Review 
UCT University of Cape Town 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom 
UKHL UK House of Lords 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation 
UNISA University of South Africa 
UPOV Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
abbreviation used to refer to the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants  
US United States 
USA United States of America 
US-PTO US Patent and Trademark Office 
  
V & A Victoria and Alfred 
  
WHO World Health Organisation 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation 
WIS Wisconsin 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
[South Africa] is a developing country with its own set of developmental 
challenges in which agriculture plays a central role. Therefore it is 
imperative to develop and implement a national policy on intellectual 
property rights that focuses on the sustainable use of agricultural 
biotechnology.1 
1.1 Agriculture, modern biotechnology, and the law 
1.1.1 Introduction  
Agriculture, which feeds an ever-growing population and provides livelihoods 
to many, is, in most African countries, a crucial yet underperforming sector.2 In 
the South African context, statistics and reports generally indicate a decline in 
agricultural output and a largely disempowered farming sector, particularly 
among vulnerable members of that community.3 
Modern biotechnology is held out as being key to meeting agricultural 
challenges,4 yet its opponents argue that the technology ‘will wreak 
environmental catastrophe, worsen poverty and hunger, and lead to a 
corporate takeover of traditional agriculture and the global food supply.’5 With 
                                                          
1
  Draft Biosafety policy for comments 2005, Government Gazette No 27913, Notice No 1576 of 
2005. 
2 
 In sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture engages between 30 and 90 percent of the labour force and 
accounts for roughly between 30 and 80 percent of GDP.  For individual country statistics see 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html [Accessed 2 February 2010]. On 
the importance of agriculture in South Africa and more generally see § 3.2.1. Agriculture, for the 
purpose of this thesis, means the production of food and other cash crops of plant origin.   
3
  See chapter 3. 
4
  See for example the statement by (then) US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and Agriculture 
Secretary Ann Veneman dated May 13, 2003 titled ‘US and cooperating countries file WTO case 
against EU moratorium on biotech foods and crops: EU's illegal, non-science based moratorium 
harmful to agriculture and the developing world’. For a more recent example see ‘Biotechnology is 
key to fighting hunger, Clinton says’ published on Bloomberg.com in October 2009. 
5
  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ‘The state of food and agriculture 2003-
04: agricultural biotechnology: meeting the needs of the poor?’ (2004) FAO Agriculture Series No 
35 Rome, 2004. 
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this ‘global war of rhetoric’6 being fought in the background, South Africa has 
emerged as one of the major users of modern biotechnology in agriculture.7  
Increasingly, these products and processes of modern biotechnology are 
protected by intellectual property8 (IP) rights, particularly patents.9 
Biotechnology patents include patents over life forms10 and gene patents.11 
Strong harmonised IP protection, it is said, will ultimately12 lead to a transfer of 
technology, innovation, foreign investment, and thus overall social benefit.13 
However, in the same way that modern biotechnology has its opponents and 
                                                          
6
  Glenn Stone ‘Biotechnology and suicide in India’ (2002) 43:5 Anthropology News.  
7
  Figure 3 in chapter 3 indicates the global extent of the cultivation of GM crops. 
8
  Drahos describes intellectual property as a ‘twentieth-century generic term used to refer to a group 
of legal regimes which began their existence independently of each other and at different times in 
different places.’ Drahos A philosophy of intellectual property (1996) at 14. See generally 
Christopher May and Susan K Sell Intellectual property rights: a critical history (2006).  The 
prevailing international IP regime protects copyright,  trademarks, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. 
9  These patents, which sometimes form what is referred to as patent thickets around a particular 
technology, are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small group of private firms, such as 
Bayer, Cargill, Dow, Monsanto, Novartis, Pioneer and Syngenta. In the context of GM cotton in 
South Africa, Monsanto is currently the only commercial supplier. On patent thickets and the 
impact of increased IP protection around PGRs generally see Zakir Thomas ‘Agricultural 
biotechnology and proprietary rights: challenges and policy options’ (2005) 8(6) J of World 
Intellectual Property 711-734. 
10
  The US decision in Diamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303 (1980) involving the patenting of a 
bacterium designed to consume oil, laid the foundations for this to occur. It was held that 
prohibition on the patenting of products of nature did not extend to ‘living’ products manufactured 
through human intervention. On the other hand the Supreme Court of Canada in Harvard College 
v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) 2002 SCC 76, drew the line at the patentability of ‘life 
forms’ (in this case the oncomice). See generally Edmund Sease ‘From microbes, to corn seeds, to 
oysters, to mice: patentability of new life forms’ (1988) 38 Drake Law Review 552-572. Members 
of TRIPs must, at least, allow the patenting of micro-organisms such as the oil-eating bacterium. 
(See § 5.5.4).  
11
  Gene patents typically involve the patenting of gene sequences. In the UK for example, the Patent 
Regulations 2000 confirm that inventions involving biological material, including gene sequences, 
may be the subject of patent applications. Intellectual Property Office ‘Examination guidelines for 
patent applications relating to biotechnological inventions in the Intellectual Property Office’ 
(April 2009). See generally Williamson, Alan R ‘Gene patents: socially acceptable monopolies or 
an unnecessary hindrance to research?’ (2001) 17(11) Trends in Genetics 670-673 where he 
concludes, at 670, that ‘on balance their effect is to retard, rather than to stimulate, both scientific 
and economic progress.’  
12
  There is an acknowledgement of some social cost hence IP protection is a balancing act. ‘It is 
precisely because patents interfere in the labour of others that they are a privilege. Their creation 
has to be consistent with the rights of others to labour’. Drahos (note 8) at 31. 
13  Many of the economic studies that have been conducted are based on theoretical models that 
consider economic growth and are not concerned with the impact of IP on social development. On 
the limitations of economic analysis see for example Fink and Maskus (eds) Intellectual property 
and development: lessons from recent economic research (2005), Stiglitz ‘Towards a pro-
development and balanced intellectual property regime’ (2004) Keynote address at the Ministerial 
Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed Countries, World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), Seoul, October 25, 2004 and Schneider, Patricia Higino ‘International trade, 
economic growth and intellectual property rights: a panel data study of developed and developing 
countries’ (2005) 78 J of Development Economics 529-547. 
Un
ive
rsi
y O
f C
ap
e T
ow
n 
3 
 
sceptics, so too does IP, particularly when it creates exclusivity rights in 
respect of plant genetic resources, 14 and in the developing country context.15  
Modern biotechnology in agriculture is often portrayed as being the gift of a 
Trojan horse.16 Concerns about the technology are not only direct 
environmental and health concerns, but also the direct and indirect social 
costs of deploying the IP-protected technology.17 Because biotechnology 
patents are typically underpinned by scientific knowledge they can be 
exploited, not only in the products marketplace, but also in respect of further 
scientific research.18  
Between the two extreme ends of the debate is the voice which rejects a ‘one-
size-fits all’ approach to both agricultural biotechnology and intellectual 
                                                          
14
  See generally A Mushita and C Thompson ‘Patenting biodiversity? Rejecting WTO/TRIPS in 
southern Africa’ (2002) 2 Global Environmental Politics 65-82. On the developmental concerns of 
IP protection see the report of the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ‘Integrating 
intellectual property rights and development policy’ (September 2002).  
15
  We are told that: ‘in developing countries patent systems do not perform their “accepted” function 
of stimulating invention but instead provide a legal means of ensuring that existing technology … 
be purchased at high prices.’ Original footnotes omitted. Dirk van Zyl The social creation of a 
legal reality (1981) PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh at 254. See also Anna Dahlberg ‘Are 
stronger intellectual property rights an obstacle or a condition for international technology 
transfer? An analysis of the effects of the TRIPS Agreement’ in Mpasi Singela (ed) Human rights 
and intellectual property rights (2007) 31-68 where she concludes that there is no conclusive 
evidence that stronger IPRs will either encourage or discourage technology transfer. Even in the 
developed world, there is concern about the impact of the prevailing patent regime. See for 
example Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner Innovation and its discontents: how our broken patent 
system is endangering innovation and progress, and what to do about it (2004) on the US patent 
system.  
16
  See for example Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss and Rachel Wynberg ‘The seeds of neo-colonialism: 
genetic engineering in food and farming’ (2002) GroundWork, and Mariam Mayet ‘The new green 
revolution in Africa: Trojan horse for GMOs?’ (2007).  
17
  See in this regard the European Group on Ethics in Science and new Technologies to the European 
Commission ‘Ethics of modern developments in agriculture technologies Opinion No 24’ (17 
December 2008) and the COGEM Report ‘Socio-economic aspects of GMOs: building blocks for 
an EU sustainability assessment of genetically modified crops’ CGM/090929-01. 
18  This is referred to as the concept of dual knowledge in which a single ‘discovery’ may contribute 
to both scientific research and to a useful commercial application. Dual knowledge is often 
exploited in what is known as patent-paper pairs in which a publication is coupled with the patent. 
Empirical research shows a citation rate decline for such papers after formal IP rights have been 
granted, thus suggesting that IP rights may have a negative impact on the diffusion of scientific 
knowledge. Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott ‘Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free 
flow of scientific knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis’ (2007) 63 
Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 648-687. The pursuit of a dual knowledge 
strategy was enabled in the US by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and is likely to become the practice 
in South Africa once the Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and 
Development Act 51 of 2008 becomes operational. Researchers in the developing world already 
face a host of barriers to effective research. See for example Forero-Pineda, Clemente and 
Jaramillo-Salazar, Hernan ‘The access of researchers from developing countries to international 
science and technology’ (2002) 54 International Social Science Journal 129-140. 
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property.19 The argument is that approaches to agricultural biotechnology and 
IP must be balanced against the receiving community’s needs and that the 
regulatory regime must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate situational 
public concerns.  
On a practical and doctrinal level, the aim of this thesis is to evaluate whether 
or not the approach in South African law, policy, and practice around modern 
biotechnology and IP rights in agriculture achieves an acceptable balance 
between private rights and public welfare. On a more theoretical level, the 
thesis looks broadly at ownership and property issues, in particular in regard 
to plant genetic resources (PGRs), and considers approaches to property 
rights that will accommodate both public and private interests. 
1.1.2 Introducing the case study 
The case study, set out in chapter 3, is the small-scale GM cotton industry in 
the Makhathini region in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa. The problems faced by 
small-scale farmers in the industry are complex and similar to those 
experienced throughout the developing world. The comparative position in 
India is described below.  
The rain-dependent cotton growing farmers of Vidarbha are faced with 
declining profitability because of dumping in the global market by the 
US, low import tariffs, failure of the Monopoly Cotton Procurement 
Scheme and withdrawal of the state (resulting in declining public 
investment in agriculture, poor government agriculture extension 
services and the diminishing role of formal credit institutions). The 
farmer now depends on the input dealer for advice, leading to supplier-
induced demand, and on informal sources of credit, which result in a 
greater interest burden. In short, the farmer is faced with yield, price, 
credit, income and weather uncertainties. The way out is to merge bold 
public policy initiatives with civil society engagement.20 
                                                          
19
  From the IP perspective see for example Stiglitz (note 13), Fink and K Maskus (note 13) and the 
COGEM Report (note 17).  
20
  Srijit Mishra ‘Farmer's suicides in Maharashtra’ Economic and Political Weekly (April 22, 2006) 
1538-1545. The abstract suggests that the agrarian crisis ‘has precipitated a spate of suicides in 
Maharashtra. The suicide mortality rate for farmers in the state has increased from 15 in 1995 to 57 
in 2004’. Hundreds of cotton farmers have committed suicide since 1998, mostly by drinking 
pesticides. Stone (note 6). 
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Vulnerable agricultural communities are compromised by international trade 
rules and poorly conceived agricultural policy. Yet the supplier, the ‘input 
dealer’, is increasingly protected by the same trade regime. The underlying 
promise is that this is in everyone’s development interests.21 
The thesis proposition is that the reining in of private rights, through a property 
paradigm, should have the effect of increasing the space for governments to 
develop more appropriate and sustainable responses to their country’s 
agricultural needs. 
1.2 Broader thesis context  
1.2.1 Putting plants into context 
This thesis is premised on the notion that plant genetic resources are central 
to our survival and thus are of key public interest. Plants are the very essence 
of our health and vitality.22 From our food security,23 to our dignity,24 much 
depends on plants and on our access to plant resources. 
                                                          
21
  The impact of the international trade regime on economic growth itself remains contested.  See for 
example Rodriguez and Rodik ‘Trade policy and economic growth: a skeptic's guide to cross-
national evidence (April 1999) National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No 
W7081. 
22
  It is estimated that the primary health-care needs of about 80% percent of people living in 
developing countries are met through the use of traditional medicines, 85% percent of which are 
dependent on PGRs. A World Health Organisation (WHO) estimate cited in S Biber-Klemm and T 
Cottier (eds) Rights to plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge: basic issues and 
perspectives (2005) at 8. Plant genetic resources are the active ingredient in many pharmaceutical 
drugs. In a recent doctoral study in pharmacology it is reported that, in South Africa, over 3000 
indigenous plant species are used for medicinal purposes. Mamello Sekhoacha ‘Investigation of 
antimalarial activity of five South African medicinal plants and chemical identification of their 
active constituents’ (2008) PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town.  
23
  Debbie Collier and Charles Moitui ‘Africa’s regulatory approach to biotechnology in agriculture: 
an opportunity to seize socio-economic concerns’ (2009) 17 RADIC 29 at 31 note 7 where it is 
indicated that food security is a ‘state of affairs where all people at all times have access to and 
safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life.’  
24
  Dignity is linked to cultural and traditional practices such as those in medicine and agriculture 
which often involves access to plant resources. On the complexities of the cultural value of plants 
see for example Rosemary J Coombe ‘Intellectual property, human rights and sovereignty: new 
dilemmas in international law posed by the recognition of indigenous knowledge and the 
conversation of biodiversity’ (1998) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 59-115. See also 
Remigius N Nwabueze Biotechnology and the challenge of property (2007) 233-95; and Biber-
Klemm and Cottier (eds) Rights to plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge: basic issues 
and perspectives (2005). 
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A broad overview of the practices and the development of policy and law in 
regard to PGRs raises a sense of disquiet.25 Over centuries, communities of 
farmers and agriculturalists have domesticated, and continually improved, 
crops from wild varieties. In the spirit of ‘common heritage’,26 germplasm27 
from these crops has been taken from their centres of origin.28 Additional 
improvements and adaptions have been made by the importers of the raw 
material.  
After a rise in private sector interest in agricultural research, heightened by the 
revolutions in biotechnology, the twentieth century saw a more proprietary 
approach to PGRs being adopted,29 leading to the CBD affirmation of 
sovereign rights over resources and the TRIPS requirements for patent or 
                                                          
25
  Useful background reading in this regard include Keith Aoki ‘Weeds, seeds & deeds: recent 
skirmishes in the seed wars’ (2003) 11 Cardozo J Int’l & Comp L 247-331 and Keith Aoki and 
Kennedy Luvai ‘Reclaiming “common heritage” treatment in the international plant genetic 
resources regime complex’ (2007) Mich St L Rev 35 -69. See also Kal Raustiala and David G 
Victor ‘The regime complex for plant genetic resources’ (2004) 58 International Organization 
277-309. 
26
  Common heritage implies the availability to a community of resources held in common. The term 
(often associated with deep seabed resources) envisages that the common resources should not be 
subjected to excessive private rights. Biber-Klemm and Cottier (note 24) at 58.  The idea of PGRs 
as common heritage is expressed in the FAO’s International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources, UN FAO, 22nd Session, para 285, UN Doc C/83/REP (1983) (FAO Undertaking), 
which ‘is based on the universally accepted principle that PGRs are a heritage of mankind and 
consequently should be available without restriction.’ (Article 1). The international regime 
regulating PGRs has subsequently become more complex after the negotiation of both the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992) (CBD), recognising sovereignty 
over PGRs, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 ILM  
81 (1994) (TRIPS) requiring the recognition of proprietary rights in all fields of technology. See 
Keith Aoki and Kennedy Luvai ‘Reclaiming “common heritage” treatment in the international 
plant genetic resources regime complex’ (2007) Mich St L Rev 35 at 37. For a historical account of 
the concept of the common heritage of humankind, see Craig Forrest ‘Cultural heritage as the 
common heritage of humankind: a critical re-evaluation’ (2007) XL CILSA 124 at 125-127 (see in 
particular footnotes 5 and 6) and at 140-150.  See also Ikechi Mgbeoiji ‘Beyond rhetoric: state 
sovereignty, common concern, and the inapplicability of the common heritage concept to plant 
genetic resources’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 821-837 where the author 
disputes the applicability of the common heritage concept to PGRs. 
27
  ‘[P]lant germplasm is a resource that reproduces itself, and a single ‘taking’ of germplasm could 
provide the material base upon which whole new sectors of production could be elaborated.’ Jack 
R Kloppenburg First the seed: the political economy of plant biotechnology (1988) at 154 cited in 
‘Weeds, seeds & deeds’ (note 25) at 262. 
28
  Mgbeoji questions the applicability of the common heritage concept during the colonial era, as the 
‘transfer of germ plasm from the colony to the mother country was more or less perceived as “an 
internal affair” of the colonial empires’.  Ikechi Mgbeoji ‘Beyond rhetoric: state sovereignty, 
common concern, and the inapplicability of the common heritage concept to plant genetic 
resources’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 821 at 823. 
29
  The implications of the burgeoning regime for developing countries and for public sector research 
are discussed in Wright and Pardey ‘Changing IP regimes: implications for developing country 
agriculture’ (2006) 2 Int J Technology and Globalisation 93-114. 
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plant breeders’ rights.30 Plant innovation was first protected in South Africa in 
1952 under the Patents Act.31 This patent protection in respect of PGRs was 
repealed and replaced, in 1964, by the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act.32 Although 
plant varieties are still excluded from patentability, biotechnological 
innovations involving plants are not.   
The move to a proprietary approach to PGRs has been referred to as a 
regime shift from a common heritage to a property rights system.33 While the 
notion of sovereign rights may provide a mechanism for biodiverse countries 
to benefit from their resources34 the result is nevertheless ironic: 
… in the twenty-first century equatorial countries that have traditionally 
been regarded as the places where crop diversity originated are now 
net borrowers of germplasm from the gene/seed banks located in 
developed countries, such as the United States. Thus, at the point 
when a “common heritage” system facilitating free flow of germplasm 
across borders would benefit farmers and plant breeders within 
developing nations, “common heritage” has been abandoned and 
replaced with a system premised on germplasm as “sovereign 
property” or commodified intellectual property which diminishes access 
to germplasm.35 
Concerns about the growing industrial approach to agriculture may be 
grouped under the three pillars of sustainable development, namely: 
economic development, social development, and the protection of the 
environment.36 Environmentally there are concerns that the IP-protected 
products of modern biotechnology lead to monocultures and the loss of 
genetic diversity. There are also concerns about the potential impact on the 
                                                          
30
  See Part II, ‘A brief history of seed cultivation’ in Aoki ‘Weeds, seeds & deeds’ (note 25) at 261-
286. 
31
  Act 37 of 1952 (now repealed). The Act provided for the grant of patents in respect of ‘any new 
variety of plant, other than a tuber propagated plant which has been reproduced asexually’. 
32
  Act 22 of 1964.  This Act was subsequently repealed and replaced that the Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Act 15 of 1976. 
33
  Raustiala and Victor (note 25). For an interesting view on these developments see Joseph Vogel ‘A 
proposal based on ‘the tragedy of the commons’: a museum of bioprospecting, intellectual 
property rights and the public domain’ in Barbara Ann Hocking (ed) The nexus of law and biology: 
new ethical debates (2008). 
34
  The CBD envisages bilateral agreements between countries of origin and private parties. 
35
  Keith Aoki and Kennedy Luvai ‘Reclaiming “common heritage” treatment in the international 
plant genetic resources regime complex’ (2007) 35 Mich St L Rev  at 37-8. 
36
  See the discussion on sustainable development at § 5.4.1 below. 
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broader environment (soil, water supply, etc).37 From a social and economic 
perspective, there are concerns about food security and safety, cultural 
heritage, freedom of choice, and economic welfare.38  
These concerns are diverse and are often regulated in seemingly discreet 
areas of law which together spin an intricate web of rules, a complex 
regulatory regime, around PGRs.39 
1.2.2 A complex regulatory regime 
A proliferation of international organisations and instruments over the past few 
decades has given rise to ‘an array of partially overlapping and non-
hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area.’40 These ‘regime 
complexes’ are in turn reflected in the provisions of domestic law. 
In the context of PGRs, Raustiala and Victor identify at least five clusters of 
international legal regimes:  
• The 1961 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (UPOV Convention);41  
• The UN cluster on plant genetic resources (the 1983 FAO 
Undertaking42 and the 2002 International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture43 (ITPGRFA));  
                                                          
37
  Aoki and Luvai (note 35) at 36; the European Group on Ethics in Science and new Technologies to 
the European Commission ‘Ethics of modern developments in agriculture technologies’ Opinion 
No 24 (17 December 2008) and the COGEM Report ‘Socio-economic aspects of GMOs: building 
blocks for an EU sustainability assessment of genetically modified crops’ CGM/090929-01. 
38
  Ibid. See generally also Jeffery Smith Seeds of Deception (2003) and Lily Films The future of food 
(2004).  
39
  See in this regard Kal Raustiala and David G Victor ‘The regime complex for plant genetic 
resources’ (2004) 58 International Organization 277-309 and Aoki and Luvai (note 35). 
40
  Raustiala and Victor (note 39) at 279. 
41
  International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec 1, 1961 (revised on 
Nov 10, 1972, Oct 23, 1978, and Mar 19, 1991).  
42
  International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, UN FAO, 22nd Session, para 285, UN Doc 
C/83/REP (1983). 
43
  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, approved during the 
FAO Conference (31st Session resolution 3/2001) on 3 November 2001, entered into force 29 June 
2004. Although the treaty entered into force on 29 June 2004, South Africa has not signed the 
treaty. The treaty, which only applies to the crops listed in the treaty, is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5. 
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• The Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research 
(CGIAR), an international network of research centres and gene 
banks;44  
• The World Trade Organisation (WTO) TRIPS Agreement;45 and  
• The 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity46 (CBD).47  
An additional cluster which might be added to this is the international human 
rights framework.48 
This complex mix of common heritage (FAO / CGIAR clusters) and sovereign, 
private and community rights systems (WTO / UPOV / CBD clusters) which is 
seen in the international regimes is echoed in South Africa where a key 
principle in environmental law is that PGRs are part of the environment, which 
is the people’s common heritage,49 and where agricultural50 and trade and 
industry51 law recognises proprietary rights in PGRs.  
The common heritage approach does not have universal force in international 
law, and has increasingly limited application to PGRs.52 While domestic 
environmental law treats PGRs as common heritage (most likely intended to 
                                                          
44
  The CGIAR, which was initially concerned with the threat of famine, and remains concerned about 
the needs of developing countries, is described as ‘a strategic partnership, whose 64 Members 
support 15 international Centres, working in collaboration with many hundreds of government and 
civil society organizations as well as private businesses around the world.’ 
www.cgiar.org/who/index.html [Accessed 11 November 2009].  The CGIAR genebanks (there are 
11 worldwide) maintain over 650,000 samples of plant genetic resources. The CGIAR is co-
sponsored by the FAO, UNDP, the World Bank and IFAD. 
45
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 ILM  81 (1994) (TRIPS). 
46
  Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
47
  Raustiala and Victor (note 39) at 283-4. 
48
  In particular the rights set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 6 ILM 368 (1967) (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976, 6 ILM 360 (1967) (ICESCR). South Africa has signed but not 
ratified the ICESCR, and has signed and ratified the ICCPR. The SA government is however being 
urged to ratify the ICESCR. Press release ‘Human rights groups call on South African government 
to immediately ratify socio-economic rights covenant’ (2008) 9(2) ESR Review 26. 
49
  Section 2(4)(o) of South Africa’s National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.  
50
  See for example the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 20 of 2005. 
51
  Although the Patents Act 57 of 1978 excludes plant varieties from patentability, it has allowed the 
patenting of GM plants (see chapter 3). 
52
  The FAO Undertaking, based on the principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of 
mankind,’ has largely been replaced with the ITPGRFA which, in line with the CBD, expresses the 
notion of sovereignty over PGRs.  See generally also the view expressed by Mgbeoji (note 28). 
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mean the heritage of the ‘people’ of South Africa and not in the global sense), 
the negotiated trade and IP regimes require private property rights over 
knowledge and technological applications involving these PGRs. TRIPS 
requires patents to be available for product and process inventions in all forms 
of technology, and for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system.53  
There is a groundswell of support for the proposition that the current position 
unduly favours private interests54 resulting in high socio-economic costs.55 
This is particularly so in the developing world where legal frameworks for 
intellectual property rights are mostly underdeveloped and where, in many 
communities, the idea that knowledge is capable of private ownership may be 
alien and ‘culturally inappropriate’.56 Mushita and Thompson explain: 
[t]hat knowledge or ideas can be property is a cultural artefact of Anglo-
Saxon law, for ontologically, knowledge is not conducive to single 
                                                          
53
  Even in respect of the listed ITPGRFA ‘common heritage’ germplasm, in most cases ‘any 
individual genes, advances lines, cells, particular DNA sequences, and compounds derived from 
such germplasm may be the subject of intellectual property protection.’ Keith Aoki and Kennedy 
Luvai ‘Reclaiming “common heritage” treatment in the international plant genetic resources 
regime complex’ (2007) 35 Mich St L Rev at 54.  
54
  Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns the knowledge economy? 
(2002) talk of the power of intellectual property rights and warn of the ‘project’ which they call 
information feudalism where the ownership of knowledge is concentrated in the hands of a few 
monopolistic corporations. They argue (at 2-3) that:  
‘[t]he redistribution of property rights in the case of information feudalism involves a transfer 
of knowledge assets from the intellectual commons into private hands. These hands belong to 
media conglomerates and integrated life sciences corporations rather than individual scientists 
and authors. The effect of this … is to raise levels of private monopolistic power to dangerous 
global heights, at a time when states, which have been weakened by the forces of 
globalization, have less capacity to protect their citizens from the consequences of the exercise 
of this power’. 
55
  As the extract in § 1.1.2 illustrates; the economic consequences of increased proprietary rights in 
plant genetic resources can have major social impacts on vulnerable communities in developing 
country conditions. Monopolies on information increase the cost of the goods associated with the 
patent and also the cost of access to patented resources for the purposes of use and for further 
research in the public good. On the curtailment of the freedom to research imposed by the 
ownership of IP rights see for example Drahos and Braithwaite (note 54) at 3-4 where they discuss 
Myriad’s proprietary rights over the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes which are linked to breast and 
ovarian cancer and are thus necessary research tools in the fight against these forms of cancer. 
56
  Debbie Collier ‘Access to and control over plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in 
South and Southern Africa: how many wrongs before a right?’ (2006) 7 Minnesota Journal of 
Law, Science and Technology 529 at 534 and the authorities cited therein. See also Kent Nnadozie 
et al (eds) African perspectives on genetic resources: a handbook of laws, policies, and institutions 
(2003) at 25-26. 
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ownership. Knowledge increases by sharing, with taking an idea and 
using it, transforming it, debating it.57   
One of the difficulties however in balancing public and private interests in 
PGRs arises from the ‘regime complex’ which results in numerous diverse 
government departments, in one way or another, being able to assert some 
aspect of control over PGRs.58 This is exacerbated by the lack of an active, 
overarching or umbrella body that is able to bring together these department 
and the various stakeholders, including industry and civil society, for effective 
joint decision-making, which in the South African context is required by the 
Constitutional notion of co-operative governance.59  
The problem is that the ‘multiplicity of interests and fora, and the existence of 
several debates or negotiations taking place simultaneously, can tax the 
resources of even the largest governments and can lead to poorly co-
ordinated, inconsistent, and even contrary policies.’60 The problem of a 
fragmented institutional framework61 is not unique to the South African 
context.62     
                                                          
57
  A Mushita and C Thompson ‘Patenting biodiversity? Rejecting WTO/TRIPS in southern Africa’ 
(2002) 2 Global Environmental Politics 65 at 66. As Dutfield points out, there are indigenous 
systems for the protection of knowledge that ‘make patents seem like blunt inflexible instruments 
by comparison.’  G Dutfield ‘The public and private domains: intellectual property rights in 
traditional knowledge’ (2000) 21 Science Communication 274 at 281. He goes on to suggest that 
the incompatibility between the Western concepts and indigenous concepts may be overplayed. 
58
  The various government departments in SA whose laws and policies may impact on PGRs include 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (formerly the Department of Agriculture), 
the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs (formerly the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism), the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Science and 
Technology, and the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. Government 
Departments, in addition to the above, that should be informed stakeholders in decision-making on 
rights in PGRs include the Department of Economic Development and the Department of Social 
Development. 
59
  In terms of chapter 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, organs 
of government should not encroach on the functions of one another, and they should co-operate in 
good faith which requires consultation on matters of common interest and co-ordination of actions 
and legislation. 
60
  Michel Petit et al Why governments can’t make policy: the case of plant genetic resources in the 
international arena (2000) at 6. 
61
  On fragmentation in the context of environmental law, see LJ Kotzé ‘Improving unsustainable 
environmental governance in South Africa: the case for holistic governance’ (2006) 1 PER 1-44. 
62
  See Petit et al (note 60). Petit et al, at 38, identify the typical government institutions that regulate 
PGRs as being the ministries of agriculture, the environment, trade and commerce, and to a lesser 
extent, foreign affairs, law and finance. Other actors identified include the research community, the 
private sector, NGOs, and civil society. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
 To
wn
 
12 
 
Rights in PGRs, in the South African context, derive predominantly from 
legislation under the auspices of three departments: the Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), the Department of Water and 
Environmental Affairs (DWEA), and the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI). These departments and the legislation which they administer are briefly 
introduced in the section below. 
1.2.2.1 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
The Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act63 (CARA) currently provides 
for the ‘sustainable utilisation of natural agricultural resources’.64 The focus of 
the Act is the conservation of soil, water sources and vegetation and its 
provisions seek to combat weeds and invader plants. The Act provides for 
conservation committees to be established in respect of any area,65 and 
establishes a Conservation Advisory Board (CAB) for the purposes of advising 
on control measures and matters arising from the Act.66 
In 2003, a draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill67 (SARA) 
emerged under the auspices of the Department which, if enacted, would 
repeal the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act (CARA) and abolish the 
Conservation Advisory Board and Conservation Committees. SARA 
specifically recognises that apartheid law deprived many people of access to 
agricultural land, thus skewing patterns of utilisation of agricultural land in 
South Africa. SARA thus recognises the link between land ownership and an 
equitable agricultural sector and seeks to address this while ensuring the 
                                                          
63
  Act 43 of 1983. 
64
  Natural agricultural resources are defined in the Act as ‘the soil and the water sources and 
vegetation occurring on agricultural land, excluding weeds and invader plants’. 
65
  Section 15 regulates the establishment of conservation committees. 
66
  Section 16 regulates the Conservation Advisory Board, which membership is to consist of two 
officers from the Department of Agriculture, an office of the Department of Environmental 
Affairs, a representative from any conservation committee that may have been established, and one 
person nominated by the South African Agricultural Union (now called Agri SA). The Advisory 
Board is required to advise the Minister on: ‘(a) the desirability of prescribing specific control 
measures with regard to a particular area; (b) the desirability of establishing a specified scheme, 
and the provisions of any such scheme; and (c) and other matter arising from the application of this 
Act or a scheme, or which it may deem necessary in order to achieve the objects of this Act or 
which the Minister may refer to it for advice.’ (s 17(2)). 
67
  An electronic copy of the Bill is available at www.nda.agric.za/docs/Legislation/sustainable.htm 
[Accessed 9 July 2009]. 
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sustainable utilisation of natural agricultural resources. The Bill provides for 
the establishment of local and provincial land care committees. 
In addition to the above legislation which ultimately seeks to ensure the 
sustainable utilisation of agricultural resources, the department administers, 
among many others, three pieces of legislation that are involved in 
establishing the parameters for rights that may be obtained by private bodies 
in respect of PGRs: namely, the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act,68 the Plant 
Improvement Act,69 and the Genetically Modified Organisms Act.70 
The Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, compliant with South Africa’s obligations 
under the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV),71 provides a system for the registration of plant breeders’ 
rights in respect of varieties of certain kinds of plants. The Act, which is 
discussed more extensively elsewhere in the thesis,72 provides for the 
designation of a registrar, responsible for implementing the provisions of the 
Act.  
The Plant Improvement Act prescribes certain conditions for the import/export 
and sale of certain plants or propagating material, and provides for the 
recognition of certain varieties of plants and for a system of certification of 
plants and propagating material to ensure the quality and usefulness thereof. 
A registrar of plant improvement carries out the duties established by the Act. 
The Genetically Modified Organisms Act (GMO Act), discussed in detail in 
chapter 5, regulates the use of genetically modified organisms, including its 
use in agricultural applications such as GM crops. Although drafted prior to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,73 the GMO Act has subsequently been 
amended to align to Act with the provisions of the Protocol.74 The Act 
                                                          
68
  Act 15 of 1976. 
69
  Act 53 of 1976. 
70
  Act 15 of 1997. 
71
  See § 5.5.4.1. 
72
  See in particular § 5.5.4.3. 
73
  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000, 39 ILM 1027 
(2000). 
74
  Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Act 23 of 2006. 
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establishes, in addition to a registrar, an Executive Council of GMOs75 and an 
Advisory Committee,76 which are mandated specifically to focus on issues 
relating to genetic engineering. 
While the dispensation for agriculture provides for numerous committees, 
these are not inclusive of all stakeholders in the debates about PGRs. This is 
true also of the legislation administered by the Department of Water and 
Environmental Affairs.  
1.2.2.2 Department of Water and Environmental Affairs 
The National Environmental Management Act77 (NEMA) is the overarching 
environmental law which is underpinned by a number of environmental 
management principles.78 NEMA indicates that ‘[t]he environment is held in 
public trust[79] for the people, the beneficial use of environmental resources 
must serve the public interest and the environment must be protected as the 
people’s common heritage.’80 
                                                          
75
  Members of the Executive Council include members from the Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Labour, and the Department of Trade 
and Industry (s 3). 
76
  The Advisory Committee consists of not more than ten persons, knowledgeable in genetic 
engineering, appointed by the Minister. 
77
  Act 107 of 1998. 
78
  These principles are in s 2 of NEMA. NEMA is discussed in more detail in the context of 
sustainable development (a NEMA principle in s 2(3)) in § 5.4.1. 
79
  The public trust doctrine ‘draws upon the Roman Law idea of common properties (res communis) 
and on certain provisions of Magna Carta. It deals with … constraints on alienation by the 
sovereign and with an affirmative protective duty of government – a fiduciary obligation – in 
dealing with certain properties held publicly.’ (footnotes omitted) Joseph L Sax ‘Liberating the 
Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles’ (1980) 14 University of California, Davis Law 
Review at 185. Sax is generally regarded as the father of the modern conception of the public trust 
doctrine. His seminal article ‘The public trust doctrine in natural resource law: effective judicial 
intervention’ (1970) 68 Michigan Law Review 471-566 is oft-cited. Other sources and views on the 
public trust doctrine include, among many others, Richard J Lazarus ‘Changing conceptions of 
property and sovereignty in natural resources: questioning the public trust doctrine’ (1986) 71 
Iowa Law Review 631-716; Carol Rose ‘The comedy of the commons: custom, commerce, and 
inherently public property’ (1986) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 711-781; Carol Rose 
‘Joseph Sax and the idea of the public trust’ (1998-1999) 25 Ecology LQ 351-362; Richard 
Delgado ‘Our better natures: a revisionist view of Joseph Sax’s public trust theory of 
environmental protection, and some dark thoughts on the possibility of law reform’ (1991) 44 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1209-1227; James Huffman ‘Fish out of water: The public trust doctrine in 
a constitutional democracy’ (1989) 19 Environmental Law 527-572; and James Huffman 
‘Avoiding the takings clause through the myth of public rights: the public trust and reserved rights 
doctrines at work’ (1987) 3 J Land Use & Envtl L 171-212. 
80
  Section 2(4)(o). 
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In turn, the ‘environment’ is defined in s 1 of the NEMA as: 
 the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of - 
 (i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth;  
(ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 
(iii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the inter-relationships 
among and between them; and 
(iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and 
conditions of the foregoing that influence human health and well-
being… 
In other words, South African environmental law specifically provides that the 
state is required to administer, as trustee, on behalf of South Africa’s people, 
all aspects of plant life (not specifically limited to indigenous plants) including 
the physical and cultural properties of plants in a manner that serves the 
public interest.81 The public trust doctrine restrains the state from alienating 
the resource held in trust and places a fiduciary duty on the state in its 
dealings with the resource.82  
NEMA’s chapter 2 establishes two institutions, the National Environmental 
Advisory Forum (NEAF) and the Committee for Environmental Coordination 
(CEC). The role of NEAF is to inform and advise the relevant Minister on 
matters concerning environmental management which must be conducted in 
accordance with certain principles.83  
                                                          
81
  The public trust doctrine has been introduced in South Africa in NEMA and also in the context of 
water and mineral resources. See Jan Glazewski Environmental law in South Africa (2005) at 17, 
428; E Van der Schyff ‘Who “owns” the country’s mineral resources? The possible incorporation 
of the public trust doctrine through the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act’ 
(2008) 4 TSAR 757-778; and E Van der Schyff and G Viljoen ‘Water and the public trust doctrine 
– a South African perspective’ (2008) 2 4 The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern 
Africa 339-354.  
82
  Sax ‘Liberating the public trust doctrine’ (note 79) at 185. 
83
  These principles are set out in chapter 1 and include the fulfilment and prioritisation of the 
Constitution’s socio-economic rights; the notion of sustainable development (see § 5.4.1); the 
public trust doctrine; and the principle that the costs of remedying pollution must be paid for by 
those responsible for harming the environment. The Forum is required to consist of between 12 
and 15 members who hold office for 2 years and who represent stakeholders from organised 
labour, organised business, NGOs, and community based organisations (CBOs). An annual report 
on the work of the Forum must be presented to Parliament and the documentation is required to be 
open to the public. 
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The role of CEC is to ‘promote the integration and coordination of 
environmental functions by the relevant organs of state’84 and its functions 
include ‘endeavouring to ensure compliance with the principle set out in 
section 2(2)[85] by … requiring reports from its members and advising 
government on law reform.’86  
In addition to NEMA, the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs 
administers the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act87 
(NEMBA). NEMBA confirms the state’s trusteeship of biological diversity88 and 
regulates the conservation and sustainable use of indigenous biological 
resources. NEMBA and its regulations make provision for the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from bioprospecting involving indigenous 
biological resources, which will apply in certain scenarios involving rights in 
indigenous PGRs. NEMBA establishes the South African National Biodiversity 
Institute (SANBI) to monitor and report on biodiversity issues. 
Further legislation administered by the Department includes the Environment 
Conservation Act,89 which is gradually being repealed and replaced by NEMA. 
The Environment Conservation Act provides for the identification and control 
of activities, including the removal of natural resources, land use and 
agricultural processes, which may have a detrimental effect on the 
environment.90 The control of these activities will, in future, fall under NEMA. 
The third government department whose legislation impacts on rights in PGRs 
is the Department of Trade and Industry. 
                                                          
84
  Section 7(2). 
85
  Section 2(2) states that ‘[e]nvironmental management must place people and their needs at the 
forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, developmental, cultural and social 
interests equitably.’ 
86
  Section 7(3)(g). Members of the Committee include, among others, the Directors General from the 
Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (chairperson); Water Affairs and Forestry; 
Minerals and Energy; Land Affairs; Constitutional Development; Housing; Agriculture; Health; 
Labour; and Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (s 8). Notably absent from the list is the 
Director General from the DTI, although there is provision for any other Director General to be co-
opted onto the committee. The Committee is required to present an annual report and its 
documentation should be available on request. 
87
  Act 10 of 2004. 
88
  Section 3. 
89
  Act 73 of 1989. 
90
  Part V. 
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1.2.2.3 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
Relevant legislation administered by the Department of Trade and Industry 
includes legislation in the fields of consumer protection, competition and 
certain aspects of intellectual property law.  
In so far as intellectual property law is concerned, the DTI administers the 
Patents Act91 which excludes from patentability ‘any variety of animal or plant 
or any essentially biological process for the production of animals or plants.’92 
These exclusions do not preclude the patenting of micro-organisms and 
processes which are not essentially biological, provided the requirements for 
patentability are met.93  In South Africa, claims over genetically engineered 
plants are routinely registered in the patents office.94  
In addition, the DTI administers consumer protection and competition law 
which curtail the extent to which monopoly rights may be exploited to the 
detriment of the consumer. The recently enacted Consumer Protection Act95 
and the Competition Act96 are discussed in chapter 4. 
The three government departments discussed above have an interest in 
connected aspects of PGRs and their engagement, together with other 
interested stakeholders, on these issues is required and should align with the 
principles of co-operative governance.97 Proposals for an overarching co-
operative body and the principles to guide that body are set out in the 
concluding chapter, in response to the thesis question.   
                                                          
91
  Act 57 of 1978. 
92
  Section 25(4)(b). 
93
  See § 3.2.5.  See also Kidd and Mayet ‘Access to genetic resources in South Africa in Kent 
Nnadozie et al (eds) African perspectives on genetic resources: a handbook of laws, policies, and 
institutions (2003) at 240. 
94
  See § 3.2.5. 
95
  Act 68 of 2008 discussed in § 4.4.4.  
96
  Act 89 of 1998 discussed in § 4.4.2. 
97
  The legislative framework for co-operative governance can be found in chapter 3 (co-operative 
governance) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and in the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005.  See also chapter 3 of NEMA. For a 
useful account of the challenges facing cooperative intergovernmental relations in South Africa see 
Tryna Edwards ‘Cooperative governance in South Africa, with specific reference to the challenges 
of intergovernmental relations’ (2008) 27 Politeia 65-85. 
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1.3 Thesis question, method and structure 
1.3.1 Broader research question and its relevance  
The broader question guiding the direction of the thesis is:  
How should South African law regulate property rights in plant genetic 
resources? 
As previously indicated, the aim of the thesis is to evaluate whether or not the 
approach in South African law, policy and practice around modern 
biotechnology and IP rights adequately balances public and private interests.  
More theoretically, the thesis examines ownership and property issues, 
particularly in regard to PGRs, with a focus on approaches to property that 
accommodates both public and private interests.  
The case study is used as a mechanism to test the claims generally made in 
the thesis, and more specifically that: 
• The current practice (which includes strong IP rights) around modern 
biotechnology products in agriculture is unsustainable;  
• This has contributed towards the weakening of the agricultural sector; 
and 
• By reining in private rights, some space will be created for improving 
the sustainability of the agricultural sector. 
The current law and practice in IP and agricultural biotechnology are not the 
only problems impacting on sustainable agriculture.98 Adjusting private rights 
will therefore have limited effect if not coupled with other reform efforts, 
including reform in land redistribution, education and skills transfer, for 
example. 
                                                          
98
  See § 3.2. 
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The thesis approach is pragmatic and its proposals are located within the 
boundaries of the current global system for rights in PGRs, notwithstanding 
the cogency of fundamental challenges to the current global regime for IP.99  
The potential for property rights problems or disputes in respect of PGRs 
exists in a number of areas. These include food security and sustainable 
livelihoods. Other examples, some frequently reported on in the media in 
South Africa, include the use of PGRs or plant-related traditional knowledge in 
pharmaceutical100 or cosmetic and lifestyle101 products; the commercial use, 
including the access to (and benefit sharing in), and the sale, of indigenous 
plant material;102 and the use of genetically modified crops for food and animal 
feed.103   
                                                          
99
  See Barratt The battle for policy space: strategic advantages of a human rights approach in 
international intellectual property negotiations (2008) PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town at 
14. Stiglitz (note 19) and other economists argue that IP should not have been included in the trade 
agenda. 
100
  The importance of PGRs in the pharmaceutical industry is evident in the following recent 
University of Cape Town Degrees of Doctor of Philosophy in pharmacology: Carmen Abriette 
Lategan ‘The investigation of Siphonochilus aethiopicus and Aloe ferox for anti-plasmodial 
activity’ (2008) PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, which investigates the anti-malarial 
activity of two medicinal plants Siphonochilus aethiopicus and Aloe ferox which are reported to be 
used by traditional healers to treat malaria, and Mamello Sekhoacha ‘Investigation of antimalarial 
activity of five South African medicinal plants and chemical identification of their active 
constituents’ (2008) PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, which indicates that over 3000 
indigenous plant species are used for medicinal purposes in South Africa.  
101
  See for example: ‘Hoodia “diet plant” under threat from illegal exports’ Cape Times, Friday, 
November 24, 2006, where it is reported that: ‘HOODIA, the southern African plant which the San 
have used as an appetite suppressant and thirst quencher for thousands of years, is under threat 
after being hammered so hard by people … trying to make a quick buck that it may become extinct 
within two years. … [T]he Northern Cape, Namibia and Botswana were [therefore] not allowing 
any of their Hoodia to be exported. … In 1997 the CSIR patented Hoodia’s active appetite 
suppressant ingredient, P57, and in 1998 signed a licence agreement with the British company 
Phytopharm to develop and commercialise it. This was done without the San’s involvement, 
although it was the San’s knowledge that led to the CSIR’s research. The San were also excluded 
from the lucrative commercialisation deals. The San took up the issue and the CSIR later agreed to 
give 6% of the royalties to the SA San Council.’ 
See also ‘Dieters flock to buy fake miracle pills’ Sunday Times, 12 March, 2006 and ‘San reap no 
benefits as companies flout law and sell fake or illegal Hoodia products’ Cape Times, Monday, 
March 13, 2006 to the effect that ‘All commercially traded Hoodia products today contain illegally 
acquired resources and traditional knowledge.’ 
102
  Consider for example the Research and Licence Agreement (the ‘Ball Agreement’) entered into 
between the National Botanical Institute (NBI) in Kirstenbosch, South Africa and the Ball 
Horticultural Company, USA. The Ball Agreement is essentially a bioprospecting agreement in the 
horticulture and floriculture sector. Henne and Fakir ‘NBI-Ball Agreement: A new phase in 
bioprospecting?’ (1999) 39 Biotechnology and Development Monitor 18-21. 
103
  See for example ‘GM crops in Africa will not end hunger – study’ Cape Times, Wednesday, 
January 11, 2006 to the effect that ‘… [t]he 100-page report Who benefits from GM crops? 
Monsanto and its corporate driven genetically modified crop revolution concludes that the 
increase in GM crops in a limited number of countries has largely been the result of the aggressive 
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Broadly, the legal and policy issues which may arise in respect of property 
rights in PGRs include: 
• The right of access to PGRs, and more specifically the extraction and 
use of, and the distribution of the benefits from, local biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge by multinational corporations and foreigners;104  
• The patenting of PGRs and its impact on the diffusion of knowledge, on 
access to medicines and food, and on development generally;  
• Liability for non-licenced cultivation of GM crops and the contamination 
of conventional or organic crops with GM crops; and 
• Disputes around the utilisation of agricultural resources for the 
production of bio-fuels. 
The way in which PGRs are regulated has important consequences, whether 
for food security or the health of the agricultural, or other, sector or for the 
well-being of a particular community. The task of regulating these resources is 
a complex balancing act requiring the regulator to consider applicable 
international and domestic (both statutory and common) law. Depending on 
the particular issue being considered, this could include provisions in the fields 
of international trade law, environmental law (including biodiversity law and, 
where an organism has been modified, biosafety law), intellectual property 
law, property law, contract law, delict law, constitutional law and other related 
areas. Many aspects of these diverse areas of law are canvassed in this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
strategies of the biotech industry, rather than the consequence of benefits derived from using GM 
technology.’ The report refers to the GM sweet potato in Kenya which was presented as a key GM 
crop to help African agriculture. It is reported that by the end of January 2004, and more than US 
$10 million later, the results of the trials revealed that the non-GM sweet potatoes had yielded 
significantly more than the GM variety. The political aspects of GM crops are explored in ‘Pro and 
anti-GMO groups state case in parliament’ Cape Times, Wednesday, January 18, 2006. See also 
‘Genetically modified foods a growing concern’ Cape Times, Tuesday, August 22, 2006 and 
‘Opposition to GM cassava field trials in South Africa “Plans won’t benefit poor”’ Cape Times, 
Monday, 25 September, 2006. 
104
  In the rhetoric of the North/South divide, the term biopiracy is often used. See for example the 
work of a ‘biopirate hunter’ in a report by Jay McGown Out of Africa: mysteries of access and 
benefit sharing (2006). In the context of animal resources see MM Scholtz and J Mamabolo ‘A 
developing country perspective on recent developments in animal breeders and intellectual 
property rights’ (2006) (SASAS Congress 2006 : Supplement 1, Vol 36, Issue 5) South African 
Journal of Animal Science 22-25. 
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thesis, although the focus narrows to an analysis of the law and policy 
applicable to genetically modified cotton in South Africa, the context of which 
is discussed in chapter 3. Although the focus is on the cotton industry, the 
thesis will suggest a flexible theoretical framework and principles for law 
reform that may be useful for adjudicators and legislators regardless of 
whether their focus is the agricultural, horticultural, pharmaceutical, cosmetics, 
food and beverages, or any other, sector that utilises PGRs.  
1.3.2 Method of research  
The thesis is primarily the product of a desk-top study and much of the 
research conducted involved the gathering and the textual/contextual analysis 
of applicable primary and secondary legal material. Publications in economic 
and social sciences were also consulted. The thesis has further been 
informed by discussions with, amongst others, Cotton South Africa (Cotton 
SA), the Agricultural Research Council (ARC), NGOs who work in the field, a 
small-scale cotton farmer, a supplier of cottonseed,105 biotechnology patent 
agents, and academic economists.106 
The thesis draws on aspects of a number of disciplines and areas of the 
law,107 and requires a multidisciplinary approach.108 In keeping with the focus 
of the thesis, the scope of the research is limited to the following objectives: 
1. To clarify how property rights in PGRs (specifically in modern 
biotechnology for agriculture) are regulated (the descriptive objective); 
                                                          
105
  Wenkem SA (Pty) Ltd at Pongola: Wenkem is the only supplier of cotton seed in the Makhathini 
Flats. 
106
  From the Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development at the 
University of Pretoria and from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.  
107
  The thesis considers the discipline of law, and how the law responds to the biological sciences, the 
social sciences and agricultural economics.  
108
  The term multidisciplinary research is used broadly here to convey research that is also trans- or 
interdisciplinary in meaning. Janssen and Goldsworthy explain that the need for a multidisciplinary 
approach arises ‘[s]ince problems are not disciplinary abstractions but real-life phenomena with 
many dimensions to them, many problems cannot be addressed adequately through a 
monodisciplinary approach. All too often, sticking to a single discipline may turn research into an 
abstract formality (Blume, 1990), and therefore into an obsolete tool for development. … For most 
problems a multidisciplinary approach is the only effective way to conduct the research.’ William 
Janssen and Peter Goldsworthy ‘Multidisciplinary research for natural resource management: 
conceptual and practical implications’ (1996) 51 Agricultural Systems 259 at 260-261. 
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2. To assess the socio-economic impact of this regulatory regime by way 
of a case study (the implications objective); and 
3. To explore and suggest possibilities for reform that will allow greater 
inclusion of the public interest (the reform objective). 
These objectives form a common thread through the chapters as described in 
the section below. 
1.3.3 Structure of thesis 
The various chapter headings, their objectives, and a brief description of each 
chapter follows: 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis question (‘How should South African 
law regulate property rights in plant genetic resources?’), the context in 
which the question arises, and the manner in which addressing the 
question will be approached. 
 
Chapter 2 Property in theory: an evolving concept 
Chapter 2 explores the notion of property and considers the theoretical 
underpinnings of the current regulatory regime (part of the descriptive 
objective). The chapter examines some modern and nuanced ways of 
thinking about property (part of the reform objective). 
  
Chapter 3 Property in practice: a case study of PGRs 
Chapter 3 focuses on the current experience in the agricultural sector 
(specifically GM cotton) and considers the implications for sustainable 
agriculture of the current regulatory regime (part of the implications 
objective).  
 
Chapter 4 Legal framework (1): the Monsanto Agreement 
Chapter 4 considers the contractual relationship between Monsanto 
and farmers in the context of GM cotton seed and the regulatory 
framework for this relationship, as well as the relationship between 
Monsanto and farmers that are not party to the agreement (part of the 
descriptive objective). 
 
Chapter 5 Legal framework (2): the State’s regulatory powers 
Chapter 5 explores the complexities of the international and domestic 
regulatory regime for PGRs (part of the descriptive objective). 
 
Chapter 6 Findings 
Chapter 6 draws further conclusions on the impact of the current 
regulatory framework and whether or not it strikes a balance between 
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public and private interests (part of the implications objective). It 
assesses the potential value of reining in private rights. 
 
Chapter 7 Recommendations and thesis conclusion 
Finally, chapter 7 merges theoretical suggestions with practical 
solutions on how to think about and how to regulate property rights in 
PGRs in a manner that is better able to accommodate public interest 
(part of the reform objective). 
The thesis outcomes may be useful in the development of policy, law, and 
jurisprudence in respect of property and IP rights in PGRs and of modern 
biotechnology in agriculture. The thesis contributes to a relatively new body of 
literature on the developmental aspects of intellectual property in the South 
African context.109 
The language of property is used as the medium in which to explore the 
regulatory structure around PGRs.  
1.4 Using the language of property as an instrument of reform 
The language of property, and property law, provides a useful tool to explore 
the relationships formed in respect of PGRs. The constitutionally-derived 
notions of the limitation of rights110 and the lawful deprivation of property111 
provide a means for government to restrict property related entitlements.   
Some background to property and IP in the South African context is set out 
below. 
                                                          
109
  Such as Tana Pistorius ‘The impact of intellectual property law and policy on sustainable 
development’ (2007) 32 South African Yearbook of International Law 376-395; MM Scholtz and J 
Mamabolo ‘A developing country perspective on recent developments in animal breeders and 
intellectual property rights’ (2006) (SASAS Congress 2006 : Supplement 1, Vol 36, Issue 5) South 
African Journal of Animal Science 22-25; C Bramley and JF Kirsten ‘Exploring the economic 
rationale for protecting geographical indicators in agriculture’ (2007) 46 1 Agrekon 69-93; Y Daya 
and N Vink ‘Protecting traditional ethno-botanical knowledge in South Africa through the 
intellectual property regime’ (2006) 45:3 Agrekon 319-338; and Otsile Ntsoane ‘African 
indigenous knowledge - an academic and socio-cultural exploration for indigenisation’ (2005) 4:1 
Indilinga: African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems 89-109.  See also the recent WIPO  
publication titled The economics of intellectual property in South Africa (2009). 
110
  See s 36 in annexure A. 
111
  See s 25 in annexure A. 
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1.4.1 Brief overview of property and IP law in South Africa 
South Africa is a mixed legal system reflecting aspects of both the European 
civil law112 and the English common law113 traditions.114 The civil law 
component derives from Dutch occupation of the Cape of Good Hope, from 
around 1652, which resulted in the introduction of Roman-Dutch law115 to the 
Cape; and the common law component from the subsequent defeat of the 
Dutch settlers by the British. The British, in 1806, decided that Roman-Dutch 
law would remain in force at the Cape, but imposed English procedural law.116 
Although Roman-Dutch law formed the basis of substantive law principles, 
new statutes and new legal developments were unavoidably influenced by 
English law. Judges and advocates were often also trained in the English 
tradition. 
The legal system in place at the Cape was later followed in the British colony 
in Natal and many aspects of this system influenced developments in the two 
Boer Republics, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republike (the Transvaal) and the 
Oranjevrijstaat (the Orange Free State).117 The British, victorious in the Anglo-
Boer War,118 ultimately took control of all of these territories and in 1910 the 
Union of South Africa, with four provinces,119 was established. The resulting 
legal system was a hybrid system of English common law and civilian Roman-
Dutch principles, and a plural system, for the British supplemented the 
                                                          
112
  ‘Civil law’ in this instance, referring to European legal systems (most of which are now codified) 
influenced by commentators on Roman law.  
113
  ‘Common law’, on the other hand, is with reference to those legal systems (such as the English and 
North American systems) based on custom, where law is derived through decisions of the court, 
and where the influence of Roman law has been minimal. See Lourens Marthinus Du Plessis An 
introduction to law 3ed (1999) at 19. 
114
  On South African law generally see Lourens Marthinus Du Plessis An introduction to law 3ed 
(1999); HR Hahlo and Ellison Kahn The South African legal system and its background (1968) and 
The Union of South Africa: the development of its laws and constitution (1960); Basil Edwards 
Introduction to South African law and legal theory 2ed (1995); and Reinhard Zimmermann and 
Daniel Visser Southern Cross: civil law and common law in South Africa (1996). For a general 
overview and guidance see Amanda Barratt and Pamela Snyman Researching South African Law 
(2005) available online at www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Africa.htm. 
115
  The work of Dutch jurists such as Hugo De Groot (1583-1645), Johannes Voet (1647-1713) and 
Simon van Leeuwen (1626-1682) have influenced the law in South Africa. See generally the jurists 
at Du Plessis (note 114) at 40-48. Roman-Dutch law was supplemented and extended by applicable 
legislation (placaaten). Du Plessis (note 114) at 49-50. 
116
  Du Plessis (note 114) at 51. 
117
  Barratt and Snyman (note 114). 
118
  1899-1902. 
119
  The Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
 To
wn
 
25 
 
common law system with indigenous law that would regulate many aspects of 
the lives of the original occupants of the colony.120  This system, 
supplemented by a growing body of statute law, is to a large extent still intact 
today, provided that where there is conflict with the Constitution,121 the 
offending law must give way.122   
The private law of property in South Africa, which is discussed in more detail 
in chapter 4, is based predominately on the Roman-Dutch civil law tradition, 
whereas intellectual property law is predominantly protected by statute 
(originally based on the English statutory model).123 The discussion on 
intellectual property, for the purpose of this thesis, will focus on patents and 
on plant variety protection. 
Intellectual property law was predominantly introduced into state law in 
southern Africa as a means to extend the protection afforded to the colonial 
proprietors of intellectual property.124 For example, in Botswana the now-
repealed Patents and Designs Protection Act125 was enacted to ‘provide for 
the protection in Botswana of inventions the subject of patents subsisting in 
the United Kingdom or in the Republic of South Africa.’126 This is true, to some 
extent, of early IP law in South Africa.127  
As discussed above, until 1910 South Africa consisted of four separate 
colonies: each with its own laws regulating patents. The earliest Patents Act128 
in South Africa, modelled on the English Patent Act,129 was passed by 
                                                          
120
  Du Plessis (note 114) at 69-70. 
121
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (the Constitution). 
122
  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
123
  For an interesting discussion on the origin of patents, see Ikechi Mgbeoji ‘The juridical origins of 
the international patent system: towards a historiography of the role of patents in industrialization’ 
(2003) 5 Journal of the History of International Law 403-422. 
124
  Debbie Collier ‘Access to and control over plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in 
South and Southern Africa: how many wrongs before a right?’ (2006) 7 Minnesota Journal of 
Law, Science and Technology 530 at 549. 
125
  Chapter 68:02, The Laws of Botswana, Revised Edition 1997. The Patents and Designs Protection 
Act has been replaced by the Industrial Property Act 14 of 1996. 
126
  Preamble of the Patents and Designs Protection Act of 1955. 
127
  For a comprehensive study of the history of South African patent law see JR Steyn The 
significance in South African patent law of the claims in a patent specification (1974) LLD Thesis, 
UNISA, cited in TD Burrell Burrell’s South African Patent and Design Law 3ed (1999).  
128
  Act 17 of 1860. 
129
  The Patent Law Amendment Act 1852 was then in force in England. 
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parliament of the Cape of Good Hope in 1860.130 This was closely followed by 
the first Natal statute on patents, Law 4 of 1870.131 Patent law in the Orange 
Free State132 and the Transvaal133 changed shape after the Anglo-Boer War 
ended.134  
The Union of South Africa was proclaimed on 31 May 1910, and in 1916 the 
industrial property laws of the four British colonies were consolidated and 
amended by the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act,135 
modelled, to a large extent, on the British Patents Act of 1907.136 
In 1947, South Africa acceded to the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property of 20 March 1883 (the Paris Convention)137 which provides 
that member countries must afford to nationals from other member countries 
the same protection as it affords to its own nationals and that the filing of an 
application for intellectual property protection in one member country gives a 
right of priority to the date of that filing in respect of corresponding applications 
filed in other member countries.138  
                                                          
130
  Burrell (note 127) at 1.6. 
131
  In both pieces of legislation the meaning of the term ‘invention’ was the same as the English patent 
law and was thus limited to the ‘manner of manufacture’. Burrell (note 127) at para 1.7. This 
terminology is important for it determines what is patentable; in other words, what is protected 
property. 
132
  Patent Law in the Orange Free State was to be found in the Law Book, chapter CXII. Burrell (note 
127) at para 1.8. 
133
  Law 6 of 1887 of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek. Burrell (note 127) at para 1.9. 
134
  The Boer-War ended with the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging of 31 May 1902. In 1902 the definition 
of invention was amended, by the Transvaal Proclamation 22 of 1902, to mean ‘any new and 
useful art process machine manufacture or composition of matter or any new and useful 
improvement thereof capable of being used or applied in trade or industry.’ Prior to that, in both 
colonies, the meaning of ‘invention,’ could be derived from the provision that ‘[a]ny person who 
makes a new industrial invention, capable of being exploited as a subject of trade or industry, shall 
have the exclusive right to exploit such invention to his own advantage for such a term and under 
such conditions as shall hereinafter be determined.’ Section 1 of both applicable pieces of 
legislation. Burrell (note 127) at para 1.9. 
135
  Act 9 of 1916. 
136
  The definition of ‘invention’ contained in the Transvaal Proclamation 22 of 1902 was followed in 
Act 9 of 1916. Burrell (note 127) at para 1.11.1. 
137
  Prior to then, the Convention was revised at Brussels on 14 December 1900, at Washington on 2 
June 1911, at The Hague on 6 November 1925 and at London on 2 June 1934. South Africa has 
since adopted the revisions to the Paris Convention effected at Lisbon on 31 October 1958 and at 
Stockholm on 14 July 1967 (which entered into force on 26 April 1970). 
138
  Burrell (note 127) at para 1.11.2. 
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The Paris Convention endorsed the principle that plant products could be 
protected as industrial property.139  
In 1952, the patent provisions of Act 9 of 1916 were repealed and replaced by 
the Patents Act 37 of 1952 (now also repealed) which was, to a large degree, 
based on the British Patents Act of 1949.140 Soon after this,141 the Union of 
South Africa became the Republic of South Africa, and some years later the 
Patents Act of 1952 was repealed by the Patents Act 57 of 1978, an Act which 
is still operational today. 
The current Patents Act142 was amended in 1997143 to comply with the 
obligation to align domestic law with the provisions of the WTO TRIPS 
agreement144 which establishes minimum standards for domestic protection of 
intellectual property. In particular, patents must be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.145  The TRIPS agreement is discussed in greater detail in chapter 
5. The Patents Act was again amended in 2005146 to require an applicant for a 
patent to furnish information relating to any role played by an indigenous 
biological resource, a genetic resource or traditional knowledge or use in an 
invention.147  
The most important recent development in property law in South Africa has 
been the introduction of a Constitutional property clause148 and the idea that 
                                                          
139
  Margaret Llewelyn and Mike Adcock (eds) European plant intellectual property (2006) at 10. The 
Paris Convention does not expand on how plant products may be protected.  It simply states in 
Article 1(3) that  ‘[i]ndustrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and shall apply 
not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and extractive industries 
and to all manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, 
minerals, mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour.’ 
140
 Burrell (note 127) at para 1.12. 
141
  On 31 May 1961. 
142
  Act 57 of 1978. 
143
  Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997. 
144
  The TRIPS agreement was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 and is binding on all WTO members.  
145
  Article 27 TRIPS. 
146
  Patents Amendment Act 20 of 2005. 
147
  In this regard see also the Policy Framework for Indigenous Knowledge (IK) through the 
Intellectual Property (IP) System drafted by the Department of Trade and Industry.  
148
  Section 25. Relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights are set out in annexure A. 
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law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid.149 The impact of 
this development on property law in South Africa is explored in chapters 2 and 
4.150 
Notwithstanding significant developments introduced by way of legislation, 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law principles remain a core component of the 
property rights scaffolding. 
1.4.2 Roman law classifications  
Roman law distinguished between things which are capable of being privately 
owned (res in commercium) and things which fall out of commerce (res extra 
commercium), such as common things (res omnium communes)151 and public 
things (res publicae),152 which are not susceptible to private ownership. 
Things which are capable of being privately owned are res privatae (which are 
things already owned) and res nullius, which are things not privately owned 
but which are ultimately capable of private ownership.153  
Chapter 2 considers attempts to modernise the typology154 and argues that 
the value of the classification is the clarity with which it can be said that there 
are things that cannot be privately owned.  
In the South African context, property law, as a discreet legal discipline, is 
predominantly concerned with things that can be privately owned (res 
privatae). Using the theory of subjective rights (explored more fully in chapter 
                                                          
149
  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
150
  See in particular § 2.5 and § 4.3.3. 
151
  Examples of things considered to be common in Roman law include ‘the air, running water, the 
sea and sea-shore’. In South African law the sea and the sea-shore are vested in the state president 
and are classified as public things. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
the law of property (2006) at 25-6 (‘Silberberg and Schoeman’). Roman-Dutch law appears to 
have recognised only the air and the open sea as res omnium communes. 
152
  Public things vest in a community and are intended for public use. This includes things like public 
roads, perennial rivers, and harbours. Silberberg and Schoeman (note 151) at 26-7. 
153
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 151) at 25-9.  
154
  In David M Berry ‘Beyond public and private: reconceptualising collective ownership’ (2006) 1 
EastBound at 151-172. 
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4) property law is defined as the ‘system of rules that regulate the legal 
relationships of legal subjects with regard to a specific legal object.’155  
Property rights in the narrow private law sense typically refer to real rights 
(ownership)156 and limited real rights such as servitudes. A more extensive 
(and constitutional) meaning of property includes other patrimonial rights such 
as personal rights and immaterial property rights.157 Added to this are claims 
for specific resources or performance against the state that derive from 
statute.158 The prevailing view is that personality rights do not constitute 
property rights.159  
The impact of the Constitution has been to fast-track the evolution of the 
concept of property. The Constitution, in particular its bill of rights,160 presents 
challenges to the traditional theoretical approaches to property. Reflecting on 
theory is therefore an integral part of this thesis.  
1.4.3 Theoretical approaches to property 
The theoretical components of this thesis engage with ‘the reflective discourse 
about the justification, distribution, function and meaning of property rules and 
practices in society.’161 A better understanding of theory provides a useful 
backdrop to the thesis proposals on regulating property rights in PGRs. 
Western theories on property have influenced developments in South Africa. 
Although vestiges of the property as a natural, inalienable, right can be found 
                                                          
155
  François du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law (2007) at 406 (‘Wille’s principles of 
South African law’). The subjective theory of rights which requires a thing contrasts with the 
prevailing ‘bundle of rights’ approach in Western jurisprudence.   
156
  Ownership is generally viewed as the most extensive of the real rights which a person may have in 
respect of property. Ownership embraces the power to use (ius utendi), to enjoy the fruits (ius 
fruendi) and to consume property (ius abutendi), and also the power to possess (ius possidendi), to 
dispose of (ius disponendi), to reclaim property from anyone who unlawfully withholds it (ius 
vindicandi) and to resist any unlawful invasion of property (ius negandi). Wille (note 155) at 470. 
157
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 151) at 9-10. 
158
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 151) at 11. Rights against the state include licenses, permits and 
quotas as well as land and water-use rights. 
159
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 151) at 9. Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality (2004) have classified personality rights as the right to body and life; the right to 
physical liberty; the right to good name (reputation); the right to dignity; the right to feelings; the 
right to privacy; and the right to identity. 
160
  Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
161
  A J van der Walt in GE Van Maanen et al (eds) Property law on the threshold of the 21st century 
(1996) at 671. 
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in our law,162 recent developments have led to a greater focus on the 
discourses which allow recourse to the social, economic and political context 
of conflicting property rights. Closest to the natural rights approach, is the 
discourse of proportionality, embedded in utilitarian theory, which justifies 
interference with private property rights if it is economically expedient and 
efficient to do so. A third, more transformative, discourse that is evolving 
espouses a more critical form of analysis, also context-sensitive, but in a 
manner that is free of utilitarian restraints.  
Aspects of these three approaches (natural rights, utilitarian, and 
transformative) are discussed in chapter 2.  To assist movement beyond the 
traditional framework, concepts such as the moral excludability of property,163 
the distributive side of property,164 and the dialogue of democratic 
accountability are explored.165  
1.5 Concluding remarks 
Social, environmental and economic concerns have been expressed about 
modern biotechnology and IP in agriculture. Modern biotechnology has raised 
concerns about monocultures and threats to biodiversity, while the 
‘propertisation’166 of PGRs, and of knowledge about PGRs, has the ability to 
create monopolies, drive up prices and lock up information that would 
otherwise be freely available for use by all.167 Food security, biodiversity and 
                                                          
162
  See A J van der Walt ‘Ownership and eviction: Constitutional rights in private law’ (2005) 9 
Edinburgh Law Review 32-64 in the context of eviction and, more generally, AJ van der Walt 
‘Property theory and the transformation of property law’ in Elizabeth Cooke (ed) Modern studies 
in property law (2005) 661-380. 
163
  See Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307. 
164
  See Frank Michelman ‘Possession v distribution in the constitutional idea of property (1978) 72 
IOWALR 1319-1350. 
165
  See Jennifer Nedelsky ‘Should property be constitutionalized? A relational and comparative 
approach’ in GE Van Maanen et al (eds) (note 161) at 417-432 in § 5. 
166
  The term ‘propertisation’ is used to describe the process in which rights are acquired which enable 
the exclusion of others from intellectual goods and from resources which would otherwise have be 
considered to be in the commons. See for example the use of the term by Richard A Posner 
‘Intellectual property: the law and economics approach’ (2005) 19 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives at 57 and by Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252 
at 268. 
167
  Barratt talks about the ‘inherent social costs of the patent system’ as being: the high (unaffordable 
to many) cost associated with patented goods; the lack of incentive to research and develop into 
products for which there is no attractive markets, such as products required by poor people, for 
example, research and development into tuberculosis or malaria treatments; and the increased cost 
of research as a result of the patenting of essential research tools such as gene sequences, proteins 
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sustainable livelihoods are some of the key considerations in regulating rights 
in PGRs.168 
A degree of legal flexibility is therefore required to accommodate these 
concerns, making the ‘one-size-fits-all’ harmonisation of laws project a 
dubious one.169 Greater flexibility would also accommodate ethical concerns 
about the pervasive award of IP rights in all aspects of life.170  
Developments involving PGRs must be sustainable and ethically sound.171 
This requires a balancing of competing interests within the property paradigm, 
the theoretical dimensions of which are explored in chapter 2.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
and enzymes. Amanda Barratt The battle for policy space: strategic advantages of a human rights 
approach in international intellectual property negotiations (2008) PhD Thesis, University of 
Cape Town at 29-34.  
168
  See for example the European Group on Ethics in Science and new Technologies to the European 
Commission ‘Ethics of modern developments in agriculture technologies’ Opinion No 24 (17 
December 2008). 
169
  A Mushita and C Thompson ‘Patenting biodiversity? Rejecting WTO/TRIPS in southern Africa’ 
(2002) 2 Global Environmental Politics at 65. See also Joseph Stiglitz Making globalisation work 
(2007) at 119 and generally Drahos and Braithwaite (note 54).  
170
  For a theological perspective on the ethical concerns of patenting in the field of agricultural 
biotechnology see Christoph Baumgartner ‘Exclusion by inclusion? On difficulties with regard to 
an effective ethical assessment of patenting in the field of agricultural bio-technology’ (2006) 19 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 521-539.  
171
  Opinion No 24 (note 168) at 69-71 extrapolates ethical goals for responsible action in agriculture 
(food security and sustainability) from the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from the 
underlying values of respect for human dignity and justice. Human dignity, as it has also been 
viewed in the South African context is seen as the foundation of other fundamental rights. See for 
example Cheadle, Davis and Haysom ‘Chapter 5: Dignity’ in South African constitutional law: the 
bill of rights (2007) LexisNexis at para 5.1-5.2. This aligns with the Preamble to the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘[w]hereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world.’ 
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CHAPTER 2  
PROPERTY IN THEORY: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT 
In the end the ‘property’ notion in all its conceptual fragility, is but a 
shadow of the individual and collective response to a world of limited 
resources and attenuated altruism.1 
2.1 Introduction 
Property, in all its complexity, provides a useful tool to explore, and critically 
comment on, the legal nature of the relationships between the state, 
vulnerable communities and private entities with regard to PGRs. Property 
has both doctrinal and theoretical dimensions, and the aim of chapter 2 is to 
consider some theoretical dimensions of property, which should ultimately 
inform property doctrine. The doctrinal dimensions of the property regime for 
PGRs are discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
Anglo-American theories on property have been influential in the South 
African context.2 These theories typically maintain that strong, individualised 
rights to private property are in the best interests of society.3 This lays the 
foundation for a ‘more-is-better’ argument, and an argument for the 
privatisation of public resources.4 While the value of a just property institution 
is undeniable, the danger in the prevailing approach is that it elevates the 
status of property and the individual beyond the concerns of the common 
weal.  
This chapter considers the notion of property and various approaches to 
property that have developed over time and which have influenced the South 
                                                          
1
  Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 296 at 307.  
2
  See the discussion in Theunis R Roux Constitutional property rights review in South Africa: a 
‘civil society’ model (1997) PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge.  
3
  See Roux (note 2). See generally also Drahos with Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns 
the knowledge economy? (2002). On the need for strong private property rights and for a view on 
how adopting Western conceptions of property will assist poor developing countries see also the 
views expressed by Robert Guest The shackled continent (2004).  
4
  The classic expression in favour of privatising public resources is the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
argument first posited by Hardin in ‘The Tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243-1248. 
See the discussion at § 2.6.2. 
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African approach.5 The chapter includes a discussion on the differences 
between physical (tangible) and intangible property and on the notion of 
excludability as a prerequisite for the propertisation6 of a resource.   
2.2 What is property? 7 
Property is a politically charged, complex, dynamic,8 historically troubled,9 and 
ever-evolving10 notion that defies definition. More specifically, property is 
sometimes described as being the ownership11 of a thing12 or an object,13 or 
                                                          
5
  The historical development of the law of property is particularly important, as Visser explains: 
‘[s]ince the Middle Ages the civil law concept of private ownership has, at each stage, been 
affected – perhaps more so than many other concepts – by social, economic, political and cultural 
factors.’ Footnotes omitted. Visser ‘The ‘Absoluteness of ownership: the South African common 
law in perspective’ (1985) Acta Juridica at 39. 
6
  The term ‘propertisation’ is considered in Chapter 1, note 166. 
7
  The word ‘property’ derives from propius, a Latin word that conveys two meanings: ‘1. that which 
one owns and 2. a standard of behaviour or correct conduct that is ‘proper’. Rosemary J Coombe 
and Andrew Herman ‘Rhetorical virtues: property, speech, and the commons on the world-wide 
web’ (2004) Anthropological Quarterly 559 at 561. Hence a link between property and propriety. 
See also for example Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray ‘Private property and public propriety’ 
in Janet McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) at 11-39. 
8
  Dynamic in the sense that property is a relative concept: what constitutes property today may well 
not be considered to be property tomorrow, and vice versa. Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ 
(1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 296. Gray’s explanation for the dynamic character of 
property is premised on the notion that property is that which is excludable (physically, legally and 
morally). Circumstances (physical, legal or moral) may change rendering resources that were 
excludable as non-excludable, or vice versa. Property that is non-excludable generally remains in 
the commons.  
9
  While the contemporary question is whether the right to property is constitutionally protected (for 
the debate on whether or not property should be protected in the South African Bill of Rights see 
AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) at 2-3 and the sources referred to therein), and 
if so, what the content of that right should be, for many (communitarians) the right to property is in 
fact quite the opposite, being ‘the main enemy of equality and freedom’. Ali Riza Coban 
Protection of property rights within the European Convention on Human Rights (2004) at 1-2. As 
Visser states, ‘[o]ne may suspect that the history of the formal juridical interpretation of a legal 
concept, which has been described both as the “word of discord, of lies and blood”, and as a “holy 
and inviolable right”, is unlikely to present a picture of continuous uniformity.’ D P Visser ‘The 
“absoluteness” of ownership: the South African common law in perspective’ (1985) Acta Juridica 
at 39. 
10
  In the South African context see for example DV Cowen New patterns of landownership. The 
transformation of the concept of landownership as plena in re potestas (1984) published by the 
Law Student’s Council of the University of the Witwatersrand. More generally see CA Reich ‘The 
new property’ (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 733-87 and Kenneth J Vandevelde ‘The new property 
of the nineteenth century: the development of the modern concept of property’ 29 Buffalo Law 
Review 325-67. 
11
  In a seminal work on ownership, Honoré gives an account of the standard incidents of ownership 
common in legal systems that recognise private ownership, and the complexities relating to these 
incidents that can arise in particular cases. Honoré, A ‘Ownership’ in Guest, AG et al Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) at 107-147. Although Honoré acknowledges the right of unfettered 
use; the right to exclude; and the ‘power of alienating and an immunity from expropriation’ as the 
cardinal features of ownership’ (at 113), he emphasises the limitations placed on the owner. 
Honoré (at 113) lists the standard incidents (the ‘eleven leading incidents’) of ownership as 
follows: ‘the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income of the 
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more technically, as being rights in an object, or without reference to the 
object, as being a bundle of rights,14 or as legal,15 social16 or power17 
relations, and as an organising idea.18  
Trespass rules play a role in defining property and in allocating wealth.19 In 
Anglo-American jurisprudence, these rules are sometimes expressed through 
a bundle of rights model of property (the bundle being comprised of various 
entitlements).20 This approach emphasises person-person relationships and is 
less concerned about the ‘thing’ or ‘object’ of property rights.21 In South Africa 
the subjective rights theory,22 embedded in our private law, specifies things as 
the object of a real right, thus suggesting a connection between property 
rights and things.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and 
absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and the incident of 
residuarity.’  
12
  Typically, a thing ‘is an independent corporeal object (other than human beings) which is 
susceptible to legal control and which is valuable and useful to a person’. Badenhorst et al (eds) 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property (2006) (‘Silberberg and Schoeman’) at 23. 
13
  An object is defined as ‘anything with regard to which a person can acquire and hold a right.’ 
Things are an object. Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the law of property (2006) at 8.  
14
  The American realist ‘bundle of rights’ approach conceptualises property, not as a thing, but as a 
bundle of rights. Kevin Gray explains: ‘When I sell you a quantum of airspace the whole point is 
that – apart from molecules of thin air – there is absolutely nothing there. The key is, of course, 
that I have transferred to you not a thing but a “bundle of rights”, and it is the “bundle of rights” 
that comprises the property.’ Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 
252 at 259. The bundle of rights approach is often attributed to Hohfeld. Merrill and Smith explain 
that, ‘[a]lthough Hohfeld did not adopt the metaphor of a “bundle of rights,” his discussion of how 
fee simple ownership of land can be broken down into a complex of jural relations directly 
anticipates the adoption of the bundle-of-rights metaphor favored by the Legal Realists.’ 
(Footnotes omitted). Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith ‘The property/contract interface’ 
(2001) 10 (4) Columbia Law Review 773 at 783.  
15
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 1. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Fundamental 
legal conceptions: as applied in judicial reasoning (1919).  
16
  See JW Singer and JM Beerman ‘The social origins of property’ (1993) 6  Can J L & 
Jurisprudence 217-248. 
17
  See for example Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray ‘Private property and public propriety’ in 
Janet McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) and Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ 
(1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252 at 294 where Gray states that ‘“[p]roperty” is the power-relation 
constituted by the state’s endorsement of private claims to regulate the access of strangers to the 
benefits of particular resources.’  
18
  Harris Property and justice (1996) at 63. See also JE Penner The idea of property in law (1997) 
and Laura S Underkuffler The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003). 
19
  Harris (note 18) at 13, 26.  
20
  See Honoré (note 11) for the standard incidents of ownership. 
21
  See for example JE Penner ‘The “bundle of rights” picture of property’ (1996) 43 UCLA LR 711 at 
713-714. 
22
  See § 4.3.1. 
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A description of a property right, consistent with the subjective rights theory, is 
that a property right is ‘a right to exclude others from things … grounded by 
the interest we have in the use of things.’23 This right of exclusion, one of the 
standard incidents of ownership, is a pivotal component of property.24  
2.2.1 Gray’s model of excludability  
Excludability25 has been described as the very ‘propertiness’ of property.26 
Whether or not a resource is excludable will determine whether or not a 
resource may be propertised. As Gray explains:27  
a resource can be propertised only if it is – to use … [an] ugly but 
effective word – “excludable”. A resource is “excludable” only if it is 
feasible for a legal person to exercise regulatory control over the 
access of strangers to the various benefits inherent in the resource.28  
Gray identifies non-excludable resources as being resources which cannot be 
privately owned on account of physical, legal or moral restraints. A resource is 
physically non-excludable when ‘it is not possible or reasonably practicable to 
exclude strangers from access to the benefits of a particular resource in its 
existing form.’29 Gray uses the example of the light from a lighthouse: while it 
is physically possible to exclude others from (or control access to) the 
                                                          
23
  JE Penner The idea of property in law (2000) at 71. See also Stephen R Munzer A theory of 
property (1990) at 17. 
24
  See for example Penner (note 23) at 71; and Carol Rose ‘The comedy of the commons: custom, 
commerce, and inherently public property’ (1986) 53:3 The University of Chicago Law Review at 
711 where she cites William Blackstone’s definition of property (repeated in the text above) as 
‘that sole and despotic dominion … over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the 
right of any other individual in the universe’ and Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 
458 US 419, 435 (1982) to the effect that the right to exclude is the most valuable element of 
property. 
25
  It has been argued that the use of the term ‘excludability’ is not ideal – it conjures up images of 
exclusion during apartheid and it ‘transforms property relations from the use of things into power 
over people.’ AJ Van der Walt ‘Unity and pluralism in property theory: a review of property 
theories and debates in recent literature (part 1)’ (1995) 1 TSAR at 15 at 31; AJ Van der Walt 
‘Dancing with codes: protecting, developing and deconstructing property rights in a constitutional 
state’ 2001 SALJ 258 at 265 cited by Elmarie van der Schyff The constitutionality of the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002’ (2006) LLD Thesis, North-West 
University, Potchefstroom. It is nonetheless a useful and effective term that conveys an 
unambiguous meaning. 
26
  Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252-307 and the discussion in 
AJ van der Walt ‘Unity and pluralism in property theory – a review of property theories and 
debates in recent literature: part I’ (1995) TSAR 15 at 30-31. 
27
  Gray (note 26) at 256. 
28
  Footnotes omitted. Gray (note 26) at 268.  
29
  Gray (note 26) at 269. 
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lighthouse itself; it is impossible, while the light is switched on, to exclude 
others from access to the benefits of the light. It is therefore possible to have 
property in the lighthouse, but not possible to have property in the light.30 Gray 
maintains that ‘[n]o one can claim “property” in a resource in relation to which 
it is physically unrealistic to control, consistently over prolonged periods, the 
access of strangers.’31 In other words, physical excludability requires that the 
claimant be able to assert physical control over access. This raises the 
question whether it is realistic or practicable to assign intangible property 
rights such as patents in PGRs. 
Because higher life forms can reproduce by themselves, the grant of a 
patent over a plant, seed or non-human animal covers not only the 
particular plant, seed or animal sold, but also all its progeny containing 
the patented invention for all generations until the expiry of the patent 
term.32  
The concept of legally excluding a resource entails regulating others’ access 
to the resource by appropriate legal means, such as a contractual 
arrangement or an IP law regime.33 For example, propertising an invention by 
registering a patent or protecting (thus propertising) an event from being 
broadcast by way of contract. Where a party fails, or is unable, to make use of 
such available mechanisms, then the resource has not been propertised and 
is thus available for the use and exploitation by anyone.   
                                                          
30
  By way of case illustration, and indeed central to his analysis, Gray relies on the High Court of 
Australia’s highly influential decision in Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v 
Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479. In the Victoria Park Racing case the defendant owned property 
opposite the plaintiff’s racecourse. The defendant erected a platform on his property. From the 
platform it was possible to see the entire racecourse, as well as the display boards, and to hear any 
announcements made by the organisers. Taylor then arranged for the Commonwealth Broadcasting 
Corporation, an additional defendant, to broadcast live radio reports on the races. The plaintiff 
suffered a loss as a result of the broadcasts, which saw punters, who would have otherwise 
attended the races, rather listening from home, or other comfortable premises, and which inspired 
an illegal betting industry in Sydney. The plaintiff sought to put an end to the defendants’ activities 
on the basis of copyright and nuisance law. The central issue ‘was whether the defendants had 
taken anything that might be regarded as the plaintiff’s “property”.’ Gray (note 26) at 266. The 
court was divided on the issue. While a minority was of the view that there had been a 
misappropriation (‘of the profitable enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land’ Rich J at 501), the majority 
found that no cause of action existed, essentially, although not explicitly, on the basis that the 
particular resource under examination was non-excludable for physical, legal and moral reasons. 
See Gray (note 26) at 269.   
31
  Footnotes omitted. Gray (note 26) at 270. 
32
  The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, Patenting of higher life forms and related 
issues, (June 2002) cited at para 165 in Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser 2004 SCC 34. 
33
  Gray (note 26) at 273. 
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The third and final restraint on the excludability of property is the notion of 
public morality. As Gray explains: 
… there are certain resources which are simply perceived to be so 
central or intrinsic to constructive human coexistence that it would be 
severely anti-social that these resources should be removed from the 
commons. To propertise resources of such social vitality is contra 
bonos mores: the resources in question are non-excludable because it 
is widely recognised that undesirable or intolerable consequences 
would flow from allowing any one person or group of persons to control 
access to the benefits which they confer.34 
According to Gray, ‘…claims of “property” may sometimes be overridden by 
the need to attain or further more highly rated social goals … [t]he goals to 
which “property” defers often relate to fundamental human freedoms.’35 The 
deference of property to such fundamental human freedoms is increasingly 
visible in South African case law such as the V & A Waterfront,36 the 
Nhlabathi,37 and the Qualidental Laboratories38 cases.  
In the V & A Waterfront case the fundamental right to freedom of movement39 
precluded the court from restraining the respondents from entering the 
property in question, the V & A Waterfront complex in Cape Town.40 
The Nhlabathi case, heard by the Land Claims Court, involved a cultural right 
embedded in statute, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act.41 The court 
                                                          
34
  Gray (note 26) at 280-1. 
35
  Gray (note 26) at 281. 
36
  Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape, and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C). 
37
  Nhlabathi & Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
38
  Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and Another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C).  
39
  It was also suggested by the Court (Desai J at para [448]) that, should the applicant also seek to 
prohibit begging at the Waterfront complex, this would in all likelihood not be entertained as such 
an order would fall foul of the respondent’s right to life, which encompasses a right to a livelihood.  
40
  At most the court was prepared to restrain the respondents from ‘unlawfully causing harm to 
visitors and businesses situated at the Victoria & Alfred Waterfront…’ and from ‘unlawfully 
assaulting, intimidating or threatening any employee and/or official of the [Waterfront].’ (At para 
[452]). 
41
  Act 62 of 1997. The Act mandates that an occupier has the right to bury deceased family members 
on the land where they live if there is an established practice permitting such burials. (See s 
6(2)(dA) and the definition of established practice). 
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confirmed that the first applicant,42 who, along with the deceased’s family lived 
on the respondent’s farm,43 was entitled to bury the body of his late father on 
the respondent’s farm, notwithstanding the respondent’s protestations that the 
‘appropriation of … [the deceased’s] grave constitutes not only a deprivation 
of some of the landowner’s property rights, but also an expropriation of those 
rights.’44 The court reasoned, amongst other things45 that, ‘[i]t is a religious or 
cultural imperative for many occupiers that their ancestors be buried close to 
where they live. The importance of that imperative would in most cases be 
sufficient reason to justify the deprivation of some incidents of ownership from 
the owner of the land’.46 
In the Qualidental Laboratories case, the court was asked to assist the 
property owner, the applicant, resist the efforts of the respondents who had 
restrained the property owner, in terms of the provisions of the National 
Heritage Resources Act,47 from demolishing a villa with heritage value. Davis 
J rejected the applicant’s argument that the respondents’ interpretation of the 
Act eroded the applicant’s ownership rights, finding ultimately that ‘[ownership] 
entitlements can only be exercised in accordance with the social function of 
law and in the interests of the community’.48  
In the case of patent law, moral excludability is often statutorily defined. For 
example, s 25(4)(a) of the Patents Act49 provides that ‘[a] patent shall not be 
granted … for an invention … which would be generally expected to 
encourage offensive or immoral behaviour’. Where a patent has been granted, 
its exploitation should be curtailed by the same normative framework which 
Gray provides.  
                                                          
42
  The first applicant was the eldest son born out of the marriage of the deceased. The second 
applicant was the deceased’s widow and the third was also a child of the deceased. The deceased 
had been living with the applicants on the respondent’s farm. 
43
  In terms of the definition of an ‘occupier’ contained in the Extension of Security of Tenure Act. 
44
  Nhlabathi (note 37) at para [32]. 
45
  Accepting that in some instances the rights of the owner would outweigh the right of an occupier 
to a grave. 
46
  Nhlabathi (note 37) at para [31]. 
47
  Act 25 of 1999. 
48  Qualidental Laboratories (note 38) at 37. The decision was confirmed on appeal in Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and Another 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA).  
49
  57 of 1978. 
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Although Gray’s notion of excludability is workable in respect of both physical 
and intellectual property, note should still be taken of the fundamental 
difference between physical and intellectual property.  
2.3 Differences between physical and intellectual property 
Unlike physical property, intellectual property (rights in knowledge or 
information, or so-called ‘abstract objects’)50 cannot be exhausted by use. 
Physical property is inherently susceptible to being a scarce resource and it 
derives value from that. Thus, while physical objects may be described as 
scarce and rivalrous, knowledge and information are not:51 for example two 
people cannot use the same hammer at the same time, whereas any number 
of persons may simultaneous use the knowledge of how to construct a cabinet 
at the same time.52  
Intellectual property is knowledge and knowledge is inherently a public good: 
there is no cost in sharing that knowledge (it is not lost to the first holder) and 
it is indeed beneficial to do so, as knowledge grows development.53 Although 
intellectual property is a public good and can be consumed without 
reduction,54 there is an obvious economic reason for the holder of knowledge 
and information to want to curtail others’ ability to simultaneously use such 
knowledge and information. Hence intellectual property law: to create an 
artificial scarcity in knowledge and information and allow for the holder of the 
intellectual property rights to extract a price for the use of the information and 
knowledge. This creates a potential for the holder of the IP to monopolise a 
market,55 which can impede on others’ negative liberties, such as the freedom 
                                                          
50
  Drahos cites an algorithm and the formulae for penicillin and its derivatives as examples of 
abstract objects. Drahos A philosophy of intellectual property (1996) at 1. 
51
  Christopher May and Susan K Sell Intellectual property rights: a critical history (2006) at 19. 
52
  These examples are borrowed from May and Sell (note 51) at 6. 
53
  Joseph E Stiglitz ‘Towards a pro-development and balanced intellectual property regime’ (2004) 
Keynote address at the Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed 
Countries, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Seoul, October 25, 2004. 
54
  Richard Posner ‘Do we have too many intellectual property rights?’ (2006) 38 Intellectual 
Property Law Review 639 at 644. 
55
  Posner (note 54) at 644. 
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of others to trade, and hence the extent of its protection must be kept in 
check.56 This is achieved by way of limitations. 
The first such limitation is the duration of the right: whereas property rights in 
tangible things generally endure in perpetuity, the granting of patents, for 
example, is for a limited duration only. In addition to the duration limitation, 
two further limitations on intellectual property are the so-called scope 
limitations and the notion of fair use.57 Scope limitations in patent law include, 
for example, the requirements for novelty and inventiveness.58 In addition, the 
notion of fair use is sometimes used to limit scope. Fair use refers to the 
range of acceptable ‘infringements’ of intellectual property rights – for example 
breach of copyright for personal research.59  
While the propertisation of IP is broadly reflected on,60 and sometimes 
lamented, it is mostly accepted as irreversible, and rather than argue its 
legitimacy as property, arguments are made for its limitation on the basis of 
the existing framework for property.61 In keeping with Gray’s notion of 
excludability, the framework for property should not breach the thresholds of 
justice.62 
Those who reflect on the justifications for IP as property generally do so within 
the framework of the existing justifications for property, as the section below 
reflects.   
                                                          
56
  Drahos (note 50) at 30. The underlying rationale for IP protection is not only to reward the holder 
of the right but rather that such protection should ultimately be of social benefit within the territory 
that has acknowledged and protected the rights. For example, the idea behind early English patents 
was that patents would encourage the transfer of technology and valuable trades to England, 
ultimately promoting the growth of human capital. Drahos (note 50) at 31. 
57
  Posner (note 54) at 641. 
58
  In the South African context see s 25 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
59
  In the South African context see s 12 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
60
  For an overview of the competing perspectives on IP, see P Steidlmeier ‘The moral legitimacy of 
intellectual property claims: American business and developing country perspectives’ (1993) 12(2) 
Journal of Business Ethics 157-164. 
61
  See for example Micheal A Carrier ‘Cabining intellectual property through a property paradigm’ 
(2004) 54 Duke L J 52-144.  
62
  See Harris (note 18).  According to Harris, a minimalist conception of justice has three elements: 
(1) natural equality (that no one is treated as an inferior human being); (2) autonomous choice (that 
everyone has choices over some range of actions); and bodily integrity (that unprovoked invasions 
of bodily integrity are prohibited). Harris at 171-176.  
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2.4 Justifying property: traditional frameworks  
Approaches to property develop and evolve in response to pressing social, 
economic and cultural forces.63 Underlying property developments in the 
South African context are the traditional Western justifications for and 
approaches to property.64 The first of these may be categorised as the natural 
rights approach, exalting private property rights as inalienable pre-social 
rights. The second traditional approach from the West is a utilitarian 
(conventionalist)65 approach, which sees property as a social or legal creation. 
In recent years concerns with inequality and the need for redress have 
adjusted the focus from the unbridled individual protection of property and a 
transformative approach to property has began to evolve.66 These three 
approaches are briefly discussed below.  
2.4.1 A natural rights approach to property and intellectual property 
Notwithstanding the differences between the natural rights and utilitarian 
approaches, Roux indicates that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
‘they operate dialectically, often appearing in one and the same judgment, in 
opposing majority and minority judgments or in a line of cases in the waxing 
and waning of a particular doctrine over time.’67 While the natural rights 
approach ‘checks’ for state interference with property and the conventional 
approach ‘balances’ interests, underlying both justifications for property is the 
notion that state interference with property should be viewed with caution, for 
the protection of property, which may reward labour and investment, ultimately 
                                                          
63
  See for example Carole Rose ‘Property as the keystone right?’ (1995-1996) Notre Dame Law 
Review 71(3) 957-1015. See also Kenneth J Vandevelde ‘The new property of the nineteenth 
century: the development of the modern concept of property’ (1980) Buffalo Law Review 325-367 
at 325 where he traces the transformation of the concept of property from the Revolutionary period 
to modern times.  
64
  Much of this section on the traditional approaches to property was influenced by Roux’s thesis 
(note 65). Roux labels the two dominating approaches in Anglo-American thought as the natural 
rights approach and the conventionalist approach and he advocates for the use of a third approach 
which he terms the civil society model. Other approaches identified by Roux include the civic 
virtue tradition and the personality theory of property.  
65
  The term ‘conventionalist’ is used by Theunis R Roux Constitutional property rights review in 
South Africa: a ‘civil society’ model (1997) PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge.  
66
  Such as Michelman’s needs-based theory of minimum welfare explored in AJ van der Walt ‘A 
South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social justice (2004) 19 SAPR/PL 253-307. 
67
  Roux (note 65) at 44. 
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is for the greater social good – ‘people will trade instead of fight’;68 and ‘the 
rising tide will lift all boats’.69  
It is argued that a natural rights approach70 is at the root of the modern civil 
law and common law traditions.71 Its historical context is the struggle (for 
individual freedom) against the absolute powers of the monarchy and the 
feudal system of ownership. An approach embedded in the notion of natural 
law gives expression to the idea that certain rights – including the right to 
property – are inalienable natural rights, and are pre-social, abstract universal 
principles belonging to a higher law that is ‘naturally or automatically inscribed 
in the conscience of all thinking and feeling people.’72 This approach is locked 
into the idea that ‘[p]roperty is the key to all other rights because it is prior to 
politics, and hence the basis upon which all other civil rights rest.’73   
The approach, in the civil law tradition, owes much of its credence to the 1789 
French Revolution against feudalism and the property practices of the 
monarchy, and the widely-adopted Napoleonic Code with its ‘bottom-up’74 
approach to property: the idea that property comes before governance; and 
government interference with property is treated with suspicion and should not 
be tolerated.75  
Early theorists contributing to the Anglo-American common law natural rights 
tradition76 include Lord Edward Coke,77 John Locke,78 and William 
                                                          
68
  Rose, Carol M ‘The moral subject of property’ Discussion paper (2006) Social Science Research 
Network at 13. 
69
  Ibid at 18. 
70
  A classic expression of the natural law approach to property rights is contained in Article 43 of the 
1937 Constitution of Ireland which provides that ‘[t]he State acknowledges that man, in virtue of 
his rational being, has the natural right, antecedent to positive law, to the private ownership of 
external goods.’ 
71
  Bernard H Siegan Property rights: from Magna Carta to the fourteenth amendment (2001) at 51. 
72
  Christopher Roederer and Darrel Moellendorf Jurisprudence (2004) at 25.  
73
  This is what Carole Rose calls the ‘priority argument’ in Carol M Rose ‘Property as the keystone 
right?’ (1995-1996) 71(3) Notre Dame Law Review 329 at 333. 
74
  As Rose points out, although ‘narrated as a bottom-up story, first of property and then of 
governance … in fact, the history of property regimes shows a strong streak of top-down features. 
From the top-down perspective, the central point of property and commerce is to build national 
strength and the ability to make war. And in that top-down story, property’s association with 
liberty is at most accidental.’ Rose (note 73) at 339. 
75
  Rose (note 73) at 339. 
76
  The Magna Carta (first issued in 1215) is often associated with advancing the natural rights 
approach. The Magna Carta set limits to the powers of the monarchy and thus laid the foundations 
for the strong protection of private property rights in common law. Siegan (note 71) at 7. 
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Blackstone.79 While Blackstone famously described the right to property as 
‘that sole or despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe’,80 it is Locke’s philosophical interventions on 
property (as labour-desert) and on the limited role of government (to secure 
individual rights) that are most often invoked to justify the liberal approach 
property.81 Locke does however limit labour’s gain to the point where there is 
‘enough and as good left in the common for others’.82 
In the South African context, a similar ‘absoluteness of property’ approach 
was originally sustained, relying not on common law, but on the Roman and 
Roman-Dutch concept of ownership as plena in re potestas.83 The 
correctness of this proposition has been challenged on the basis that 
limitations on ownership and the idea of split ownership were accepted 
                                                                                                                                                                      
77
  Lord Edward Coke (1552-1634) authored a four-volume commentary, embracing the 1225 Magna 
Carta, on English law titled the Institutes of the Laws of England (1600-1615). Siegan (note 71) at 
12. 
78
  See John Locke’s theories (in particular Chapter V, Book II of the Two treatises of government 
(1690)) on the limited role of government and on property and labour embracing the notion that 
through labouring, one may acquire property, subject to the provisos that enough is left in the 
commons for others; and that only as much as one can use without it spoiling is taken from the 
commons. Drahos summarises Locke’s core propositions as follows: 
1 God has given the world to people in common. 
2 Every person has a property in his own person. 
3 A person’s labour belongs to him. 
4 Whenever a person mixes his labour with something in the commons he thereby 
makes it his property. 
5 The right of property is conditional upon a person leaving in the commons 
enough and as good for the other commoners. 
6 A person cannot take more out of the commons than they can use to advantage.  
Drahos A philosophy of intellectual property (1996) at 43. 
79
  William Blackstone (1723-1780) who authored the Commentaries (1765-1769) was regarded as a 
leading interpreter of English Law. Siegan (note 71) at 130. Kennedy’s take on the Commentaries 
is that ‘[t]hey restate as “freedom” what we see as servitude’. Duncan Kennedy ‘The structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries’ (1979) Buffalo Law Review 205 at 211.  
80
  W Blackstone Commentaries on the laws of England (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
facsimile edn. 1979) II, p.2 cited by, inter alia, Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray ‘Private 
property and public property’ in McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) at 12. 
Blackstone in fact goes on to qualify this statement and express unease about ownership claims. 
Rose, Carol M ‘The moral subject of property’ Discussion Paper (2006) Social Science Research 
Network. See also the discussion on Lock in Harris (note 18) at 30. 
81
  Locke’s writing should be located in its response as an alternative to a view that supports the 
divine right of the monarchy and their absolute power over the land. See further note 92 below. 
82
  John Locke (Thomas I Cook (ed)) Two treatises of government’ (1964) at 134.  
83
  See for example Denis V Cowen New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the 
concept of ownership as plena in re potestas (Paper read at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, on Thursday 26 April 1984, under the auspices of the Law Students’ Council of the 
University and the Trust Bank of Africa Limited, in the Trust Bank series of continuing legal 
education lectures.  
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concepts in Roman and Roman-Dutch law.84 The source of the South African 
‘absoluteness’ approach is rather accredited to received nineteenth-century 
Pandectism.85 As Visser explains, ‘… the present position in South Africa was 
enormously strengthened by the fact that Pandectists were read as if they 
counted amongst our institutional writers. And in the process the notion of the 
fundamental unrestrictedness of ownership found its way into our law.’86  
The pandectist concept of ownership, which links property rights to personal 
freedom and autonomy, was most likely influenced by the paradigm shift in 
philosophy attendant on the works of Immanuel Kant and reflected, in law, 
through Savigny87 ‘who is regarded as the creator of the modern civil-law 
system of private-law rights based on personal autonomy as formulated by 
Kant’.88  
In so far as IP and the natural rights approach is concerned, Locke’s labour 
theory89 embracing the notion that making improvements through labouring 
should be rewarded, is often invoked and indeed appears well suited to justify 
intellectual property. Coupled with the notion of reward is the idea that such 
rights are a necessary incentive to encourage improvements,90 a concept that 
finds expression in both Locke’s labour’s desert91 argument and in the 
utilitarian economics approach, discussed below.  
                                                          
84
  See D P Visser ‘The “absoluteness” of ownership: the South African common law in perspective’ 
(1985) Acta Juridica 39-52; and Van der Walt ‘Ownership and Personal Freedom: Subjectivism in 
Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of ownership’ (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589. 
85
  Visser (note 84) at 39. The pandectist concept of ownership and its influence in property law in 
South Africa is explored more extensively in Van der Walt (note 84). 
86
  Visser (note 84) at 47. In support of his view, Visser points out that Savigny’s definition of 
ownership (as the unrestricted and exclusive domain over an object) is quoted by Wessels J in 
Johannesburg City Council v Rand Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314; by Steyn CJ in Regal v 
African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A); and by Spoelstra AJ in Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 
1113 (T). 
87
  Van der Walt (note 84) at 588. See also AJ van der Walt ‘Unity and pluralism in property theory – 
a review of property theories and debates in recent literature: part I’ (1995) TSAR 15 at 22-3. 
88
  AJ van der Walt ‘Unity and pluralism in property theory – a review of property theories and 
debates in recent literature: part I’ (1995) TSAR 15 at 23. 
89
  See note 78. 
90
  This argument does not adequately explain impressive innovations and advances in science which 
have occurred in societies without intellectual property rights or a customary equivalent, such as 
occurred during the era of imperial China. Drahos (note 78) at 15.  
91
  May and Sell (note 51) at 22. 
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In defending92 a natural rights approach Locke makes the assumption that 
‘every Man has a Property in his own Person’93 and asserts that through 
labouring (which entails mixing labour with property), one may acquire 
property.94 Notwithstanding theoretical difficulties,95 Locke’s ‘mixing metaphor’ 
remains popular for justifying intellectual property, although it is unlikely that 
Locke had intellectual property in mind at the time of writing.96  
An approach to property, from the German idealist tradition,97 which is said to 
straddle the divide98 between a natural rights (rights as pre-social) approach 
and a proportionality (rights as social) approach, is Hegel’s99 personality 
justification for property, linking the notion of property with the actualization of 
the self. As Radin explains, ‘to achieve proper self-development – to be a 
person – an individual needs some control over resources in the external 
environment.’100  
Applying the personality justification to intellectual property generates the 
result that ‘different categories of intellectual property seem to lend 
themselves to different amounts of “personality.” Poetry seems to lend itself to 
                                                          
92
  Locke is rejecting Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha: or the natural power of kings (1680) which 
supports the divine right of the monarchy and their absolute power over the land and thus he 
confronts the difficulty in overcoming the idea that God gave the earth to ‘Mankind in common’, 
hence eschewing individual ownership. Drahos (note 78) at 42. 
93
  John Locke Two treatises of government (1690) Book II, 27 cited in Drahos (note 78) at 42. 
94
  See note 78.  
95
  Coval, Smith and Coval point out that Locke does not provide a theory of justification (beyond the 
idea of ownership of one’s body) but merely provides a theory of extension of ownership through 
the mixing metaphor and even that is unsatisfactory, which Nozick (in Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974)) demonstrates by showing the absurdities that may flow from the metaphor. Nozick uses 
the (silly) example of pouring a can of one’s tomato soup into the ocean. On Locke’s account, 
according to Nozick, one would own that part of the ocean throughout which the marked soup 
molecules have diffused. S Coval, JC Smith and Simon Coval ‘The foundations of property and 
property law’ (1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal 457 at 465.  
96
  Drahos (note 78) at 47. 
97
  Hegel’s property theory is embedded in the German Idealist tradition. The personality theory of 
property, with its origins in German idealism, has had less of an impact on the development of 
Anglo-American law than the natural rights approach. Roux (note 65) at 9-10. For commentary on 
Hegel’s philosophical system as it relates to property, and intellectual property, see for example J 
Hughes ‘The philosophy of intellectual property’ (1988) 77 Georgetown Law Journal 287-366; MJ 
Radin ‘Property and personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015; chapter 4 ‘Hegel: the 
spirit of intellectual property’ in Drahos (note 78); and May and Sell (note 51) at 20-21. 
98
  Roux (note 65) at 10 (footnote 5). 
99
  Philosophy of right (T Knox trans. 1942) is the standard English translation of Hegel’s 
Grundlinien der philosophie des rechts. Radin (note 97) at 971.  
100
  Radin (note 97) at 957. Coval, Smith and Coval approach it slightly differently by justify 
ownership on ‘the necessity of rights of non-interference to the area of free action’. Coval, Smith 
and Coval (note 95) at 465.  
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personality better than trade secrets, symphonies better than microchip 
masks.’101 Industrially applicable intellectual property, such as patent law, 
tends to express less personality. Thus, one view is that a labour theory is 
incomplete, and should be supported by a personality theory.102 
On the foundations of a natural rights approach, laissez-faire libertarianism 
has developed, the pivotal notion of which is that ‘the right to private property 
is in some sense a bulwark of individual freedom against the abuse of state 
power’.103 The role of government is to prevent outside interference with 
existing property rights; the legislature is thus effectively deprived of the ability 
to redistribute wealth, and the democratic process is stifled.104 Thus, although 
the courts generally accept a move away from an ‘absoluteness’ approach,105 
the absoluteness terminology, particularly in its disfavour of state interference, 
remains in the theoretical background. A similar effect results from the 
application of a utilitarian approach. 
2.4.2 A utilitarian approach to property and intellectual property 
A utilitarian or conventionalist106 approach is the ontological opposite to a 
natural rights approach. Famously, Bentham denounces natural rights as 
‘nonsense upon stilts’:107 rights are legal creations, derived from laws, created 
by government, and, on entry into civil society, ‘[b]oth the propertied and 
propertyless agree to this arrangement out of self interest. … [for] the decision 
                                                          
101
  Hughes (note 97) at 339. 
102
  Hughes (note 97) at 329.  
103
  Roux (note 65) at 42. 
104
  Roux (note 65) at 10. 
105
  See for example King v Dykes 1971 (3) SA 540 (RA) where it was stated in the Rhodesian 
Appellate Division that: 
‘[t]he idea which prevailed in the past that ownership of land conferred the right on the owner 
to use his land as he pleased is rapidly giving way in the modern world to the more responsible 
conception that an owner must not use his land in a way which may prejudice his neighbours 
or the community in which he lives, and that he holds his land in trust for future generations. 
Legislation dealing which such matters as town and country planning, the conservation of 
natural resources, and the prevention of pollution, and regulations designed to ensure that 
proper farming practices are followed, all bear eloquent testimony of the existence of this 
more civilised and enlightened attitude toward the rights conferred by ownership of land.’ 
(545G-H). 
106
  This is the term used by Roux to express the approach espoused by, among others, Hume and 
Bentham. 
107
  Bentham (1748-1832) ‘Anarchical fallacies’ in Jeremy Waldron (ed) ‘Nonsense upon stilts’: 
Bentham, Burke and Marx on the rights of man (1987) 46 at 53 cited by Roux (note 65) at 24.  
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to secure settled expectations is not just an advantageous arrangement at the 
time of its making, but also, if maintained, a way of maximising overall welfare 
in the long run.’108  
As Demsetz explains, ‘[i]n the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play 
no role. Property rights are an instrument of society and derive their 
significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which 
he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others. These expectations find 
expression in the laws, customs, and mores of a society.’109  
The essence of utilitarianism, as promoted by Bentham and John Stuart Mill, 
is the positivist conception that legal rights are man-made and should 
‘maximize the aggregate balance of pleasure over pain.’110 Utilitarianism is 
described as a theory of democracy which recognises that everyone’s 
preferences should be considered in the determination of the social good; and 
that the majority preferences (the majority’s pleasure), which is measured 
qualitatively, should be pursued at the expense of the minority (the minority’s 
pain).111 
Building on utilitarian theory, utilitarian economics recognises that material 
resources, among other things, are important in the pursuit of happiness but 
that such resources are scarce. Policy and law are thus required to be 
efficient with regard to the allocation of resources; and, in economic parlance, 
the institutions of property and contract provide such efficiency.112 The 
approach is concerned with … ‘providing for the economic well being of 
society.’113 Maximising society’s wealth (defined as ‘the sum of all tangible 
                                                          
108
  Roux (note 65) at 42. 
109
  Harold Demsetz ‘Toward a theory of property rights’ 1967 American Economic Review at 347.  
110
  Roederer (note 72) at 190. 
111
  Roederer (note 72) at 187-91. 
112
  The idea is that respect and protection for the institutions of property and contract leads to 
economic efficiency. For a critique of the ‘efficiency’ argument see Duncan Kennedy and Frank 
Michelman ‘Are property and contract efficient?’ (1980) Hofstra L Rev 711-70. 
113
  RL Heilbroner The making of economic society 3rd ed (1993) quoted in Hunter, Ingleby and 
Johnstone (eds) Thinking about law: perspectives on the history, philosophy and sociology of law 
(1995) at 62. (Emphasis added). 
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and intangible … goods and services…’)114 (wealth maximization), even at the 
expense of a minority, is the guiding principle for legal choices. Economists 
operate on the assumptions that individuals behave in a rational manner to 
promote their self-interest115 and that property and contract (free markets) are 
economically efficient institutions to achieve the collective interest.116 Laws 
that impede on the institutions of contract and property create a barrier to 
economic efficiency. 
Although intellectual property is inefficient (it hampers free competition in 
order to stimulate incentives),117 it has a utilitarian justification as its ultimate 
gain is the maximisation of society’s wealth. The problem lies in trying to 
balance incentives against the cost of exclusion and the movement concedes 
that ‘no one knows whether the current scope of patent protection is 
optimal’.118  
While the law and economics approach may be better geared to achieving 
balance than a natural rights approach, a legislature or judiciary adhering to 
this approach is still ultimately focused on maximising economic welfare, with 
the underlying assumption that, in the long run, strong property rights 
protection will promote the aggregate welfare.119 Thus, notwithstanding its 
                                                          
114
  Richard A Posner ‘The Justice of Economics’ Economia delle scelte pubbliche, (1987) 1 at 15, 
republished in Richard A Posner The economic structure of the law (Edited by Francesco Parisi) 
(2000) at 129. 
115
  Critics of the prevailing economic theory argue that human rationality is a mistaken assumption as 
people are often guided by non-economic and ‘irrational’ motivations. Saliem Fakir 
‘Understanding humans is key to economics: crisis exposed the fallacy of rational behaviour’ Cape 
Times December 15, 2009, citing, among others, George Akerlof and Robert Schilled Animal 
spirits: how human psychology drives the economy and why it matters for global capitalism 
(2009). 
116
  Hunter (note 113) at 64. As mentioned above, Kennedy and Michelman (note 112) critique the 
efficiency argument. 
117
  Joseph E Stiglitz ‘Towards a pro-development and balanced intellectual property regime’ (2004) 
Keynote address at the Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed 
Countries, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Seoul, October 25, 2004. 
118
  Richard A Posner ‘Intellectual property: the law and economics approach’ (2005) 19 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 57 at 69. Extended lengths of copyright protection, the use of contract by 
the owners, as well as alternative methods for covering the fixed costs of innovation (such as 
public financing rather than propertisation) are all issues that the law and economics movement is 
currently focused on Posner at 57. 
119
  Roux (note 65) at 44. Responses to the inequality of unbridled utilitarianism include Rawl’s 
Theory of justice (1999).  
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element of proportionality,120 bounded as it is by the pursuit of wealth 
maximization by individuals seeking to promote their self-interest in free 
markets, utilitarian economics is unlikely to satisfy the level of transformation 
and equality prescribed by the South African Constitution.121 The Constitution 
requires more than a mere utilitarian balancing of rights, as Sachs J has 
reiterated:  
[i]n a society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom it cannot 
be presupposed that the greatest good for the many can be achieved 
at the cost of intolerable hardship for the few, particularly if by a 
reasonable application of judicial and administrative statecraft such 
human distress could be avoided.122  
Such ‘judicial and administrative statecraft’ might be learnt from a study of 
modern developments and contemporary views on property. Roux, for 
example, has suggested, in the South African context, an indigenous 
constitutional solution in which civil society,123 representing all its members’ 
interests, would participate in the negotiation of social reform legislation.124  
                                                          
120
  Roux (note 65) at 166 (note 16) cites Lourens du Plessis and JR de Ville ‘Bill of rights 
interpretation in the South African context (1) diagnostic observations’ (1993) 4 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 63-87; Du Plessis and De Ville ‘Bill of rights interpretation in the South African context 
(2) prognostic observations’ (1993) 4 Stellenbosch Law Review 199-218; and Du Plessis and De 
Ville ‘Bill of rights interpretation in the South African context (3): comparative perspectives and 
future prospects’ (1993) 4 Stellenbosch Law Review 346-393. 
121
  AJ van der Walt ‘Ownership and eviction: constitutional rights in private law’ (2005) 9 Edinburgh 
Law Review 32 at 48 and see generally also AJ van der Walt ‘Property theory and the 
transformation of property law’ in Elizabeth Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law (2005) 
661-680. 
122
  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) at para [29]. 
123
  Roux (note 65) discusses the natural rights and, what he calls, the conventionalist approaches and 
advocates rather a civil society model. The term ‘civil society’, and its relevance in the South 
African context, is discussed by Roux at 178-89. As an example of a civil society policy-
formulation body, Roux, at 189, cites the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC). At NEDLAC, Government comes together (in the spirit of ‘social dialogue’) with 
organised business, organised labour and organised community groupings on a national level to 
discuss and try to reach consensus on issues of social and economic policy. See 
www.nedlac.org.za. Other approaches identified by Roux include the personality theory of 
property (where he refers to the English Philosopher TH Green whose work was influenced by 
Hegel); and the civic virtue tradition (where he refers to the work of James Harrington, Margeret 
Radin and Carol Rose).  
124
  According to Roux; ‘[t]he difference between the civil society model and the Checking [natural 
rights approach] and Balancing [utilitarian approach] Models amounts to the role which would be 
ascribed to the Constitutional Court in assessing where the line between compensatable and non-
compensatable takings should fall. When operating either of the latter models, courts in the United 
States and Commonwealth Africa have tended to become preoccupied with a linguistic search for 
the essence of property. If the state invades this assumed essence, full compensation is paid, if not, 
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2.5 Transformation, property and the South African Constitution  
2.5.1 Transformative ways of thinking about property 
Traditionally property is viewed as a negative right requiring a public / private 
divide that ill-suits these approaches for the social reform task.125 Tushnet 
explains that: 
[t]he language of negative rights supports a sharp distinction between 
the threatening public sphere and the comforting private ones. … 
[However] the predominance of negative rights creates an ideological 
barrier to the extension of positive rights in our culture.126 
Criticism of the traditional, unitary, approaches to property has gained 
momentum over time with arguments for greater plurality in property thought 
to accommodate radical changes that have occurred in the social, economic 
and political context.127 Some of the changes include the shift in ownership of 
resources predominantly by individuals and families to ownership by corporate 
entities (often MNCs),128 the move toward dephysicalised property,129 
                                                                                                                                                                      
individuals affected by the legislation under review have no recourse to compensation at all. The 
dividing line between compensatable and non-compensatable takings is accordingly often very 
arbitrary, leading to injustice. In terms of the … [civil society] model … by contrast, the true cost 
of social reform policies would be assessed by organisations in civil society in the course of 
striking the relevant social compact. The model would thus produce both a fairer and more 
efficient result than either of the two Anglo-American models.’ Roux (note 65) at 194. Footnotes 
omitted. Implementing this approach would require the property clause in the Constitution to be 
amended. Roux has drafted a civil society model clause at 195-196. He acknowledges however 
that ‘[o]nly a very courageous Parliament would adopt a property clause of this sort, representing 
as it does a clean break with comparative constitutional law.’ (Roux at 200). 
125
  Prioritising positive rights (such as socio-economic rights) requires a blurring of this distinction. 
Mark Tushnet ‘An essay of rights’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363 at 1392. 
126
  Mark Tushnet (note 126) at 1392-3. 
127
  This happened after World War II. AJ van der Walt ‘Unity and pluralism in property theory – a 
review of property theories and debates in recent literature: part I’ 1995 TSAR 15 at 24. 
128
  Hence the idea of developing individual freedom and autonomy through property is outdated. Van 
der Walt (note 127) at 26. It should also be noted that in international human rights law, a 
distinction is made between a natural person and a legal entity in so far as the protection of aspects 
of intellectual property as human rights is concerned. The point is made that ‘[u]nder the existing 
international treaty protection regimes, legal entities are included among the holders of intellectual 
property rights. However … their entitlements, because of their different nature, are not protected 
at the level of human rights.’ (Footnotes omitted). Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights ‘General Comment No 17’ (2005) E/C 12/GC/17 12 January 2006 para 7, which refers to 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, twenty-seventh session (2001) ‘Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property’ Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 29 November 2001, E/C 12/2001/15 at para 6. 
129
  Important contributions in this regard include Reich ‘The new property’ (1964) Yale Law Journal 
733-787 and Vandervelde ‘The new property of the nineteenth century: the development of the 
modern concept of property’ (1980) Buffalo Law Review 325. 
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including welfare rights,130 the increasingly entrenched framework for socio-
economic rights,131 and the post-colonial context of many developing 
countries.  
For critical theorists, the fundamental contradiction in the democratic state132 
(‘that relations with others are both necessary to and incompatible with our 
freedom’)133 results in an overly protective approach to property as a negative 
right which perpetuates the imbalance (the status quo) favouring those who 
already have power and access to resources.134 To protect individual liberties, 
a decisive divide between the private and public domains is maintained, the 
boundary is property, and the protection of private rights will mostly prevail in 
the face of public demand. The rhetoric is one of ‘tolerating inroads’ rather 
than ‘democratic accountability’.135  
                                                          
130
  Van der Walt (note 127) at 24-25. These developments, for some, signify the fragmentation, 
disintegration and the collapse of the institutions of property and should be checked. Grey ‘The 
disintegration of property’ in Pennock and Chapman Property (NOMOS XXII) (1980) 69-85 and 
Brudner ‘The unity of property law’ (1991) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 3-66 
cited by Van der Walt (note 127).  
131
  From an international perspective, see for example, within the UN structure, documentation from 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Human Rights Council (a 
body of the General Assembly), the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. The Human Rights Committee monitors ICCPR compliance of 
member states; and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights monitors ICESCR 
compliance of member states. These committees publish authoritative ‘General Comments’ on 
their interpretations of the substantive content of the human rights provisions in the respective 
treaties. In addition, the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Limburg Principles) UN doc E/CN/4/1987/17, 
Annex and (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122-135 and the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations 
of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691-704 add 
significant weight to the jurisprudence of human rights. Relevant provisions in human rights law 
are discussed in chapter 5. 
132
  Tushnet explains that ‘[i]n our culture, the fear of being crushed by others so dominates the desire 
for sociality that our body of rights consists largely of negative ones.’ Tushnet (note 126) at 1392. 
133
  Duncan Kennedy ‘The structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’ (1979) Buffalo Law Review 205 at 
213. In other words our need for incorporation, and our fear of domination. Kennedy at 354. See 
also FI Michelman ‘Possession vs distribution in the constitutional idea of property’ (1987) 72 
Iowa Law Review 1319-1350. Liberalist thinking overcomes the contradiction through its belief in 
rights and the mechanisms (such as abstract categorisation, formalism or balancing) to mediate or 
deny the contradiction. Van der Walt (note 127) at 37-38. See also Jennifer Nedelsky ‘Should 
property be constitutionalized? A relational and comparative approach’ in GE van Maanen and AJ 
van der Walt (eds) Property on the threshold of the 21st century (1996) 417 at 428 where she talks 
of the prevailing concern about the threat of the collective (democracy) to the individual. 
134
  This is particularly true in contexts such as South Africa where apartheid racialised the divide 
between a minority who were empowered by the imposed social and legal system, and a majority 
who were stripped of any means of empowerment. 
135
  On the ‘dialogue of democratic accountability’ see Nedelsky (note 133) at 428-32. 
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On a liberal construction, rights and interests need to be ‘balanced’ and often 
individual rights trump collective need. Tushnet discusses the difficulty of 
balancing, which requires a reduction of rights to measurable values, in the 
absence of a substantive theory of rights136 and the ‘extremely complex 
consequences that reach far beyond the narrow setting of most cases.’137 The 
case study in chapter 3 illustrates such consequences. 
In the critical line of thinking,138 the tension between democracy and security 
and stability is ‘recast in ways that do not require mythologizing either rights or 
the mechanisms that enforce them’.139 In some arguments, the framework is 
inverted ‘to see the public sphere as comforting and the private one as 
threatening.’140  
Nedelsky’s approach conceptualises rights as relationships and suggests that 
the liberal notion of ‘rights as trumps’ and rights as being limits to democracy 
should be replaced by a dialogue of democratic accountability. Property 
should be accountable to equality, dignity and autonomy and not the reverse.  
This approach shifts the focus from protection against others to 
structuring relationships so that they foster autonomy. Some of the 
most basic presuppositions about autonomy shift: dependence is no 
longer the antithesis of autonomy, but a precondition in the 
relationships … which provide the security, education, nurturing, and 
support that make the development of autonomy possible. … The 
whole conception of the relation between the individual and the 
collective shifts: we recognize that the collective is a source of 
autonomy as well as a threat to it.141 
                                                          
136
  There is however much activity in the development of a human rights framework, both at an 
international (see note 131) and a national level. See the discussion on human rights in chapter 5.  
137
  Tushnet (note 126) at 1372. 
138
  The critical theory line of thinking has continued in the work of pragmatists and poststructuralists 
such as Radin, Michelman, Underkuffler and Nedelsky. Van der Walt (note 127) at 39-40. See 
generally Radin and Michelman ‘Pragmatism and poststructuralist legal practice’ (1993) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1019.  
139
  Nedelsky (note 133) at 431. 
140
  Tushnet (note 126) at 1392. 
141
  Nedelsky (note 133) at 429.  
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Viewing rights as relationships (see also the African idea of Ubuntu below)142 
opens up the possibility for a dialogue of democratic accountability, which 
requires ‘a mechanism, an institutionalized process, of articulating basic 
values – particularly those that are not derivative from democracy – which is 
itself consistent with democracy. And we need ways of continually asking 
whether our institutions of democratic decision-making are generating 
outcomes consistent with those values’.143  
This approach, which requires meaningful engagement with civil society on 
issues of property and property’s impact on basic values, is reflected in the 
Constitutional Court decision in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, 
and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others144 
where the court rejected the argument that it is impractical to expect 
meaningful engagement in the case of around 67 000 people living in the 
inner city of Johannesburg in unsafe and unhealthy buildings in relation to 
whom ejectment orders would have to be issued. The Constitutional Court 
was of the view that ejectment orders should not be granted in the absence of 
meaningful engagement.  
Another useful theoretical tool that might assist in the South African context is 
Michelman’s conceptualisation of property in a distributory rather than a 
possessive sense.145 The prevailing conception of property is possessive:146 
property is the mechanism for constraining democracy – it is the paradigm 
demarcating the sphere of private rights – and thus the rhetoric is one of 
tolerating regulatory inroads and of compensation for regulatory takings.  
Michelman points out a possible consequence of such an approach being that 
‘in certain, general circumstances, prominently including the large-scale 
                                                          
142
  Ubuntu encapsulates the notion of interdependence; that ‘a person is a person through other 
persons’, which should give some idea as to how relationships should be conducted. Dr Patrick 
‘The gift of Ubuntu is a beacon for our times’ Cape Times March 30, 2009. See also § 2.5.3. 
143
  Nedelsky (note 133) at 430. 
144
  2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). On the issue of meaningful engagement, the Court refers to its previous 
decisions in Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) and Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC).  
145
  FI Michelman ‘Possession vs distribution in the constitutional idea of property’ (1987) 72 Iowa 
Law Review 1319-1350. 
146
  Michelman illustrates that the distributive side of property was there at the origin and in the 
historic vision of the US Constitution but that it has been recessive in legal discourse.  
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capitalistic, industrial organisation that had come to prevail in American 
society, a regime of highly abstract, firmly anti-distributive property rights 
might … itself constitute undemocratic relationships of power and 
subjection.’147 Michelman’s response to this purely exclusionary strategy is to 
invoke an inclusionary strategy (which he suggests is combinable with an 
exclusionary strategy) embracing a distributive norm for property that enables 
the distribution of ‘whatever property in whatever form is considered minimally 
prerequisite to political competence.’148 The recent Constitutional Court 
decision in Residents, Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes and Others149 demonstrates both a possessive and distributive sense 
of property. In this case, although the applicants were unlawful occupiers 
which the respondents (which included the Minister of Housing) were lawfully 
entitled to evict, the order of the court required that alternative accommodation 
must be offered to the people evicted, and that meaningful engagement of the 
timing of the evictions must take place. The respondents could thus not 
exercise their possessive rights (right of eviction) without attending to the 
distributory rights (adequate housing) of the applicants. 
A useful and practical method for adjudicating conflict between public interest 
and private rights is suggested by Underkuffler.150 Underkuffler conceptualises 
both a common and an operative conception of property where there are 
competing demands for the property. When the values underlying the 
competing demands are different, individual protection (the common 
conception) remains intact. To unleash the operative conception the core 
values underlying the public claims must be similar to those of the competing 
individual. Underkuffler’s method is analysed further in chapter 7. 
In thinking transformatively about intellectual property151 specifically, 
consideration should be given to the nature of that which is being owned and 
                                                          
147
  Michelman (note 145) at 1335. 
148
  Michelman (note 145) at 1330. 
149
  [2009] ZACC 16. 
150
  Laura S Underkuffler The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003). 
151
  The current trends toward patenting almost anything have been described as being libertarian in 
nature: the central idea being that one’s labour must be rewarded.  See Gold ‘The reach of patent 
law and institutional competence’ (2004) 1 University of Ottawa Law and Technology Journal 
263-284. 
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how these rights of possession are being exercised.152 Using a critical 
approach, Drahos and Braithwaite argue for a democratic property rights 
approach which requires that the following conditions be met: 
(1) all relevant interests must be represented in the negotiation of the 
property rights; 
(2) all involved in the negotiation must have full information about the 
consequences of various possible outcomes; and 
(3) one party must not coerce the others.153 
These conditions of representation, information and non-domination are paid 
lip service in the current global intellectual property regime dominated as it is 
by industry pressure.154 Policy design, in the neoliberal conception, broadly 
takes place ‘“from above”, avoiding compromise with interest groups and 
using democratic institutions to legitimate a preset reform agenda.’155 A 
different policy design is envisaged by the Constitution.156  
2.5.2 The South African Constitution  
There was much debate in South Africa about whether or not property should 
be included in the Constitution. Ultimately a compromise property clause 
(reached through ‘consensus by fatigue’),157 that is not unambiguously 
negative in nature, was agreed to.158 The core provisions of s 25 of the final 
Constitution provide that: 
                                                          
152
  Rosemary J Coombe ‘Critical cultural legal studies’ (1998) Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 
463 at 470. 
153
  Drahos with Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns the knowledge economy? (2002) at 190. 
154
  Ibid. 
155
  Bruce G Carruthers and Laura Ariovich ‘The sociology of property rights’ (2004) Annu Rev Sociol 
23-46 at 37 (references omitted). 
156
  See also § 7.3.7 on public participation. 
157
 AJ van der Walt in Janet McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) at 112, note 18 where 
he cites M Chaskalson ‘Stumbling towards section 28: negotiations over the protection of property 
rights in the interim Constitution’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 222-240. 
158
  ‘The desire to exclude property rights from a bill of rights comes from a legitimate apprehension 
that property rights will operate to upset many desirable types of legislation aimed at achieving 
social stability in South Africa during the next decade.’ John Murphy ‘The ambiguous nature of 
property rights’ (1993) 18 (2) Journal for Juridical Science 35 at 38. On the arguments around a 
Constitutional right to property in the South African context, and on the differences between s 28 
of the interim Constitution and s 25 of the final Constitution see, inter alia, Matthew Chaskalson 
‘The problem with property: thoughts on the constitutional protection of property in the United 
States and the Commonwealth’ (1993) 9 SAJHR 388-411; Carole Lewis ‘The right to private 
property in a new political dispensation in South Africa’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 389-430; and see 
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(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of 
general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property.  
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general 
application - 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
(b) subject to compensation … 
… 
(4) For the purposes of this section - 
(a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land 
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to 
all South Africa's natural resources; and  
(b) property is not limited to land.  
… 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking 
legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related 
reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in 
accordance with the provisions of section 36(1). 
The prevailing view is that the inclusion of a property clause places the law of 
property within the reformist framework of the Constitution.159 Property rights 
rank alongside a range of other protected rights and, in the event of a conflict 
of rights, property rights must be interpreted in a manner (or recognised to an 
extent) that does not create an obstacle to social reform.160  
Section 25 specifically indicates that property is not limited to land161 and 
provides that deprivation (without compensation) and expropriation (with 
compensation) of property may only occur by law of general application.162 
Deprivation may not be arbitrary and expropriation must be for a public 
                                                                                                                                                                      
generally AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 1-3 and in particular the sources 
cited at 2 (notes 5 – 9). 
159
  François du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law (2007) at 406. 
160
  Murphy (note 158) at 35. 
161
  Section 25(4)(b). 
162
  For a discussion on deprivation and expropriation of property in the South African context see § 
4.3.3 below. 
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purpose or in the public interest. Public interest includes reform to bring about 
equitable access to South Africa’s natural resources.163 
The impact of the Constitution on private law institutions is one of the most 
complicated and controversial debates being addressed in legal theory in 
South Africa today.164 The notion of ‘transformative constitutionalism’165 is, for 
many,166 central to that debate.  
Although there is a tension between arguments for retaining the stability and 
integrity of existing law,167 and the need for a paradigm shift168 to achieve the 
social reform imperatives of the constitution, there is at least widespread 
recognition that the social function of property is ‘significantly more 
emphasised than in the immediate past.’169 As Davis J, in the Cape High 
                                                          
163
  Section 25(4)(a). 
164
  AJ Van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of South African 
property law (part 1)’ (2005) 4 TSAR at 655.  
165
  In a seminal article, Klare uses the term transformative constitutionalism to describe ‘a long-term 
project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed … to transforming 
a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, 
and egalitarian direction.’ Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ 1998 SAJHR 
146 at 150.  
166
  See for example AJ Van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of South 
African property law (part 1) (2005) 4 TSAR 655-689 and AJ Van der Walt ‘Transformative 
constitutionalism and the development of South African property law (part 2) (2006) 1 TSAR 1 – 
31. Van der Walt (part 1; note 5) lists, among many others, the following South African 
publications inspired by Klare’s idea of transformative constitutionalism: Botha ‘Metaphoric 
reasoning and transformative constitutionalism’ 2002 TSAR 616-627; 2003 TSAR 20-36; 
Moseneke ‘The fourth Bram Fischer memorial lecture: transformative adjudication’ 2002 SAJHR 
309-319; and Botha ‘Freedom and constraint in constitutional adjudication’ 2004 SAJHR 249-283. 
See also Marius Pieterse ‘What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism?’ 
(2005) 20 SAPR/PL 155.  
167
  Proponents of a more conservative approach advocate change by ‘interstitial’ (case-by-case) 
development. Van der Walt ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of South 
African property law (part 1)’ (2005) 4 TSAR at 659. In favour of this approach, Van der Walt 
cites: Van Aswegen ‘Policy considerations in the law of delict’ 1993 THRHR 171-196; Lubbe 
‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: the bill of rights and its implications for the development of 
contract law’ 2004 SALJ 395-423 and, for a critique of the interstitial approach, Botha ‘Freedom 
and constraint in constitutional adjudication’ (note 166). 
168
  There is acceptance from the Constitutional Court for the need for a paradigm shift generally 
attendant on the Constitution: 
‘In some countries the Constitution only formalizes, in a legal instrument, a historical 
consensus of values and aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken past to 
accommodate the needs of the future. The South African Constitution is different: it retains 
from the past only what is defensible and represents a decisive break from and ringing 
rejection of, that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular and 
repressive, and a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, 
caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly articulated in the Constitution. The 
contrast between the past and what it repudiates and the future to which it seeks to commit the 
nation is stark and dramatic.’ S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para [262].  
169
  Wille’s principles of South African law (note 159) at 406. 
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Court, argues in Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape 
and Another:170  
… ownership in South Africa can no longer be characterised as an 
absolute and individualistic right without any qualification attached 
thereto. Absolute ownership effectively means that the owner can do 
‘what he (or she) wants’ within the bounds of law; that is to say, he or 
she has an absolute and unlimited control over the property by using it 
as he or she sees fit. This individualistic concept of ownership is 
ostensibly found in the fact that the owner’s right is enforceable against 
the whole world and therefore includes exclusive entitlements in 
respect of the disposition and enjoyment of such property.  
However, in our constitutional democracy an increased emphasis has 
been placed upon the characteristic of ownership that entitlements can 
only be exercised in accordance with the social function of law and in 
the interests of the community. Inherent responsibilities of ownership 
towards the community in the exercise of entitlements have been 
increasingly emphasised. A balance must be struck between the 
protection of ownership and the exercise of entitlements of the owner 
regarding third parties on the one hand, and the obligations of the 
owner to the community on the other.171  
Although the concepts of balancing and proportionality are routinely employed 
by the courts,172 and are indeed required by the Constitution’s limitation of 
rights clause,173 the Constitutional notion of proportionality and balancing, 
unlike the utilitarian notion, is not restrained by the principle of wealth 
maximisation. In the South African context, the right to property is considered 
alongside the gamut of other protected rights,174 for example: 
the constitutional right to environment is on a par with the rights to 
freedom of trade, occupation, profession and property entrenched in ss 
22 and 25 of the Constitution. In any dealings with the physical 
                                                          
170
  2007 (4) SA 26 (C). 
171
  Ibid at 37. (Emphasis added). 
172
  See also, for example, in Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: 
Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, 
Mpumalanga Province and Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC), para [93], it is said that: 
‘[o]ur Constitution … requires those who enforce and implement the Constitution to find a 
balance between potentially conflicting principles. It is founded on the notion of 
proportionality which enables this balance to be achieved.’ 
173
  Section 36, the limitation of rights clause, is set out in annexure A.  
174
  See the Bill of Rights, extracts of which are set out in annexure A. 
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expressions of property, land and freedom to trade, the environmental 
rights requirements should be part and parcel of the factors to be 
considered without any a priori grading of the rights. It will require a 
balancing of rights where competing interests and norms are 
concerned.175 
It has also been said that South Africa’s ‘constitutional property right is nothing 
like a classical liberal property right. Plainly, they contemplate that the state 
may engage in a significant measure of wealth redistribution, which 
contradicts the classical liberal understanding of rights.’176 
What this means in practice, in particular in so far as private disputes are 
concerned, is not entirely clear. Over time, and in an attempt to reconcile the 
constitution and common law, three discourses have emerged on how to 
adjudicate on the impact of the Constitution on the existing principles of 
common law.177 The first is a ‘weak application’ argument in which it is argued 
that by simply removing apartheid laws, the private law system, with its own 
value system and internal logic, would produce the results required by the 
Constitution.178 With this approach, changes to the common law would be 
interstitial and certainty and stability would be maintained.179 A criticism of the 
approach is that it is likely to entrench the existing order and resist change.180 
The second, a ‘stronger application’ argument, requires a more direct effect 
on private law by developing private law through the mechanism of horizontal 
application of the fundamental rights in the constitution.181 A direct 
horizontality approach under the interim Constitution182 was explored by the 
courts and rejected, in Du Plessis v De Klerk,183 in favour of an indirect 
                                                          
175
  BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 
2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at page 143. 
176
  Gregory Alexander ‘The potential of the right to property in achieving social transformation in 
South Africa’ (2007) (8) 2 ESR Review 2-9 at 8. 
177
  Van der Walt (note 164). 
178
  Van der Walt (note 164) at 660. 
179
  Van der Walt (note 164) at 669. 
180
  Van der Walt (note 164) at 669. This criticism is supported by a consideration of the effect of, 
inter alia, the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions in Brisley v Drotsky (2002) 4 SA 1 (SCA) and 
Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom (2002) 6 SA 21 (SCA) in respect of contract law. In this regard 
see also Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: the Bill of Rights and its 
implications for the development of contract law’ 2004 SALJ 395-423. 
181
  Van der Walt (note 164) at 661. 
182
  Section 7 of Act 200 of 1993. 
183
  (1996) (3) SA 850 (CC).  
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approach.184 The final Constitution is more instructive that the fundamental 
rights provisions do apply horizontally.185 How to implement this in practice 
has been the subject of much debate in and outside the courtroom. In some 
cases the horizontality approach has led to conservative decisions, with 
judges generally unhappy to alter the status quo unless there is clear direction 
from the legislature.186 More progressive outcomes are likely to emanate from 
the third approach, which uses the discourse of the state’s duty to protect 
fundamental rights.187 A duty to protect approach188 allows for decision-
making that closes the gap between the common law, where the state’s 
obligations to protect are fewer and the Constitution which imposes a duty 
upon the state to protect fundamental rights.189  
Where the granting and deployment of intellectual property rights impacts on 
human rights, whether civil and political or socio-economic, of members of a 
particular community, the discourse of the state’s duty to protect these human 
rights should be invoked, requiring the state to take appropriate measures.190 
                                                          
184
  The majority judgement was handed down by Kentridge AJ who was influenced by the Canadian 
and German approach, and confirms his position as follows: 
‘(a) Constitutional rights under chapter 3 [Fundamental rights] may be invoked against an 
organ of government but not by one private litigant against another. 
(b) In private litigation any litigant may nonetheless contend that a statute (or executive act) 
relied on by the other party is invalid as being inconsistent with the limitations placed on 
the Legislature and Executive under chapter 3. 
(c) As chapter 3 applies to common law, governmental acts or omissions in reliance on the 
common law may be attacked by a private litigant as being inconsistent with chapter 3 in 
any dispute with an organ of government.’ (Footnotes omitted.)(At 879 A-C). 
185
  Section 8 of the Constitution, set out in annexure A. 
186
  For example the Brisley (note 180) and Afrox (note 180) cases. 
187
  Van der Walt (note 164) at 667.  
188
  See the decisions in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In Re: Ex Parte 
Application of President of the RSA (2000) 2 SA 674 (CC); Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) (2001) 4 SA 938 (CC); and Modder East 
Squatters v Modderklop Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (2004) 8 BCLR 821 (SCA), cited by Van der Walt (note 164) at 
680. See also Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
189
  In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers supra it is said at para 44 that: [t]here are not two systems of 
law, each dealing with the same subject-matter, each having similar requirements, each operating 
in its own field with its own highest Court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the 
Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force 
from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.’ Chaskalson JP indicates, in para [45] 
that ‘there is no bright line between public and private law’. 
190
  For a discussion on a human rights approach to intellectual property see Peter K Yu 
‘Reconceptualizing intellectual property interests in a human rights framework’ (2007) UC Davies 
L Rev 1039-1150. See generally also Amanda Barratt The battle for policy space: strategic 
advantages of a human rights approach in international intellectual property negotiations (2008) 
PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town and the sources cited therein. 
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The state’s duty to protect approach is underpinned by provisions in 
domestic191 and international law192 which require states to respect, protect 
and fulfil fundamental human rights.193  
While the shift toward the idea of the state’s duty to protect, which includes 
‘duties to prevent abuse of rights by third parties, including non-State 
actors,’194 is encouraging, it should not rule out the possibility that in some 
case the internal logic of private law can appropriately accommodate the 
underlying values of the Constitution.195  
The state’s duty to protect discourse is buttressed by the notion of Ubuntu.  
2.5.3 African jurisprudence and property in African customary law 
Ubuntu, like Western jurisprudence, values the notion of human dignity. 
However, Ubuntu is about interdependence and it recognises both individual 
and community dignity and demands from us that we take care of and 
responsibility for others.196 The strong focus on individualism, the hallmark of 
                                                          
191
  Section 7(2) of the Constitution. See annexure A.  
192
  Important sources of international law relating to the state’s duties in this regard are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted Dec 16, 1996, entered into 
force 23 Mar 1976, 6 ILM 368 (1967), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted Dec 16, 1966, entered into force 3 Jan 1979, 6 ILM 360 
(1967), the latter of which has yet to be ratified in South Africa. Although South Africa has not 
ratified the ICESCR, a comprehensive range of socio-economic rights are included as justiciable 
rights in the Bill of Rights. In this regard see for example DM Davis ‘Adjudicating the socio-
economic rights in the South African Constitution: towards ‘deference lite’?’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 
301-327; Sandra Liebenberg and Beth Goldblatt ‘The interrelationship between equality and socio-
economic rights under South African’s transformative Constitution’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 335-361; 
and Sandra Liebenberg ‘The application of socio-economic rights to private law’ (2008) 3 TSAR 
464-480. The human rights framework incorporating these treaties is discussed in chapter 5. 
193
  Although both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) (Article 
27) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 6 ILM 368 (1967) 
(Article 15) contain provisions that balance the right to protection of intellectual property with the 
right to participate in cultural life and to share in scientific advancement, only certain aspects of IP 
are protected. See also Rosemary J Coombe ‘Intellectual property, human rights & sovereignty: 
new dilemmas in international law imposed by the recognition of indigenous knowledge and the 
conversation of biodiversity’ (1998) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 59 at 65 where she 
indicates that ‘State parties must report measures to prevent the use of scientific and technical 
progress for purposes that are contrary to the enjoyment of human rights.’ (Footnotes omitted). 
194
  Rosemary J Coombe ‘Intellectual property, human rights and sovereignty: new dilemmas in 
international law posed by the recognition of indigenous knowledge and the conversation of 
biodiversity’ (1998) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 59 at 68. 
195
  Van der Walt (note 164) at 683-4. 
196
  Narnia Bohler-Muller ‘Beyond legal metanarratives: the interrelationship between storytelling, 
ubuntu and care’ (2007) 1 Stell LR 133 at 143. 
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dominant Western jurisprudence, is surpassed by an approach in which 
individual interests are important only from within a group context.   
The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of 
the population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines 
individual rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif 
of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised 
and operational declaration in our evolving society of the need for 
human interdependence, respect and concern.197 
 
[U]buntu thinking … is crucial to the fundamental purpose of the South 
African constitution, which is to develop an interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights that goes way beyond the limited notion of such a bill as only a 
defence against state intrusion and based on negative freedoms.198  
Like Ubuntu, property in African customary law, which has Constitutional 
recognition,199 places emphasis on the community and not the individual.200 
Chanock201 reminds us of the Western censure of its colonial subjects in their 
attitude about communal tenure,202 and documents the move, as a result of 
colonial intervention, from a system of rules based on respect of kinship in 
favour of one which espouses individualisation (from status to contract). 
Bennett also talks about how the authors who documented African custom 
imposed Western ideas of legal order: customary relationships typically based 
                                                          
197
  Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) at par [37] 
198
  Drucilla Cornell ‘A call for a nuanced constitutional jurisprudence: ubuntu, dignity, and 
reconciliation’ (2004) 19 SAPR/PL 666 at 675. 
199
  Section 211(3) of the Constitution requires the courts to ‘apply customary law when that law is 
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary 
law.’   
200
 According to an FAO land tenure study, the ‘three cardinal principles’ of the relationship between 
individuals, the community and land are that: 
(a) There shall be no private ownership of land. The land occupied by a tribal 
community shall belong to that community and cannot be alienated 
without its consent. 
(b) Every individual shall have security of tenure. 
(c) No member of the community shall be without land. 
‘Communal Land Tenure’, an FAO land-tenure study, prepared by Sir Gerald Clawson, 1950, cited 
in M Yudelman Africans on the land (1964) at 14. 
201
  Chanock cautions against the ability of colonial agents to fully grasp and document rules of 
custom. Martin Chanock, ‘A peculiar sharpness. An essay on property in the history of customary 
law in colonial Africa’(2007) The Journal of African History 65-88. See also TW Bennett 
Customary law in South Africa (2004) at 5-6 where he talks about the difficulties of reducing oral 
custom to writing and the problems of language (custom reduced to writing was mostly recorded in 
European languages). 
202
  Which Channock argues, in its formulation was an ‘invention’ of the colonial state. Communal 
tenure was viewed as lacking in advancement. Chanock (note 200) at 70. 
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on family and community obligations were moulded into the ‘rights and duties’ 
dialect of the West.203 
The communal nature of indigenous ownership was brought to the fore in the 
Richtersveld204 and the Ndebele-Ndzundza205 cases. The Richtersveld case 
involved a claim for restitution of land by the Richtersveld Community in terms 
of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.206 The Constitutional Court was asked 
by the appellant to reconsider the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding that the 
community ‘held a “customary law interest” in the … land which was akin to 
ownership and that this right included the ownership of minerals and precious 
stones.’207 (Emphasis added). The Court determined that it must refer to 
indigenous law to ascertain the nature and the content of the rights in the land 
previously held by the Community: and that the principles of indigenous law 
need not be viewed through the ‘common-law lens’208 as the Constitution209 
‘acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of indigenous law as an 
independent source of norms within the legal system.’210 The applicability of 
indigenous law is subject only to the principles of the Constitution and other 
applicable statutory provisions. In this particular case the Constitutional Court 
echoed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding that, under indigenous Nama 
law, land was communally owned by the community, and its members had a 
right to occupy and use the land.  As the Supreme Court of Appeal explains: 
[o]ne of the components of the culture of the Richtersveld people was 
the customary rules relating to their entitlement to and use and 
occupation of this land. The primary rule was that the land belonged to 
the Richtersveld community as a whole and that all its people were 
                                                          
203
  Bennett (note 200) at 6. 
204
  Alexkor Ltd and Another v The Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC). For 
discussion on the decision see, among others, K Lehmann ‘Indigenous Rights and the Right to 
Culture’ 2004 SAJHR 86-118 and Hanri Mostert and Peter Fitzpatrick ‘Law against Law: 
Indigenous Rights and the Richtersveld cases’ (2004)(2) Law, Social Justice & Global 
Development Journal available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_2/mostertfitzpatrick. [Accessed 18 December 
2008]. 
205
  Prinsloo and Another v Ndebele-Ndzundza Community and Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA). 
206
  Act 22 of 1994.  The Act provides for the restitution of rights in land to persons or communities 
dispossessed of such rights as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.  
207
  Para [42]. 
208
  Para [51]. 
209
  Section 211(3) of the Constitution. 
210
  Para [51]. 
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entitled to the reasonable occupation and use of all land held in 
common by them and its resources. All members of the community had 
a sense of legitimate access to the land to the exclusion of all other 
people. Non-members had no such rights and had to obtain permission 
to use the land for which they sometimes had to pay. There are a 
number of telling examples. A non-member using communal grazing 
without permission would be fined ‘a couple of head of cattle’; the 
Reverend Hein, who settled in the Richtersveld in 1844, recorded in his 
diary three years later a protest by the community that Captain Paul 
(Bierkaptein) Links had, without the consent of the ‘raad’, let 
(‘verpacht’) some of its best grazing land at the Gariep River Mouth; 
and the trader McDougal established himself at the mouth of the 
Gariep River in 1847 only after obtaining the permission of Captain 
Links on behalf of the community and agreeing to pay for the privilege. 
The captain and his ‘raad’ enforced the rules relating to the use of the 
communal land and gave permission to newcomers to join the 
community or to use the land.211  
The court concluded that the Richtersveld Community was the indigenous law 
owner of the land and was entitled to restitution of the right.  
Similarly in the Ndebele-Ndzundza case, in terms of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the Land 
Claims Court to recognise community ownership of land in view of the Court’s 
factual conclusions that:212 
(a) The claimants' predecessors constituted a group of people who 
lived on and worked the farm for a continuous period of nearly 50 
years from before the end of the 19th century until their relocation 
in the late 1930s.   
(b) They lived under the authority of a chief designated by the 
traditional tribal hierarchy: In the late 19th century and first two 
decades of the 20th century, under Chief Madzidzi, and, for the 
next 20 years, under his son and successor, Chief Japtha 
Mahlangu.   
(c) They held the land as a group and in common with each other.  
(d) They occupied the farm exclusively and without immediate 
supervision or direct control from the white landowners.  
                                                          
211
  Para [18] of the SCA Judgement, also quoted in para [58] of the CC Judgment.  
212
  At para [29]. 
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(e) They did so in accordance with the ancient customs and traditions 
of the Ndebele-Ndzundza people. 
Likewise, in so far as knowledge and information is concerned, for many 
communities in Africa the concept of individual ownership of property gives 
way to a collective approach toward ideas and knowledge.213 The prevailing 
IP regime transplanted to many post-colonial African societies may conflict 
with the host country’s value systems.214 This might partly explain why in 
many African countries activity in industrial property offices remains low.215  
Although inequalities existed under kinship rules, these, according to 
Chanock, were arguably less pronounced than under the Western alternative. 
It would be unfortunate if the ideology of respect and the centrality of 
community underlying customary law does not find a way to influence 
developing jurisprudence. 
A final, but important, aspect of property that needs to be addressed in this 
chapter is the theoretical framework for explaining resources that are found 
not excludable. 
2.6 If it’s not (private) property, what is it? 
Trespass rules establish a (private) property spectrum ranging from full-
blooded ownership, where a person has an extensive range of use-privileges 
and powers of control, to a position of lesser privileges and power, which 
Harris calls, ‘mere’ property.216 Whether or not a person can acquire any 
                                                          
213
  Kent Nnadozie et al (eds) African perspectives on genetic resources (2003) at 25-27. This idea is 
sometimes expressed as ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’. The idea that ‘intellectual property 
builds on intellectual property’ to some extent concedes this point. Richard A Posner ‘Do we have 
too many intellectual property rights?’ (2006) 38 Intellectual Property Law Review 639-651 at 
646. 
214
  See for example Kabudi PJ ‘Protection of intellectual property rights of indigenous knowledge in 
Tanzania: legal constraints and challenges’ (2004) 3 Indilinga Afrncan Journal of Indigenous 
Knowledge System 33-44.  
215
  See for example the statistical tables in World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) ‘World 
patent report: a statistical review’ (2008) at 62-69. In so far as technology patent filing in South 
Africa is concerned, the UN Development Program and US Patent Office statistics reflect that in 
2001, in South Africa (which, compared to many other African countries, has a fairly sophisticated 
intellectual property regime) 2.5 technology patents per one million people were registered, 
compared with twenty-five in Australia and 779 in South Korea. Alla Katsnelson ‘South Africa 
Fights Low Patent Rate’ Nature.Com 14 October, 2004.  
216
  Harris (note 18) at 28-32. 
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privileges and powers within the property spectrum over a resource will 
depend on whether or not the resource is capable of physical, legal and moral 
excludability.217 Outside of the private property spectrum, one finds State or 
public property, which Harris describes as quasi-ownership interests and, in 
addition to this, the commons or common property.218 These resonate with the 
Roman law concepts of res omnium communes and res publicae.  
While the ancient principle that some things cannot be privately owned is an 
important one, the details of the Roman law concepts have remained largely 
underdeveloped and appear of limited practical significance.219 There is 
however a suggestion that the classification be revisited.220  
2.6.1 Revisiting the Roman / Roman-Dutch law categories221 
Roman law distinguished between things capable of private ownership (res in 
commercium)222 and things which fall out of commerce (res extra 
commercium) consisting of res divini iuris and res humani iuris.223  
The three classes of things (res sacrae, res religiosae, res sanctae) classified 
as divini juris have been declared ‘obsolete classifications’.224 Res humani 
iuris includes common things (res omnium communes) and public things (res 
publicae). Res communes have been construed as ‘resources belonging to 
                                                          
217
  Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 269. 
218
  Harris also refers to ‘protected non-property holdings’ to refer to resources that fall outside of the 
property domain altogether.  Harris uses the example of the strict regulatory structure for human 
embryos in the UK. Harris (note 18) at 111.   
219
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 25-29. See also the discussion at 717-720 on the extensive 
reform of water law and its impact on the common law. 
220
  See for example David M Berry ‘Beyond public and private: reconceptualising collective 
ownership’ (2006) 1 EastBound 151-172 and Andrew Herman ‘“The network we all dream of”: 
manifest dreams of connectivity and communication or, social imaginaries of the wireless 
commons,’ November 2008, distributed to the Stellenbosch Advanced Property Law Reading 
Group and subsequently published as a chapter in Barbara Crow, Michael Longford, and Kim 
Sawchuck (eds) The wireless spectrum: the politics, practices and poetics of mobile 
communication (2008). 
221
  Van der Schyff gives a comprehensive account of the development in Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law of res omnium communes, res publicae and related concepts. Elmarie van der Schyff The 
constitutionality of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (2006) 
LLD Thesis, North-West University at 84-106.  
222  Things which are capable of being privately owned are res privatae (which are things already 
owned) and res nullius, which are things not privately owned but which are ultimately capable of 
private ownership. Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 25-9.  
223
  DH van Zyl History and principles of Roman private law (1983) at 128. 
224
  A prior edition of Wille’s principles of South African law: Dale Hutchinson (Gen Ed) Wille’s 
principles of South African law (1991) at 250. 
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humanity as a whole,’225 supervised by the state, whereas public property (res 
publicae), which consists of the ‘regalia of the sovereign’226 were treated as 
resources that belong to the state, the populus.227  
Common things belong to no-one and are available for use by all, subject to 
governance that manages the resource to avoid depletion or destruction.228 
Roman-Dutch law appears to have recognised only the air and the open sea 
as res omnium communes.229 
Res publicae are things which cannot be privately owned and are referred to 
as either belonging to an entire civil community or as the property of the 
state.230 Public things consist of resources for public use. This includes things 
like public roads, perennial rivers, and harbours.231 For example in South 
Africa the sea and the sea-shore are vested in the State president and are 
classified as public things.232  
The distinction between common and public property is said to be of limited 
significance.233 One should bear in mind however that, while in principle it is 
possible to acquire private ownership of a specific portion of a common thing 
by appropriation,234 it is not possible to do so with regard to public things 
which vest in the state.235 Interference with the use of res publicae or res 
communes could, on the basis of an infringement of a personality right,236 give 
rise to a remedy based on the actio inuriarum.237  
                                                          
225
  JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) at 129.  
226
  Ibid. 
227
  JAC Thomas (note 225) at 129. Traditionally, examples of the former included air and running 
water and the latter the sea, public rivers and the seashore and also public installations such as 
roads, bridges, and national parts. Wille’s principles of South African law (note 159) at 417. 
228
  Herman (note 220). 
229
  Van der Schyff (note 221) at 98. 
230
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 26. See also Van der Schyff (note 221) at 98. 
231
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 26-7. 
232
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 25-6.  
233
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 29. 
234
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 25. The authors give the example of air compressed in a gas 
cylinder and thus reduced to a thing in commerce.  
235
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 29.  
236
  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality (2004) have classified personality 
rights as the right to body and life; the right to physical liberty; the right to good name (reputation); 
the right to dignity; the right to feelings; the right to privacy; and the right to identity. 
237
  François du Bois (note 159) at 417; and Silberberg and Schoeman (note 12) at 26 and 29. The 
action injuriarum has been described as ‘the general remedy for aggression upon person, dignity 
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Berry238 modernises the Roman law typology by re-introducing, and 
modifying, the concept of res divini iuris. He conceptualises the forms of 
property ownership as public, private and collective ownership and argues 
that res communes and common heritage fall into the category of collective 
ownership. 
Berry argues that the temptation is to conceptualise property in binary terms, 
as either private or public, but that the range of possibilities is broader than 
that. An argument is made for a more critical and creative approach to the 
Roman law classifications of property, which, so the argument goes, should 
be viewed as fluid, and the boundaries permeable. Berry reminds us that 
those resources which do not belong to anyone –  res nullius – and which are 
capable of becoming private property (res privatae) are akin to the public 
domain;239 and that resources not susceptible to private ownership such as 
res communes (the commons) are not capable of private ownership and as 
such are not res nullius.  
Berry’s understanding of the modern day commons is narrower than the idea 
of common heritage and thus, on the back of the res divini iuris classification, 
he introduces a neologism, res imperium, as a form of dominium ‘for the good 
of humankind as a whole,’240 essentially a home for resources that are ‘the 
common heritage of mankind’ – res communes humanitatus – which is neither 
a public domain nor a commons. As examples of res imperium, Berry 
suggests the human genome, the natural world, life-forms, space, the moon, 
and ideas and concepts.241  
Although it may well be possible to develop the Roman law classifications to 
such an extent that they are accommodating of current day concerns much 
thought and debate would still need to go into these relatively underdeveloped 
concepts, that were originally applied to relatively few resources. In South 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and reputation.’ Jonathan M Burchell Personality rights and freedom of expression: the modern 
Actio injuriarum (1998) at 133. 
238
  In David M Berry ‘Beyond public and private: reconceptualising collective ownership’ (2006) 1 
EastBound at 151-172. 
239
  Berry (note 238) at 155. 
240
  Berry (note 238) at 165. 
241
  Berry (note 238) at 165. 
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Africa these ancient concepts have all but languished while a renewed focus 
on tenets of customary and indigenous law around the ‘ownership’ of natural 
resources (sometimes appearing akin to a managed commons approach, see 
Richtersveld242 and Ndebele-Ndzundza243 above) are equally capable of 
being used creatively (and together with aspects of the private law of property) 
to distinguish between private and public property. 
It is uncertain at which level the revised Roman law classification is being 
suggested: whether it is an international law initiative or if the idea is to 
develop national law principles. Arguably in any event, both international law 
and national law (at least in South Africa) have the necessary mechanisms at 
hand, through concepts such as sovereignty, public trust, public property, 
common heritage, public domain, community-based natural resource 
management,244 and common or communal property resources. The value of 
the ancient classifications is that they underpin the modern concepts at an 
abstract, principled, level and allow for a democratic, public-centred notion of 
property to emerge.  
2.6.2 Property within a modern constitutional democracy  
Over centuries a dominant philosophical concept of property and ownership 
has emerged in which property is an inalienable human right and is the key to 
all other rights. The state is not to interfere with private property (except in the 
most compelling circumstances and usually with compensation) and hence 
the private – public binary divide, represented graphically in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The public / private binary 
                                                          
242
  Alexkor Ltd and Another v The Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC). 
243
  Prinsloo and Another v Ndebele-Ndzundza Community and Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA). 
244
  For a discussion of case studies, and the challenges, and the potential benefits, of community-
based natural resource management in the SA context, see C Fabricius and S Collins ‘Community-
based natural resource management: governing the commons’ (2007) 9 Supplement 2 Water 
Policy 83–97. 
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Piercing the barrier (the right to property) between public and private means 
an invasion of an inalienable right which is difficult to achieve as property is a 
negative right, not to be interfered with. In an increasingly unequal society with 
diminishing scarce resources this binary approach will likely hamper reform 
and perpetuate inequality thus it is argued that ‘the distinction or relationship 
between public and private in property should not be seen as a direct conflict 
or a strict dichotomy but rather as two extremes on a continuum…’.245  
A ‘two extremes on a continuum’ approach accommodates the dynamic and 
evolving nature of property and it represents a theoretical shift away from the 
chasm between private and public. Berry might not be satisfied however as it 
does not address his criticism about the absence of categories other than 
public and private.  
The continuum works well to explain (excludable) resources that fit into 
Harris’s property spectrum,246 with ‘full-blooded’ ownership being in the 
extreme private and ‘mere propery’ tending toward the public, but it does not 
(and is surely not intended to) provide for the full extent of public resources to 
be plotted.  Figure 2 below represents a tentative attempt to locate the private 
/ public debate within the finite nature of public resources.247  
The term ‘public resources’ should be understood, in the broadest sense, as 
public property embracing public and natural resources, the public domain248 
including public goods such as knowledge, as well as other public assets, 
infrastructure, and aspects of heritage. While some aspects of some of these 
                                                          
245
  Andre van der Walt ‘The public aspect of private property: post-apartheid fragments: law, politics 
and critique’ (2004) 19 SAPR/PL 676-723 at 714. See also Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray 
‘Private property and public property’ in McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) at 11-
39. 
246
  The more a (privately ownable) resource gravitates toward the public end of the spectrum, the 
more limited the nature of the rights will be. 
247
  Unfortunately, use is made of the terms ‘excludable’ and ‘enclosure,’ which some theorists might 
prefer to avoid.  
248
  The concept of the public domain is broadly understood to encompass a diverse range of public 
goods that are available for use by all. See for example James Boyle The public domain: enclosing 
the commons of the mind (2008) and his many other publications on the public domain. See also 
Charlotte Waelde (ed) Intellectual property: the many faces of public domain (2007) and G 
Dutfield ‘The public and private domains: intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge’ 
(2000) 21 Science Communication 274 at 281. 
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resources may be privately acquired, it will depend on whether the aspect is 
excludable. ‘Inherently public property’249 is unlikely to be excludable. 
 
Figure 2:  A public-centred notion of private and public property 
Private property is that which is excludable and has been excluded. While 
deprivation of private property may not be arbitrary, reining in the right in order 
to balance it against a compelling countervailing right should not constitute an 
arbitrary deprivation. In figure 2, private property is ringed off from public 
resources and there is an inalienable core of private property. The social and 
economic justifications for recognising private property are undeniable, what is 
at issue is the extent of such rights, particularly in respect of public goods. 
Outside of the core (discussed below), private property is protected by the rule 
against no arbitrary deprivation, to the extent that such private property is 
excludable. Common heritage are global resources of a public nature that 
extend beyond the boundaries of the sovereign.250 The use of all resources is 
subject to regulation251 and the solid and permeable circles indicate the 
existence of trespass rules. Permeability reflects the dynamic nature of 
                                                          
249
  Carol Rose ‘The comedy of the commons: custom, commerce, and inherently public property’ 
(1986) 53 The University of Chicago Law Review at 720. Rose mentions for example specific 
passageways which if in private ownership may lead to rent seeking ‘holdouts and monopolies’ (at 
749). 
250
  On common heritage generally see chapter 1, note 26. 
251
  Hardin, 25 years after penning ‘The tragedy of the commons,’ admits that the weightiest mistake in 
his paper was to omit the adjective ‘unmanaged’. He adds that ‘individualism is cherished because 
it produces freedom, but the gift is conditional: the more the population exceeds the carrying 
capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up.’ Hardin, Garrett ‘Extensions of 
“the tragedy of the commons’ (1998) 280 Science 682-683. 
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property and the increasing fragmentation of property (the existence of 
multiple exclusion rights)252 that occurs when private rights are acquired over 
aspects of public resources.253 Permeability recognises that not all 
occurrences of ownership are full-blooded. The more public the nature of the 
resource, the more intrusions the holder of private rights can expect. The 
decisions in the V & A Waterfront, Qualidental Laboratories and Nhlabathi 
cases discussed earlier illustrate this.   
The ‘inalienable’ part of property (both a negative and a positive right) is 
reduced to the core or pith of autonomy.254 As Van der Walt has stated, ‘the 
extent to which a regulatory deprivation may affect private property negatively 
… [should be] determined by the nature of the property and its relation to the 
autonomy and privacy of the person or persons affected – the stronger the 
social relations and function of the property, the stronger and the wider are the 
regulatory powers of the legislature in determining the content and limits of 
that property, but the stronger the personal and individual character and 
function of the property, the weaker and smaller are the state’s powers to limit 
it through regulation.’255  
In this approach the allocation of use-privileges in public resources (through 
mostly permeable constitution-backed enclosures) takes place within a 
modern international framework recognising sovereign rights.256  
The sovereign, underpinned by the principles of democracy and circumscribed 
by the duties to fulfil human rights is required to administer public resources 
                                                          
252
  The notion of fragmentation stands in contrast to the numerus clausus doctrine in both common 
and civil law which prescribes a fairly rigid set of proprietary rights. Whereas fragmentation can 
explain the carving out of rights for those who have been unfairly excluded from property, it also 
adds a veneer of legitimacy to the increasing trend toward the granting of proprietary rights over 
aspects of public resources. Another concern with fragmentation is that once rights have been 
recognised, withdrawing them becomes difficult (and costly). Bruce Ziff ‘The irreversibility of 
commodification’ 2005 Stell LR 283-301.  
253
  See the discussion on Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, 
Western Cape, and Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C).  
254
  Useful concepts include Michelman’s property as means for democratic participation. See also the 
decision in Residents, Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 
discussed above. 
255
  Van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) at 134 (footnotes omitted). This is the position in 
German case law.  
256
  Article 2(1) of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the State grants full permanent 
sovereignty to states over its natural resources. GA Res 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess, Supp 
No 31 (1974) 50, UN Doc A/9631 (1974). 
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according to the nature of the resource and the needs and interests of its 
people. 257 The sovereign has broad oversight of the allocation of resources 
and should monitor participation in both the public and private sphere to 
ensure the optimum balance between private property and public resources.  
One of the criticisms which a property model embracing the notion of a 
‘commons’ or ‘common heritage’ must confront is the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’258 argument.  The tragedy of the commons argument maintains 
that common property regimes are ‘largely to blame for a host of social ills 
including resource depletion, pollution, dissipation of economic surplus, 
poverty among resource users, backwardness in technology, and 
misallocation of labour and capital.’259  
Significant counter-arguments include the reminder that not all common 
property is ‘everybody’s property’, it is a form of collective ownership (hence 
the permeable bordered enclosure in figure 2) with rules for the collective to 
abide by, and with rules for outsiders permitted to access the resource.’260 
Often, it is the using of resources by non-‘owners’ that leads to social ills. The 
notion of common heritage resources likewise imposes duties on those who 
access the resources; and on those who have sovereign rights over aspects 
of these resources.261  
Also countering the ‘tragedy of the commons’ approach are those who point 
out that the consequence of extensive private property over public resources 
                                                          
257
  The sovereign must be one whose aim is ‘the common welfare and the salvation of all.’ Foucalt in 
James D Faubion (ed) Essential works of Foucalt 1954-1984 (Volume three) at 210. Foucalt cites 
the seventeenth-century author, Pufendorf, who says that ‘Sovereign authority is conferred upon 
them [the rulers] only in order to allow them to use it to attain or conserve what is of public 
utility.’ 
258  The seminal article is G Hardin ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243-1248.  
259
  S V Ciriacy-Wantrup and Richard C Bishop ‘“Common property” as a concept in natural resources 
policy’ (1975) 15 Natural Resources Journal at 713-714. 
260
  Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (note 259) at 715. See also Hardin’s admission in note 251. 
261
  The understanding is that ‘[t]he sovereign rights of nation states over certain environmental 
resources are not proprietary, but fiduciary.’ Peter H Sand ‘Sovereignty bounded: public 
trusteeship for common pool resources?’ (2004) 4:1 Global Environmental Politics 47 at 48. 
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is an  ‘anti-commons’ effect which stresses the public interest detriment that 
can occur when the tolerated reach of private property is overly broad.262  
Rose263 acknowledges the argument that uncertainty about property rights 
‘invites conflicts and squanders resources’264 but takes the contrary view that 
the commons is comedic265 and, in ‘defiance of classical economic 
thinking’,266 the commons in fact facilitates commerce. As Rose indicates: 
… service to commerce was a central factor in defining as ‘public’ such 
properties as roads and waterways. Used in commerce, some property 
had qualities akin to infinite ‘returns to scale.’ … And customary 
doctrines might be thought a ‘comedy of the commons’ not only 
because it may infinitely expand our wealth, but also, at least in part, 
because it has been thought to enhance the sociability of the members 
of an otherwise atomized society.267 
The public trust doctrine holds together the public-centred approach to private 
ownership in natural resources.  
2.6.3 The public trust doctrine  
The public trust doctrine is rooted in the Roman law distinction between res in 
commercium and res extra commercium.268 Notwithstanding criticism of the 
doctrine,269 it has been extensively applied in the USA (Rose indicates three 
                                                          
262
  See for example Michael Heller ‘The tragedy of the anti-commons’ (1998) 111 Harvard Law 
Review 621-688; and David Bollier Silent theft: the private plunder of our common wealth (2002). 
263
  Rose (note 249). 
264
  Rose (note 249) at 715-6. 
265
  Rose means comedic in the classical sense of a story with a happy ending. Rose (note 249) at 723. 
266
  Rose (note 249) at 716. Rose also considers the possibility that classical economic theory 
recognises two exceptions (in respect of ‘plenteous’ goods and ‘public’ goods) to the rule 
favouring private and exclusive property rights. Rose (note 249) at 717. 
267
  Rose (note 249) at 723. 
268
  Jan Glazewski Environmental law in South Africa (2005) at 17. Joseph Sax is generally regarded 
as the father of the modern conception of the public trust doctrine. His seminal article ‘The public 
trust doctrine in natural resource law: effective judicial intervention’ (1970) 68 Michigan Law 
Review 471-566 is oft-cited. 
269
  See for example Richard J Lazarus ‘Changing conceptions of property and sovereignty in natural 
resources: questioning the public trust doctrine’ (1986) 71 Iowa Law Review 631-716; Richard 
Delgado ‘Our better natures: a revisionist view of Joseph Sax’s public trust theory of 
environmental protection, and some dark thoughts on the possibility of law reform’ (1991) 44 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1209-1227; James Huffman ‘Fish out of water: The public trust doctrine in 
a constitutional democracy’ (1989) 19 Environmental Law 527-572 and James Huffman ‘Avoiding 
the takings clause through the myth of public rights: the public trust and reserved rights doctrines 
at work’ (1987) 3 J Land Use & Envtl L 171-212. 
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waves of popularity of the doctrine since the early nineteenth century)270 and 
elsewhere, including South Africa.271  
While there is much debate on the usefulness and extent of the public trust 
doctrine,272 in South Africa the doctrine is statutorily recognised in the National 
Environmental Management Act273 (NEMA) and also in the National Water 
Act274 and the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act.275 The 
public trust reach of the NEMA is extensive:276  
[t]he environment [which includes plants 277] is held in public trust for 
the people, the beneficial use of environmental resources must serve 
the public interest and the environment must be protected as the 
people’s common heritage.278 
                                                          
270
  Rose (note 249) at 729.  
271
  The public trust doctrine has been introduced in South Africa in NEMA and also in the context of 
water and mineral resources. See Jan Glazewski Environmental law in South Africa (2005) at 17, 
428; E Van der Schyff ‘Who “owns” the country's mineral resources? The possible incorporation 
of the public trust doctrine through the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act’ 
(2008) 4 TSAR 757-778; and E Van der Schyff and G Viljoen ‘Water and the public trust doctrine 
– a South African perspective’ (2008) 2 4 The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern 
Africa 339-354. The public trust doctrine is referred to in the following cases: Truck and General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and Another 2007 (2) SA 26 (SCA); Bareki NO 
and Another v Gencor Ltd and Others 2006 (1) DS 432 (T); Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products and Others 2004 (2) SA 393 (E); BP Southern 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 
124 (W); and South African Shore Angling Association and Another v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs 2002 (5) SA 511 (E). 
272
  See the extensive discussion in Van der Schyff’s LLD (note 25) at 106-152 where she analyses the 
public trust doctrine in, not only its traditional and modern sense, but also the idea and meaning of 
it being codified in the South African context, and in particular in so far as minerals are concerned. 
273
  Act 107 of 1998. 
274
  Act 36 of 1998. 
275
  Act 28 of 2002. 
276
  Ngcobo J of the Constitutional Court has indicated that ‘[t]he importance of the protection of the 
environment cannot be gainsaid. Its protection is vital to the enjoyment of the other rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights; indeed, it is vital to life itself. It must therefore be protected for the 
benefit of the present and future generations. The present generation holds the earth in trust for the 
next generation. This trusteeship position carries with it the responsibility to look after the 
environment’. Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental 
Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 
and Others 2007(6) SA 4 (CC) at para [102].  
277
  Environment is defined in s 1 of the NEMA as ‘the surroundings within which humans exist and 
that are made up of- 
 (i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth;  
(ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 
(iii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the inter-relationships among and between them; 
and 
(iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the foregoing 
that influence human health and well-being…’. 
278
  Section 2(4)(o). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
76 
 
In other words, South African environmental law specifically provides that the 
state is required to administer, as trustee, on behalf of South Africa’s people, 
all aspects of plant life (not specifically limited to indigenous plants) including 
the physical and cultural properties of plants in a manner that serves the 
public interest. It is said that the public trust doctrine not only prevents the 
state from alienating the resource held in trust but also places a fiduciary duty 
on the state in its dealings with the resource.279  
PGRs, although not necessarily often conceptualised as natural resources280 
in the way that water and minerals might be, are a natural agricultural 
resource281 already subject to extensive regulation. Through NEMA these 
resources are acknowledged as being part of the ‘environment’282 subject to 
the public trust doctrine.  
 The idea is that a public trusteeship should serve as a tool ‘preventing the 
destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common.’283 In this 
conceptualisation, and along the lines of the National Water Act,284 the state 
has a duty, as public trustee of the nation’s PGRs, to ensure that PGRs are 
‘protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a 
sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in 
accordance with its constitutional mandate.’ The public trust doctrine presents 
a means to restrain how the state manages the public resources within its 
boundaries.  
                                                          
279
  Sax ‘Liberating the public trust doctrine’ (note 79) at 185. 
280
  For example the Physical Planning Act 88 of 1967 (now partially repealed) defines ‘natural 
resource’ as any raw material obtained from nature and includes soil, air, water and minerals. 
281
  ‘Natural agricultural resources’ are defined by the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 
of 1983 as ‘the soil, the water sources and the vegetation, excluding weeds and invader plants’.  
282
  See note 277. 
283
  Joseph Sax ‘Liberating the public trust doctrine from its historical shackles’ 14 University of 
California-Davis Law Review (1980) 185-194 at 187 cited in Peter H Sand (note 261) at 51. 
284
  Section 3(1) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998, titled ‘[p]ublic trusteeship of nation’s water 
resources’ reads as follows: 
‘As the public trustee of the nation’s water resources the National Government, acting through 
the Minister, must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and 
controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in 
accordance with its constitutional mandate.’ 
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2.7 Concluding remarks 
In South Africa both the protection and the limitation of property are anchored 
by the provisions of the Constitution which requires a closure of the chasm 
between the public and the private.285 This chapter has discussed what this 
means for property, particularly in the context of natural resources. A more 
public-centred approach to property is explored. Property should be 
recognised as a positive and a negative right alongside other fundamental 
and foundational rights. Where the public interest is compelling, the 
Constitution provides for the lawful deprivation of property through the 
exercise of the state’s regulatory powers.  
In chapter 3, a case study is presented to demonstrate the extent of private 
rights currently tolerated in PGRs in the case of genetically modified 
cottonseed and to give an overview of the broader social and economic 
context in which these rights are deployed.   
                                                          
285
  It has been said that the Constitution requires a ‘move away from a static, typically private-law 
conceptualist view of the constitution as a guarantee of the status quo to a dynamic, typically 
public-law view of the constitution as an instrument for social change and transformation under the 
auspices … of entrenched constitutional values’. AJ van der Walt, The constitutional property 
clause (1997) cited in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 
768 (CC) (the FNB case) at para 52. The FNB case is discussed in chapter 4, note 115. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROPERTY IN PRACTICE: A CASE STUDY OF PGRS  
… Bt cotton holds very little potential to significantly reduce poverty and 
… may in fact be widening and deepening poverty…1 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of chapter 3, together with the findings presented in chapter 6, is to 
meet the implications objective presented in chapter 1, namely to assess the 
impact of the current regime for PGRs. This regime is a complex matrix of 
public law instruments (described in chapter 5) which should be considered 
alongside the private law of property and contract (discussed in chapter 4).  
Chapter 3 has three main parts. The first part places agriculture in context, in 
particular in Africa and South Africa, and considers threats to the sustainability 
of the agricultural sector. The second part illustrates how private property 
rights are acquired in PGRs through innovation and patents in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry, and the extent to which these rights have taken hold in 
both the global and local context. The third and final part of the chapter 
introduces the cotton market in South Africa, and discusses the experiences 
of the Makhathini cotton farmers during the past decade, with a view to 
ascertaining whether or not strong property rights in PGRs impact on the 
sustainability of the agricultural sector.  
3.2 Agriculture and threats to sustainable agriculture 
3.2.1 The importance of agriculture 
Although there is a clear link between agriculture and food security given that 
agriculture feeds the world’s expanding population, sufficient available food 
does not necessarily equate with food security.2 Access (both physical and 
                                                          
1
  Aaron deGrassi ‘Genetically modified crops and sustainable poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan 
Africa: an assessment of current evidence’ (June 2003) Third World Network at 32. 
2  Debbie Collier and Charles Moitui ‘Africa’s regulatory approach to biotechnology in agriculture: 
an opportunity to seize socio-economic concerns’ (2009) 17 RADIC 29 at 31(note 7) where it is 
indicated that food security is a ‘state of affairs where all people at all times have access to and 
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financial3) to food, among other things, is as important as sufficient agricultural 
output.4 Agriculture itself is not only about the production of food, it is the 
source of livelihood for many African communities and is often an important 
component of a country’s export offerings.5 In sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture 
engages between 306 and 907 percent of the labour force and, in many 
countries, accounts for roughly between 30 and 80 percent of GDP.8  
The statistics in the South African context are broadly sketched by the 
Department of Agriculture in its strategic plans for agriculture.9 The Strategic 
Plan for the Department of Agriculture 2007 (Strategic Plan 2007) outlines the 
economic significance of the sector. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life.’ On the nature of the right to 
adequate food, see UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment 
No 12’ (1999) E/C 12/1999/5, 12 May 1999. 
3
  The rise in food prices of the past few years is a major concern to food security. See in this regard 
the statement adopted by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
on the world food crisis 16 May 2008 (UN doc E/C 12/2008/1 [2008]).  
4
  Ibid. 
5
  It has been said that ‘[i]f agriculture is in trouble, Africa is in trouble’. Donald L Sparks ‘Economic 
trends in Africa South of the Sahara’ in Katherine Murison (ed) Africa south of the Sahara 32nd ed 
(2003) at 18.  
6
  This is the figure for South Africa. Available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook [Accessed 10 January 2008]. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United 
Nations) reports that ‘Sub-Saharan Africa contains a total population of 626 million people of 
whom 384 million (61 percent) are classified as agricultural.’ Malcolm Hall (ed) ‘Farming systems 
and poverty: improving farmers’ livelihoods in a changing world’ FAO Corporate Document 
Repository. Available at www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/Y1860E/y1860e00.htm [Accessed 4 
February 2008]. 
7
  This is so in countries such as Malawi and Burkina Faso. The average is around seventy to eighty 
percent. Available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook [Accessed 10 January 
2008].  
8
  Collier and Moitui (note 2) at 31 and the sources cited therein. 
9
  The first such plan is the Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture, November 2001 (Strategic 
Plan 2001). Subsequent plans include the Strategic Plan for the Department of Agriculture 2003 to 
2006; March 2003 (Strategic Plan 2003/6) the Strategic Plan for the Department of Agriculture 
2007 (Strategic Plan 2007) and the Strategic Plan for the Department of Agriculture 2008/09- 
2010-2011. (Strategic Plan 2008/9- 2010/11). The plans are available at www.nda.agric.za 
[Accessed 3 April 2009]. The Strategic Plan 2001 is derived from a framework of policy for the 
agricultural sector established by the following policy instruments (as listed in the Strategic Plan 
2001): 
• The New African Initiative, in terms of which African leaders pledge to eradicate poverty 
and pursue sustainable growth and development; 
• The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy which is intended to transform 
rural South Africa into an ‘economically viable and socially stable and harmonious sector 
that makes a significant contribution to the nation’s GDP’; 
• The Black Economic Empowerment Commission; 
• The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development programme; 
• The Vision and Code of Conduct for Labour Relations in Agriculture; 
• The Integrated Government Planning Framework; and 
• The 1995 White Paper on Agriculture and the 1998 Discussion Document on 
Agricultural Policy. 
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Formal agriculture provides employment to about 930 000 farm 
workers. This includes seasonal and contract workers. In addition, the 
smallholder sector provides full or part-time employment for at least 1,3 
million households. It is further estimated that about 6 million people 
depend on agriculture for a livelihood. Generally, the number of jobs 
created per unit of investment is higher in agriculture than in other 
sectors. This implies that growth in agricultural output has a significant 
impact on job creation. 
Notwithstanding the Department’s commitment to growth,10 the vital role of 
agriculture and the impact which growth of the sector could have on 
unemployment, poverty and hunger, statistics indicate shrinking output and a 
shrinking agricultural sector.11 The Strategic Plan 2007 indicates that: 
During 2005/06 the estimated volume of agricultural production was 
6,4% lower than in 2004/05. The volume of field-crop production 
decreased by 21,1% compared to the previous year as a result of the 
decrease in maize, sorghum and dry bean production.12 
The Strategic Plan 2008/09-2010/11 confirms this decline during the 2006/07 
period. During this period the estimated volume of agricultural production was 
only 1,1% higher than the 2005/06 period and ‘[t]he volume of field-crop 
production decreased slightly by 1,6% because of a decrease in oilseeds and 
hay products. Horticultural production also decreased by 2,1% because of a 
decrease in apricots, granadillas and cabbage production.’13  
Likewise, the SA Cotton Sector Strategic Plan: Implementation Programme 
Plan (IPP)14 envisages the expansion of cotton production by both commercial 
and small-scale farmers, yet the statistics show the opposite is in fact 
occurring.15 
                                                          
10
  See also government’s Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (November 2000). 
11
  The Strategic Plan 2001 indicates that primary agriculture accounts for 4,5% of the GDP of South 
Africa while the Strategic Plan 2007 indicates that agriculture contributed only 2,2% of the 2005 
GDP. 
12
  Strategic Plan 2007 (note 9) at 12. 
13
  Strategic Plan 2008/09- 2010/11 at 10. 
14
  22 April 2004. 
15
  In its April 2009 crop estimate, Cotton SA estimates that the production for 2008/09 will be ‘18% 
down from the previous season and the smallest in more than 45 years mainly due to low 
international prices at planting time and the more favourable prices of other competing summer 
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The Strategic Plan 2001, and the subsequent plans, envisage a ‘united and 
prosperous agricultural sector’, and were drafted in a consultative process 
with input from the key stakeholders including the Department of Agriculture, 
the National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU),16 and Agri South Africa (Agri 
SA).17 The plans indicate that the strategic goal for the agricultural sector is 
‘[t]o generate equitable access and participation in a globally competitive, 
profitable and sustainable agricultural sector contributing to a better life for all’. 
This chapter demonstrates that current policy and practices support the rights 
of industry stakeholders to the detriment of local agricultural communities and 
frustrate the attainment of the goals of equitable access and participation in a 
sustainable agricultural sector. The case study presented in this chapter 
focuses on the cotton sector and vulnerable small-scale farmers within the 
sector.  
Poor agricultural practices and inadequate or ineffective agricultural policy are 
a malaise not restricted to South Africa. Agriculture in many African countries 
has not been able to recover from colonially imposed inequity,18 from green 
revolution failures,19 and has suffered further neglect by post-colonial 
                                                                                                                                                                      
crops’. ‘Latest Crop Estimate’ at www.Cotton SA.org.za/ [Accessed 6 April 2009]. The total 
hectares planted with cotton has consistently decreased over the past decade; from 82 971 hectares 
in 1997/98 to 10 563 hectares in 2007/08. Although the area under cultivation has shrank 
significantly, the average yield during this period has shown consistent growth: during this period 
the average yield per hectare has increased from 746 kg seed cotton per hectare in 1997/98 to 2 
825 kg seed cotton per hectare in 2007/08. ‘Latest Crop Estimate’ at www.Cotton SA.org.za/ 
[Accessed 6 April 2009].  
16
  The National African Farmers Union of South Africa (NAFU) is an independent, non-
governmental, organisation, formed in 1991, with the assistance and support of the National 
African Chamber of Commerce and Industries (NARCOC). NAFUs vision is to be ‘[a] 
representative farmer organisation ensuring competitive, sustainable, and equitable empowerment 
of the majority of South African farmers.’ See www.nafu.co.za [Accessed 3 April 2009].  
17
  Agri SA was established in 1904 as the South African Agricultural Union. It currently has a 
membership base of approximately 70 000 large and small-scale commercial farmer members. The 
mission of Agri SA is to promote the sustainable profitability and stability of commercial 
agricultural producers and agribusinesses through its involvement and input on national and 
international level. See www.agriinfo.co.za [Accessed 3 April 2009].  
18
  See Collier (note 8) at 534-35 and the authorities cited therein. See also Ezekiel Walker 
‘Agriculture, cash crops, food security’ in Kevin Shillington (ed) Encyclopaedia of African History 
Vol 1 (1997) at 22-23. 
19
  Green revolution technology includes inputs such as chemical fertilizers, irrigation systems and 
improved plant cultivars. Although ‘successful’ in much of Asia, the promise of the green 
revolution failed to materialise in Africa. See InterAcademy Council (IAC) report titled ‘Realizing 
the promise and potential of African agriculture’ (2004) at xviii. Available online at 
www.interacademycouncil.net/CMS/Reports/AfricanAgriculture.aspx [Accessed 19 January 
2008]. The success of the green revolution in Asia has in fact been challenged for it has resulted in 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
82 
 
governments.20 Efforts to address these patterns of neglect are frustrated by 
both internal pressures21 as well as international trade regime with its import 
tariff reductions, dumping, agricultural subsidies, and the IP protection of 
agricultural tool.22 
3.2.2 The dumping of subsidised products 
Cheap agricultural products from countries such as the USA and China, 
where farmers are subsidised, are often dumped23 in developing country 
markets.  In 2007, the headline of a local newspaper24 cautioned: SA farming 
on knife-edge and the article suggests that: 
[s]ince 1990, over 20 000 South African farmers have left the land. 
Major problems include low import tariffs and the ‘dumping’ in South 
Africa of cheap agricultural products from rich countries where farmers 
are heavily subsidised. 
Subsidised cotton is a major problem for many African countries, particularly 
where cotton is an important export crop. The practice of subsidising farmers 
in the US, in the case of upland cotton, was challenged by Brazil25 before a 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.26 Brazil requested consultations with the US 
                                                                                                                                                                      
monocultures to the detriment of crop diversity and an increase in pests and pesticide use. Devlin 
Kuyek ‘Genetically modified crops in African agriculture: implications for small farmers’ (August 
2002) www.grain.org/briefings/?id=12 [Accessed 3 April 2009]. 
20
  New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) ‘Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme’ (CAADP(July 2003) 8. Available at 
www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/caadp.pdf [Accessed 19 January 2008]. See also § 7.3.3.3. 
21
  The major internal factors negatively impacting on agriculture in many African countries include 
civil unrest and the affect of HIV/AIDS on the community. Collier (note 8) at 529. 
22
  The question is also asked whether there is a link between modern technologies and the notion of 
agricultural deskilling: Stone expresses the view that the two agricultural technologies primarily 
responsible for the loss of agricultural skills are hybrid seeds and pesticide sprays and that GM 
seeds can contribute to deskilling depending on local circumstances. Glenn D Stone ‘Agricultural 
deskilling and the spread of genetically modified cotton in Warangal’ (2007) 48 (1) Current 
Anthropology 67 at 85. 
23
  Dumping occurs when a company exports a product to another country at a price lower than the 
cost of production or the price normally charged in its own home market. Although not specifically 
prohibited by the WTO trade rules, countries are entitled to take action against the practice of 
dumping by charging antidumping duties in terms of the Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex 1 A, Marrakesh Agreement. 
24
  Cape Times Monday, June 4, 2007 at 1. See also ‘Land reform founders on market forces: 
agricultural liberalisation crushing small-scale farmers’ Cape Times Tuesday, August 26, 2008. 
25
  Third parties who reserved their rights in the matter were Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, 
Chad, China, Chinese Taipei, European Communities, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Venezuela, Japan, Thailand.  
26
  United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton (DS 267). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
83 
 
in terms of the WTO rules in 2002 as it was concerned about government 
assistance provided to US cotton producers, users and exporters and the 
legislation which provided for such assistance in the form of subsidies, grants, 
export credits and the like.27 The Panel, in its report to Members in September 
2004, found that the actions of the US breached the WTO rules on subsidies, 
and that the US domestic support programmes resulted in suppressed prices 
in the world market which resulted in serious prejudice of Brazil’s (among 
other countries) interests. The US appealed to the Appellate Body which, in 
the main, upheld the findings of the panel and, although the US agreed to 
modify its practices to comply with its WTO obligations, it failed to do so 
adequately. In 2006 Brazil requested the establishment of a WTO panel in 
terms of the provisions concerned with the Surveillance of Implementation of 
Recommendations and Rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body.28 This Panel, 
and an Appellate Body hearing an appeal from the US in 2008 essentially 
concluded again that the US measures were inconsistent with the WTO’s 
Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).29  
Although ‘unsuccessful’, the US managed to draw the dispute out for at least 
6 years, protecting its cotton industry while damaging the more vulnerable 
cotton markets in other countries, including countries in West and Central 
Africa, during that time.30    
South Africa, unlike other large developing countries, has not used the WTO’s 
(costly) dispute resolution mechanisms and seems unlikely to, according to 
the head of the South African delegation to the WTO who has indicated that: 
                                                          
27
  Documentation on the dispute is available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm [Accessed 3 April 2009].  
28
  Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
1994, 33 ILM 1226 (1994). 
29
  The Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, are 
annexed to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (Marrakesh Agreement), 
1994, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (1994).  
30
  See for example the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Annex: Cotton 
subsidies and their effects on the economies of West and Central Africa’ in Economic development 
in Africa: trade performance and commodity dependence (2003) United Nations at 63-68.  
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[t]here are many areas where we could make a complaint against the 
US or EU, such as sugar, dairy and cotton, but other countries have 
had a greater interest in pursuing the US and EU on these issues.31 
Restrictions on trade barriers, first-world subsidies and dumping are not the 
only trade law threats to healthy agriculture in Africa: the international IP law 
regime also impacts on the health of the sector. 
3.2.3 International intellectual property law 
The IP rights regime instituted by the TRIPS32 Agreement has been described 
as creating ‘new forms of servitude’.33 Drahos and Braithwaite explain: 
When farmers farm with Monsanto’s seeds their world changes. Seeds 
become patented technology.[34] Farming becomes agricultural 
biotechnology. Farmers never own this technology. Instead they 
become its annual lessees under a system of patents and licences. 
Farmers manage a technological system on behalf of a corporate entity 
that keeps a monitoring eye on their land and crops to make sure that 
its patents and licenses are being observed.35 
IP rights in PGRs are becoming increasingly important, and challenging, for 
regulators seeking to achieve sustainable agriculture. In government’s 2004 
National Draft Discussion Document on Agricultural Biotechnology36 the IP 
rights dilemma is set out as follows:37  
a) There is an asymmetry between the nationality of most Plant 
Breeders’ Rights holders and the nationality of most users. … 
Approximately 60% of rights-holders in South Africa are 
foreigners … that are largely based in Europe and the North 
America. 
b) The exploitation of local biodiversity and indigenous knowledge 
presents a challenge for South Africa. For example, if farmers 
and traditional communities have adapted, improved and 
                                                          
31  Ann Crotty ‘SA fails to use WTO’s dispute process’ Cape Times Monday, November 9 2009. 
32
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).  
33
  Drahos with Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns the knowledge economy? (2002) at 38. 
34
  Monsanto’s patents in respect of cottonseed are described in § 3.2.5.  
35
  Drahos with Braithwaite (note 33) at 38. 
36
  Government Gazette No 27936, Notice 1591 of 2005. 
37
  Government Gazette No 27936, Notice 1591 of 2005 at para 2.4. 
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produced seed that is environmentally sustainable, who then 
deserves to reap the benefits of innovation through modern 
biotechnology? Individuals or the whole community (in a country 
that often doesn’t recognise collective rights)? 
c) Why should farmers provide access to landraces if there will not 
be due consideration for the benefits …  
d) Farmers are concerned that the possible introduction of gene 
use restriction technologies … could introduce an additional cost 
upon agricultural production as well as its potential impact on 
landraces. 
e) The majority of institutions in South Africa lack enforcement 
mechanisms for intellectual property rights. In fact, few even 
have an office coordinating intellectual property matters. 
f)  Strategically, there is no national coordination of intellectual 
property, particularly with regard to agricultural biotechnology. 
While public institutions grapple with these challenges, and the challenges of 
managing IP,38 key industry players in the agricultural sector, such as 
Monsanto, appear to use every available means to maximise their investment 
on research and development by securing IP rights such as patents and plant 
variety protection and through the use of contract law.39  
3.2.4 Monsanto’s operations in South Africa  
The Monsanto Company, a multinational agricultural company with its 
headquarters in St Louis, Missouri, is one of the world’s largest producers of 
agricultural products, with a mission to help farmers ‘feed, clothe and fuel our 
growing world’.40 Originally founded in 1901, as a chemical company,41 the 
new millennium saw Monsanto’s focus shift, through a series of mergers, 
acquisitions and business sales, from the chemical industry to the agricultural 
                                                          
38
  Draft Discussion Document on Agricultural Biotechnology 2004, Government Gazette No 27936, 
Notice 1591 of 2005 at para 3.7 indicates that ‘[t]here are management challenges with regard to 
the use of IPR, such as ways of disclosing intellectual property, questions of ownership, 
remuneration, forms of intellectual property exploitation, and the question of who should manage 
intellectual property rights as well as the growth and developmental challenges of a country like 
SA.’ 
39
  Monsanto’s Cotton Technology Agreement is scrutinised from a black-letter law perspective in 
chapter 4, and its broader context discussed in the text below.  
40
  www.monsanto.com/who_we_are/default.asp [Accessed 11 November 2009] 
41
  As a chemical company its products have included saccharin, agent orange, aspartame, 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone (rBGH). 
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biotechnology industry.42 Monsanto is one of the forerunners in plant genetic 
engineering and holds numerous patents in relation to, among other things, 
genetically engineered soy, canola, maize and cotton seed.43 Using these 
patents and its technology agreements, Monsanto determines how farmers 
may use the resultant genetically engineered seed.44  
In its 2008 Annual Report,45 the CEO, in his letter to shareholders, paints the 
picture of growing meat consumption in ‘places like China and India’ which is 
driving the need for more grain, a demand which Monsanto’s innovations seek 
to meet. On this basis, Monsanto commits ‘to increase … annual gross profit 
to a range of $9.5 billion to $9.75 billion in 2012’ which may well be achievable 
given Monsanto’s performance in 2008. In its financial highlights for 2008, the 
CEO indicates that: 
Monsanto realized record sales for a fifth consecutive year in fiscal 
2008, delivering compound annual earnings growth of 20 percent-plus 
during that time and enabling us to return value to shareowners 
through our investments, dividends and share repurchases. 
Monsanto appears to have been rewarded for its innovation and seems not to 
be struggling to recover its research and development costs.46 
Monsanto is important, and powerful, in the South African cotton market 
where at least 90% of all cotton grown is genetically modified,47 all of it 
currently using Monsanto’s patented technology. In 2006 Monsanto acquired 
                                                          
42
  For a discussion on the growth of the US seed industry and Monsanto’s position in the industry 
and its mergers and acquisitions, see Debra Blair ‘Intellectual property protection and its impact on 
the US seed industry’ (1999) 4 Drake J Agric Law 297-331. 
43
  Ibid. 
44
  See chapter 4. 
45
  At www.monsanto.com/investors/financial_reports/annual_report/2008/default.asp [Accessed 11 
November 2009]. 
46
  Monsanto indicates that its annual R&D budget is approximately 9% to 10% of its sales. In 2008 
Monsanto invested $980 million in research and development in respect of ‘new biotech traits, 
elite germplasm, breeding, new variety and hybrid development, and genomics research’. 
www.monsanto.com/investors/corporate_profile.asp [Accessed 11 November 2009]. 
47
  The Department of Agriculture reports that in 2005, ‘[g]enetically modified cotton accounted for 
approximately 90% of local cottonseed sales’. Department of Agriculture ‘The Seed Industry’ (10 
August 2005) at 1. Available at 
www.nda.agric.za/docs/Cropsestimates/THE%20SEED%20INDUSTRY.doc [Accessed 31 July 
2006]. 
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the Delta and Pineland Company (‘Deltapine’),48 the only seed company that 
produces and distributes Bt cotton seed in South Africa, thus consolidating its 
monopoly in the GM cotton market. South Africa is important to Monsanto as 
a showcase to other developing countries that, like the EU, may otherwise be 
resisting GM crops.49 
The Monsanto Technology Agreement, reproduced in annexure B and 
analysed in chapter 4, indicates that ‘Monsanto licenses the Grower under 
applicable patents owned or licensed by Monsanto to use these technologies’ 
and records that the South African patent numbers covering these 
technologies are 90/1417,50 86/592151 and 90/8699.52 These patents, in the 
genetic engineering field, are described in some detail below for two reasons. 
Firstly, the descriptions illustrate modern biotechnology (genetic engineering) 
in respect of agricultural crops, and secondly they indicate what is being 
protected (appropriated) as a form of private property (the claims stated in the 
patent establish the extent of the property right)53 and how seemingly 
unpatentable,54 naturally occurring, genetic material is altered and described 
in a manner that overcomes the statutory hurdles to patentability.55  
                                                          
48
  The acquisition has been confirmed by agents of Deltapine and Cotton SA. 
49
  When the (then) US trade representative, Robert Zoellick (now World Bank president) announced 
that the US would challenge the EU’s position on GM crops at the WTO, he was flanked by TJ 
Buthelezi, the chairperson of the Ubongwa Farmers Union in Makhathini. Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss 
‘Bt cotton in South Africa: the case of the Makhathini farmers’ Seedling April 2005, 13-21 at 13. 
50
  Patent application number 90/1417 is a patent involving ‘synthetic plant genes and method for 
preparation’ in the name of Monsanto Company. (See Patent Journal, April 1990). 
51
  Patent application number 86/5921 is a patent involving ‘glyphosate-resistant plants’ in the name 
of Monsanto Company (see Patent Journal, August 1987 at 125-126). 
52
  Patent application number 90/8699 is a patent involving ‘promoter for transgenic plants’ in the 
name of Monsanto Company (see Patent Journal, December 1990 at 101).  
53
  Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf Intellectual property and international trade: the TRIPS 
Agreement (2008) at 242. 
54  Section 25(4)(b) of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978 provides that: ‘[a] patent shall not be 
granted- 
(a)  ... 
(b)  for any variety of animal or plant or any essentially biological process for the production of 
animals or plants, not being a micro-biological process or the product of such a process.’ 
55
  Ibid. The use of the words ‘variety’ and ‘essentially biological process’ are intended to exclude 
from patentability naturally occurring processes and traditional breeding products and processes. 
On the other hand, the door is opened to genetically engineered plants through the patentability of 
micro-biological processes and products, including micro-organisms (Article 27(3)(b) TRIPS), 
which patent offices have accepted can mean plant genes. Margaret Llewelyn and Mike Adcock 
(eds) European plant intellectual property (2006) at 65.  
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3.2.5 Monsanto’s patents in respect of genetically engineered cotton 
South Africa’s Patent Act56 provides for patents to be granted for any new57 
invention which involves an inventive58 step and which is capable of being 
used or applied in trade or industry or agriculture.59 Although the Act excludes 
from patentability plant varieties and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants, it does not exclude micro-biological processes or the 
product of such a process.60  Although the Department of Agriculture’s 
discussion document on agricultural biotechnology indicates that ‘it is not clear 
whether products of biotechnology such as plants … can be patented,’61 it is 
common practice to do so, as the discussion below reveals.  
South African patents endure for a period of 20 years62 from the date of filing 
and thus the first registered of the three patents, patent number 86/5921, has 
already expired some years back63 and is no longer protected by the Patents 
Act. The remaining two patents will expire during 2010. Once these patents 
have expired, Monsanto’s technology may however continue to be protected 
either by new patents in respect of newer innovations,64 or possibly to a more 
                                                          
56
  Act 57 of 1978. 
57
  ‘Novelty’ generally requires an invention not to have been previously disclosed, and to be state of 
the art at the time priority is claimed. See for example Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 
1972 1 SA 589 (A) and Netlon Ltd v Pacnet (Pty) Ltd 1977 3 SA 840 (A). 
58
  An invention is inventive if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to that 
which forms part of the state of the art at the time. See for example Ensign-Bickford (South Africa) 
(Pty) Ltd and Others v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd 1999 (1) SA 70 (SCA). 
59
  Section 25(1). 
60
  Section 25(4)(b). There are no provisions in the Act or any additional guidelines on 
biotechnological inventions nor is there any case law in this regard. See also Kent Nnadozie et al 
(eds) African perspectives on genetic resources: a handbook of laws, policies, and institutions 
(2003) at 240. 
61
  Government Gazette No 27936, Notice 1591 of 2005 at 26.  What this comment reveals is the lack 
of co-ordination among government departments: whereas the Department of Trade and Industry, 
through its CIPRO office, allows for claims over plants, the Department of Agriculture does not 
appear to be aware of this. 
62
  Section 46(1) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 provides that: ‘[t]he duration of a patent shall … be 20 
years from the date of application therefore, subject to payment of the prescribed renewal fees …’. 
63
  The patent expired on 6 August 2006. 
64
  This is sometimes expressed as ‘evergreening’ which is a strategy to tweak existing inventions in 
order to create a new patentable invention. See for example European Patent Office (EPO) 
‘Scenarios for the future: how might IP regimes evolve by 2025? What global legitimacy might 
such regimes have?’ (2007) at 75. 
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limited extent, by way of contract law and through the protection of plant 
breeders’ rights in the various cultivars.65  
The rights afforded by a patent grant are limited to the claims contained in the 
patents. An invalid claim in a patent ‘until corrected or amended, is an 
insurmountable obstacle to the grant of relief for infringement of the patent’.66  
A description of each patent is set out below.  
3.2.5.1 Patent 86/5921: glyphosate-resistant plants 
The first South African patent of the three listed in Monsanto’s agreement 
relates to an invention that allows for the genetically modified plant cells 
(modified to be resistant to a particular herbicide) to be successfully 
regenerated into plants that are themselves resistant to the herbicide.  
This invention is in the fields of genetic engineering, biochemistry and plant 
biology. The patent explains that prior art had already established that the 
insertion of a modified gene (from bacteria) that expresses the EPSPS 
enzyme into a plant cell was able to create glyphosate-resistant (GlyR) plant 
cells.67 Glyphosate is the active ingredient in Monsanto’s herbicide called 
Roundup. Prior art had also established that glyphosate tolerant plant cells 
can be selected which overproduce EPSPS in the presence of low levels of 
glyphosate. What had not been done previously was to devise a method of 
genetically transforming plant cells in a manner that causes the regenerated 
cells and plants to also become resistant to glyphosate.68  
The patent lists the suitable plants for the invention as including soybean, 
cotton, alfalfa, canola, flax, tomato, sugar beet, sunflower, potato, tobacco, 
                                                          
65
  Plant breeders’ rights are protected in terms of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976 and 
discussed further in chapters 4 and 5.  
66
  H Lundbeck A/S and Another v Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd 2008 BIP 79 (CP). 
67
  Complete Specification of Patent Number 86/5921 at 2. 
68
  Complete Specification of Patent Number 86/5921 at 3. The technical description in the patent is 
to the effect that ‘[t]he present invention embraces a cloning or expression vector which contains a 
gene which encodes a form of EPSPS which can effectively confer glyphosate resistance (GlyR) on 
plant cells and plants regenerated therefrom. The EPSPS gene encodes a polypeptide which 
contains a chloroplast transit peptide (CPT), which enables the EPSPS polypeptide (or an active 
portion thereof) to be transported into a chloroplast inside the plant cell.’ Complete Specification 
of Patent Number 86/5921 at 4. 
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corn, wheat, rice and lettuce.69 The method for transforming cotton cells is set 
out in the patent.70 
There are 36 claims in the patent71 including the claim over the gene which 
renders the plant cell resistant to glyphosate.72 The claims extend to 
glyphosate-resistant: tomato plants,73 tobacco plants,74 oil seed rape,75 flax 
plant,76 soybean plant,77 sunflower plant,78 sugar beet,79 alfalfa plants,80 but 
not cotton plants. The impact of the omission of cotton plants is not entirely 
clear but is most likely insignificant given the claims over the gene. In any 
event, the patent has expired.  
If a strict approach to the patentability requirements was adopted, the 
inventive step81 of this invention could arguably be challenged on the basis 
that prior art had already established that the insertion of a modified gene 
(from bacteria) that expresses the EPSPS enzyme into a plant cell was able to 
create glyphosate-resistant (GlyR) plant cells. Prior art had also established 
that glyphosate tolerant plant cells can be selected which overproduce 
EPSPS in the presence of low levels of glyphosate. What had not been done 
previously was to devise a method of genetically transforming plant cells in a 
manner that causes the regenerated cells and plants to also become resistant 
to glyphosate. The question is whether the method devised would have been 
obvious to a person skilled in the art. While the standard of inventiveness 
required in the US is low, countries are at liberty to determine their standard 
according to their needs. 
                                                          
69
  Complete Specification of Patent Number 86/5921 at 5. 
70
  Complete Specification of Patent Number 86/5921 at 40-1. 
71
  Complete Specification of Patent Number 86/5921 at 68-71. 
72
  Claim 1, Complete Specification of Patent Number 86/5921 at 68. 
73
  Claim 23. 
74
  Claim 24. 
75
  Claim 25. 
76
  Claim 26. 
77
  Claim 27. 
78
  Claim 28. 
79
  Claim 29. 
80
  Claim 30. 
81
  See note 58. The question ‘Was the invention obvious?’ is asked in assessing inventive step. See 
for example Generics (UK) Ltd v Lundbeck A/S [2007] RPC 32 (at 20) cited in Intellectual 
Property Office ‘Examination guidelines for patent applications relating to biotechnological 
inventions in the Intellectual Property Office’ (April 2009) at para 26.   
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Even after its expiry, Monsanto continues to refer to the patent in their Cotton 
Technology Agreement. Monsanto was approached for comment regarding 
their likely contractual arrangement with farmers once the patents have all 
expired. No response was forthcoming despite repeated requests for 
information from both the local and the US office.  
3.2.5.2 Patent 90/1417: synthetic plant genes and method for 
preparation 
This patented invention relates to the engineering of synthetic genes for 
insertion into plants in a manner which increases the expression efficiency of 
the inserted synthetic gene. The broad patent claims cover plants and seeds 
which contain the synthetic gene. The patent, in the statement of the 
invention,82 indicates that: 
[t]he present invention provides a method for preparing synthetic plant 
genes which genes express their protein product at levels significantly 
higher than the wild-type genes which were commonly employed in 
plant transformation heretofore. In another aspect, the present 
invention also provides novel synthetic plant genes which encode non-
plant proteins. 
More specifically, the invention describes the preparation of synthetic plant 
genes which encode the crystal protein toxin of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt).83 
The invention indicates that in prior art the expression of the Bt toxin protein in 
plants has been problematic as mostly the levels of expression are low. This 
compromises the insecticidal efficacy of the genetically engineered plant.84 
This invention addresses the problem by offering a means to elevate the 
expression level of Bt toxin proteins in plants.85 
                                                          
82
  Patent 1990/1417 at 16. 
83
  Patent 1990/1417 at 16. 
84
  Patent 1990/1417 at 18, 22. 
85
  Patent 1990/1417 at 22. On the method of plant transformation, the patent indicates that a chimeric 
plant gene containing a structural coding sequence of the present invention can be inserted into the 
genome of a plant by any suitable method. Patent 1990/1417 at 32. 
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Plants which the patent identifies as suitable for use of the invention include 
soybean, cotton, alfalfa, oilseed rape, flax, tomato, sugarbeet, sunflower, 
potato, tobacco, maize, rice and wheat.86 
In so far as the patent claims are concerned, the patent contains 46 claims,87 
ranging from claims over the method for improving the expression of a 
heterologous gene in plants by modifying the structural coding sequence of 
the gene;88 to claims over a structural gene which encodes an insecticidal 
protein of Bacillus thuringiensis;89 to a plant transformation vector comprising 
a particular plant gene;90 to a chimeric plant gene which comprises a 
structural coding sequence encoding an insecticidal protein of Bacillus 
thuringiensis;91 to a transformed plant cell containing a specified chimeric 
plant gene;92 and to plants93 that contain the transformed plant cell; and finally 
even the seed94 produced by such a plant. As with the previous patent, 
novelty and inventiveness could be assessed by a person skilled in the art. 
The patent expires on 23 February 2010.  
3.2.5.3 Patent 90/8699: promoter for transgenic plants 
This invention involves the DNA sequence of a promoter from the figwort 
mosaic virus (FMV) which functions as a strong and uniform promoter for 
chimeric genes inserted into plant cells.95 
Broadly stated, a promoter assists an inserted gene to express the protein for 
which it codes in the plant cell.96 Certain promoters (strong promoters) are 
more effective at this than others. Whereas prior art showed that a promoter 
                                                          
86
  Patent 1990/1417 at 32. 
87
  Patent 1990/1417 at 115-171. 
88
  Claim 1 of Patent 1990/1417 at 115. Method claims are contained in claims 1 through to 12, and 
claim 27. See also claims 39 and 40. 
89
  Claims over structural genes are contained in claims 13 to 24 and claims 26, 28, 29. See also claim 
41. 
90
  Claim 25 of Patent 1990/1417 at 161. See also claim 42. 
91
  Claims over a chimeric plant gene are contained in claims 30-33. See also claim 43. 
92
  Claims over transformed plant cells are claims 34 and 35. See also claim 44. 
93
  Patent protection over plants is claimed in claims 36 and 37. See also claim 45. 
94
  Claim 38. See also claim 46. 
95
  Abstract of the Disclosure, Patent 1990/8699. ‘The promoter is used in a plant cassette vector, a 
chimeric gene and in methods for transforming plant cells to obtain transgenic plants, plant cells or 
seeds incorporating the FMV promoter.’ Abstract of the Disclosure, Patent 1990/8699. 
96
  Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699 at 1A. 
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from the cauliflower mosaic virus (CaMV) was the ‘strongest constitutive 
promoter known in plants’,97 this promoter also showed a high degree of 
variability. The object of the patented invention therefore was to ‘provide a 
promoter for use in transgenic plants that exhibits an increased and more 
uniform level of expression of a gene product … than that exhibited by 
previously known plant promoters.’98 The invention uses the figwort mosaic 
virus (FMV).  Both the cauliflower mosaic virus and the figwort mosaic virus 
are members of the caulimoviruses which are a group of double-stranded 
DNA viruses.99  
The patent specifically indicates that suitable plants for the invention include 
soybean, cotton, alfalfa, oilseed rape, flax, tomato, sugar beet, sunflower, 
potato, tobacco, maize, wheat, rice and lettuce.100 
The patent contains 48 claims, including claims over the promoter;101 a 
method for transforming a plant cell to express a chimeric gene containing the 
promoter;102 a chimeric gene containing the promoter;103 a transformed plant 
cell containing the chimeric gene;104 a plant transformation vector capable of 
inserting a chimeric gene containing the promoter into susceptible plant 
cells;105 a transgenic plant containing such transformed plant cells;106 and a 
seed107 from such a plant. 
In addition to a possible challenge to inventiveness in light of prior art, a 
challenge might also be launched against the patent on the basis that a 
discovery of something that has always existed is not novel and is therefore 
not patentable.108 Increasingly however it is standard practice abroad ‘to 
                                                          
97
  Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699 at 2. 
98
  Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699 at 4. 
99
  Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699 at 7. 
100
  Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699 at 14. 
101
  Claims 1-5 of the Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699. See also claim 42. 
102
  Claims 6-9 of the Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699. See also claims 22, 23 and 43. 
103
  Claims 11-14 of the Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699. See also claim 44. 
104
  Claims 16-21 of the Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699. See also claim 45. 
105
  Claims 24-27 of the Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699. See also claim 46. 
106
  Claims 28-34 of the Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699. See also claim 47. 
107
  Claims 35-41 of the Completed Specification of Patent 90/8699. See also claim 48. 
108
  Section 25(1)(a) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
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recognise the novelty for a natural substance which has been isolated for the 
first time and which had no previously recognised existence.’109 
This patent expires on 30 October 2010.  
A discussion on the validity of these patents is constrained by the absence of 
case law and guidelines for the patentability of biotechnological inventions in 
South Africa. The South African patent office is not an examining office and 
any challenges to validity are likely to require litigation. 
Monsanto’s genetic engineering patents are particularly valuable in a country, 
like South Africa, that permits GM crops. This usually involves the regulation 
of genetic modification (or modern biotechnology) in terms of international and 
national biosafety law. The regulatory regime in the South African context, and 
the broader global uptake of GM crops, is introduced in the section below. The 
regulatory regime is discussed in more detail in chapter 5 in the context of the 
state’s regulatory powers.  
3.3 Genetic modification and its regulation   
3.3.1 Definitions 
The terms modern110 biotechnology,111 genetic engineering and genetic 
modification are often used interchangeably. Techniques in modern 
biotechnology involve the transfer of genes between species in a manner and 
                                                          
109
  Howard Florey Institutes Application / Relaxin OJEPO 1995, 388 (V 0008/94) cited in UK 
Intellectual Property Office guidelines (note 81).  
110
  Modern biotechnology should not be confused with the so-called traditional methods of 
biotechnology which produced products such cheese, beer and penicillin. Early (or traditional) 
forms of biotechnology include centuries old techniques such as fermentation and the selective 
breeding of plants and animals. Biotechnology becomes modern biotechnology when it involves 
the transfer of genetic material between organisms, in a manner occurring without contact between 
the organisms. See Mackenzie et al An explanatory guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
IUCN (2003) at 7. The evolutionary development of biotechnology is sometimes described as the 
three generations, or phases, of biotechnology. The first two phases (traditional biotechnology) 
consisting of first generation techniques such as selective breeding and fermentation and second 
generation use of pure cell or tissue culture to yield new products, and the third phase being 
modern biotechnology which uses recent advancements in gene technology, such as the ability to 
transfer genes between species, in a manner which could not occur using traditional techniques. 
Iqbal Parker et al ‘A national biotechnology strategy for South Africa’ (June 2001) Department of 
Arts, Culture, Science and Technology at 1. 
111
  The term biotechnology broadly encompasses the use of living things (organisms) or their 
derivatives, in various techniques, to make or modify products and processes. See for example the 
definition of biotechnology in Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
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at a speed not previously possible.112 A definition for genetic modification is 
contained in South Africa’s Genetically Modified Organisms Act113 and 
modern biotechnology is defined in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,114 a 
protocol negotiated in terms of the Convention on Biological Diversity,115 
which South Africa is party to.   
Whereas the Cartagena Protocol embraces a much narrower definition of 
living modified organisms,116 the South African GMO Act more broadly defines 
a genetically modified organism as: 
… an organism the genes or genetic material of which has been 
modified in a way that does not occur naturally through mating or 
natural recombination or both, and ‘genetic modification’ shall have a 
corresponding meaning.117 
In other words, any modification of genes or genetic material in a manner that 
does not occur naturally is defined by the GMO Act as a genetically modified 
organism. The definition of modern biotechnology in the Cartagena Protocol is 
somewhat narrower than this. The protocol defines modern biotechnology as: 
… the application of:  
a.  In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into 
cells or organelles, or  
b.  Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family,  
that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination 
barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and 
selection… 
                                                          
112
  A National Biotechnology Strategy for South Africa (June 2001) Department of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology at 1-3. 
113
  Act 15 of 1997. The GMO Act is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
114
  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2000, 39 ILM 1027 (2000). 
115
  Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
116
  Article 3 of the Protocol defines a living organisms and living modified organisms as follows: 
‘(g) “Living modified organism” means any living organism that possesses a novel 
combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology;  
(h) “Living organism” means any biological entity capable of transferring or replicating 
genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids…’. 
117
  Section 1 of the GMO Act. 
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The protocol therefore applies to technologies which involve in vitro or ‘fusion’ 
techniques that are not used in traditional breeding and that overcome natural 
barriers.  
The provisions of the Protocol and the GMO Act, both discussed further in 
chapter 5, would therefore be applicable to GM cottonseed118 produced using 
the techniques described in the above-mentioned patents. The Protocol 
regulates the transboundary movement of GMOs and the GMO Act regulates 
activities involving GMOs in the South African context. South Africa is one of a 
relatively small group of countries that has actively embraced GM crops, as 
figures 3 and 4 below illustrates. 
3.3.2 Extent of cultivation 
GM crops have been commercially cultivated for more than a decade.119 It is 
reported that in the year 2006, one year after the first decade of 
commercialised GM crops, the global area of GM crops increased by thirteen 
percent (twelve million hectares) to reach a total of 102 million hectares.120 By 
2008 three more countries were growing GM crops and the global area 
increased to 125 million hectares.121 The global area of commercialised GM 
crops, per country, in 2008 is set out in figure 3. 
                                                          
118
  Currently cotton is genetically modified to perform one of two (or both) functions: to act as a 
pesticide or as a herbicide or to perform a combination of these functions. Cotton that is 
genetically modified to act as a pesticide is known as Bt cotton. Bt refers to Bacillus thuringiensis, 
a bacterium occurring naturally in soil which, when its genes are inserted into the cotton plant, 
produces toxins that are effective in controlling certain insect infestations (eg the bollworm), hence 
reducing the need for certain pesticides. The second type of genetic modification occurs when the 
cotton plant is modified to resist (survive) the herbicide glyphosate (ie Monsanto’s Roundup 
Ready) which would ordinarily kill both weeds and the cotton plant. Cotton plants that are 
genetically modified to have both traits, which are known as stacked varieties, are also 
commercially available. Stephen Greenberg ‘Global agriculture and genetically modified cotton in 
Africa’ (October 2004). Available at www.grain.org/research/btcotton.cfm?links [Accessed 10 
January 2008]. 
119
  See for example the United States Department of Agriculture ‘The first decade of genetically 
engineered crops in the United States’ (2006). Available at 
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib11/eib11.pdf [Accessed 4 February 2008]. 
120
  International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) ‘Global status of 
commercialized biotech/GM crops: 2006’. Available at 
www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/default.html [Accessed 4 February 2008]. 
121
  The three new countries are Egypt, Burkina Faso and Bolivia. ISAAA Brief 39 – 2008 Executive 
Summary available at 
www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/39/executivesummary/default.html [Accessed 3 April 
2009].  
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Rank Country Area (million hectares) GM Crops 
1 USA 62.5 Soybean, maize, cotton, canola, 
squash, papaya, alfalfa, sugar beet 
2 Argentina 21.0 Soybean, maize, cotton 
3 Brazil 15.8 Soybean, maize, cotton 
4 India 7.6 Cotton 
5 Canada 7.6 Canola, maize, soybean, sugar beet 
6 China 3.8 Cotton, tomato, poplar petunia, 
papaya, sweet pepper 
7 Paraguay 2.7 Soybean 
8 South Africa 1.8 Maize, soybean, cotton 
9 Uruguay 0.7 Soybean, maize 
10 Bolivia 0.6 Soybean 
11 Philippines 0.4 Maize 
12 Australia 0.2 Cotton, canola, carnation 
13 Mexico 0.1 Cotton, soybean 
14 Spain 0.1 Maize 
15 Chile <0.1 Maize, soybean, canola 
16 Colombia <0.1 Cotton, carnation 
17 Honduras <0.1 Maize 
18 Burkina Faso <0.1 Maize 
19 Czech 
Republic 
<0.1 Maize 
20 Romania <0.1 Maize 
21 Portugal <0.1 Maize 
22 Germany <0.1 Maize 
23 Poland <0.1 Maize 
24 Slovakia <0.1 Maize 
25 Egypt <0.1 Maize 
Source: Clive James, 2008. 
Figure 3: Global area of GM crops by country in 2008 
Up until 2008, South Africa was the only African country with commercial GM 
crops. In 2008 South Africa was joined by Burkina Faso and Egypt.122 In 
addition, laboratory research and field trials are being conducted in a number 
of African countries including Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Sudan, 
Algeria, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Nigeria and Angola.123  
                                                          
122
  Ibid. 
123
  Grain at www.grain.org/seedling_files/seed-04-07-gm-africa-map.pdf [Accessed 4 February 
2008]. See also Steven Were Omamo and Klaus von Grebmer (eds) Biotechnology, agriculture, 
and food security in southern Africa (2004) at 15. 
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The most common occurring GM crops are cotton, soybean and maize, and, 
in the 2004/05 season approximately 90 percent of cotton seed, 52 percent of 
soybean and 20 percent of maize seed sold in South Africa was genetically 
engineered.124 Field trials being conducted in South Africa include canola, 
potato, tomato and wheat. The map125 shown in figure 4 indicates the extent 
and location of GM crops grown in South Africa in 2004/5. 
  
(Source: Biowatch) 
Figure 4: Genetically modified crops in South Africa (2004/5) 
Genetic modification in agriculture, and the distribution of its products,126 is 
controversial127 and opinions in this regard are polarized.128 Concerns about 
                                                          
124
  Department of Agriculture ‘The Seed Industry’ (10 August 2005). Available at 
www.nda.agric.za/docs/Cropsestimates/THE%20SEED%20INDUSTRY.doc [Accessed 31 July 
2006]. 
125
  Published by Biowatch at www.biowatch.org.za/main.asp?include=docs/gm_crops.html. 
[Accessed 4 February 2008]. 
126
  In 2002 African countries, in dire need of food, were offered genetically modified food aid from 
the US. Zambia rejected the GM foods and stood by its rejection; Zimbabwe, an exporter of non-
GM foods, agreed to accept the maize only if it was milled so that farmers would be incapable of 
planting the maize and contaminating local crops; and Lesotho, Malawi and Mozambique 
eventually relented and accepted the GM food.  
127
  In addition to ethical and religious concerns with the technology, there is concern generally about 
the possible threat posed by the technology to the environment (biodiversity) and to human and 
animal health. In addition, a spectre of socio-economic consequences may arise from the use of 
GM crops including ‘the displacement of traditional crops and its attendant problems, and the 
disruption of small scale farming systems’. Collier and Moitui (note 2) at 33, citing Mackenzie et 
al (note 110) at para 35. See generally also Christoph Baumgartner ‘Exclusion by inclusion? On 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
99 
 
GM cotton include environmental129 and socio-economic130 factors. These 
concerns are discussed in the context of the case study in chapter 6.  
The potential value of biotechnology is recognised in the Biotechnology 
Strategy for South Africa.131 Supporting legislation, the GMO Act, has enabled 
the approval and the import of many agricultural biotechnology products.132 
The SA approach has been criticised, on the one hand for being overly 
restrictive and therefore stifling industry, and on the other for being overly 
permissive and for lacking in broader consultation and appreciation of the 
local context.133 In so far as the technology itself is concerned, what appear to 
be benefits to the farmer should not obscure increased risks and exposure to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
difficulties with regard to an effective ethical assessment of patenting in the field of agricultural 
bio-technology’ (2006) 19 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 521-539. 
128
  See for example Susanne Freidberg and Leah Horowitz ‘Converging networks and clashing 
stories: South Africa’s agricultural biotechnology debate’ (2004) 51(1) Africa Today 3-25. On the 
potential benefits of GM see for example Julian Kinderlerer ‘Genetically modified organisms: a 
European scientist’s view’ (2000) 8 NYU Environmental Law Journal 556-565. 
129
  In addition to the concern about the vulnerability of monocultures, there is growing evidence that 
the benefits, or effectiveness, of genetically engineered cotton crops decrease over time. In 
Australia, for example, one study reports that the pesticide benefits of Monsanto’s genetically 
engineered Ingard cotton varieties steadily declined from one season to the next: ‘Average use of 
insecticide … was 52% less in 1996/1997 (season of Ingard introduction), 44% less in 1997/1998, 
and only 38% less in 1998/1999.’ Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss and Christine Jardine, Biowatch South 
Africa, Briefing No. 3 ‘Genetically engineered cotton. High risks, low returns’ (2004) at 3. 
Available at www.biowatch.org.za/pubs/briefings/2004/briefing03.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2009]. 
It is also reported that a seven-year study by the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy, the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences and Cornell University in the US has found that farmers in China 
who planted Bt cotton initially cut their pesticide use by more than 70% and earned around 36% 
more than farmers planting conventional cotton; but that pesticide use on the GM crops had to be 
increased over time and this lead to GM cotton farmers ultimately earning 8% less than 
conventional cotton farmers. See the Cornell Chronicle ‘Seven-year glitch: Cornell warns that 
Chinese GM cotton farmers are losing money due to “secondary” pests’ online at 
www.cals.cornell.edu/cals/public/comm/news/archive/seven-year-glitch.cfm [Accessed 3 March 
2009]. Notwithstanding potential environmental risks, it would appear that the biosafety trials, 
which should have been conducted two or three years prior to the release of the seed to farmers, 
were conducted almost simultaneously with its release. Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss, Biowatch South 
Africa, ‘Bt cotton and small-scale farmers in Makhathini – a story of debt, dependence, and dicey 
economics’ available at www.grain.org/btcotton/?id=100 [Accessed 3 March 2009]. 
130
  On socio-economic concerns and biotechnology in Africa see generally Collier and Moitui (note 2) 
and see the discussion in chapter 6. 
131
  The strategy was developed under the auspices of the Department of Science and Technology in 
2001. The Biotechnology Strategy is available online at 
www.pub.ac.za/resources/docs/biotechstrategy_2002.pdf [Accessed 6 April 2009]. The strategy is 
criticised for being hastily drafted with a ‘corporate-driven, top-down orientation’. Aaron deGrassi 
‘Genetically modified crops and sustainable poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa: an 
assessment of current evidence’ (June 2003) Third World Network at 22. 
132
  The Department of Agriculture provides a list of all GMO permits issued on its website at 
www.nda.agric.za/ under Regulatory and Other Services | Plant | Plant Genetic Resources | Genetic 
Control. [Accessed 3 April 2009]. 
133
  See Michel Fok, Jean-Luc Hofs, Marnus Gouse, Johann Kirsten ‘Contextual appraisal of GM 
cotton diffusion in South Africa’ (2007) Vol 1 (4) Life Science International Journal at 468-482.  
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hardship by vulnerable farm workers and small-scale and subsistence 
farmers.  
3.4 Cotton and the South African cotton market 
3.4.1 Cotton: not just a textile fibre 
Cotton, grown from seed, is a summer crop that can withstand harsh climates 
(but requires moisture to germinate) making it a potentially useful cash crop 
for farmers in Africa. After the USA and Uzbekistan, Africa is the third largest 
cotton export region in the world.134 The varieties of wild species of cotton,135 
some of which may be native to southern Africa, are generally considered to 
be commercially unviable: common commercial cotton crops include Egyptian, 
Sea Island, American Pima, and American Upland. Cotton is used not only as 
a textile fibre, but also to produce cottonseed oil which is used in many food 
products and in animal feed. 
In an historical account Cotton South Africa (Cotton SA)136 indicates that ‘[i]n 
1516 … a certain Barbosa met natives in South Africa who grew cotton and 
wore cotton clothing. This was a type of wild cotton, species of which still exist 
today. The first cotton seed was planted [by settlers] in 1690 in the Western 
Cape, more or less 40 years after the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck.’137  
Cotton was then brought from the United States in 1846 and was planted in 
the Amanzimtoti district in Natal and, between 1860 and 1870 cotton 
cultivation was encouraged in Natal and in the Cape due to the demands for 
cotton arising from the American Civil War. It appears that production then 
dropped off until the twentieth century. In the early decades production was 
encouraged in what were then the Transvaal Lowveld and the Eastern 
                                                          
134
  Stephen Greenberg ‘Global agriculture and genetically modified cotton in Africa’ (2004) African 
Centre for Biosafety at 4.  
135
  On the difficulties of identifying centres of origin, see CL Brubaker and JF Wendel ‘Reevaluating 
the origin of domesticated cotton (Gossypium hirsutum; Malvaceae) using nuclear restriction 
fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs)’ (1994) 81 American Journal of Botany 1309-1326 
which indicates that the dominant commercial species (Gossypium hirsutum L) originates from the 
‘semiarid tropics and subtropics of the Caribbean, northern South America, and Mesoamerica’ (at 
1309). 
136
  Cotton SA is an association incorporated under Section 21 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
137
  Cotton SA ‘History of cotton in South Africa’ www.Cotton SA.org.za [Accessed 3 April 2009].  
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Transvaal. Soon thereafter, the production of cotton was encouraged in 
regions of Natal and, in 1927, cotton was grown under irrigation in the Lower 
Orange river region.138 
Cotton was declared an agricultural crop in 1939,139 and in 1974 the Cotton 
Board was established. The Cotton Board, among other things, fixed prices 
for the cotton industry.140 The Cotton Board was dissolved, following the 
enactment of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act of 1996,141 and Cotton 
South Africa (Cotton SA) was established as a non profit (section 21)142 
organisation to administer the cotton industry in South Africa,143 but not to set 
prices, as the cotton trade was liberalised at about the same time. 
The production of cotton in South Africa has steadily declined since the 
market was liberalised, most likely due to falling world prices and the 
comparatively better price of competing crops such as maize, sunflower seed 
and sugar cane.144 Lack of access to credit since 2002 has also played a role 
in the decreasing number of cotton farmers.145 As a result a number of cotton 
ginneries have been unable to cover their fixed costs of operation and have 
consequently closed down.146  
For large-scale commercial farmers, cotton is cultivated in combination with 
other crops while, for small-scale farmers (such as those who farm in the 
                                                          
138
  Cotton SA ‘History of cotton in South Africa’ www.Cotton SA.org,za [Accessed 3 April 2009]. 
139
  Section 102 of the (now repealed) Co-operative Societies Act 29 of 1929. Cotton SA ‘History of 
cotton in South Africa’ www.Cotton SA.org,za [Accessed 3 April 2009]. 
140
  Michel Fok et al ‘Contextual appraisal of GM cotton diffusion in South Africa’ (2007) Vol 1 (4) 
Life Science International Journal 468-482.  
141
  Act 47 of 1996, discussed in chapter 4. 
142
  Section 21 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
143
  Its functions include the rendering of information services, the stimulation of production and the 
usage of cotton, the enhancement of the marketability of cotton through research, quality standards 
and norms as well as training, to act as advisory body to various Government Departments, to 
apply for appropriate statutory measures in terms of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 
and to administer such measures, small-scale cotton farmer development and overseeing the 
Cotton Sector Strategy Plan. 
144
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. Cotton production has declined from approximately 157 515 bales in 
2000/01 to approximately 96 501 in 2001/02 to approximately 47 466 in 2009/10. M Gouse, JF 
Kirsten and L Jenkins ‘Bt cotton in South African: adoption and the impact on farm incomes 
amongst small-scale and large scale farmers’ (2003) 42(1) Agrekon 15-28 at 16 and Cotton SA 
(www.Cotton SA.org.za). 
145
  See note 15. See also Stephen Morse and Richard Bennett ‘Impact of Bt cotton on farmer 
livelihoods in South Africa’ (2008) 10 Int J Biotechnology 224 at 226. 
146
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. 
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Makhathini Flats), the opportunities to produce other crops are limited by the 
harsh climate and the lack of support services.147 For commercial (large-
scale) cotton growers, and small-scale farmers alike, pesticide saving and 
peace of mind about bollworms are indicated as the most important benefit of 
Bt cotton.148 While the cost of the seed and technology agreement is indicated 
as the major disadvantage (resulting in some farmers ceasing to plant the 
seed),149 other ‘benefits’ include increased yield and labour saving.150 
As mentioned above, at least 90% of all cotton grown in South Africa is 
genetically modified. 151 In the Makhathini Flats the figure is closer to 100%.152  
The practice is for Cotton SA to make cotton cultivar recommendations in 
conjunction with experts in the cotton industry.153 Recommendations are 
made for each production region. The 2008/09 recommendations for the 
KwaZulu Natal region (which includes the Makhathini Flats) are: 
• NuOPAL RR  NuOPAL 
• DeltaOPAL RR DeltaOPAL 
• DP Lebombo BG/RR (for handpicking purposes) 
• DP 444 BG/RR (for all regions) 
• DP 445 BG/RR 
All of these are Deltapine (Monsanto)154 cottonseed, and all of the cultivars 
recommended are GM cottonseed except for the DeltaOPAL. Cottonseed 
suppliers stock a limited variety of cottonseed and it is increasing difficult for 
farmers to obtain conventional (non-GM) seed: if it is available it is generally 
packaged in large 25 kg bags that small-scale farmers are unable to afford.155 
                                                          
147
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. 
148
  M Gouse, JF Kirsten and L Jenkins (note 144) at 20-21. 
149
  M Gouse, JF Kirsten and L Jenkins (note 144) at 20.  
150
  M Gouse, JF Kirsten and L Jenkins (note 144) at 20-21. 
151
  The alternatives to Bt cotton include conventional cotton crops which require extensive (and 
harmful) pesticide spraying, and organic alternatives which may involve techniques such as crop 
rotation, companion planting and the use of natural sprays. 
152
  Stephen Morse and Richard Bennett ‘Impact of Bt cotton on farmer livelihoods in South Africa’ 
(2008) 10 Int J Biotechnology 224 at 237. 
153
  See the Cotton SA ‘National cultivar recommendations for cotton – 2008/09’ available at 
www.Cotton SA.org,za [Accessed 3 April 2009]. 
154
  In South Africa, Deltapine is a subsidiary company of Monsanto. 
155
  Harald Witt et al ‘Can the poor help GM crops? Technology, representations & cotton in the 
Makhathini Flats, South Africa’ (2006) 109 Review of African Political Economy 497 at 507. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
103 
 
Farmers who purchase GM cottonseed are required to sign the Cotton 
Technology Agreement, reproduced in annexure B. 
The high percentage uptake of GM cottonseed in the Makhathini Flats is 
packaged by some as the successful deployment of agricultural 
biotechnology, narrated through the experiences of small-scale farmers in 
Makhathini.156  A more compelling view is that farmers simply have no choice 
in the matter. This view maintains that the ‘favourable attention accorded the 
Makhathini cotton farmers is indicative not of the appropriateness of the 
technology, but a symptom of a development policy and life-science industry 
which is keen for the technology to succeed’.157 In effect, government policy 
strengthens the hand of the property rights holders. 
3.4.2 The Makhathini farmers: triumph or tragedy?158  
Makhathini is situated in the northern KwaZulu Natal province in the floodplain 
area east of the Ubombo mountains, below the Pongolapoort Dam 
                                                          
156
  See for example Ismael, Thirtle and Beyer ‘Can GM technologies help the poor? The efficiency of 
Bt cotton adopters in the Makhathini flats of KwaZulu-Natal (2002) 41 Agrekon 62-74; and 
Stephen Morse and Richard Bennett ‘Impact of Bt cotton on farmer livelihoods in South Africa’ 
(2008) 10 Int J Biotechnology 224-239.  
157
  Harald Witt et al (note 155) at 498. See also Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss ‘Bt cotton in South Africa: 
the case of the Makhathini farmers’ (2005) in Seedling Barcelona, Spain: Grain and the authorities 
cited in note 158 below. 
158
  Authors who, in their publications, are ‘cautiously optimistic’ about the deployment of Bt cotton in 
Makhathini include Yousouf Ismael, Richard Bennett, and Stephen Morse ‘Can farmers in the 
developing countries benefit from modern technology? Experience from Makhathini Flats, 
Republic of South Africa’ 2001 (Vol 1 No 5) Crop Biotech Brief; Stephen Morse and Richard 
Bennett ‘Impact of Bt cotton on farmer livelihoods in South Africa’ (2008) 10 Int J Biotechnology 
224-239; Colin Thirtle, Lindie Beyers, Yousouf Ismael and Jenifer Piesse ‘Can GM technologies 
help the poor? The impact of Bt cotton in Makhathini Flats, KwaZulu-Natal (2003) Vol 31 No 4 
World Development 717-732; M Gouse, JF Kirsten and L Jenkins ‘Bt cotton in South Africa: 
adoption and the impact on farm incomes amongst small-scale and large-scale farmers’ (2003) 
42(1) Agrekon 15-28; and M Gouse, C Pray and David Schimmelpfennig ‘The distribution of 
benefits from Bt cotton adoption in South Africa’ (2004) 7(4) AgBioForum 187-194. 
Slightly less enthusiasm for the technology is expressed by Hofs JL & Kirsten J ‘Genetically 
modified cotton in South Africa: the solution for rural development?’ (2001) Working paper 2001-
17, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Pretoria.  
Authors that are more critical of the technology in Makhathini include Harald Witt, Rajeev 
Patel and Matthew Schnurr ‘Can the poor help GM crops? Technology, representation & cotton in 
the Makhathini Flats, South Africa’ (2006) 109 Review of African Political Economy 497-513; 
Devlin Kuyek ‘Genetically modified crops in African agriculture: implications for small farmers’ 
(August 2002) www.grain.org/briefings/?id=12 [Accessed 11 November 2009]; Stephen 
Greenberg ‘Global agriculture and genetically modified cotton in Africa’ (October 2004) African 
Centre for Biosafety; Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss ‘Bt cotton in South Africa: the case of the 
Makhathini farmers’ (2005) in Seedling Barcelona, Spain: Grain and Aaron deGrassi ‘Genetically 
modified crops and sustainable poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa: an assessment of current 
evidence’ (June 2003) Third World Network. 
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(sometimes called the Jozini Dam) on either side of the Pongola River. 
Makhathini falls within the Umkhanyakuda district, one of the poorest in the 
province, and the majority of farmers in the area are small-scale farmers with 
landholdings generally between 1 and 3 hectares.159 There are approximately 
5000 small-scale farmers in the area, the majority are women, as a result of 
the migration of men to mines, plantations, and industry.160 
Recognising its enormous cropping, fishing and grazing potential – the area 
has fertile alluvial soils and an annual rainfall of approximately 600mm – the 
Pongola River floodplain was reserved for development by the British colonial 
government during its period of reign and, when South Africa became a 
Republic in 1961 it became state land.161 The river was dammed in the 
1960s,162 with the intention that it would be used for irrigation for the growing 
of sugar cane by ‘poor whites’.163 For a variety of reasons though, those 
earmarked for occupation did not take up occupation in the region. 
The damming of the river had major consequences for Makhathini’s residents: 
fishers and farmers engaged in floodplain agriculture lost their livelihoods164 
and some 5000 individuals were resettled in order that the irrigation scheme 
could be established.165 Although the scheme opened up the possibility for the 
large-scale cultivation of cotton, as it had the potential to provide a predictable 
and controllable supply of water to the flats,166 the (expensive) scheme has 
largely failed and much of the region remains rain fed. This presents almost 
insurmountable challenges to cotton farmers. Notwithstanding these 
challenges, government institutions continue to support the cotton industry in 
                                                          
159
  Witt et al (note 157) at 498. 
160  Aaron deGrassi ‘Genetically modified crops and sustainable poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan 
Africa: an assessment of current evidence’ (June 2003) Third World Network at 33. 
161
  Clive Poultney ‘Water committees take action’ ILEIA Newsletter, v1n92, 1992. 
162
  The damming of the river had consequences for local agriculture. The previously natural flooding 
cycle was interrupted and replaced by controlled flooding from the dam. The controlled releases of 
water (undertaken by the Department of Water Affairs) often led to problems being experienced by 
farmers due to incorrect timing or duration of floods. In 1987 Water Committees were established 
to allow for representation of user groups from the affected communities in determining when 
water would be released. Poultney (note 161). Water from the Jozini Dam, and state land 
connected with the dam is now administered by Mjindi Farming (Pty) Ltd, a parastatal 
organisation. Witt et al (note 157) at 503. 
163
  Poultney (note 161). See also Witt et al (note 157) at 499. 
164
  Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 24. 
165
  Witt et al (note 157) at 500. 
166
  Witt et al (note 157) at 499. 
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the area. One of the downsides of ‘[t]he surging interest in cotton as the key 
institutionally supported cash crop [is that it] triggered a corresponding 
decrease in a number of food crops which had previously been planted 
regularly in the area’.167 
GM cotton was introduced by Monsanto and Deltapine into the Makhathini 
region in 1998. This would not have been possible without the backing of 
public institutions such as the Department of Agriculture and the Land Bank 
which provided financial support for farmers through a private facilitator, the 
Vunisa Cotton Company, which, until around 2002, was the sole supplier and 
purchaser of cotton seed. Vunisa would advance credit on the agreement that 
farmers would deliver their seed cotton to Vunisa. In 2001/02 a new company, 
the Makhathini Cotton (Pty) Ltd (MCC), erected a new gin in the area. Many 
farmers sold their seed cotton to MCC, who offered higher prices, 
notwithstanding their agreement with Vunisa. Vunisa and the Land Bank 
suffered a financial blow as a result. Only limited credit was available in the 
2002/03 season (the MCC did not offer credit facilities) and by the 2003/04 
season Vunisa had stopped operating in the area.168  
Farmers who purchase GM cottonseed sign the Cotton Technology 
Agreement (reproduced in annexure B) which requires that farmers: 
• Use the seed for planting a commercial crop for only one season; 
• Plant a refuge as part of the insect resistance management strategy; 
• Not supply any seed containing Bollgard to any third party; 
• Not use or provide seed containing Bollgard to anyone for crop 
breeding, research, or seed production; 
• Not ratoon any Bollgard cotton; 
• Allow Monsanto agents to inspect the growers’ fields to ensure that 
the correct refuge areas have been planted.169 
                                                          
167
  Footnote omitted. Witt et al (note 157) at 500. 
168
  Fok et al (note 140) at 5. 
169
  Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss, Biowatch South Africa, ‘Bt Cotton and small-scale farmers in 
Makhathini – A story of debt, dependence, and dicey economics’ available at 
www.grain.org/btcotton/?id=100 [Accessed 3 March 2009]. 
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A 2001 survey of twelve farmers who planted Monsanto’s Bollgard revealed 
that farmers did not understand the contracts they had signed.170 In some 
cases ‘farmers understand their contracts to mean that in the case of a crop 
failure, the seed will be replaced.’171 Only one of the twelve farmers indicated 
that he had been fully apprised of the terms of the contract; five of the twelve 
were aware of the need to plant refuges and only three had done so.172  
There have been studies which indicate marginal economic benefits and 
benefits relating to reduced pesticide use relative to previous cultivation of 
conventional cotton.173 The majority of the farmers in a study of 100 farmers in 
the Makhathini area between 2003 and 2005 indicate that the increased 
livelihood is invested in their children’s education, although school attendance 
is negatively impacted during the harvesting period.174 Other uses of the 
increased livelihood include the repayment of debt (28 respondents); 
investment in cotton (45 respondents); and investment in other crops (20 
respondents).175  
There is some evidence that farmers who are able to finance genetically 
modified crops become trapped in a debt-cycle that is in fact worse than the 
debt-cycles already experienced by farmers growing non-genetically modified 
crops.176 Even prior to the release of GM cottonseed, farmers, as a matter of 
course, faced depressing levels of indebtedness, exacerbated by poor yields 
and the fact that cotton was often the only source of credit in the region.177 
                                                          
170
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
171
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
172
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). The industry recognises the real possibility of resistance developing 
and has made it a contractual requirement that users of Bt crops plant refuges of non-GE varieties 
to ensure that a sub-population of insects is not exposed to Bt toxin. It is intended that this sub-
population will not develop any resistance and will pass on the non-resistant gene, diluting the 
resistant genes coming from insects that have been exposed to and survived Bt toxin. Elfrieda 
Pschorn-Strauss and Christine Jardine, Biowatch South Africa, Briefing No. 3 ‘Genetically 
engineered cotton. High risks, low returns’ (2004) at 4. Available at 
www.biowatch.org.za/pubs/briefings/2004/briefing03.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2009]. 
173
  Conventional cottonseed is cheaper than GM cottonseed. In addition to the increased cost of the 
seed, when farmers purchase GM cottonseed, they are required to pay a technology fee. In the 
2006/07 season Wenkem provided Nu Opal (Bt) seed at R165 per 5kg and, in addition, the 
technology user fee cost R 114 per 5 kg. The cost of Nu Opal RR seed was R176 per 5 kg and the 
technology fee R258 per 5kg.  
174
  Morse and Bennett (note 156) at 230-31. 
175
  Morse and Bennett (note 156) at 230. 
176
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
177
  Witt (note 157) at 504. 
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GM cottonseed has not provided a solution to this ‘dependent cyclical 
relationship’ between farmers and an ‘ever-changing set of developmental 
institutions that has served to entrench farmers in a high risk, low-return 
system of agriculture that is neither financially nor ecologically tenable’.178 
Small-scale farmers are also likely to be vulnerable in terms of not owning 
land which in itself has an important impact on sustainable agriculture. 
Farmers uncertain about land tenure are unlikely to invest in and pursue long-
term agricultural solutions, and will rely rather on to cash crops such as 
cotton.  
Access and ownership of land, following land dispossession during 
colonisation, the impact of apartheid, and the slow redistribution of land 
thereafter,179 is of major socio-economic concern. Currently much of the area 
under discussion is predominantly owned by the state and is held in trust by 
the Minister of Land Affairs until such time as it is redistributed to the 
inhabitants of the area.180 Small-scale farmers are faced with a hostile 
environment where the slow redistribution of land, liberalisation of agricultural 
markets and a decrease in support all contribute to deepening poverty.181 It 
has thus been said that, ‘… [s]cientists and researchers discussing Bt cotton 
without regard to the land issue have the effect of consciously or unwittingly 
downplaying the massive injustices and inequalities of the past and 
present.’182 The odds for development seem to be stacked against the most 
vulnerable of communities. 
Since the introduction of genetically engineered cotton, the number of cotton 
varieties available to farmers has decreased (and available varieties are 
mostly, and in some areas exclusively, genetically engineered). While yields 
may have risen, overall production has fallen, costs have increased, many 
jobs have been lost, and spinners have expressed dissatisfaction with the 
                                                          
178
  Witt (note 157) at 504. 
179
  Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 31-2.  
180
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
181
  Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 32. 
182
  Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 32. 
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quality of cotton being produced.183 Although the argument is sometimes 
made that a successful cotton industry requires a great deal of coordination 
among public and private players and that this is better achieved when the 
number of companies involved is few, suggesting that competition should 
yield to coordination,184 communications with Cotton SA and the Agricultural 
Research Centre do indicate that the lack of competition in the South African 
context has negative consequences.185  
Figures 5 and 6 below, compiled from Cotton SA186 statistics reflect estimates 
of the extent of the cultivation and the performance of cotton in the region 
during the period under review. The vast differential in respect of the number 
of cotton growers and the size of the area under cultivation is explained by 
variable climatic and economic factors.187  
Figure 5 indicates small-scale farmer cotton production in KwaZulu Natal from 
1996 (two years prior to the introduction of GM cotton seed in the region) and 
figure 6 indicates the average cotton yield statistics per hectare for dryland 
cultivation in South Africa. 
Total hectares of cotton cultivated in 
KZN Production year 
DRYLAND IRRIGATION TOTAL 
Estimated 
number of 
small-scale 
farmers 
1996/97 9379 471 9850 3000 
1997/98 9700 454 10154 2200 
1998/99 4821 318 5139 2200 
1999/00 6000 300 6300 3000 
2000/01 3200 10 3210 3000 
2001/02 9593 0 9593 3229 
2002/03 1060 0 1060 353 
2003/04 3000 1300 4300 1594 
2004/05 1645 400 2045 598 
                                                          
183
  Pschorn-Strauss and Jardine (note 172) at 3. 
184
  David Tschirley, Colin Poulton and Duncan Boughton ‘The many paths of cotton sector reform in 
Eastern and Southern Africa: lessons from a decade of experience’ (2006) MSU International 
Development Working Paper No 88. 
185
  Concerns about monocultures, cost, and general public interest have been expressed by these 
organisations. 
186
  At www.Cotton SA.org.za.  
187
  JL Hofs, B Hau, D Marais and M Fok ‘Boll distribution patterns in Bt and non-Bt cotton cultivars 
II. Study on small-scale farming systems in South Africa’(2006) at 
www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/1789/1/Hofs_Boll2(2006).pdf [Accessed 3 March 2009]. 
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2005/06 5200 1560 6760 2260 
2006/07 1900 1030 2930 853 
2007/08 860 440 1300 2260 
2008/09 1500 0 1500 809 
Figure 5: Small-scale cotton production in KwaZulu-Natal (1996-2008) 188 
YEAR 
TOTAL RSA 
HECTARES 
DRYLAND 
AVERAGE YIELD 
(seed cotton per 
hectare) 
DRYLAND 
MAKHATHINI 
YIELD 
(seed cotton per 
hectare) 
DRYLAND 
1997/98 67 017 403 620 
1998/99 69 578 580 643 
1999/00 67 356 545 270 
2000/01 40 282 777 1000 
2001/02 38 153 593 400 
2002/03 28 897 515 400 
2003/04 12 252 475 600 
2004/05 17450 492 600 
2005/06 8 866 521 388 
2006/07 8 394 485 650 
2007/08 2 863 451 500 
Figure 6: Total dryland cotton yield statistics per hectare189 
The statistics from the decade under review of GM cotton cultivation in 
Makhathini Flats are briefly narrated below. 
1997/98 – 1998/99 – 1999/2000 – 2000/01  
During the first four seasons under review, the number of cotton growers in 
the area fluctuated between 2000 and 3000 and the area under cultivation, by 
some accounts, at times exceeded 12 000 hectares.190 At this time the Vunisa 
Cotton Company was the sole supplier of cotton and was able to offer credit 
due to its relationship with the Land Bank.   
Farmers were encouraged to purchase Monsanto’s Bollgard technology on 
the basis that the crops would increase the farmers’ yields and would require 
                                                          
188
  The table consists of extracts from Cotton SA’s statistics titled ‘small scale farmer cotton 
production in the RSA’ available online at www.Cotton SA.org.za. The figures are estimates, as 
reported at small scale cotton farmers’ forum meetings. 
189
  The table is an extract from Cotton SA’s table titled ‘hectares planted and yields for the Republic 
of South Africa’ available online at www.Cotton SA.org.za. 
190
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. 
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reduced insecticide spraying.191 Additional inputs into the Makhathini project 
included a donation from Monsanto of $10,000 to the Ubombo Farmers 
Association for the purchase of farming equipment in 2001.192 In order to 
encourage farmers to plant cotton, Monsanto and Deltapine introduced money 
back policies and other incentives.193 
2001/02 season 
In this season the area under cultivation increased substantially from the 
previous season, and the number of small-scale farmers engaged in cotton 
cultivation increased by almost 30%.  
It was around this time that the cultivation of cotton in Makhathini was hailed a 
success194 and used to pressure other African countries to adopt GM crops195 
and as a moral justification for the Biotech Products196 case, discussed in 
chapter 5, against the European Communities.197 The argument is that 
Europe’s cautious approach toward GM food has a detrimental effect on 
Africa’s potential to fight poverty and food insecurity.198  
The ‘success’ refers to the high percentage uptake of GM cotton: many 
reports fail to indicate the broader implications of adopting GM cotton in a 
market where there is over-production and depressed world prices.199 In 
addition, GM cotton is a labour-saving technology which has lead to major 
labour cuts on large commercial farms: since 1998 more than 58 000 cotton-
                                                          
191
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
192
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
193
  Communication from Marnus Gouse, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Pretoria (17 January 2008). 
194
  Reports by the genetic modification industry indicate that the cotton yields of the small-holder 
farmers increased dramatically by up to 220%. Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). What the reports fail to 
indicate, amongst much else, was the artificial level of support and the package of inputs that 
accompanied the seeds. Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
195
  Pressured countries include Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Pschorn-Strauss (note 169). 
196
  European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R. 
197
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169) See the many examples of the discourse of ‘biotechnology for the 
poor’ cited in Hisano, Shuji ‘A critical observation on the mainstream discourse of “biotechnology 
for the poor”’ (2005) 82 Working Paper Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University. 
198
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 169).  
199
  The price of cotton in South Africa has fallen almost 40% since the introduction of Bt cotton in 
South Africa in 1998. Cotton SA statistics cited in Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 34. 
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farm workers have lost their jobs.200 This is a dire situation with South Africa’s 
already unacceptably high unemployment figures.201  
During this period, the Makhathini Cotton Company came into operation and 
established a local gin; this ultimately led to a litigated dispute with the Vunisa 
Cotton Company and the eventual demise of the Vunisa Cotton Company and 
its ‘reckless lending’ practices.202  
2002/03 season 
The area cultivated dropped during the 2002/03 – to around just over 1 400 
hectares and the number of small-scale farmers to less than 400.203 Late rains 
and drought were experienced,204 and many farmers are reported to have lost 
their entire crops, with those who had planted GM crops in greater debt than 
conventional seed farmers after the crop failure.205 Many farmers lacked 
access to credit following the demise of Vunisa and cancelled credit facilities. 
 2003/04 season 
Notwithstanding the poor previous season, around 1 500 farmers grew cotton 
in the 2003/04 season.206 Productivity nevertheless remained low, placing a 
strain on the finances of the Makhathini Cotton Company (MCC). It is 
indicated that, for the MCC gin to ‘turn a profit it will have to process over 10 
million kg a year … . In the 2003/4 season … the gin processed only 8 million 
kg.’207 Matters never improved, as will be discussed below. 
2004/05 season 
                                                          
200
  A Cotton SA statistic cited in Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 34. 
201
  Official unemployment rates are close to 30%. A van Niekerk (ed) Law@work (2008) at 4. 
Statistics South Africa indicate that between January and June 2008, 153 000 people employed in 
the agricultural sector lost their jobs. Statistics South Africa ‘Quarterly labour force survey –  
additional aspects of the labour market in South Africa: informal employment; underemployment 
and underutilised labour; unemployment’ (2008) at 23. 
202
  Makhathini Cotton (Edms) Beperk v Vunisa Cotton (Edms) Bpk (2002) Unreported case. Witt (note 
157) at 503. 
203
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. 
204
  Fok et al (note 140) at 12. 
205
  Pschorn-Strauss (note 163). 
206
  Fok et al (note 140) at 14. 
207
  Witt (note 157) at 506. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
112 
 
The number of cotton farmers (548) dropped and the area under cultivation 
remained low.208 The yields for the 2003/04 and 2004/05 seasons, although 
up from the drought seasons in 2001/02 and 2002/03, remained well below 
the yields achieved in the 2000/01 season.  
2005/06 season 
The area under cultivation rose to more than 6 000 hectares of dryland cotton 
and the number of cotton farmers increased to over 2000.209 This substantial 
increase is ascribed to the provision of free (Monsanto) seed by the KwaZulu 
Natal Agricultural Department.210 Notwithstanding these efforts, yields 
remained low as a result of harsh climatic conditions. 
2006/07 season 
The number of cotton farmers fell to just over 800 (no free inputs were 
provided) and the area under cultivation dropped to around a half211 of the 
previous season’s cultivated area. Increased yields were realised, but overall 
productivity remained low. 
2007/08 season 
The area under cultivation dropped again this season, although the estimated 
number of small farmers increased. The sustained low productivity over the 
previous seasons ultimately led to an application for the liquidation of the 
Makhathini Cotton Company.212 
2008/09 (current) season 
In the 2008/09 season matters did not improve: farmers were confronted with 
late rains and were again without a local cotton ginnery to provide their cotton 
                                                          
208
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. 
209
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. 
210
  Fok et al (note 140) at 6. See also the table titled ‘small-scale cotton farmer production estimates’ 
at www.Cotton SA.org.za/reports_tables.aspx?tableID=8 [Accessed 11 November 2009]. 
211
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. See also the table titled ‘small-scale cotton farmer production estimates’ 
at www.Cotton SA.org.za/reports_tables.aspx?tableID=8 [Accessed 11 November 2009]. 
212
  A provisional order was granted in the Natal Provincial Division on 16 November 2007 
(N167/2007). 
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to. Despite all of government’s efforts, there is no institutional framework that 
small-scale farmers growing cotton in Makhathini can turn to for support.  
The production costs of cotton are high due to the cost of seed and its 
associated inputs. These costs and the low world prices for cotton are the 
major hurdles facing both commercial and small-scale farmers.213 Whereas 
the cost of conventional cotton represents 40-60% of the total input cost, with 
the introduction of Bt cotton the percentage increases to 70-80%,214 thus 
putting resource-poor farmers at greater financial risk.215 Notwithstanding the 
clear risks facing the Makhathini cotton farmers, most do not produce any 
alternative crop.216 Reasons for this are the harsh climate, the lack of irrigation 
and the lack of a functioning market. In addition, agriculture itself, it seems, is 
under pressure: 
In SA smallholder agriculture is also associated with poverty and 
farming is no longer attractive to the youth in the rural areas. The 
reduction, if not disappearance of the supply of much needed technical 
assistance, contributes to make agriculture further less attractive.217 
In so far as cotton yields are concerned, as the statistics above reflect, the 
cultivation of GM cotton in Makhathini is unimpressive. Studies indicate that 
up until the 2002/03 season, the cotton lint yield fluctuated around 200 kg/ha 
(or 540 kg/ha of seed cotton) which is estimated at around half of the yield in 
Francophone African countries.218 In China, irrigated cotton yields are in 
excess of 3000 kg per hectare.219 Interpreting the Cotton SA statistics, the 
opinion has been expressed that increases in yields since the introduction of 
GM cottonseed are almost insignificant and even less impressive, bearing in 
mind that the cost of GM cotton is so much greater than conventional 
cotton.220 It has been reported that the only farmers who are able to purchase 
                                                          
213
  Cotton SA have indicated that they would like to see more competition in the market and, to this 
extent, are considering alternative cultivars where the focus would be on dryland production. 
214
  Fok et al (note 140) at 8. 
215
  Fok et al (note 140) at 8. 
216
  This is contrary to the typical practice in family farming in Africa. Fok et al (note 140) at 11.  
217
  Fok et al (note 140) at 12. 
218
  Fok et al (note 140) at 3. 
219
  Morse and Bennett (note 156) at 227. 
220
  See generally Hofs et al (note 187). 
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seed, when access to credit is not available, are those who have access to 
pension income.221  
Although Makhathini has been flouted as an ‘example of the potential for 
science to improve people’s lives,’222 and notwithstanding studies that indicate 
that using Bt cotton can benefit farmers in technical respects,223 on deeper 
reflection surprise is expressed that the overall results and the overall 
performance of cotton in the region has not deterred farmers from growing 
cotton.224 The point is made that: 
[t]echnical solutions can not be expected to solve problems of an 
institutional order and in the case of the Makhathini Flats cotton 
producers, focus on a technical solution has diverted attention from the 
institutional problems.225 
Cotton production, by large and small-scale farmers, is likely to continue to 
limp in South Africa, until there is an appropriate institutional response beyond 
a ‘corporate-driven, top-down orientation.’226 The problems are compounded 
by the global over-production of cotton, and resulting low world prices, for 
which both first world subsidies and Bt technology have been implicated. 227  
3.4.3 Monsanto/ government: a relationship detrimental to public interest?  
The cost of the increasingly extensive scope of IP protection afforded to 
biotechnology companies may include: ‘increases in genetic uniformity, 
increases in market concentration, higher costs to farmers, and potentially 
higher … prices for the public.’228 In the case of Monsanto’s GM cotton, there 
is evidence of market concentration, higher costs to farmers and fears of 
                                                          
221 
 Marnus Gouse et al ‘Bt cotton and Bt maize: an evaluation of direct and indirect impact on the 
cotton and maize farming sectors in South Africa’ (2008) Study conducted for the South African 
Department of Agriculture, which illustrates the precarious economics of small-scale cotton 
production, indicating that ‘gross margins are frequently less than R1,000 per hectare, roughly 
equivalent to the current monthly old-age pension.’ 
222
  Siyabulela Ntutela, Wieland Gievers and Rudzani Ramaite (eds) Science-based improvements of 
rural/subsistence agriculture: forum proceedings (2006) Academy of Science of South Africa at 4.  
223
  For example, a reduction in the use of pesticides and reduced labour needs.  
224
  Fok et al (note 140) at 14. 
225
  Fok et al (note 140) at 15. 
226
  Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 22.  
227
  Ibid. 
228 
 Ewens, Lara E ‘Seed wars: biotechnology, intellectual property and the quest for high yield seeds’ 
(1999) 23 Boston College Intl and Comparative Law Review 285-310 at 308. 
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monoculture. The impact of this and other global trends in cotton, on the 
livelihoods of many farm workers and small-scale farmers has been 
devastating.229 There is very little, if any, decent alternative work for those 
who have lost their livelihoods in the process.  
Government, through its policies, and the provision of credit and cottonseed, 
has been intimately involved with the uptake of GM cottonseed in Makhathini. 
Farmers in the area have become dependent on these provisions, and, where 
crops have failed, have been caught up in a vicious cycle of debt.  
Institutional planning for the area has been described as an ‘incoherent and 
continually mutating institutional framework imposed upon a matrix of 
changing developmental and political philosophies [which has] led to a lack of 
continuity and poor co-operation.’230 As a result ‘high levels of institutional 
mistrust, disillusionment with development as a process, and crippling levels 
of indebtedness’ pervade the area.231 
In 2002, a preliminary agricultural development plan for the Makhathini Flats 
was launched.232 The plan was drafted by independent consultants233 who 
concluded that the Makhathini Flats ‘has the potential to produce vast 
quantities of food, including the staples of maize, wheat and rice’.234 The 
development plan envisaged the region as the breadbasket of South Africa, 
indicating that the environmental conditions of the Makhathini Flats are 
potentially conducive to numerous other crops such as coastal cashews and 
macadamia nuts and a long list of fruit and vegetables including avocadoes, 
bananas, cassava, mangoes, onions, pumpkin and squash. Water is available 
for irrigation purposes from the Jozini/Pongolapoort Dam. The consultant’s 
report indicates that ‘[r]esearch has illustrated conclusively that the Makhathini 
                                                          
229
  According to Cotton SA, thousands of farmer workers have lost their jobs, quoted in deGrassi 
(note 160) at 34. 
230
  Witt (note 157) at 500. 
231
  Witt (note 157) at 500. 
232
  See the address by Mr Narend Singh, (then) KwaZulu-Natal Minister of Agriculture and 
Environmental Affairs, at the launching of a preliminary development plan – ‘towards an 
agricultural development plan for the Makhathini flats’ Mjindi Farmers’ Hall, 17 October 2002. 
Online at www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02121716461001.htm. 
233
  Urban-Econ Development Economists and Zakhe. 
234
  Singh (note 232). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
116 
 
Flats can produce a range of food and crops in quantities to make a significant 
impact in the South African and international markets’. 
To address the remoteness of markets, the preliminary plan suggests juice 
extraction and canning operations. Implementing the plan was the task of the 
KwaZulu Natal Agricultural Development Trust, a public/private sector 
partnership, and the KwaZulu Natal Agricultural Development Forum. 
Although criticised for a lack of consultation and what was still essentially a 
top-down process in which the plan was drafted,235 the plans nonetheless 
sketched an alternative possibility.236  
Crop failures have resulted in thousands of vulnerable farmers being forced to 
vacate their farms.237 In the meanwhile government continues to support 
cotton in the region.238 The lack of proper engagement and consultation 
between small-scale farmers and government most likely affords Monsanto 
opportunities it might otherwise not have had.  
Although Monsanto’s profits from the South African market are not likely to be 
high; its aim, amidst possible shrinking markets elsewhere, will be to gain 
access to the African and other developing markets.239  
                                                          
235
  Aaron deGrassi (note 160) at 27. 
236
  A written enquiry to the KwaZulu Natal Department of Agriculture on the status quo of 
developments (dated 3 March 2009) remains unanswered. The consultants, to whom the 
correspondence was copied, have responded to say that they are not aware of any finalisation or 
implementation of the development plan.  
237
  In 2005 it was reported that the Makhathini cotton farmers, over a period of five years ‘have been 
fighting a losing battle that has forced 2 400 of them to abandon their farms.’ Thabiso Machiko 
‘Cotton farmers ripped to shreds’ Business Report, May 29, 2005. Available online at 
www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=552&fArticleId=2537782 [Accessed 2 March 2009]. 
Various explanations for this state of affairs are explored in the report, including the cost of the 
patented GM cottonseed, and the inability of farmers to pay back loans which they entered into in 
order to purchase the seed.  
238
  It is reported that Makhathini Cotton received a grant of R3.2 million to help indebted farmers, 
which was to be used ‘buy fertilisers and other chemicals needed to plant cotton’. Business Report 
(note 237). 
239
  The WTO decision against USA cotton subsidies may eventually lead to the downfall of the USA 
cotton market. This, in addition to ‘[c]losed markets in Europe, worldwide consumer rejection, 
heated international debates about the risks of GMOs, and the intransigence of Africa, sans, South 
Africa, to commercially accept GMOs, hugely threaten Monsanto’s market share in the 
agricultural biotechnology industry.’ African Centre for Biosafety ‘Monsanto’s “seed of hope 
campaign” in South Africa – a briefing document’ (January 2007) at www.biosafetyafrica.net 
[Accessed 13 March 2009].  
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The short-and-long term consequences of Monsanto’s contractual 
relationships with farmers,240 and the seemingly charitable handing out of free 
seed and other agricultural inputs should be reflected upon. 241 The profits of 
cotton for small-scale farmers are slim and give no cause to celebrate the 
Makhathini small-scale farmers as a successful model of development. 
For other African countries the fact that farmers are restrained from saving 
seed for the following season is also important. It is traditional practice, and 
indeed the practice of the majority of small-scale farmers in Africa, to save 
seed from year to year.242 While this may not be true of cotton farmers in the 
South African context, it may well have relevance in the maize and soy 
markets in South Africa. Although South African farmers may have lost their 
skills to extract cottonseed from the boll, in many developing countries, 
including Burkina Faso, this is still the practice. These are all factors that 
should influence decisions on the uptake and the regulation of GM cotton 
seed.  
3.5  Concluding remarks 
Government itself acknowledges that ‘the environmental, social, economic 
and agricultural implications of the recent biotechnology advances are not yet 
                                                          
240
  In addition to the technology agreement, Monsanto also contracts farmers to produce GM seed for 
local and export markets. This practice has both been criticised (‘GM Seed Producers Suffer 
Severe Losses’ (October 2005) at www.flag-sa.org/newsletter.htm [Accessed 11 November 2009]) 
and praised (NARU Farmer, ‘BEE + GM = SUCCESS’ (February Issue, 2007) at 13). 
241
  In addition, the socio-economic and long term impact of Monsanto’s involvement in programmes 
of the Department of Agriculture and other government initiatives should be reviewed. For 
example, it is questioned whether Monsanto’s involvement in the Eastern Cape Province through 
the Massive Food Production Programme is appropriate. In terms of the programme emerging 
farmers receive subsidies to buy seeds, herbicides and fertilizers. In effect, public funding is made 
available for the purchase of Monsanto’s Combi-Packs, thus government itself is becoming an 
agent to promote Monsanto’s campaign. The long-term implications for small-scale farmers who 
change from open pollinated maize seed to hybrid seed, and any food security implications need to 
be considered.  The point is made that ‘[u]sing new technologies such as hybrid and GM seeds in 
African regions will not dramatically improve farmers’ yield compared to that received from 
farming with traditional, open pollinated varieties. In addition, in comparison to using open 
pollinated seeds, which are often saved by the farmers themselves, hybrid and GM seeds are 
expensive inputs, which need to be bought every planting season.’ African Centre for Biosafety 
‘Monsanto’s “seed of hope” campaign’ in South Africa – a briefing document’ (January 2007) at 
www.biosafetyafrica.net [Accessed 13 March 2009]. 
242
  See for example Melanie Gosling ‘Government hands out free GM seeds to farmers’ The Mercury 
August 27, 2003. 
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fully understood’.243 One might therefore expect a more cautious and 
considered approach.  
Chapter 3 has described the patents that protect IP rights in GM cotton in 
South Africa and has introduced the notion of biosafety law which regulates 
the use of GMOs in agriculture. A case study on GM cotton was presented, 
the results of which suggest that a more public interest oriented focus is 
required. The next two chapters describe the applicable legal framework to 
locate the various points of regulation where adjustments to law and policy 
may be made that would enhance matters of public interest.  
 
 
                                                          
243
  Government Gazette No 27936, Notice 1591 of 2005 at para 1.2 (f). 
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CHAPTER 4  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK (1): THE MONSANTO AGREEMENT 
Ours is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-lingual society in which the 
ravages of apartheid, disadvantage and inequality are just 
immeasurable. The extent of the oppressive measures in South Africa 
was not confined to government/individual relations, but equally to 
individual/individual relations. In its effort to create a new order, our 
Constitution must have been intended to address these oppressive and 
undemocratic practices at all levels. In my view our Constitution starts 
at the lowest level and attempts to reach the furthest in its endeavours 
to restructure the dynamics in a previously racist society.1  
4.1 Introduction  
Contracts and intellectual property instruments are mechanisms for 
propertising a particular resource and thus for regulating access to the 
resource. An example is the Monsanto Cotton Technology Agreement (‘the 
Monsanto Agreement’),2 a contract which, reinforced by IP rights (the patents 
described in chapter 3), propertises the plant genetic resources that embody 
Monsanto’s technology. The Monsanto Agreement establishes the 
relationship between Monsanto and farmers who purchase the GM 
cottonseed.  
This chapter considers the body of domestic law applicable to this 
relationship. Although essentially a private law relationship, public law 
provisions, including constitutional provisions, have an impact on the 
relationship. Chapter 4 also considers the relationship between Monsanto and 
farmers who are not party to the Monsanto Agreement but who are found to 
be in possession of PGRs over which Monsanto may claim rights. This non-
contractual relationship is governed primarily by IP law, which protection falls 
away when the patents expire.  
                                                          
1
  Madala J in Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at para [163]. 
2
  The terms and conditions in the Monsanto Agreement (for the 2006/2007 season) are reproduced 
verbatim in annexure B. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
120 
 
The aim of the chapter is to begin describing the regulatory framework for 
property rights in PGRs. The focus of chapter 4 are the rules regulating the 
relationship between Monsanto and farmers. Chapter 5 goes on to consider 
the law regulating the relationship between the State and Monsanto, and 
between the State and farming communities.  
The Monsanto Agreement, governed by the laws of the Republic of South 
Africa,3 presents a typical private law (contract/property) arrangement in which 
rights in property are regulated by contract. The contractual relationship is 
governed by private law principles of contract and property as well as 
applicable statute. These principles must be considered holistically within the 
structure of the South African legal system.4  
4.2 The South African legal system  
The basic premise is that law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid.5 As background, the Constitution was adopted to: 
• Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human 
rights; 
• Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen 
is equally protected by law; 
• Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of 
each person; and 
• Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its 
rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.6 
These are the benchmarks against which law and conduct must be measured. 
These objectives receive much of their legal cloth from chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the ‘cornerstone of democracy’7 which affirms 
                                                          
3
  This is provided for in the agreement. 
4
  The Constitutional Court has pronounced that ‘[t]here are not two systems of law … the common 
law and the Constitution – but only one system of law grounded in the Constitution.’ Bato Star 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para [22].  
5
  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
6
  Preamble of the Constitution. 
7
  Section 7(1). 
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the democratic values of human dignity, equality, and freedom, and protects 
the rights of all people in South Africa.8 Extracts from the Bill of Rights are 
presented in annexure A.  
The Bill of Rights applies to all law.9 Thus, although the law that was in force 
when the new Constitution took effect remains in place, it must be congruent 
with the Constitution.10 The Bill of Rights specifically binds government, being 
‘the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’.11 Where 
individuals are in a horizontal relationship (such as Monsanto and contracting 
farmers), the provisions of the Bill of Rights will only bind natural and juristic 
persons to the extent that they are applicable.12 If a provision of the Bill of 
Rights does apply in a particular horizontal relationship, then the court is 
enjoined to ‘apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right’.13  In addition, ‘[w]hen interpreting 
any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.’14  
When a matter comes before the court concerning activity that may be in 
breach of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, and where legislation has been 
implemented to give effect to that particular provision, the affected party may 
not bypass such legislation by directly invoking the Bill of Rights.15 The 
affected party must rely on the legislation giving effect to the particular right 
involved; and in the event that the legislation does not fully protect the 
particular constitutional right, then the constitutionality of the legislation must 
be challenged. Where there is legislation in place on a matter which, in the 
past, may have been governed by common law principles, the Court’s powers 
                                                          
8
  Section 7(1). 
9
  Section 8(1). 
10
  Schedule 6 (Transitional arrangements), item 2(1). 
11
  Section 8(1).  
12
  Section 8(2). 
13
  Section 8(3). In terms of s 173 of the Constitution, ‘[t]he Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of 
Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power … to develop the common law, taking into 
account the interests of justice.’ 
14
  Section 39(2). 
15
  See for example South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others 2007 (5) 
SA 400 (CC). 
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of adjudication will flow not from the common law itself, but from the 
legislation.16  
Where there is no legislation in place and the development of common law is 
necessitated by the horizontal application of the Constitution, this may be 
achieved either by legislating, or, if the matter comes before the court, through 
the discourses of interstitial changes to common law, or a balancing of rights, 
or through the more fundamentally transformative discourse of the state’s duty 
to protect fundamental rights.17 As the Constitutional Court in the 
Carmichele18 case points out, ‘[o]ur Constitution is not merely a formal 
document regulating public power. It also embodies, like the German 
Constitution, an objective, normative value system. … It is within the matrix of 
this objective normative value system that the common law must be 
developed.’19 
The Court however was clear to point out that the ‘major engine for law reform 
should be the Legislature and not the Judiciary’.20   
In so far as juristic persons, such as Monsanto, are concerned, these private 
entities may benefit from the rights contained in the Bill of Rights ‘to the extent 
                                                          
16
  See for example Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) and Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). In the Bato Star 
case for example the court held that its power to review administrative action is no longer derived 
directly from the common law, but instead flows from the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
3 of 2000 (PAJA), enacted to give effect to the Constitutional right to just administrative action (s 
33 of the Constitution).  
17
  For an interesting decision on the State’s constitutional duties see for example President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA) and Others 2005 
(5) SA 3 (CC). The Modderklip case involved the unlawful occupation by a group of people of a 
portion of a private farm. The case illustrates the duty of the court to balance the landowner’s right 
to property against the unlawful occupiers’ rights against arbitrary eviction as well as their rights 
of access to adequate housing. 
18
  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). The Carmichele case involved an action by Alix Carmichele, 
who was viciously attacked by a known offender, against the respondents for damages as a result 
of the negligent failure to comply with a legal due of care owed to her by members of the South 
African Police Service and the public prosecutors at Knysna, who failed to prevent the attack. The 
matter was brought before the Constitutional Court as an application for leave to appeal in view of 
the order of absolution from the instance granted by the High Court and confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. 
19
  At 961 F-G. 
20
  At 954 D-E. 
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required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person’21 and 
protected rights may be limited only to the extent that the Constitution permits 
such limitations.22 
Bearing these principles in mind, the remainder of this chapter considers the 
Monsanto Agreement within a more detailed account of South African law.  
4.3 The Monsanto Agreement: private law in perspective 
The contractual relationship between Monsanto and farmers (growers) is 
governed by the Monsanto Agreement, a licence agreement, reproduced in 
annexure B, which governs Monsanto’s patented technology. Farmers also 
enter into a separate contract of sale. The agreement provides that: 
[o]n signature of the ‘Monsanto Technology and Licence Agreement’, 
growers will be able to buy transgenic seed containing Monsanto traits, 
from any of the Monsanto approved seed supplier or seed distributor. 
[Note: GM cottonseed in South Africa is produced exclusively by 
Deltapine, a subsidiary of Monsanto in South Africa, and is supplied to 
farmers by agents of Monsanto. Thus Monsanto appears to be the 
principal owner of the GM cottonseed being purchased in terms of the 
agreement.]  
In terms of the agreement ‘Monsanto licences the Grower under applicable 
patents’ owned or licensed to Monsanto to use these technologies’. This 
terminology aligns with the general principle that in the case of a licence 
agreement, the ‘licensee does not obtain the full rights of proprietorship.’23  
The Patents Act24 provides that a licence under a patent to use a patented 
invention terminates on the date on which the patent expires.25 Where there 
are multiple patents, parts of the contract may terminate as each patent 
                                                          
21
  Section 8(4). See for example First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
22
  The limitation of rights clause is s 36 of the Constitution. 
23
  TD Burrell Burrells South African patent and design law (1999) at § 6.35. 
24
  Act 57 of 1978. 
25
  Section 57(1). Section 57(2) affords the parties the right ‘to terminate a contract or a condition in a 
contract independently of this section.’ 
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expires. The Patents Act therefore no longer supports the current licencing 
agreements after 2010. 
The wording of the licence indicates that unfettered ownership of the physical 
seed will not be transferred to the farmer in the subsequent contract of sale. In 
the agreement growers agree: 
• To use the seed containing Monsanto gene technologies for planting a 
commercial crop only in a single season. 
• Monsanto retains ownership of the Monsanto technologies specified. 
• To not supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for planting, 
and to not save any crop produced from this seed for replanting, or 
supply saved seed to anyone for replanting. 
It is not an essential element of a contract of sale that ownership be 
transferred: ownership will only pass from the seller if both the purchaser and 
the seller intend ownership to pass.26 The parties’ intention to pass ownership 
is a question of fact, established by considering ‘the totality of the evidence.’27 
Indicators of intention are the terms and conditions of the agreement: from 
which it appears that Monsanto’s intention is to transfer only the entitlement to 
use the seed for a limited period of time and the benefit of limited fruits. Some 
suggest that the agreement is akin to a rental agreement.28 As Drahos and 
Braithwaite critically explain, farmers are the losers in this ‘information 
feudalism’ project, being reduced to mere ‘annual lessees under a system of 
patents and licences.’ 29 There are conceptual difficulties from a private law 
perspective with either a ‘servitude’ (of use or usufruct) or ‘rental’ 
arrangement, which are discussed below, although a compelling argument 
has been made against ‘a formalistic treatment of specific contract types.’30  
                                                          
26
  François Du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law (2007) at 902.  
27
  Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 902. See especially the sources cited in 
footnote 143 such as Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton & Another 1973 
(3) SA 685 (A) at 695, which was followed in Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion De 
Mercadeo Agricola 1976 (4) SA 464 (A).  
28
  See for example Debra Blair ‘Intellectual property protection and its impact on the US seed 
industry’ (1999) 4 Drake J Agric Law 297 at 326. 
29
  Peter Drahos with John Braithwite Information feudalism: who owns the knowledge economy? 
(2002) at 38.  
30
  Tjakie Naudé ‘The preconditions for recognition of a specific type or sub-type of contract – the 
essentialia-naturalia approach and the typological method’ (2003) 2 TSAR 411 at 430. 
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Monsanto’s strategy seeks to combine in rem rights31 with in personam 
rights32 and the resulting relationship is governed by a combination of property 
and contract law principles which, in South Africa, may be located within the 
theory of subjective rights.33 
4.3.1 Property and the theory of subjective rights 
The theory of subjective rights provides a private law framework within which 
to explore legal relationships between legal subjects over legal objects. This 
explains why the concept of things34 as a category of legal objects remains 
important.35  
In terms of the theory, legal subjects have rights over legal objects,36 and, 
when the object is a thing,37 the right of ownership of the thing is a real right. 
Property law in a narrow, traditional, sense may thus be expressed as the law 
                                                          
31
  The distinction between in rem and in personam rights refers to the distinction between real and 
personal rights (derived from the Roman law distinction between actions in rem and actions in 
personam) incorporated by the Pandectists in the 19th century into the doctrine of subjective rights 
(see § 4.3.1). The distinction between real and personal rights forms the basis of the divide 
between the law of property and the law of obligations. Wille (note 26) at 428. Merrill and Smith 
observe, from the works of Hohfeld and Honoré, that in rem rights impose a negative duty of 
abstention. Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith ‘The property/contract interface’ (2004) 10 
Columbia Law Review at 788-9. Referring to AM Honoré ‘Rights of exclusion and immunities 
against divesting’ (1960) 34 Tul L Rev 453 at 458-459 and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld ‘Faulty 
analysis in easement and license cases’ (1917) 27 Yale L J 66 at 71-72.  
32
  Within the realm of private law doctrine, property (in rem rights) and contract (in personam rights) 
amount to two different strategies for regulating the use of resources. Generally speaking, an in 
rem rights strategy is an exclusionary strategy that applies automatically; whereas in personam 
rights reflect a more intricate governance strategy. Merrill and Smith (note 31) at 790. 
33
  As opposed to the more modernist (Hohfeldian or Anglo-American) tradition which uses the 
concepts of ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ as a point of departure. The theory of subjective rights has its 
origin in Western Europe, and in particular the work of the nineteenth century Pandectists. Lourens 
du Plessis An introduction to law (1999) at 151-152. 
34
  A ‘thing’, in the narrow sense, is defined as ‘a corporeal or tangible object external to persons and 
which is, as an independent entity, subject to juridical control by a legal subject, to whom it is 
useful and of value.’ AJ Van der Walt and GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property (2006) at 
12. See also Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s the law of property (2006) (‘Silberberg 
and Schoeman’) at 14-15 and Wille’s principles of South African Law (note 26) at 409. 
35
  In South African property law parlance: ‘“property” is not a term of art and in itself no more that a 
convenient expression to denote the existence of some types of legal relationships between specific 
persons and legal objects, which in many, but not all, instances could be classified as “things”.’ 
Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 1. 
36
  ‘A legal object is anything with regard to which a person can acquire and hold a right.’ AJ Van der 
Walt and GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property (2006) at 8 (‘Introduction to the law of 
property’). 
37
  Other legal objects include interests of personality, immaterial property (such as patents), and 
performances. The rights recognised in respect of these objects are personality rights (in 
personality interests), immaterial property rights (in immaterial property) and personal rights (in 
performances). Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 14. 
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Patrimonial rights and 
objects 
Real Rights [Ownership] 
[Limited Real Rights] 
Personal Rights Immaterial Rights  
Things (Objects) Performance (Objects) Immaterial property 
(Objects) 
of things (Sakereg), being primarily concerned with the real and limited real 
rights over things. Taking the classification system up a notch, rights may be 
classified as either ‘patrimonial’ or ‘extra-patrimonial,’38 with property rights, in 
the traditional sense, constituting one form of rights under the umbrella term 
patrimonial rights.39 Some of the patrimonial rights and their objects are 
schematically represented in figure 7. 
  
 
  
 
  
Figure 7: Patrimonial rights and their objects 
While the traditional private law of property is narrowly defined and concerned 
with ownership and limited real rights the constitutional notion of property is 
broader and more inclusive in its protection of other subjective rights, 
including immaterial rights.40 
The private law classification of rights provides a mechanism for ‘ranking’ 
rights, and determining applicable principles and available remedies.41 A real 
right in a thing (such as ownership) means, in the event that ownership is 
unlawfully interfered with, that the owner can rely on particular remedies in the 
law of property, whereas a contractual (personal) right to performance will, in 
the event of a breach of the obligation to perform, generally give rise to 
remedies in the law of contract. Rights in immaterial property are 
predominantly protected by statute.   
                                                          
38
  Patrimonial rights are rights in respect of patrimonial objects that have economic or material value. 
Personality rights are traditionally considered to be extra-patrimonial. Silberberg and Schoeman 
(note 34) at 9.  
39
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 9, 23-4.  
40
  For a discussion on the impact of the Constitution on private property see § 4.3.3.   
41
  For example the mandament van spolie may be available if a real right exists, on the other hand a 
breach of contract remedy should be used if the right is a personal, contractual one.  See Telkom 
SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd (2003 5 SA 309 (SCA). The constitutional dimension of the law of 
property may challenge the hierarchical and scientific nature of property rights in traditional 
private law. 
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In this scheme of things, ownership is the most comprehensive real right that 
a legal subject can have over a thing:42 ‘full-blooded’43 ownership ‘entitles the 
owner to do with his or her thing as he or she deems fit, subject to the 
limitations imposed by public and private law.’44 Typically, the right to use, 
exclude and transfer are viewed as the pillars of ownership.45 Ownership is an 
independent right, unlimited in duration and is the ‘mother right’ on which 
other, more limited, rights depend.46 In Roman law the numerus clausus 
principle meant that the list of real rights (ownership and other limited real 
rights) was fixed, no new rights could be added. Roman-Dutch law was more 
flexible.47 Rights are more diversified in contemporary practice. Indigenous 
and other fundamental rights challenge the real right composite.48 
Ownership, as it is envisaged in our common law, has a residuary character,49 
and no matter how many entitlements the owner gives away, the owner 
retains a reversionary right to the entitlements once they are extinguished. 
                                                          
42
  Ownership is the ‘”mother right” ... from which other limited real rights flow.’ Silberberg and 
Schoeman (note 34) at 92 citing Snijders and Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht at 52.  
43
  Harris Property and justice (1996) at 29. 
44
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 91, citing Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand 
Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314 at 1319; Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 
102 (A) at 106–7; and also Van der Merwe Sakereg at 170 – 173.  
45
  See Honoré (chapter 2, note 11); and Bruce G Carruthers and Laura Ariovich ‘The sociology of 
property rights’ (2004) 30 The Annual Review of Sociology 23-46 at 24. 
46
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 93. Important definitions of ownership for the South African 
context are those of Bartolus de Saxoferrato and Hugo Grotius. De Saxoferrato referred to 
ownership as ‘the right of disposal over a corporeal thing, within the limits of law’ and similarly, 
for Grotius, ‘[o]wnership is complete if someone may do with the thing whatever he pleases, 
provided that it is permitted in terms of law’. Bartolus de Saxoferrato ad D 41 2 17 1 fn 4 cited in 
Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 91 fn 6 and Grotius Inleidinge 2 3 10 translation cited in 
Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 91 fn 7. 
47
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 47-48. 
48  See for example the recognition of indigenous rights in Alexkor Ltd and Another v The 
Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) and Prinsloo and Another v Ndebele-
Ndzundza Community and Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA) discussed in § 2.6.1. On the limitations 
placed on property by competing fundamental rights see Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v 
Police Commission, Western Cape 2004 (4) SA 444 C) and Nhlabathi & Others v Fick [2003] 2 
All SA 323 (LCC) discussed in § 2.2.1 and Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB International 
(Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 
(1) SA 144 (CC). In the Laugh it Off case freedom of expression was balanced against trade mark 
rights. See also Bruce Ziff ‘The irreversibility of commodification’ 2005 Stell LR 283-301. Ziff 
cautions against the growing set of property entitlements and indicates the difficulty in trying to 
withdraw some of this rights because of the compensation for expropriate rules. 
49
  Sometimes referred to as the ‘elasticity of ownership’. Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 93. 
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Ownership, as a real right, entails a number of entitlements. The major50 
entitlements being: 
• the entitlement to use the thing (ius utendi); 
• the entitlement to the fruits, including the income from the thing (ius 
furendi); 
• the entitlement to consume and destroy the thing (ius abutendi); 
• the entitlement to possess the thing (ius possidendi); 
• the entitlement to dispose of the thing (ius disponendi); 
• the entitlement to claim the thing from any unlawful possessor (ius 
vindicandi); and 
• the entitlement to resist any unlawful invasion (ius negandi).51 
In terms of the Monsanto Agreement, the entitlements transferred to the 
farmer in the Monsanto agreement include the entitlement to possess and use 
the thing (for a limited time and purpose)52 and the entitlement to some of the 
fruit (the cotton fibre but not the use of the seed for replanting etc): although 
Monsanto (or Deltapine) never get the seed back – the seed is processed in 
the purchasing ginnery for animal and human consumption. The farmer 
however is restrained, by agreement, from disposing of the seed in a variety 
of ways. Although ‘[o]rdinarily, possession of chattels signifies ownership,’53 
this is not always the case.54 Intention to pass ownership is necessary. It 
would appear from the Agreement that Monsanto intends retaining ownership 
of the seed and the farmer has a limited real right – a type of usufruct – over 
the seed. The problem with this is that a usufructuary is generally obliged to 
preserve the thing (but seed is consumed through planting) and thus the 
general principle is that a usufruct cannot be established over consumable 
movables.55   
                                                          
50
  The list is not exhaustive. Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 92. 
51
  Footnotes omitted. Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 92–93. 
52
  The agreement stipulates that ‘[y]ou agree … to use the seed … for planting a commercial crop 
only in a single season; … to not supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for planting 
[etc]’ and so forth. 
53
  Merrill and Smith (note 29) at 812. On the presumption that the possessor of moveable property is 
the owner in South African law, see Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 285-6. 
54
  Whether or not possession is a real right is contested. See for example Silberberg and Schoeman 
(note 34) at 273-275 and Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 446. 
55
  Cooper v Boyes NO and Another 1994 (4) SA 521 (C); Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 340. 
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Usufruct applies to both movable and immovable property, with the 
exception of consumable things, namely those which, by their use, are 
extinguished, such as money, wine and grain.56 (Emphasis added). 
Although our courts recognise a quasi-usufruct,57 the general rule is that 
ownership of the consumable thing is vested in the quasi-usufructuary,58 in 
other words the farmer.  
On a strict usufruct (or lease)59 reading the grower becomes the (limited) 
owner of the seed, with Monsanto retaining personal rights (arising out of 
contract) and immaterial property rights in the seed. The contract of use is 
more likely an innominate contract which, in the event of a dispute, the courts 
should ‘consider the parties’ purpose and all relevant policy considerations 
and fashion an appropriate residual rule.’60  
The concept of ownership of the tangible seed is conceptually separate from 
the idea of intellectual or immaterial property rights in the seed.61 As De Beer 
explains: 
Law creates IP by separating an abstract idea, like for a molecularly 
engineered gene, from its physical vessel, such as the gene itself 
contained in a plant or seed.62 
These IP rights are traditionally expressed as immaterial property rights63 
whereas ownership of the seed is a real right.64 For an object to be classified 
                                                          
56
  Translation of Hugo de Groot (Grotius) Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid 2.39.3 in 
Cooper v Boyes NO and Another 1994 (4) SA 521 (C) at 525. 
57
  Provided that there is security for return of the equivalent consumed goods. 
58
  Cooper v Boyes NO and Another 1994 (4) SA 521 (C) at 531 I-J, 532C; Silberberg and Schoeman 
(note 34) at 340 (footnote 164); Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 605.  
59
  Similarly, the nature of the Monsanto Agreement is irreconcilable with the concept of a lease for 
the idea that a tenant may be given an entitlement to consume and destroy (ius abutendi) is 
incompatible with the concept of a lease. E Kahn et al Principles of the law of sale and lease 
(1998) at 50. 
60
  Naudé (note 30) at 420. 
61
  IP rights in PGRs also differs from the usual incorporation of a patented component into a physical 
thing (for example including a patented part in a motor vehicle) because of the self-propagating  
nature of PGRs.  
62
  Jeremy De Beer ‘Reconciling property rights in plants’ (2005) J of World Intellectual Property 5-
31 at 5. 
63
  Immaterial property is defined as ‘the intangible expression of human skills, or inventions of the 
human mind, embodied in a tangible agent and which are by law allotted to their author.’ 
[Footnotes omitted]. Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 23. 
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as a thing, in order to give rise to real rights, it is generally required to be (a) 
corporeal; (b) external to a person; (c) independent; (d) susceptible to human 
control; and (e) of use and/or value (in commercio).65 These requirements 
make it conceptually difficult to classify IP rights (rights in immaterial property) 
as real rights.  
Roman law distinguished between res corporales and res incorporales.66 The 
English approach (on which South African IP law was modelled) originally 
transposed this Roman law distinction with the category of chose in action67 
located in the English matrix of real and personal property,68 ultimately 
creating a flexible concept of personal property.69  Today the UK Patents Act70 
specifically indicates71 that ‘[a]ny patent or application for a patent is personal 
property (without being a thing in action)’. The Act goes on to provide that, in 
Scotland, ‘[a]ny patent or application for a patent, and any right in or under 
any patent or any such application, is incorporeal moveable property.’72  
Similarly in South Africa: 
the right acquired by registration of a patent is not a ‘proprietary right’. 
Although such a right is capable of assignment, the grant of a patent 
does not give the patentee the right to make, use, exercise or vend an 
                                                                                                                                                                      
64
  Because of the public importance of PGRs an argument could be made for recognising only 
‘lesser’ rights (not real rights of ownership) in PGRs, such as has occurred in the case of water. 
See Glazewski Environmental law in South Africa (2005) at 435 for the position on water. 
65
  Introduction to the law of property (note 36) at 13; Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 14. 
66
  JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) at 125 where he indicates that ‘the distinction 
between res corporales and res incorporales first appears in juristic literature in Gaius.’ In his 
translation of the Institutes of Justinian, Thomas records that ‘[i]ncorporeal things … are such as 
cannot be touched but exist in law: for instance an inheritance, usufruct and obligations, however 
contracted.’ Book II, Tit II On incorporeal things in J A C Thomas The Institutes of Justinian: text, 
translation and commentary (1975) at 84. 
67
  A chose in action is linked in intangible property whereas a chose in possession refers to corporeal 
things. Drahos A philosophy of intellectual property (1996) at 20-1. See also footnote 68 below.  
68
  ‘Real property is linked to interests in land while personal property is defined negatively to refer to 
property which is not real property. Personal property is subdivided into chattels personal and 
chattels real. Chattels real are an anomalous category whereby, for historical reasons, leases were 
classed as personal property. Chattels personal are further subdivided into choses in possession and 
choses in action. It is this latter category that houses many statutory forms of intellectual property 
such as patents and copyright. Typically, statutes classify the relevant right as personal property, 
relying on the legally established meaning of that term.’ Drahos (note 67) at 35, note 34.  
69
  Drahos (note 67) at 21.  
70
  Patents Act of 1977 as amended. 
71
  At s 30(1). 
72
  Section 31(1). These particular provisions, it would appear, were not in the earlier statutes which 
influenced the development of intellectual property law in South Africa.  
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invention.  What section 32[73] of the Patents Act confers on the 
patentee is the right to exclude others from making, using, exercising or 
vending the invention during the currency of the patent. … It is a right 
which must be regarded simply as a statutory incorporeal real right (in 
the sense that it is enforceable against the world) which is negative in 
its application.74 
Academic debate recognises the doctrinal difficulties that arise if the definition 
of things is expanded to include incorporeal things,75 and suggest that these 
difficulties be overcome by rather describing the object of the real right, not as 
a corporeal thing but rather as another subjective right.76 Silberberg and 
Schoeman explain: ‘[t]here seems to be no reason why an immaterial property 
right cannot also be the object of a real right, considering the economic value 
implicit in such immaterial property right’.77 The authors explain, ‘if any of 
these subjective rights itself serves as the object of a real right, it is regarded, 
                                                          
73
  Section 45 is the equivalent section in the current Patents Act 57 of 1978, which, when it talks 
about the effect of a patent indicates that it is a ‘grant to the patentee in the Republic, subject to the 
provisions of this Act, for the duration of the patent, the right to exclude other persons from 
making, using, exercising, disposing or offering to dispose of, or importing the invention, so that 
he or she shall have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing by reason of the invention.’ 
The term property is used in the Act (in s 79) in a provision which allows for the assignment of 
certain patents relating to armaments to the State. The section provides that ‘[t]he patent … may be 
made out in the name of the proprietor and sealed, but such patent shall be delivered to the 
Minister of Defence and not to such proprietor and shall be the property of the State.’ 
74
  Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v Adcock-Ingram Ltd and Others 1978 BP 307 (CP) at 312C-D.  This 
position is confirmed in Chauvier and Another v Selero (Pty) Ltd and Another 1981 BP 86 (CP) at 
93 C-D.  See Burrell Burrells South African patent and design law (1999) in § 3.2. 
75
  If incorporeals are regarded as things, the distinction between different rights (eg real and personal 
rights) becomes blurred. It is conceptually impossible for a personal right to be the object of a real 
right; and it is at variance with the traditional notion of a real right giving physical power to a 
person over a thing. Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 15 and the authorities cited therein. 
76
  Introduction to the law of property (note 36) at 14. The authors cite the examples of shares in a 
company which the shareholder can utilize in various ways (Ben-Tovin v Ben-Tovin 2001 3 SA 
1074 (C)); the membership interest in a close corporation that can be attached by the sheriff 
(Badenhorst v Balju Pretoria Sentraal 1998 4 SA 132 (T)); and the loan account of a director of a 
company that can be ceded (Graf v Buechel 2003 4 SA 298 (SCA). See also Silberberg and 
Schoeman (note 34) at 15. 
77
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 16. In support of this view, the following sources are cited 
in fn 97:  
‘Kleyn and Boraine Property at 30. See also s 22(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
“[C]opyright shall be transmissible as movable property by assignment, testamentary 
disposition or operation of law”; see also s 60(5) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978: “The 
hypothecation of a patent … may on application in the prescribed manner be entered in the 
register.” Also Chauvier v Pelican Pools (Pty) Ltd 1992 (2) SA 39 (T): “Section 59(1) of the 
Act [ie the Patents Act 57 of 1978] provides that … the rights vested in a patentee shall be 
capable of devolution by operation of law. The question which then arises is in whom the 
dominium of the assets of a deceased’s estate, including the rights to a patent, reside during the 
period after the death of the testator and before delivery or transfer to the heirs or legatees”, (at 
41G) “In law the executors … have acquired the dominium in the patent.”’ 
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in terms of common law, as an incorporeal or intangible thing.’ When this logic 
is used, the courts talk about the quasi-possession of incorporeals.78 
The point of this discussion is that in the absence of policy and legislative 
clarity on what entitlements can be privately acquired and how they are 
protected might be protected, the answer will lie in the labyrinth of the private 
law principles.79 In the case of the Monsanto Agreement, this requires a 
consideration of principles of property and contract law. 
4.3.2 Personal rights in performance: the Monsanto Agreement 
The concepts of ‘freedom[80] and sanctity of contract;[81] public policy;[82] and 
good faith’[83] are the cornerstones of contract.84 The essential elements for a 
valid contract include legal capacity to contract and serious intention to be 
bound.85 In certain circumstances, a lack of consensus as to the material 
terms of the agreement may render a contract void,86 and contracts which 
have been entered into on the basis of a misrepresentation, duress or undue 
influence may be rendered voidable.87 
                                                          
78
  Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd (2003 5 SA 309 (SCA) at para [11]. 
79
  This is not always a satisfactory state of affairs. The point is made that no one ‘concerned with the 
socio-economic impact of commercial growing of GMOs can afford to be ignorant of the 
uncertainties of the common law’. Maria Lee and Robert Burrell ‘Liability for the escape of GM 
seeds: pursuing the “victim”?’ (2002) 65:4 Modern Law Review 517 at 537. 
80
  ‘Freedom of contract entails a general freedom to choose whether or not to contract, with whom to 
contract, and on what terms to contract.’ Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 737. 
The freedom of contract is regarded by some as having its origins in natural law: see FNB of SA v 
Bophuthatswana Consumer Affairs Council 1995 (2) SA 853 (BGD) at 863 E-F. 
81
  The sanctity of contract, embedded in considerations of commerce and morality, requires that 
parties be held to their agreement. The idea is that agreements should be honoured, as is expressed 
in the maxim pacta sunt servanda. Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 737. 
82
  Freedom of contract is limited by the notion that the court will not enforce contracts that are 
contrary to the public interest. Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 737. 
83
  Good faith, a concept which is closely related to public policy, is not so much an independent basis 
for striking down an agreement but rather ‘underlies and informs the entire law of contract, 
shaping its content and finding concrete expression in its technical rules and doctrines.’ Wille’s 
principles of South African law (note 26) at 738. In so far as a more community oriented approach 
to good faith is concerned, it has been said that ‘good faith cannot be contained in a neat and tidy 
legal definition. It promotes the idea that we as a community of contracting persons, each 
responsible for the other's wellbeing, should ultimately be concerned with the constitutive values 
of the supreme law under which the subordinated but indispensable law of contract must continue 
to operate’. AJ Barnard (2005) 21 SAJHR 252 cited by Davis J in Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Lta t/a 
Communicate Personnel Group v kuhn and Another 2008 (2) SA 375 (C) at para 31. 
84
  Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 737. 
85
  Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 736. 
86
  Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 745. 
87
  Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 739. 
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While the general principle is that agreements are legally binding on parties, 
exceptions may arise when an agreement is one which is ‘contrary to law, 
morality, or public policy or the enforcement of which is against the public 
interest.’88 Such agreements may be unenforceable on the grounds that 
‘[a]greements which are clearly inimical to the interests of the community 
whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run counter to social or 
economic expedience, will accordingly, on the grounds of public policy, not be 
enforced.’89 
Examples of agreements that have been held to be unenforceable include: a 
deed of cession executed by a doctor in favour of a finance company that 
would give the finance company control over all of the doctor’s earnings;90 a 
lease in terms of which the rent is to be determined by the lessor or lessee in 
his or her unfettered discretion;91 a clause in favour of the creditor providing 
for the creditor to produce a certificate of balance as conclusive proof of 
indebtedness;92 an agreement that on the debtor’s default the holder of 
security may keep the property as owner of the property;93 and where an 
attorney had acted for party A against party B and thereafter agreed to act for 
B against A.94 Agreements in restraint of trade, although presumed to be 
reasonable and enforceable,95 may also be found wanting.96  
                                                          
88
  AJ Kerr The principles of the law of contract (2002) at 181. 
89
  Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) at 8D. At 8B, Smalberger JA quotes Aquilius in 1941, 1942 and 
1943 SALJ who defines a contract against public policy as ‘one stipulating performance which is 
not per se illegal or immoral but which the Courts, on grounds of expedience, will not enforce, 
because performance will detrimentally affect the interest of the community.’ 
90
  Sasfin v Beukes 1089 (1) SA 1 (A). 
91
  See Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 179 (A). 
92
  Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others and 
Donelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1995 (3) SA 1 (A). 
93
  Graf v Buechel 2003 (4) SA 378 (SCA); Bock and Others v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd 2004 
(2) SA 242 (SCA). 
94
  Retha Meiring Attorney v Walley 2008 (2) SA 513 (D). 
95
  The common law position on agreements in restraint of trade prior to Magna Alloys and Research 
(SA)(Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) was that restraints of trade were prima facie invalid and 
unenforceable: the onus was on the party wishing to enforce the restraint to show that the restraint 
was reasonable and not contrary to public interest. This approach was reversed in Magna Alloys 
where it was held that such restraints are prima facie valid and enforceable and the onus is on a 
party to show it is unreasonable. 
96
  For the most recent case law see Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Lta t/a Communicate Personnel Group 
v kuhn and Another 2008 (2) SA 375 (C); and Hirt & Carter (Pty) Ltd v Mansfield and Another 
2008 (3) SA 512 (D). 
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With regard to the concept of public policy, the Constitutional Court in 
Barkhuizen v Napier97 has noted that: 
[p]ublic policy represents the legal convictions of the community; it 
represents those values that are held most dear by the society. 
Determining the content of public policy was once fraught with 
difficulties. That is no longer the case. Since the advent of our 
constitutional democracy, public policy is now deeply rooted in our 
Constitution and the values which underline it. Indeed, the founding 
provisions of our Constitution make it plain: our constitutional 
democracy is founded on, among other values, the values of human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms, and the rule of law. And the Bill of Rights, as the 
Constitution proclaims, “is a cornerstone” of that democracy; “it 
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic [founding] values of human dignity, equality and freedom”.98  
Although the Court upheld the particular provision (a time-limitation clause) in 
the Barkhuizen case, the court was quick to add that ‘[w]hat public policy is 
and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must now be 
determined by a reference to the values that underlie our constitutional 
democracy as given expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a 
term in a contract that is inimical to the values enshrined in our Constitution is 
contrary to public policy and is therefore unenforceable.’99 
Unless there is a biosafety rationale behind a particular provision, some of the 
provisions in the Monsanto Agreement, including the cost, are arguably 
contrary to public policy.  The following terms may unduly restrain the farmers: 
… YOU AGREE 
• To use the seed containing Monsanto gene technologies for 
planting a commercial crop only in a single season. 
                                                          
97
  2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). The Barkhuizen case involved a contract of insurance containing a time-
limitation clause in terms of which the insured, in the event that the insurer repudiated a claim 
under the contract, had a period of 90 days within which to institute legal action against the 
insurer, failing which the insured undertook to release the insurer from liability in terms of the 
contract. The insured challenged the validity of the time-limitation clause on the basis of s 34 of 
the Constitution. Section 34 provides that ‘(e)veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court…’. 
98
  Para [28]. Footnotes omitted. 
99
  Para [29].  
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• To not supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for 
planting, and to not save any crop produced from this seed for 
replanting, or supply saved seed to anyone for replanting. 
• … Monsanto may inspect and test all of your crop fields to 
determine if saved seed has been replanted. … 
… GENERAL CONDITIONS 
... In the event that the Grower saves, supplies, sells or acquires seed 
for replant in violation of this Agreement and license restriction, in 
addition to other remedies available to the technology provider(s), the 
Grower agrees that damages will include a claim for liquidation 
damages, which will be based on 120 times the applicable Technology 
Fee. 
Although public policy is informed by the Constitution and ‘contractual terms 
are subject to constitutional rights,’100 public policy, in turn, upholds the 
sanctity of contract (pacta sunt servanda). The point of departure in a 
contractual enquiry is that agreements ‘that conform to the traditional 
requirements for a contract, and from which a party is not entitled to be 
relieved in any of the ways recognized by traditional doctrine’ are strictly 
enforceable.101 The courts have elevated sanctity of contract (pacta sunt 
servanda) to a constitutional principle.  
Such reasoning may lead to harsh results.102 Davis J in Advtech Resourcing 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v kuhn and Another103 expresses 
the opinion that ‘contractual autonomy is a heavily value laden concept 
employed in an individualistic, autonomous fashion.’104 Davis J considers a 
number of authorities105 and finds that ‘the concept of contractual autonomy 
                                                          
100
  Davis J in Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v kuhn and another 
2008 (2) SA 375 (C).  
101
  Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights seriously: the Bill of Rights and its implications for the 
development of contract law’ (2004) 121 SALJ 395 at 415. 
102
  See for example the Constitutional Court decisions in Crown Restaurant CC v Gold Reef Theme 
Park (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 16 (CC) on the legality of non-variation unless in writing clauses, and 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007(5) SA 323 (CC). See also the Supreme Court of Appeal judgments in 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) and Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 
(SCA) and the discussion of these decisions in Lubbe (note 101).  
103
  2008 (2) SA 375 (C). 
104
  At para [30]. 
105
  Including R Hale ‘Bargaining, duress and economic liberty’ 1943 (43) Columbia Law Review 607; 
F Kessler ‘Contracts of adhesion. Some thoughts about freedom of contract’ 1943 (43) Columbia 
Law Review 629; Duncan Kennedy Sexy dressing (1993) ch 3; AJ Barnard ‘A different way of 
saying: on stories, text, a critical legal argument for contractual justice and the ethical element of 
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within the concept of a community of contracting persons must mean 
something distinct from a libertarian connotation, particularly if the concept of 
ubuntu is to play any role in our law’.106 He concludes that the courts have yet 
to ‘grasp the nettle’ and should (through the s 8 or s 39(2) mechanisms) revisit 
the issue of restraint of trade. In reflecting on the institution of contract, 
adjudicators and legislators should be mindful of the fact that, like property, 
contract plays an important role in allocating social wealth.107 
Much thought has been given to the impact of the Constitution on property.108  
4.3.3 Private and Constitutional property  
The provisions of the property clause in the Bill of Rights bind the State,109 
and although s 25 will generally not apply to parties inter se in a horizontal 
relationship,110 decisions that turn on s 25 and the lawful deprivation of 
property in terms of s 25 will ultimately (indirectly) impact on, and may restrict 
the rights, of parties entering into private law relationships. Within a horizontal 
relationship other constitutional rights may require the restriction of private 
property rights.111 
Other than to say that property is not restricted to land;112 the Constitution 
does not provide much guidance on the meaning and scope of the term 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contract in South Africa’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 252; Barnard ‘Death, mourning & melancholia’ 2006 
(17) Stell LR 386 at 391-6; and L Hawthorne ‘Closing the open norms in the law of contract’ 
(2004) 67 THRHR 294 at 301.  
106
  At para 31. 
107
  Harris Property and justice (1996) at 50. 
108
  Apartheid resulted in large-scale land dispossessions and the forced removals of black people. 
‘African people were confined to 13% of the total land in the country while white people owned 
almost all the remaining 87%. (Footnotes omitted) Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local 
Government Affairs and Others 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC) at para [38]. 
109
  Section 8(1).  
110
  Individuals are only bound by a provision in the Bill of Rights to the extent that that particular 
provision is applicable: s 8 (2). In so far as s 25 is concerned, the prevailing argument appears to 
be that s 25 does not apply horizontally. See for example the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (2) SA 34 (CC) (especially 
para [4]) and see the discussion in Van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) at 47-8. 
111
  This was the case in Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark 
International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) where 
freedom of expression was balanced against trade mark rights. See also Victoria & Alfred 
Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commission, Western Cape, 2004 (4) SA 444 C) and Nhlabathi & 
Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) discussed in § 2.2.1.  
112
  Section 25(4)(b). 
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property. One of the objections raised in the First Certification113 case was 
that the proposed property clause failed to recognise a right to the protection 
of IP.114 This objection was dismissed (albeit somewhat ambiguously)115 on 
the basis that it was not necessary to mention intellectual property separately 
as a universally accepted fundamental right in view of the fact that a right to 
intellectual property is ‘rarely recognised in regional conventions protecting 
human rights and in the constitutions of acknowledged democracies.’116 
Although there is no positive right in the Constitution that protects intellectual 
property, it would appear that IP is at least protected by the provisions in s 25, 
                                                          
113
  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 2006 1996 (4) 744 (CC). 
114
  At para [75]. In this regard see O H Dean ‘The case of the recognition of intellectual property in 
the Bill of Rights’ (1997) 60 THRHR 105-119. Other objections related to the absence of an 
explicit guarantee of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and that the provisions 
governing expropriation and the payment of compensation are inadequate (para [70]). In addition 
an objection was raised that the proposed clause failed to recognise mineral rights (para [74]). On 
the basis of international and comparative law, none of these objections were sustained. 
115
  The Court’s laconic response has been interpreted to mean, on the one hand, that its exclusion 
could mean that IP is not protected by the Constitution (see for example Debbie Collier ‘Access to 
and control over plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in South and Southern Africa: 
how many wrongs before a right?’ (2006) 7 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 
529 at 551); and, in respect of minerals see Lebowa Mineral Trust Beneficiaries Forum v President 
of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (1) BCLR 23 (T) where the court decided that mineral rights 
are not protected by s 25 on the basis that ‘if the drafters of the Constitution intended to protect 
mineral rights, they would have done so expressly as in other jurisdictions’ [at 29 G-H]); and on 
the other hand, the view has also been expressed that its inclusion is implied. As Van der Walt 
states: 
‘[t]he fact that mineral rights (or intellectual property or other commercial rights) are not 
usually specifically and explicitly mentioned and protected in constitutional property clauses 
(as was correctly held in the First Certification Case) means that it was not necessary for the 
South African 1996 Constitution to mention and protect them explicitly, but it does not mean 
that these rights are therefore not protected. They are not mentioned explicitly exactly because 
they are generally understood to be included in the usual generic reference to property.’ 
(footnotes omitted) AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) at 95. 
In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) (the FNB 
case) the Constitutional Court was faced with an opportunity to define ‘property’ and found rather 
that it was ‘practically impossible to furnish – and judicially unwise to attempt – a comprehensive 
definition of property for purposes of section 25’ (at para [51]). The Court accepted that 
‘ownership of a corporeal movable must – as must ownership of land – lie at the heart of our 
constitutional concept of property’, but certainly did not close the door on other forms of property 
(at para 51). In the FNB case the Court recognised the bank’s (FNB) reservation of ownership in 
its instalment sale agreements as a constitutionally protected property right. See also para [17] in 
Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International 
(Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) where Moseneke J 
indicates that intellectual property, like other property, is not immune to challenge and must be 
constitutionally tenable. 
116
  Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States is an example of a Constitution that 
contains specific protection. In terms of s 8, one of the powers of Congress is: 
‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’  
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in so far as vertical relationships117 are concerned.118 In other words, aspects 
of the arbitrary deprivation and expropriation of IP by the State may be subject 
to Constitutional scrutiny.119  
Section 25 provides the parameters for legitimate State ‘interference’ with 
private property by means of deprivation and expropriation of property by the 
State.120 According to the decision in the FNB case121 expropriation is a 
subset of deprivation. Where the deprivation is an expropriation, ss 25(2) and 
(3), which require a public purpose or public interest and compensation must 
also be complied with. 
Deprivation of private property by the State may not be arbitrary; and may 
only take place in terms of law of general application.122 Deprivation generally 
involves the restriction of use-rights in property by way of ‘public health and 
safety laws related to property, land-use planning and development controls, 
building regulations and environmental conservation laws’.123 Expropriation 
involves a ‘taking’ of property (rather than a restriction of use rights) for a 
public purpose or in the public interest. Expropriation also requires an 
                                                          
117
  For the position in horizontal matters see Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB International 
(Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 
(1) SA 144 (CC) discussed in the text below. 
118
  The aspects of protected IP should also be limited by the provisions for protection of IP in 
international law which restrict protection to natural authors in respect of their material and moral 
interests in the IP. See § 5.3.1 in this regard.  
119
  Ibid. 
120
  For a detailed examination of deprivation and expropriation in terms of s 25 see Chapter 4 
‘Deprivation’ and Chapter 5 ‘Expropriation’ in Constitutional property law (note 115) at 121-283. 
US law uses the following terminology: expropriation involves the exercise of ‘eminent domain’; 
deprivation the use of ‘police power’; and the grey area in between the two is what is called 
‘regulatory taking’ (Constitutional property law (note 115) at 128-9). An example of the grey area 
in the South African context includes the forfeiture of property (usually as a result of criminal 
activity) which is not deprivation as it is usually understood; nor is it expropriation (see 
Constitutional property law (note 115) at 180-1). 
121
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
122
  Section 25(1). 
123
  Footnotes omitted. Constitutional property law (note 115) at 124. For case law on the deprivation 
of property in terms of s 25 see especially the FNB case (note 115) and Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government 
and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
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enabling law of general application;124 and, if classified as an expropriation, 
compensation is payable.125 
The ‘law of general application’ requirement may be met by either statute or 
the rules of common and customary law.126 The ‘arbitrariness’ enquiry has 
both a procedural and a substantive element.127 What constitutes procedural 
fairness depends on the circumstances: substantive fairness, in the context of 
the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of property, requires ‘a test 
that is specific to the property clause and that falls somewhere between a 
“mere rationality” enquiry and the proportionality enquiry used to assess the 
legitimacy of limitations of rights.’128 In other words, the deprivation must at 
least be rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose, but it must 
also try to achieve a balance between the public benefit achieved and the 
private harm caused.129 The test is contextual: ‘a mere rational connection 
between means and end could suffice for a minimal deprivation, while a more 
compelling reason and a closer relationship between means and ends would 
be required when the extent of the deprivation was greater.’130 The limitation 
of rights’ analysis requires the regulator or adjudicator to look at the nature 
and importance of the competing rights;131 and the extent of the limitation 
sought to be imposed on the property right and possibly any less restrictive 
means to achieve that purpose.132 Controlling the cost or production or 
distribution of GM cottonseed, or limiting the terms and conditions that may be 
imposed contractually between the parties are measures that limit property 
and thus, if challenged, may be tested for arbitrariness. In the case of patents, 
                                                          
124
  Section 25(2). 
125
  Section 25(2)(b). 
126
  Constitutional property law (note 115) at 144. 
127
  Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) at 543. 
128
  The bill of rights handbook (note 127) at 545. (Original footnotes excluded).  
129
  Constitutional property law (note 115) at 145. See also in this regard the FNB case (note 121). 
130
  Constitutional property law (note 115) at 156. Van der Walt is comparing the formulation of the 
test in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) (the Mkontwana 
case) with that of the FNB case (note 121). 
131
  The public interest in access to PGRs and a health agricultural sector is compelling. It involves the 
protection of, among others, rights to dignity, substantive equality, culture, and the right to life 
embedded in food security and sustainable livelihoods. 
132
  See s 36 in annexure A. 
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limitations are required to comply with the TRIPS Agreement133 and, in the 
case of modern biotechnology, with the provisions of other WTO Agreements 
and the Protocol on Biosafety.134   
A deprivation which amounts to an expropriation must be for a public purpose 
or in the public interest.135 Public interest ‘includes the nation’s commitment to 
land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South 
Africa’s natural resources.’136  
The property clause in the Constitution challenges the traditional unitary and 
exclusionary concept of property. For example the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act,137 enacted in accordance with s 25(6) of the Constitution,138 goes well 
beyond the scope of real and limited real rights in land and recognises rights 
in land as ‘any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may 
include the interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law 
interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and beneficial 
occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to … 
dispossession’. These principles are applied in the Richtersveld139 and the 
Ndebele-Ndzundza140 cases discussed in § 2.5.3. 
In addition to recognising indigenous rights, the state’s duty to protect 
fundamental rights in a seemingly private dispute may further curtail the extent 
to which private rights will be protected.141  
Case law which illustrates the balancing nature of the state’s duty to protect 
rights include the President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v 
                                                          
133
  See § 5.5.4 and further at § 7.3.3.1. 
134
  The WTO agreements and their impact on states’ regulatory powers is discussed in chapter 5.  
135
  Section 25(2)(a). 
136
  Ibid. 
137
  Act 22 of 1994. The Act provides for the restitution of a right in land where a community has been 
dispossessed (after 19 June 1913) of that right as a result of racial discrimination. (Section 2(1)). 
138
  Section 25(6) provides that: 
‘A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.’ 
139
  Alexkor Ltd and Another v The Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC). 
140
  Prinsloo and Another v Ndebele-Ndzundza Community and Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA). 
141
  For example Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commission, Western Cape, 2004 (4) 
SA 444 C) and Nhlabathi & Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) discussed in § 2.2.1.  
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Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.142 The case involved a landowner who sought 
to evict unlawful occupiers from the land. The outcome essentially reinforced 
the state’s obligations to both parties: the landowner’s right to private property, 
and the unlawful occupiers’ right to adequate housing. Similar reasoning 
underlies the decision concerning a registered trademark in Laugh it Off 
Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International 
(Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae).143 In the Supreme Court 
of Appeal decision,144 Harms J quotes Professor David Vaver145 in support of 
the view that ‘intellectual property cannot be treated as an absolute value. Its 
value should be weighed up against a range of values of at least equal 
importance such as the “right of people to imitate others, to work, compete, 
talk, and write freely, and to nurture common cultures”.’146 The courts 
recognise that the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be 
constitutionally tenable.147 What is fair will have to be assessed on a case by 
case basis with due regard to the context and factual matrix of the case.148  
When assessing the weight of competing rights the primary role of agriculture 
in any society should not be undermined. Activities ‘like agricultural land use 
activities, seem to be accorded a higher social utility by the courts than 
activities that only indirectly advance public welfare through trade, industry 
and commerce.’149 Added to this are the rights to dignity and the right to life,150 
which includes the right to livelihood.  
                                                          
142
  2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). See Mia Swart ‘Left out in the cold? Crafting constitutional remedies for the 
poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 215 at 228.  
143
  2006 (1) SA 144 (CC). In the court a quo the High Court granted SAB an interdict preventing the 
appellant from marketing ‘Black Labour’ T-shirts which were held to infringe SABs Black Label 
trademark in terms of s 34(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act. The Court (a quo) found that the 
caricature was likely to take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or 
repute of SAB’s trade marks; and that the caricature bordered on hate speech. Laugh it Off 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, alleging that the message on the T-shirt was a parody of 
SAB’s trademarks; and that the interdict infringed the Constitutionally protected freedom of 
expression. 
144
  2005 (2) SA 46 (SCA). 
145
  Vaver ‘Canada's intellectual property framework: A comparative overview’ (2004) 17 Intellectual 
Property Journal at 187-8.  
146
  At para [9]. 
147
  At para [17] CC decision. 
148
  At para [49] CC decision.  
149
  Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) at 479 (emphasis added) and footnote 80 where 
the following cases are referred to: Holland v Scott (1882) 2 EDC 307 at 316 / 330; Graham v 
Dittmann & Son 1917 TPD 288 at 294; Malherbe v Ceres Municipality 1951 (5) SA 510 (A) at 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
142 
 
[T]he right to life encompasses more than “mere animal existence”. It 
includes the right to livelihood.151  
The private law rights of the parties are supplemented and constrained by the 
following domestic legislation.  
4.4 Legislation and the Monsanto Agreement 
Relevant statutes are broadly located within the areas of environmental, 
agricultural, biosafety, intellectual property and also human rights law (for 
example the right to life and dignity). These are predominantly public law 
measures that may impact on private rights, in terms of which the state may 
regulate ownership rights (such as the right to develop and trade in genetically 
modified organisms). In so far as these laws raise rights and responsibilities 
between the state and the parties, rather than between the parties inter se, 
they are discussed in more detail in chapter 5.  
Although patent law is of a public nature in the sense that duties are imposed 
on the state to recognise and protect patent rights (assuming there is a 
patentable invention), patent law has obvious implications on private actors.  
4.4.1 IP (patent and plant breeders’) rights derived from statute 
Patent protection is primarily concerned with excluding competitors, other 
researchers and the state152 from unauthorised use of the patented 
                                                                                                                                                                      
517-8. See also Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs and Others 2005 (3) 
SA 589 (CC) where provisions of provincial legislation, the Pound Ordinance 32 of 1947 (KZN), 
were declared invalid for being unconstitutional. In considering the provisions, which related to the 
impoundment of animals, the rights of landowners (seeking to have trespassing livestock 
impounded) had to be balanced against the rights of livestock owners. 
150
  See S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para [144] where it is stated that ‘[t]he 
rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights’.  
151
  Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner, Western Cape, and 
Others (Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) at 448. The Court also 
refers to Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others 1987 LRC 351 (India) reprinted in 
Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental rights in the constitution: commentary and cases (1997) 
at 520-528 where the ‘nexus between life and the means of livelihood’ is explored.  
152
  Section 4 of the Patents Act provides that: ‘[a] patent shall in all respects have the like effect 
against the State as it has against a person: Provided that a Minister of State may use an invention 
for public purposes on such conditions as may be agreed upon with the patentee, or in default of 
agreement on such conditions as are determined by the commissioner on application by or on 
behalf of such Minister and after hearing the patentee’. (Emphasis added). 
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technology.153 Monsanto’s patent rights underlie its agreement with farmers 
and patent law will apply to a grower or growers not party to the agreement 
are found growing Monsanto’s cotton.154 The latter scenario is discussed at § 
4.5. 
The agreement between the parties indicates that ‘Monsanto licenses the 
Grower under applicable patents owned or licensed by Monsanto to use these 
technologies’.  The contract indicates that the patent numbers covering these 
technologies are 90/1417,155 86/5921156 and 90/8699157 which are explored in 
chapter 3. Patent number 86/5921 has expired and is no longer protected by 
the Patents Act and the remaining two patents will expire in 2010. The rights 
afforded by a patent grant are limited to the claims158 contained in the patent 
application. A party may however secure contractual rights which extend 
beyond the rights afforded by the patent claims. As Llewelyn and Adcock point 
out: 
[t]he terms of any licence agreement are not governed by intellectual 
property laws but by the laws common to commerce which provide the 
parties to the agreement with a significant amount of freedom to dictate 
the terms of that agreement.159  
                                                          
153
  ‘The effect of a patent shall be to grant to the patentee in the Republic, subject to the provisions of 
… [the Patents] Act, for the duration of the patent, the right to exclude other persons from making, 
using, exercising, disposing or offering to dispose of, or importing the invention, so that he or she 
shall have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing by reason of the invention’ (s 45(1)). 
154
  The effect of a patent is ‘to grant to the patentee in the Republic, subject to the provisions of this 
Act, for the duration of the patent, the right to exclude other persons from making, using, 
exercising, disposing or offering to dispose of, or importing the invention, so that he or she shall 
have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing by reason of the invention’ (s 45). In 
terms of s 69A which deals with acts of non-infringement, it is not permitted to possess the 
patented invention other than for obtaining information required under any law regulating a 
product.  
155
  Patent application number 90/1417 is a patent involving ‘synthetic plant genes and method for 
preparation’ in the name of Monsanto Company. (See Patent Journal, April 1990). 
156
  Patent application number 86/5921 is a patent involving ‘glyphosate-resistant plants’ in the name 
of Monsanto Company (see Patent Journal, August 1987 at 125-6). 
157
  Patent application number 90/8699 is a patent involving ‘promoter for transgenic plants’ in the 
name of Monsanto Company (see Patent Journal, December 1990 at 101). The ‘equivalent’ US 
patent application is US5378619; and the European patent application is patent number 
EP0426641.  
158
  For more details on the specific claims of the three patents mentioned in the Monsanto Agreement, 
see § 3.2.5. 
159
  Margaret Llewelyn and Mike Adcock (eds) European plant intellectual property (2006) at 51. 
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In the South African context this freedom is to some extent curtailed by the 
provisions of the Patents Act, which provides for the automatic termination of 
licencing contracts on expiry of the patents.160 Unless Monsanto has new 
patents applicable to its cottonseed they should not be entitled to collect a 
technology user fee in addition to a purchase price subsequent to the expiry of 
its last remaining patents in 2010.  
The Patents Act, in s 90, also limits the conditions which may be imposed on 
the purchaser or licensee. One of the restrictions renders a condition ‘to 
require the purchaser or licensee to acquire from the seller … any article or 
class of articles not protected by the patent’ as null and void. The proviso in s 
90(2)(b) is however most likely to save the condition in the Monsanto 
Agreement requiring growers to implement a specified Insect Resistance 
Management Program by stating that ‘[n]othing in this section shall … affect 
any condition in a contract for the lease of or a licence to use a patented 
article, whereby the lessor or licensor reserves to himself or his nominee the 
right to supply such new parts of the patented article, other than ordinary 
articles of commerce, as may be required to put or keep it in repair.’ It is not 
quite at point (but then the patenting of PGRs is anomalous) but the intention 
of the legislation can still be gathered.  
The Patents Act is an important tool enabling Monsanto to establish a 
monopoly in respect of the production and sale of GM cottonseed in South 
Africa. This monopoly in turn enables Monsanto to impose onerous terms and 
conditions on the purchase of GM cottonseed.  
In addition to Monsanto’s patent rights, Monsanto’s subsidiary, Delta & Pine 
Land Co (Deltapine), has applied for and been granted statutory plant 
breeders’ rights161 for gossypium hirsutum L (cotton) in respect of, among 
                                                          
160
  Section 57(1) of the Patents Act which provides that ‘[a]ny contract, in so far as it relates to a 
licence under a patent to make, use, exercise, offer to dispose of, dispose of or import a patented 
invention, shall terminate on the date on which the patent under which the licence was granted 
expires, is revoked or otherwise ceases to protect such invention’. See also Burrell South African 
patent law and practice (1986) at 333-334. 
161
  In terms of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976. 
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others, DeltaOPAL RR, NuOPAL RR and DP 677 BG/RR.162 This might have 
been in anticipation of the expiry of Monsanto’s patents as the effect of the 
plant breeders’ rights is to place restrictions on the reproduction of the 
protected variety. Section 23(1) of the Act lists the activities that require prior 
authorisation (by licence) from the plant breeder. However, prior authorisation 
is not required in the event that the person undertaking the listed activity ‘is a 
farmer who on land occupied by him or her uses harvested material obtained 
on such land from that propagating material for purposes of propagation: 
Provided that harvested material obtained from the replanted propagating 
material shall not be used for purposes of propagation by any person other 
than that farmer.’163    
Other mechanisms that may limit the extent to which private rights in PGRs 
may be commercially exploited include the use of competition law, the law 
relating to the marketing of agricultural products, and consumer protection 
law.  
4.4.2 Competition law 
Competition law, as it is conventionally understood, seeks to promote (the 
efficiency of) competition within the market for goods and services. A more 
controversial role is the use of competition law in a way that seeks to balance 
free market imperatives against other social objectives in order to ‘give proper 
effect to the complex matrix of needs, aspirations and ideals operating in 
society at the time’.164 South Africa’s Competition Act165 embraces the broader 
approach, as the Act’s preamble illustrates by recognising: 
… [t]hat apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices of the 
past resulted in excessive concentrations of ownership and control 
within the national economy, inadequate restraints against anti-
                                                          
162
  The grant of plant breeders’ rights in respect of the three varieties was published in Notice 168, 
Government Gazette 28519 on 24 February 2006. 
163
  Section 23(6)( f ). The Plant Breeders’ Rights Act may however restrict certain rights of other plant 
breeders. See § 5.5.4.3 on the Plant Breeders’ Act more generally. See also Keith Kirsten’s (Pty) 
Ltd v Weltevrede Nursery (Pty) Ltd and Another 2002 (4) SA 756 (C) and Weltevrede Nursery v 
Keith Kirsten’s (Pty) Ltd and Another 2004 (4) SA 110 (SCA) on the requirements for a variety to 
be protectable; and as to who may apply for rights. 
164
  Martin Brassey (ed) Competition law (2002) at 1. 
165
  Act 89 of 1998. 
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competitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions on full and free 
participation in the economy by all South Africans. 
The Act lists among its purposes: ‘to provide consumers with competitive 
prices and product choices’;166 ‘to promote employment and advance the 
social and economic welfare of South Africans’;167 and ‘to promote a greater 
spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of 
historically disadvantaged persons.’168 
There is, on the face of it, an apparent conflict between the principles of IP law 
and competition law.169 Whereas IP has the tendency to promote market 
dominance, competition law seeks to break up the power of dominant firms. 
Both however aim to promote consumer welfare, and are ultimately 
complementary.170 Competition law is a mechanism to rein in IP related anti-
competitive behaviour to the extent that it breaches competition law.171  
In the South African context, where there is a dominant firm (meeting a 
threshold turn-over)172 in a particular market, the Competition Act prohibits the 
abuse of such dominance.173 A firm is dominant if it has a market share of 
45% or above (or less if it has market power).174 Dominant firms may not, 
among other things, ‘charge an excessive price to the detriment of 
consumers.’175 Dominant firms may not ‘refuse to give a competitor access to 
an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do so’.176 In addition, 
dominant firms may not, unless there is good reason for doing so, sell goods 
or services on condition that the buyer purchases separate goods or services 
                                                          
166
  Section 2(b). 
167
  Section 2(c). (Emphasis added). 
168
  Section 2 (f). 
169
  See in this regard James Brand ‘Intellectual property and the abuse of dominant position in South 
African competition law’ (2005) 122 SALJ 907-928. See generally also Steven D Anderman (ed) 
The interface between intellectual property rights and competition policy (2007). 
170
  Brand (note 169) at 909. 
171
  Steven D Anderman (ed) The interface between intellectual property rights and competition policy 
(2007) at 1. 
172
  Section 6. 
173
  Chapter 2, Part B. In drafting these provisions, the relevant provisions in EC and US law were 
considered. Lawrence Reyburn Competition Law of South Africa (2008) at para 7.1. 
174
  Section 7. 
175
  Section 8(a). 
176
  Section 8(b). 
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unrelated to the object of a contract, or forcing a buyer to accept a condition 
unrelated to the object of a contract.177 
Assuming Monsanto meets the threshold turn-over, they are a dominant firm 
and, if the pricing is excessive, the cost of access to the seed may be 
challenged. Whether or not a price is excessive requires an assessment of the 
actual price of a product and its economic value. Economic value is 
determined by an analysis of the costs incurred by the dominant firm.178 In 
other words ‘an excessive price is one that bears no reasonable relation to the 
economic value of the good or service … there is an unreasonable 
relationship between the price charged … and the costs incurred in producing 
it.’179 Although Monsanto’s R&D costs may have originally been high, the 
current cost of production is unlikely to significantly exceed that of 
conventional cotton.180 The cost of Monsanto’s seed is comprised of both the 
price of the seed and the cost of the technology user fee. 
The provisions relating to competitors’ access may arguably assist competitor 
/ public research undertakings to gain access to Monsanto’s technology. It is 
the role of the Competition Commission to investigate alleged contraventions 
of the Act.181 Monsanto has had allegations of anti-competitive (anti-trust) 
behaviour levelled against it for its behaviour in foreign markets.182  
Recently, in particular in the wake of a settlement agreement between Sasol 
Chemical Industries Limited and the Competition Tribunal relating to Sasol’s 
anti-competitive activities in the fertiliser industry, there have been calls for 
companies found guilty in terms of the Act to give a percentage of their annual 
                                                          
177
  Section 8(d)(iii). 
178
  Brassey (note 164) at 202. 
179
  Brassey (note 164) at 202. See also the decision of the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa 
in Mittal Steel SA Limited and others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and another 
70/CAC/Apr07.  
180
  Communication with Agricultural Research Council, July 2009. 
181
  Section 21(1). 
182
  Drahos with Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns the knowledge economy? (2002) at 165 
observe that intellectual property rights allow for companies to practice cartelism, which may be 
anti-competitive and cite the example of private antitrust action that has been brought by farmers 
(US and international) against Monsanto and its co-conspirators alleging the use of patents to fix 
prices and restrain trade in the GM corn and soybean seed markets.  
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turnover to the development of the agricultural sector, or at least for the fine to 
be utilised for helping emerging farmers who have faced rising costs.183 
South African law also permits restrictions on the marketing and sales of 
agricultural products.  
4.4.3 Legislation regulating the marketing of agricultural products  
The Marketing of Agricultural Products Act184 commenced on 1 January 1997 
and its objectives are:  
(a) the increasing of market access for all market participants; 
(b) the promotion of the efficiency of the marketing of agricultural 
products; 
(c) the optimisation of export earnings from agricultural products; 
(d) the enhancement of the viability of the agricultural sector. 
The Act puts in place mechanisms for establishing statutory measures that will 
regulate the marketing of agricultural products.  In extraordinary 
circumstances, the Act gives legislative power to prohibit the import or export 
of an agricultural product.185 The Act provides for directly affected groups to 
request the Minister of Agriculture to establish, continue, amend or repeal a 
statutory measure.186 Such requests must indicate, inter alia, the agricultural 
product(s); the objectives, or objections (to an existing measure); the support 
of other affected groups; an implementation plan and the geographical areas 
and duration in which the statutory measure applies or should apply.187  
Statutory measures must be gazetted and may involve the introduction of a 
levy.188 One of the functions of Cotton SA (a body described in chapter 3) is to 
apply for appropriate statutory measures in terms of the Marketing of 
Agricultural Products and to administer such measures. An example of this 
                                                          
183
  Business Report (online edition) ‘Guilty firms must pay more – union’ May 26, 2009. 
184
  Act 47 of 1996, which repealed the Marketing Act 59 of 1968 as amended. 
185
  In terms of s 22 of the Act. 
186
  Section 10. 
187
  Section 10(2). 
188
  Section 15. 
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includes a 2008 statutory measure189 which was put in place to extract a levy 
from ginners in respect of cotton lint.190 The purpose of the measure is to 
provide financial support for a number of functions that have been identified 
as essential and in the interest of the cotton industry. These functions are: 
(a) Rendering of information services to all role-players; 
(b) the promotion of cotton production and the usage; 
(c) the co-ordination of research; 
(d) the maintenance of quality standards and norms and the provision 
of training; and 
(e) the facilitation of the development of the emerging cotton 
production sector.191 
The intention is to increase market access for all market participants and the 
view is expressed that ‘[t]he promotion of the production of cotton can make a 
significant contribution towards the level of household food security in South 
Africa, particularly in the more arid regions of the country where other summer 
crops have regularly failed. It is furthermore important that perceptions be 
changed in terms of crops more suited to those areas to feature more 
strongly.’192 It is intended that a portion of the funds collected will be used to 
focus on small-scale farmers and the developing cotton industry. The 
measure applies throughout South Africa.193  
4.4.4 Consumer protection law 
The common law maxim, pacta sunt servanda, discussed above, is tempered 
in some cases by recently enacted consumer protection legislation. Consumer 
                                                          
189
  Marketing of Agricultural Products Act: establishment of statutory measure and determination of 
guideline prices: Levy relating to cotton lint: GNR 373 of 4 April 2008 (Government Gazette No 
30925). 
190
  A ginner is ‘any person who gins seed cotton.’ Seed cotton is ‘is the lint and seed derived from the 
ball of the cotton plant,’ cotton lint is the fibre remaining after the seed cotton has been ginned, 
and to gin is ‘to separate the seed and fibre in seed cotton.’ Clause 1 of GNR 373 of 4 April 2008 
(Government Gazette No 30925). 
191
  Clause 2 of GNR 373 of 4 April 2008 (Government Gazette No 30925). 
192
  There is a contrary view that, at least in so far as the Makhathini Flats are concerned, that 
alternative agrarian choices to cotton should in fact be pursued. See for example Harald Witt et al 
‘Can the poor help GM crops? Technology, representation & cotton in the Makhathini Flats, South 
Africa’ (2006) 109 Review of African Political Economy 497-513. 
193
  Clause 4 of GNR 373 of 4 April 2008 (Government Gazette No 30925). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
150 
 
protection in South Africa is consolidated by the Consumer Protection Act.194 
The Consumer Protection Act is extensive, and the preamble sets the context 
within which its provisions should be interpreted. The preamble recognises 
‘[t]hat apartheid and other discriminatory laws of the past have burdened the 
nation with unacceptably high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and other forms of 
social and economic inequality; and [t]hat it is necessary to develop and 
employ innovative means to … fulfil the rights of historically disadvantaged 
persons and to promote their full participation as consumers’. 
The Act establishes an ethos of fundamental consumer rights195 and 
empowers civil society support for consumer’s rights.196 In terms of the Act,197 
‘goods’ includes anything marketed for human consumption or other tangible 
object and any intangible object or licence to use intangible object and thus 
the sale of seed and the Monsanto Agreement will be subject to the provisions 
of the Act. In terms of the consumer right to fair and honest dealing, the Act 
confirms the common law prohibition on unconscionable conduct and includes 
conduct where a supplier takes advantage of a customer’s vulnerabilities.198  
False, misleading, or deceptive representations are also dealt with in the 
Act.199 In addition, suppliers are prohibited from supplying goods or services 
at a price, or on terms, that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Consumers 
have recourse to the courts, but also to a National Consumer Commission 
and a National Consumer Tribunal. 
In addition, the Act allows for categories of goods to be prescribed that require 
a trade description (labelling) and that ‘[a]ny person who produces, supplies, 
imports or packages any prescribed goods must display on, or in association 
with the packaging of those goods, a notice in the prescribed manner and 
                                                          
194
  Act 68 of 2008. 
195
  Chapter 2 sets out these rights as: the right of equality in consumer market; the consumer’s right to 
privacy; the consumer’s right to choose; the right to disclosure and information; the right to fair 
and responsible marketing; the right to fair and honest dealing; the right to fair, just and reasonable 
terms and conditions; the right to fair value, good quality and safety; and the supplier’s 
accountability to consumers. 
196
  Chapter 3. 
197
  Section 1. 
198
  Section 40 – see especially s 40(2). 
199
  Section 41. 
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form that discloses the presence of any genetically modified ingredients or 
components of those goods in accordance with applicable regulations.’200 
Outside of the consumer-supplier relationship, there are classes of persons 
(such as organic and conventional farmers who, while not party to the 
Monsanto Agreement, may nonetheless be impacted by GM cottonseed. The 
dynamics of these legal relationships may impact on decision-making as to 
the extent to which private property rights in PGRs should be tolerated.  
4.5 The Monsanto Agreement: third party rights and obligations 
What happens when a third party, who is not party to the Monsanto 
Agreement, is found in possession of proprietary GM cottonseed? This 
scenario might involve, on the one hand, a third party that is not necessarily 
unhappy with the presence of GM cottonseed on his or her land or, on the 
other hand, a third party, for example an organic farmer, who will be decidedly 
unhappy with the presence of GM cottonseed on his or her land. Whether or 
not the farmer is unhappy, Monsanto’s patents rights still weigh heavily in 
favour of Monsanto. An unhappy farmer may try to found an action in the law 
of property (nuisance) or in delict (see § 4.5.2) but is unlikely to succeed. 
Another avenue of recourse for liability and redress for damage caused by 
GMOs is under discussion under the auspices of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity.201 
4.5.1 Monsanto’s IP rights against third parties 
If cottonseed has blown onto a third party’s land and taken root, even though 
the third party might argue that accession (accessio)202 has occurred this is 
                                                          
200
  Section 24(6). A prescribed form has not yet been promulgated. For a discussion on GMO 
labelling in the South African context see Viljoen et al ‘Detection of GMO in food products in SA: 
implications of GMO labelling’ (2006) 5(2) African Journal of Biotechnology 73-82. 
201
  39 ILM 1027 (2000). See § 4.5.3 and also the discussion on the Biosafety Protocol in chapter 5. 
202
  Accession involves a thing (the accessory) or a portion of a thing being incorporated by natural or 
artificial means into another thing (the principal thing). The general principle is that owner of the 
principal thing becomes the owner of the new thing in line with the Roman law maxims omne 
quod implantatur solo cedit (things sown or planted in soil accede to the soil once it has taken 
root) and superficies solo cedit. Although there is some authority for the view that the person 
prejudiced because his seeds have taken root on another’s land can claim the value of the seeds as 
compensation, possibly on the basis of unjust enrichment. See for example Silberberg and 
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unlikely to assist the third party against Monsanto’s statutory claim. 
Monsanto’s claim will be that liability attaches to the third party on the basis of 
Monsanto’s patent rights. This was the case in the patent infringement 
proceedings203 in the Supreme Court of Canada in Monsanto Canada Inc v 
Schmeiser204 which involved GM canola (‘Roundup Ready Canola’). 
Schmeiser, a commercial farmer in Saskatchewan, had never purchased 
Roundup Ready canola, nor had he acquired a licence to grow Monsanto’s 
canola, however tests conducted on Schmeisers’ 1998 crops revealed that 
between 95 and 98 percent of the crop was roundup ready canola. The trial 
court found in favour of Monsanto, holding that the patent was valid and was 
infringed by Schmeiser, who knew, or ought to have known, that the seed 
saved and planted by Schmeiser,205 contained the patented gene and cell. 
The Federal Court of Appeal, with only a small majority,206 upheld this 
decision finding that Schmeiser used Monsanto’s patented gene and cell and 
hence infringed the patent.207 The Court (or at least the majority) 208 was not 
prepared to rule on the policy arguments against biotechnology patents, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Schoeman (note 34) at 141-156; Van der Walt and Pienaar (note 34) at 102–109; and CG Van der 
Merwe ‘Things’ Law of South Africa (Vol 27 – First Reissue Volume) at para 328-338.  
203
  The proceedings were brought in terms of s 42 of the Canadian Patent Act, namely that:  
‘Every patent granted under this Act shall … grant to the patentee … the exclusive right, 
privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to 
be used, subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction.’  
The equivalent provision in the South African Patent Act is s 45 which provides that: 
‘The effect of a patent shall be to grant to the patentee … the right to exclude other persons 
from making, using, exercising, disposing or offering to dispose of, or importing the invention, 
so that he or she shall have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing by reason of the 
invention.’ 
204
  2004 SCC 34. For a consideration of the ramifications of the decision see for example Maria Lee 
and Robert Burrell ‘Liability for the escape of GM seeds: pursuing the “victim”?’ (2002) 65  
Modern Law Review at 517-537 and the sources cited therein. 
205
  How the plants came to be on Schmeiser’s farm is disputed. The Court however rejected 
Schmeiser’s suggestions in this regard, finding, at para[6], that: ‘[t]he origin of the plants is 
unclear. They may have been derived from Roundup Ready seed that blew onto or near 
Schmeiser’s land, and was then collected from plants that survived after Schmeiser sprayed 
Roundup herbicide around the power poles and in the ditches along the roadway bordering four of 
his fields. The fact that these plants survived the spraying indicated that they contained the 
patented gene and cell. The trial judge found that “none of the suggested sources [proposed by 
Schmeiser] could reasonably explain the concentration or extent of Roundup Ready canola of a 
commercial quality” ultimately present in Schmeiser’s crop ((2001), 202 FTR 78 at para [118]).’   
206
  The judges were split 5:4. 
207
  Monsanto sought relief on the basis of accounting of profits (rather than damages) and as the court 
found that Schmeiser’s profits were what they would have been had they planted and harvested 
ordinary canola, no claim was awarded.  
208
  The minority judgment, relying on an earlier decision in the Supreme Court of Canada in Harvard 
College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) 2002 SCC 76, would have allowed Schmeiser’s 
appeal. In Harvard College the Court was once again sharply divided, but a majority (5:4) drew 
the line at the patentability of ‘life forms’ (in this case the oncomice).  
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expressing the view that ‘if Parliament wishes to respond legislatively to 
biotechnology inventions concerning plants, it is free to do so.’209 
The Schmeiser decision has been criticised for extending the protection to 
include the whole plant.210 Monsanto’s patents in SA in any event extent over 
plants and seeds. The minority judgment concluded that ‘the gene patent 
claims and the plant cell claims should not be construed to grant exclusive 
rights over the plant and all of its offspring.’211 In so far as a farmers’ right to 
save seed is concerned,212 the Supreme Court of Canada had the following to 
say:213  
[Schmeiser] argue(s) … that Monsanto’s activities tread on the ancient 
common law property rights of farmers to keep that which comes onto 
their land. Just as a farmer owns the progeny of a ‘stray bull’ which 
wanders onto his land, so Mr. Schmeiser argues, he owns the progeny 
of Roundup Ready Canola that came onto his field. However, the issue 
is not property rights, but patent protection. Ownership is no defence to 
a breach of the Patent Act. 
The same is likely to be true in South Africa as rights derived from statute take 
precedence over common law rights. The logical conclusion therefore, is that, 
if indeed the balance of rights is unduly skewed in favour of Monsanto, the 
solution is likely to be a legislative one.  
Damages recoverable from an infringing farmer are restricted by s 66(1) which 
provides that:  
                                                          
209
  Para [95]. 
210
  See for example ER Gold and WA Adams ‘The Monsanto decision: the edge or the wedge’ (2001) 
19 Nat Biotechnol 587. 
211
  Para [129]. The minority were of the opinion that: 
‘It is clear from the specification that Monsanto’s patent claims do not extend to plants, seeds, 
and crops. It is also clear that the gene claim does not extend patent protection to the plant. 
The plant cell claims ends at the point where the isolated plant cell containing the chimeric 
gene is placed into the growth medium for regeneration, Once the cell begins to multiply and 
differentiate into plant tissues, resulting in the growth of a plant, a claim should be made for 
the whole plant. However, the whole plant cannot be patented. Similarly the method claim 
ends at the point of the regeneration of the transgenic founder plant but does not extend to 
methods for propagating that plant. It certainly does not extend to the offspring of the 
regenerated plant.’ (para [130]) (Emphasis added). 
212
  Farmers’ rights are discussed in more detail in chapter 5.  
213
  Para [96]. 
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[a] patentee shall not be entitled to recover damages in respect of 
infringement of a patent from a defendant who proves that at the date 
of the infringement he was not aware, and had no reasonable means of 
making himself aware, of the existence of the patent.  
A possible (but costly) response by growers that may be pursued by 
Monsanto214 on the basis of the Patents Act, is to ‘counterclaim for the 
revocation of the patent and, by way of defence, rely upon any ground on 
which a patent may be revoked’215 although the argument was not sustained 
in the Schmeiser case. Another possibility, discussed below, is to actively 
seek remedy from Monsanto for damages, which appears to have happened 
in the Canadian case of Schmeiser. It is reported that in March 2008 
Monsanto agreed to cover the costs of a clean-up operation to remove the 
Roundup Ready canola that contaminated the Schmeiser farm,216 possibly 
paving the way for future recourse by non-licenced farmers who are the 
unwitting recipients of GM crops.217  
                                                          
214
  Monsanto, in proceedings for infringement, may be entitled to relief by way of- 
(a) an interdict; 
(b)  delivery up of any infringing product or any article or product of which the infringing 
product forms an inseparable part; and 
(c) damages (s 65(3)). 
Section 65(4) provides that ‘[i]n lieu of damages the plaintiff may, at his or her option, be awarded 
an amount calculated on the basis of a reasonable royalty which would have been payable by a 
licensee or sub-licensee in respect of the patent concerned.’ The recovery of damages is however 
restricted in terms of s 66(1), see text above, which requires that the defendant have knowledge of 
infringement before damages may be recovered. 
215
  The grounds for revoking a patent are set out in s 61 and include that the invention concerned is 
not patentable in terms of the requirements for patentability. 
216
  Schmeiser claimed $660 in the small claims court.  
217
  GM Watch, 20 March 2008. For a similar type of claim, also in Canada, see also Hoffman v 
Monsanto Canada Inc 2007 SKCA 47. The Hoffman case involved a class action by organic 
farmers against Monsanto and Bayer Cropscience Inc aimed at stopping the introduction of GM 
wheat and also limiting the spread of GM canola on the basis that these products were harmful to 
the interests of organic farmers. Shortly thereafter, Monsanto abandoned its plans to introduce GM 
wheat and the dispute was therefore reduced to a consideration of GM canola. The court indicated 
as a weakness the fact that these biotech companies did not grow GM canola and only provided 
seed to farmers. (Paras [8]-[10]). Out of its original six causes of action in: negligence; the strict 
liability rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1866), LR 1 Ex 265; (1868) LR 3 HL 330; nuisance; trespass; 
the environmental Management and Protection Act of Saskatchewan; and the Environmental 
Assessment Act of Saskatchewan; it was clear that none of the common law claims would be 
sustained. Kathryn Garforth and Paige Ainslie ‘When worlds collide: biotechnology meets organic 
farming in Hoffman v Monsanto’ (2006) 18 Journal of Environmental Law 459.  
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4.5.2 Do third parties have rights against Monsanto?218 
The concepts of neighbour law and nuisance, the idea that property must be 
used in such a manner as not to injure that of another (sic utero tuo alienum 
non laedas)219 provide an aggrieved party with remedies in the law of property 
(for infringement of property entitlements) and the law of delict (for patrimonial 
loss or personal injury). Depending on the circumstances, appropriate 
remedies may be an interdict (prohibiting particular behaviour or mandating 
certain remedial action) or compensation for damage. 
Although the argument could be made that Monsanto may be liable in delict 
for losses suffered in delict, case law, at least pre-1994 case law, relating 
specifically to actions based on the lex Aquilia indicates that aggrieved parties 
seeking redress against manufacturers of a (lawfully registered) product are 
unlikely to be successful.220 This was the case in Natal Fresh Produce 
Growers’ Association and Others v Agroserve (Pty) Ltd and Others221 where 
the plaintiff sought an interdict that would prohibit the defendants from 
manufacturing and distributing (duly registered) hormonal herbicides in South 
Africa as these herbicides are transported through water and air and are 
deposited on, and cause damage to, fresh produce (on the evidence, 
specifically in the Tala Valley area in KwaZulu Natal).  The Court was of the 
view that the manufacture of the herbicides was not rendered unlawful merely 
because the use of the herbicides by certain third parties resulted in damage 
to the plaintiffs. The court upheld an exception to the plaintiff’s plea 
maintaining that:  
[i]t may be that the use [of the herbicides] cannot take place without the 
manufacture and distribution, so that the manufacture and distribution 
can be regarded as a causa sine qua non of the use, but that is not 
                                                          
218
  See also in this regard Jeremy de Beer ‘Rights and responsibilities of biotech patent owners’ 
(2007) 40 UBCL Rev 343-373 where he uses, among other grounds, the ‘duty to prevent harm’ 
incident of ownership to argue for greater responsibility on the part of the patent owner.  
219
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 34) at 111-132; Introduction to the law of property (note 36) at 88-
97.  
220
  On the elements of aquilian liability see Chapter 41 ‘Compensation for pecuniary loss – the actio 
legis Aquiliae’ in Wille’s principles of South African law (note 26) 1094-1164. 
221
  1990 (4) SA 749 (N). 
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sufficient to saddle the manufacturers with legal responsibility of the 
conduct of the users.222 
The logical (private law) conclusion is that a third party is likely only to have a 
claim against neighbours who grow GM cottonseed.  There is an insufficient 
link between a third party and Monsanto in order to establish liability on the 
part of Monsanto and it is unlikely that an appeal to the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights will alter that. Other liability and redress options are currently under 
consideration at international law level. 
4.5.3 Liability and redress in international and domestic law 
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity223 could not reach agreement on a provision for recourse for liability 
and redress for damage caused by GMOs. The applicable Article224 provides 
for a process of engagement on liability and redress and, as yet, no resolution 
has been reached.225  
In terms of South Africa’s Genetically Modified Organisms Act,226 a statutory 
duty of care is imposed on users227 ‘to ensure that appropriate measures are 
taken to avoid an adverse impact on the environment [and human and animal 
health]228 which may arise from the use of genetically modified organisms.’229 
                                                          
222
  At 755-6. 
223
  39 ILM 1027 (2000). See also the discussion on the Biosafety Protocol in chapter 5. 
224
  The Article on Liability and Redress (Article 27) simply provides that:  
‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its 
first meeting, adopt a process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of international rules 
and procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting from transboundary 
movements of living modified organisms, analysing and taking due account of the ongoing 
processes in international law on these matters, and shall endeavour to complete this process 
within four years.’ 
225
  At the first meeting of the Parties an ad hoc, open ended working group on liability and redress 
was established and has since met on at least three occasions to consider liability and redress, 
although no definitive resolutions have been taken. The fourth COP/MOP Meeting took place in 
Germany in May 2008. The minutes of the South African executive council established under the 
GMO Act held on 29 July 2008 (formerly hosted at www.nda.agric.za) indicate that a South 
African country position on liability and redress would be finalised for a meeting on liability and 
redress in February 2009. The fifth COP/MOP meeting is scheduled to take place in Nagoya, Japan 
in October 2010.  
226
  Act 15 of 1997 as amended. 
227
  The term ‘user’ is defined in s 1 of the GMO Act to mean ‘any natural or legal person or institution 
responsible for the use of genetically modified organisms and includes an end-user or consumer.’ 
This definition is substituted in the GMO Amendment Act to read ‘a person who conducts an 
activity with a genetically modified organism’ (s 1 of the Amendment Act). 
228
  As amended by s 11 of the Amendment Act. 
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The user is liable for damage caused by the use or release of a genetically 
modified organism.230 Persons qualifying as users are likely to include 
farmers, persons transporting GMOs, and even consumers. Liability is limited 
to an adverse impact on the environment or on health and would not include 
loss of markets or other forms of economic loss.231  
4.6 Concluding remarks 
4.6.1 The chapter in brief summary 
This chapter has analysed the agreement between farmers and Monsanto. In 
private law terms the agreement, a licence of use of technology embedded in 
the cottonseed, creates a relationship between the farmer and the physical 
seed that is similar in some respects to a usufruct, except that a usufruct 
cannot generally exist over consumables. The agreement is unclear on 
whether or not ownership passes to the farmer. The farmer’s entitlements 
over the seed (such as the right to save, sell, exchange and replant seed) are 
constrained by contract and Monsanto’s IP rights. The chapter describes the 
common law grounds on which terms of the contract may be challenged. The 
hurdle is the constitutionally endorsed notion of pacta sunt servanda.  
Statutory provisions impacting on the agreement were considered in the 
chapter including the Patents Act, the Competition Act, which prohibits abuse 
(such as excessive pricing) by a dominant firm, the Consumer Protection Act, 
which tempers the pacta sunt servanda principle, and the Marketing of 
Agricultural Products Act which provides a mechanism for regulating the 
marketing of agricultural products. 
The final section of the chapter considers the potential liability of third parties 
to Monsanto and vice versa.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
229
  Section 17(1). The Amendment Act (s 11) substitutes the term ‘use and release of’ with the term 
‘activities relating to’, and inserts s 17A which provides for the recovery of costs incurred by 
Council (in terms of a new s 17(3) provision for Council to remedy damage. 
230
  Section 17(2). 
231
  For a general comment on the position in South Africa see L Feris ‘Risk Management and liability 
for environmental harm caused by GMOS – The South African regulatory framework’ (2006) (1) 
PER 1-26.  
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4.6.2 Conclusion 
Monsanto and farmers do not enter into the relationship with equal bargaining 
powers. Small-scale farmers in particular are marginalised by poor agricultural 
policy and have little choice of agricultural products. The extent to which this 
relationship may be altered by government intervention is the subject matter 
of chapter 5. Chapter 5 considers the matrix of laws, both international and 
domestic, that determine, on the one hand, the state’s relationship with 
Monsanto (its obligations toward Monsanto), and, on the other, its duties in 
respect of farmers.  
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CHAPTER 5  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2): THE STATE’S REGULATORY 
POWERS 
The law’s impact may be felt where it is least evident and where those 
affected may have few resources to recognize or pursue their rights in 
institutional fora. This is certainly true in the field of intellectual 
property…1 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of chapter 5 is to consider the regulatory framework (the ‘regime 
complex’)2 which both empowers and limits the state’s ability to regulate rights 
in PGRs in the public interest. While the focus of chapter 5 is on the regulation 
of genetically modified plants, the broader context for the regulation of various 
aspects of PGRs is described.  
The state’s regulatory powers, some of which were briefly discussed in 
chapter 4, derive from three levels: international, regional, and domestic3 law, 
and span diverse areas of law. The following are discussed in this chapter:  
• Human rights law, which regulates, inter alia: 
o Property rights 
o Socio-economic rights 
o Rights to dignity, equality and life; and 
o Rights to culture, development and farmer’s rights 
• Environmental and agricultural law, which regulate, inter alia: 
o Sustainable development; and 
o Biosafety law 
• Trade law, which includes: 
o International trade; and  
o IP: patents and plant breeders’ rights. 
                                                          
1
  Rosemary J Coombe ‘Critical cultural legal studies’ (1998) Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 
463 at 473. 
2
  See § 1.2.2. 
3
  The terms national and domestic are used interchangeably. The term municipal would also suffice. 
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The chapter is, to use the property paradigm, about the so-called ‘police-
power principle’4 in terms of which the state may regulate property (generally 
without compensation)5 for health, safety and welfare reasons. In the South 
African context ‘the state is authorized to regulate the use, enjoyment and 
exploitation of private property – even when such regulation involves limitation 
of the property owner’s entitlements and causes financial loss – provided the 
regulatory deprivation is imposed generally, for a legitimate public purpose 
and fairly (not arbitrarily in the South African terminology of s 25(1)).’6  
PGRs are of global significance and are increasingly regulated in international 
law. At this level the biotech industry is an important lobby group able to 
influence policy.7 National decisions that may which aggrieve the industry are 
taken up at the WTO.8 This occurred in the case of a complaint by the large 
GM-food producing countries (USA, Canada and Argentina) against the EU in 
the Biotech Products9 dispute.  
The first part of chapter 5 discusses the basic principles and major institutions 
in international law. The remainder of the chapter is divided into three parts: 
human rights law; environmental and agricultural law; and trade law, wherein 
                                                          
4
  See generally AJ Van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) at 132-137.  
5
  When property is expropriated, compensation is payable. The exercise of police-power amounts to 
a deprivation without compensation. 
6
  Van der Walt (note 4) at 133. See also the comparative law examples provided by Van der Walt at 
108 (footnotes 183 and 184) and at 133 where the police-power principle in the US (Coal Co v 
Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) at 413, 419) and in German law are considered. The principle in 
German law is summarised by Van der Walt (134), as follows: 
‘… the extent to which a regulatory deprivation may affect private property negatively is 
partly determined by the nature of the property and its relation to the autonomy and privacy of 
the person or persons affected – the stronger the social relations and function of the property, 
the stronger and the wider are the regulatory powers of the legislature in determining the 
content and limits of that property, but the stronger the personal and individual character and 
function of the property, the weaker and smaller are the state’s powers to limit it through 
regulation.’ (footnotes omitted). 
7
  Monsanto for example is a member of the powerful Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), 
representing major US corporations created in 1986 to negotiate what would become the TRIPS 
agreement. Drahos with Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns the knowledge economy? 
(2002) at 118. 
8
  The dispute resolution mechanism is contained in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 1994, 33 ILM 1226 (1994), Annex 2 of the Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, 33 ILM 1144 (1994). 
9
  The dispute is reported as European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R. The dispute 
settlement panel handed down its lengthy report on 29 September 2006. The dispute is discussed at 
§ 5.5. 
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the applicable provisions in international, regional and domestic law are 
considered. 
5.2 International law in the South African context  
In terms of international law,10 it is States and not individuals that are the 
principal bearers of rights and duties.11 The pacta sunt servanda rule12 is 
universally recognised in international law,13 and hence ‘[e]very treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.’14 Once enacted into domestic law,15 the provisions of domestic law, 
which reflect the principles of international law, are binding on individuals in 
terms of national law.  
The status of international law in South Africa is established by various 
provisions of the Constitution: s 39 provides, inter alia, that ‘when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum … must consider international 
                                                          
10
  International law rules derive from consensus between states and not from a central authority. 
According to Palmeter and Mavroidis, ‘modern discussions of the sources of international law 
usually begin with a reference to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’ 
which indicates that international law includes: 
‘a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. … judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’  
David Palmeter and Petros C Mavroidis ‘The WTO legal system: sources of law’ (1988) 92 The 
American Journal of International Law at 398. See also John Dugard (ed) International law: a 
South African perspective (2005) at 27 
Strictly speaking, this chapter is concerned with the rules of public international law. As Dugard 
explains, ‘[p]ublic international law … must be distinguished from private international law. 
Public international law governs the relations between states. It comprises a body of rules and 
principles which seek to regulate relations between states. Private international law concerns the 
relations between individuals whose legal relations are governed by the laws of different states.’ 
Dugard at 2. Private international law may be involved in the case of cross-border contamination 
of GM crops.  
11
  Dugard (note 10) at 1.  
12
  Dugard (note 10) at 406 describes the rule as being the ‘foundation stone’ on international law. See 
also Malcolm N Shaw International law (2003) 811-2 where he describes the rule as ‘arguably the 
oldest principle of international law.’ 
13
  See for example the preamble of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 8 ILM 679 
(1969). Although South Africa is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, the treaty, which is ‘a 
blend of codification and progressive development, is viewed as a definitive statement on the law 
of treaties by both signatories and non signatories’. Dugard (note 10) at 406. See also Shaw (note 
12) at 810. 
14
  Article 26 of the Vienna Convention. 
15
  The Constitution (at s 231) provides the mechanism for international agreements to become law in 
South Africa. 
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law.’16 International law is further entrenched by s 233, which provides that 
‘when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over 
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.’ The 
Constitution also provides that customary international law is law in South 
Africa provided it is not inconsistent with the Constitution or other statutory law 
in South Africa.17 
Given the Constitutional provisions, and prevailing legal sentiment, Dugard 
predicts that, in post-apartheid South Africa, ‘appeals will be made to 
international law as a “higher law”’,18 and he gives examples of where this has 
already occurred.19 Common law rules will be required to give way to 
conflicting provisions of customary international law,20 which will only be 
subject to domestic legislation and the Constitution. Once incorporated into 
domestic law, international agreements are elevated to the extent that ‘it is the 
duty of the court to ascertain the content of the [international] rule and to seek 
to give an interpretation to the Constitution that accords with this rule, and that 
only if this is impossible because of a clear inconsistency between the rule of 
international law and the Constitution, the latter is to prevail’. 21 The idea is 
that ‘[i]nternational agreements and customary international law … provide a 
framework within which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and 
                                                          
16
  Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
17
  Section 233. 
18
  Dugard (note 10) at 25. 
19
  Dugard (note 10) at 25 where he cites the constitutional challenges to the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (challenged on the basis that international law required 
prosecution for gross human rights violations whereas the legislation granted immunity) and the 
Gauteng School Education Bill of 1955 (challenged on the basis that the Bill discriminated against 
the Afrikaans minority in terms of international human rights law). In the case of the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act (considered in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and 
others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC)) the court 
considered the international law principles but concluded that the Act in question was not in 
violation of these principles. In the matter involving the Gauteng School Education Bill (Ex parte 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature: in re dispute concerning the constitutionality of certain 
provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC)), Sachs J refers to 
the minority rights provisions of the Constitution in the light of public international law. The Act 
was held not to be in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. 
20
  Dugard (note 10) at 56. 
21
  This is Dugard’s interpretation of the decision in AZAPO  v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). Dugard (note 10) at 68-69.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
163 
 
understood.’22 International law will be invoked, ‘not only as a guide to 
statutory interpretation but as a challenge to the validity of legislation.’23  
Unlike the clear hierarchical distinction in South African domestic law between 
the Constitution (and its Bill of Rights) and other sources of law, the sources 
of international law are not so ranked. There appears to be no hierarchy of 
rights or vertical structure in international law.24 In addition, international law 
has fragmented as it expands into new areas, creating problems in the 
coherence between the different institutions and the regimes established by 
them.25  
In this system, treaties that protect fundamental human rights may appear to 
rank no higher than, for example, agreements regulating international 
economic relations, unless the latter treaty so provides. Countries that have 
not signed a particular treaty are not bound by its provisions and latter treaties 
relating to the same subject matter take precedence.26 There is however 
some comfort in the notion that ‘[m]odern international law has seen important 
developments in the hierarchy of norms. Whereas in classical international 
law, all norms and rules enjoyed equal ranking, today, certain norms, known 
as peremptory norms (jus cogens),[27] enjoy a higher status in the normative 
hierarchy.’28 Some firming up of this notion is desirable. In addition, the 
creative use of the tools of interpretation may influence dispute outcomes and 
assist with the prioritising of certain values. 
International and regional bodies responsible for the development of 
international and regional rules on human rights, environmental, agricultural 
                                                          
22
  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
23
  Dugard (note 10) at 67. 
24
  Dugard (note 10) at 43, where he indicates that ‘international society is viewed as a horizontal 
system premised on the sovereign equality of states.’ 
25
  See for example Martti Koskenniemi ‘Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising for 
the diversification and expansion of international law, report of the study group of the International 
Law Commission’ UN Doc A/CN 4/L 682, 13 April 2006.  
26
  Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. 
27
  See for example Article 53 of the Vienna Convention (1969). There is some uncertainty regarding 
which norms would be considered to be peremptory although ‘there is widespread support for the 
view that the prohibitions against slavery, genocide, racial discrimination (including apartheid) 
torture and the denial of self-determination …[in addition to aggression] … qualify for the status 
of peremptory norms.’ Dugard (note 10) at 43-44. 
28
  Dugard (note 10) at 27-28. See also Shaw (note 12) at 115-119. 
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and trade law include at least three international organisations: the United 
Nations (UN); the African Union (the AU), formerly the Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU) (although a regional body, the AU is a recognised international 
law body);29 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
5.2.1 The UN, the AU and the WTO  
Detail on the background, objectives, and instruments of these three 
organisations is provided to assist interpret the rights and duties that might 
flow from membership of the organisations and ratification of their 
instruments. 
5.2.1.1 The United Nations 
The United Nations,30 which preceded the establishment of the AU and the 
WTO, was constituted in 1945 in terms of the UN Charter.31 The Charter 
embraces a number of human rights provisions,32 as do other UN 
agreements, which include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR);33 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);34 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).35 The AU has a similar focus to the UN whereas the WTO, an 
                                                          
29
  Tiyanjana Maluwa ‘International law-making and the Organisation of African Unity: an overview’ 
(2000) 12 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 201-225. 
30
  The purposes of the UN are fourfold (Article 1 of the Charter) namely: to maintain international 
peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations based on the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination; to achieve international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character while encouraging respect for 
human rights; and finally to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of 
these common ends. 
31
  The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 and came into force on 24 October 
1945. The Charter, the constituent treaty of the UN, is binding on all members, including the USA.  
32
  On the legal status of the human rights provisions of the Charter see Dugard (note 10) at 313-4 
where he discusses the human rights provisions in the context of apartheid and the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
1971 ICJ Reports 16 at 57 (the Namibian Opinion), which decision ‘dispelled any doubts 
concerning the legal obligations that were imposed on member states by the human rights 
provision in the Charter.’  
33
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 71 (1948) 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, not as a legally binding agreement, 
but rather a ‘common standard’. Shaw (note 12) at 259.  
34
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, 6 ILM 368 (1967). 
35
  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976, 6 ILM 360 (1967). 
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international economic organisation, is concerned with the rules for 
international trade.  
To assist the UN to achieve international economic and social co-operation, 
specialised agencies have been identified and brought within the domain of 
the UN.36 These agencies include, amongst others, the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the UN (FAO), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), and the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO).37 
In 1993, Member States of the United Nations created the Office of the High 
Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) by a General Assembly Resolution. 
The OHCHR is mandated to promote and protect the enjoyment and full 
realization of the rights contained in the UDHR, ICCPR and the ICESCR.38 
5.2.1.2 African Union (formerly the OAU) 
The AU has recently emerged out of the OAU, having been inaugurated in 
July 2002. A key instrument adopted by the OAU in 1981 is the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights39 which establishes an African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to promote human and peoples’ 
rights and ensure their protection in Africa.40  
The African Charter is supplemented by the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union (AU).41 In the preamble fifty-three heads of state record that they are: 
                                                          
36
  Article 57 read with Article 63. 
37
  The WTO establishes a link with WIPO (and hence the UN) in the preamble of the TRIPS 
agreement which states that the parties desire ‘to establish a mutually supportive relationship 
between the WTO and … WIPO … as well as other relevant international organisations …’. 
38
  These instruments together are referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights. See 
www.ohchr.org [Accessed 2 July 2009]. 
39
  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, 21 ILM 58 (1982). The charter was acceded 
to by South Africa on 9 July 1996. 
40
  The Commission concedes that ‘[the African human rights system] … remains one of the most 
comprehensive in terms of the rights protected but yet the feeblest in terms of protecting those 
rights.’ Internship policy of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, available at 
www.achpr.org.  
41
  The Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted by the OAU in July 2000, establishes the AU 
which was inaugurated in July 2002. The transformation from the OAU to the AU reflects the 
change in era: the OAU focussed on the transition of African countries from colonialism to self-
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DETERMINED to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront our 
continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political 
changes taking place in the world;  
… 
DETERMINED to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, 
consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good 
governance and the rule of law; 
The objectives of the AU are set out in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act and 
include, among other, the objectives to ‘[p]romote and defend African common 
positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples’,42 to 
‘[e]ncourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’,43 and to 
‘[p]romote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human 
rights instruments’.44 The AU is also tasked to ‘[c]oordinate and harmonize 
policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the 
gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union.’45 
Also within the domain of the OAU, and now the AU, is the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) program, a ‘holistic, comprehensive and 
integrated strategic framework for the socioeconomic development of 
Africa’.46 NEPAD was formally adopted as a program (a ‘pledge by African 
leaders’) of the OAU in July 2001, and has subsequently been integrated into 
the AU.47  
                                                                                                                                                                      
determination; and the AU is committed to addressing the serious economic and social issues faced 
by the continent. Dugard (note 10) at 549-50. 
42
  Article 3(d). 
43
  Article 3(e). 
44
  Article 3(h). 
45
  Article 3(l). 
46
  T Maluwa ‘The African Union, the Southern African Development Community, and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development: some observations on South Africa’s contribution to 
international law-making and institution building in Africa, 1994-2004’ (2004) 29 SAYIL at 4 note 
10, cited in Dugard (note 10) at 554-5. 
47
  NEPAD is in fact a merger of two plans for economic development in Africa, namely: the 
Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) (led by South Africa, Algeria 
and Nigeria) and the OMEGA Plan for Africa (developed by Senegal). Dugard (note 10) at 554-6. 
In April 2008 a review summit of five heads of state (from South Africa, Senegal, Algeria, Egypt 
and Nigeria) met to discuss progress in this regard. Their report was tabled at the AU summit in 
Egypt in July 2008. 
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NEPAD’s founding document recognises ‘that failures of political and 
economic leadership in many African countries impede the coherent 
mobilisation of resources into productive areas of activity in order to attract 
and facilitate domestic and foreign investment.’48 In its strategic framework 
document49 a bleak picture of the ‘poverty and backwardness of Africa’50 is 
painted and a call is made ‘for the reversal of this abnormal situation by 
changing the relationship that underpins it’.51 More specifically, a call is made 
‘for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international 
community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the 
development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations.’52 
In its sectoral priorities, numerous shortcomings in Africa’s agriculture sector 
are identified.53 Attempts to address these shortcomings may arguably be 
curtailed by Africa’s commitments in terms of the WTO’s multilateral trade 
arrangements.   
5.2.1.3 The World Trade Organisation 
The WTO has its origins in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which dates back to around 1947-48. At that time, the idea of an 
International Trade Organisation was mooted at a UN Conference on Trade 
and Employment but never materialised; thus paving the way for the GATT, a 
somewhat provisional agreement (and informal organisation) involving trade 
rules and tariff concessions. Until the establishment of the WTO in 1994 the 
rules for the liberalisation of international trade were provided for by the 
GATT.54 
Rules on tariffs and other trade matters were produced during the various 
rounds of trade negotiations under the GATT. The eighth round of trade and 
tariff negotiations, the Uruguay Round, commenced in 1986 and concluded in 
1994. The Uruguay Road addressed a number of identified shortcomings (in 
                                                          
48
  ‘A New African Initiative: Merger of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery 
Programme (MAP) and Omega Plan’, July 2001, at para [34]. 
49
  ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’, October 2001.  
50
  At para [2]. 
51
  At para [5]. 
52
  At para [8]. 
53
  Section B of the NEPAD Framework document, October 2001. 
54
  Shaw (note 12) at 1167. See generally www.wto.org.  
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particular the fact that the GATT only regulated trade in goods and not in 
services or intellectual property) and resulted in the signing of ‘a long and 
complex agreement covering a range of economic issues, such as agriculture, 
textiles and clothing, rules of origin, import licensing procedures, subsidies, 
intellectual property rights, and procedures on dispute settlement.’55 
Importantly, it also led, on 1 January 1995, to the establishment of the WTO 
as a permanent institution.56 Although the WTO replaced the GATT as an 
organisation, the GATT as an agreement (GATT 1994)57 still regulates 
aspects of the international trade in goods. The current round of negotiations, 
the Doha Development Round, commenced in November 2001 with the 
intention of rectifying imbalances in previous rounds and promoting the 
development of the least developed countries.58 Negotiations have however 
broken down over a lack of consensus on a number of issues, including 
agricultural imports and subsidies, although efforts are being made to get the 
negotiations back on track in order to conclude the negotiations in 2010.59   
The main aims of the WTO ‘are to administer and implement the multilateral 
and plurilateral trade agreements together making up the WTO, to act as a 
forum for multilateral trade negotiations, [and] to try and settle trade disputes 
and to oversee national trade policies.’60 
 Instruments negotiated under the WTO free trade agenda include, among 
others,61 the Agreement on Agriculture;62 the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement);63 the Agreement on the Application of 
                                                          
55
  Ibid. 
56
  Ibid. 
57
  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) 33 ILM 1153 (1994). 
58
  Joseph E Stiglitz ‘Towards a pro-development and balanced intellectual property regime’ (2004) 
Keynote address at the Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed 
Countries, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Seoul, October 25, 2004. 
59
  Charlotte Matthews ‘Trade chief urges Doha conclusion’ BusinessDay, 22 October 2009. 
60
  Shaw (note 12) at 1168. 
61
  The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade negotiations resulted in a large number of agreements 
including the ‘umbrella’ agreement, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 
(Marrakesh Agreement) 1867 UNTS 154; 33 ILM 1144 (1994). There are about 60 WTO 
agreements.  
62
  Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UNTS 3. 
63
  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UNTS 3 
(TBT Agreement). 
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Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement);64 and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS),65 which many argue should not have been included in trade 
negotiations.66  
Difficulties arise when the treaty obligations arising out of membership of the 
three organisations (the UN, AU and the WTO) are in conflict with each other. 
On such occasions, the adjudicator of the particular dispute must invoke the 
rules for the interpretation of treaties. 
5.2.2 Conflicting treaty obligations  
The perceived lack of a hierarchy in the relationship between international 
organisations and their respective treaties may be addressed to some extent 
by a closer reading of the instruments and through the use of purposive 
interpretation.67 In so far as the substantive provisions of a treaty are 
concerned: 
[t]here are broadly three approaches to treaty interpretation: the textual, 
the teleological, and the intention of the parties. The first gives effect to 
the literal or grammatical meaning of words and is the approach 
favoured by formalists and positivists. The second emphasizes the 
object and purpose of a treaty in the interpretative process. Ambiguities 
in a treaty are resolved by choosing that interpretation which gives the 
maximum effect to the main purpose and object of the treaty. The third 
approach seeks to give effect to the intention or presumed intention of 
the parties, which the judge infers from the text and the preparatory 
works (travaux préparatoires) or historical record of the treaty.68 
                                                          
64
  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures, 1867 UNTS 493 (SPS 
Agreement). 
65
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 ILM  81 (1994) (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
66
  Stiglitz (note 58). 
67
  Where the dispute involves non-member parties, it should also be remembered that although 
treaties are generally only binding on parties, customary international law is binding on all states. 
It may happen therefore that the provisions of a particular treaty become customary law, in which 
case ‘all states would be bound, regardless of whether they had been parties to the original treaty 
or not.’ Shaw (note 12) at 835.  
68
  Dugard (note 10) at 417-18. 
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These three approaches are codified in the Vienna Convention.69 Article 31(2) 
of the Convention legitimises the use of the preamble and annexes in 
interpreting a treaty and Article 32 the use of preparatory work in certain 
circumstances. 
In the event of a conflict between treaties’ obligations, the UN Charter 
provides that members’ obligations set out in the Charter shall prevail over all 
other treaty obligations.70 Hence some form of hierarchy is in fact agreed to by 
the parties to the Charter. Members of the UN pledge to co-operate with the 
UN in acting to promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.71 
Although the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),72 an international 
environmental law treaty, was in place prior to the establishment of the WTO 
and its package of agreements, the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol73 follows 
chronologically on the heels of the WTO agreements. The Protocol, a 
compromise agreement,74 addresses a potential conflict between trade and 
the environmental in its preamble as follows: 
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be 
mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development, 
                                                          
69
  Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see note 13). The Vienna 
Convention regulates successive treaties on the same subject matter (Article 30). 
70
  Article 103(i) provides that ‘in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’  South Africa and the US 
have signed the Charter. 
71
  Article 56. 
72
  Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
73
  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000, 39 ILM 1027 
(2000). 
74
  See § 5.4.2.2. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
171 
 
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a 
change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing 
international agreements, 
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this 
Protocol to other international agreements … 
Article 22(1) of the CBD (which pre-dates the WTO Agreements) provides 
that: 
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing 
international agreement, except where the exercise of these rights and 
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological 
diversity. 
Members of the WTO recognise, in the preamble to the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO, that: 
their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income 
and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in 
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development. 
(Emphasis added). 
It would appear from this preamble that a consideration of instruments 
protecting human and socio-economic rights, including environmental rights, 
is not outside the scope of consideration in trade law disputes. Sustainable 
development is specifically indicated as an objective.75 The decisions taken in 
terms of the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism76 indicate however that the 
free trade agenda is likely to curtail the extent to which states may implement 
                                                          
75
  Sustainable development is discussed in § 5.4.1. Sustainable development is described as the 
‘contemporary international norm which underpins environmental law’. Jan Glazewski 
Environmental law in South Africa (2005) at 12. Sustainable development involves the integration 
of environmental protection, economic development and social upliftment into decision-making. 
76
  The dispute resolution mechanism is contained in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement, 33 ILM 1226 (1994). 
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environmental measures77 that might impede on free trade. This is certainly 
the case when one, or more, of the parties to the dispute is not bound by the 
environmental law treaty provisions.78 This was the case in the Biotech 
Products79 dispute where the WTO panel was asked to consider, in a trade-
related dispute, the interpretive role to be played by the CBD,80 the Biosafety 
Protocol and the precautionary principle as a general principle of law.81 The 
panel concluded that the provisions of the CBD and the Protocol need not be 
taken into account as they are not in force for a number of the WTO members; 
and that the ‘legal status of the precautionary principle remains unsettled’.82 
The decision illustrates the problem of the increasingly fragmented approach 
in international law.  
While it may appear from the cases that trade and IP obligations are likely to 
prevail in such disputes, this is not an immutable state of affairs.83 
[w]hen it comes to which treaties should take priority, we must bear in 
mind that IPRs are meant to serve the public interest as they benefit 
the rights holders. Since the CBD was opened for signature in 1992, 
over 170 countries have already ratified it, implying that biodiversity 
conservation, sustainability and equitable sharing are now public 
interest issues throughout the world (Tarasofsky 1997). It is essential 
that the WTO, which is the key institution overseeing and promoting the 
internal trade systems, pays much greater attention to MEA’s like the 
                                                          
77
  See for example the panel reports in United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 30 ILM 1594 
(1991) (although the report was never adopted) where the US domestic measures designed to 
protect dolphins when tuna is harvested with purse seine nets were challenged in relation to 
imports in terms of the old GATT system; and in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products 38 ILM 118 (1999) where the US domestic measures designed to 
protect sea turtles were successfully challenged in relation to imports.  
78
  Although the non-member party may be bound if it is a principle of customary international law 
(see note 67). 
79
  European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R. The dispute settlement panel handed down its report 
on 29 September 2006. 
80
  The US has signed the CBD but has not ratified it, and has not signed the Biosafety Protocol; and 
Argentina and Canada have signed the Biosafety Protocol but have not ratified it.  
81
  The precautionary principle is discussed further below. See § 5.4.2.2 and note 258. 
82
  Para [7.89] Reports of the Panel (note 79).  
83
  Petersmann suggests constitutional reforms of WTO law in order that human rights are required to 
be taken more seriously. Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich ‘The WTO Constitution and human rights’ 
(2000) 3 J of International Economic Law 19-25. For an argument against constitutionalisation, 
and in favour of a development approach (a focus on development rather than trade), see Deborah 
Cass The constitutionalization of the World Trade Organisation: legitimacy, democracy and 
community in the international trading system (2005).  
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CBD. The May 1988 WTO Ministerial Declaration made no mention of 
the environment, biodiversity or even MEAs. On the contrary, the CBD 
should be given much greater priority, even by the WTO. Developing 
countries should be given the time and the opportunity to design 
national IPR systems in accordance with their interests.84 
In addition, a strong message urging governments to comply with their human 
rights obligations has emerged from numerous quarters within the UN. In 
2000 the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights recommended ‘the primacy of human rights obligations over 
economic policies and agreements’85 and in 2001 the High Commissioner of 
Human Rights reiterated that ‘human rights are the first responsibility of 
Governments’.86  
Currently an amendment to the TRIPS agreement to require disclosure of 
origin of traditional knowledge and genetic material in patent applications is on 
the negotiating table.87 Human rights and development require greater 
concessions than this.  
The remainder of this chapter deals with the state’s regulatory powers as 
defined by relevant international, regional and domestic law provisions in 
human rights, environmental, agricultural and world trade law. 
5.3 Human rights law 
The classification of human rights into different generations or categories (civil 
and political, socio-economic, and cultural) is less important in the South 
African context where the full extent of civil, political, social, economic and 
                                                          
84
  Graham Dutfield ‘Intellectual property rights, trade and biodiversity: the case of seeds and plant 
varieties’ IUCN Project on the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Trade 
Regime (Intersessional Meeting on the Operations of the Convention (Montreal, Canada, 28-30 
June 1999). 
85
  Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Sub Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub 2/RES/2000/7 (Aug, 17, 2000) cited in Peter K Yu ‘Reconceptualizing intellectual 
property interests in a human rights framework’ (2007) UC Davis LR 1039 at 1041. 
86
  The High Commissioner cited the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the 
1993 World Conference on Human Rights. UN ECOSOC Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights ‘The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commission’ UN Doc E/CN 
4/Sub 2/2001/13 cited in Yu (note 85) at 1042. 
87
  Intellectual Property Watch ‘New WTO draft modalities text on IP issues gathers wider support’ 
18 July 2008. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
174 
 
cultural rights are protected and are justiciable.88 The sections below look at 
the protection of a number of these rights, including property, dignity, equality, 
life, and culture and how their protection, and the duties imposed on the 
state89 as a result of their protection, impact on the way in which the state is 
required to regulate rights in PGRs.  
5.3.1 Property and other rights in human rights law 
Property is protected in numerous international human rights instruments. 
Property and some attributes of IP rights are included in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights90 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.91  
                                                          
88
  Many authors question the assumptions on which the separation of the two sets of rights were 
based. See Coombe (note 101) at 62. On the South African courts approach to socio-economic 
rights see for example Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 
(CC); Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001(1) SA 46 (CC) and Minister 
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) and on the interplay between 
the two sets of rights see President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). See generally Danie Brand and Christof Heyns (eds) 
Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) for a comprehensive overview of the state’s duty to 
protect and promote the socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution, such as the rights to 
education, housing, health, social security, food, water and a sustainable environment. In addition, 
the Bill of Rights protects language and culture (s 30) and the rights of cultural, religious and 
linguistic communities (s 31). See generally Christof Heyns and Danie Brand ‘The constitutional 
protection of religious human rights in Southern Africa’ in (2000) 3 CILSA 52-82. 
89
  In so far as the duties imposed on the state in terms of the ICESCR (which South Africa has not 
ratified) see also the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Limburg Principles) UN doc E/CN/4/1987/17, Annex 
and (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122-135 and the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691-704. 
90
  The UDHR provides that: 
Article 17: 
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others;  
(2)  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.  
Article 27: 
(1)  Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy 
the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2)  Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
91
  The ICESCR provides that:  
‘Article 15: 
1.  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:  
 (a)  To take part in cultural life;  
 (b)  To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;  
 (c)  To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.  
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the 
development and the diffusion of science and culture.  
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The IP attributes protected by these human rights instruments are the author’s 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production.92 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
General Comment No. 17 distinguishes IP rights from human rights. Whereas 
human rights are ‘fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements 
belonging to individuals … [or] communities’, intellectual property rights ‘often 
with the exception of moral rights, may be allocated, limited in time and scope, 
traded, amended and even forfeited’.93 The human rights aspect of IP is 
limited to human persons, who are authors94 and creators, and the moral95 
and material (adequate standard of living) interests of such authors.96 The 
rights of legal entities who are the holders of intellectual property rights are not 
protected at the level of human rights.97 
In so far as property in human rights instruments is concerned, arbitrary 
deprivation of property is prohibited, and the approach to IP is a balanced 
one: although the rights of the author/inventor are protected, this must not be 
to the exclusion of the right to ‘share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits’.98 Parties are required to take measures for ‘the development and 
the diffusion of science and culture’99 and to ‘respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.’100 Notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3.  The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.  
4.  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the 
encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural fields.’  
92
  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No 17’ (2005) E/C 
12/GC/17 12 January 2006 (‘General Comment No 17’). For a detailed discussion on the attributes 
of IP which are protected see Yu (note 85). 
93
  General Comment No 17 at paras [1]-[2]. 
94
  ‘Author’ is defined in General Comment No 17 at paras [7] and [8]. 
95
  Moral interests are defined in General Comment No 17 at paras [12]-[14] to include the right of 
recognition as creator and to object to any distortions and modifications that are prejudicial to the 
author. 
96
  Ibid. 
97
  General Comment No 17 at para [7]. 
98
  Article 27 of the UDHR. 
99
  Article 15.2 of the ICESCR.  
100
  Article 15.3 of the ICESCR. 
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these long-standing provisions, the ‘international human rights framework is 
unfamiliar for many intellectual property scholars.’101  
From a regional perspective, the approach to property, like that in international 
and domestic law, entails a balancing act between public interest and the right 
to property. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights102 provides 
that ‘[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community 
and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.’ 
The potential for IP rights to give rise to social justice concerns, particularly 
given the inroads into sovereignty as a result of global efforts to harmonise 
national laws is well recognised.103  
To the extent that we have seen rights to intellectual property 
entrenched and expanded internationally, it is even more important to 
ensure that those rights are exercised in a fashion congruent with 
international human rights norms.104 
The arena should not be clouded with notions of the absoluteness of property 
or property as a barrier between private and public. Property rights must be 
balanced against other rights including socio-economic rights and the 
foundational rights to dignity and life.105  
5.3.2 Socio-economic rights 
Although South Africa is not party to the ICESCR the state has a duty to 
realise a number of socio-economic rights including rights to education, 
housing, health, social security, food, water and a sustainable environment.106 
                                                          
101
  Rosemary J Coombe ‘Intellectual property, human rights and sovereignty: new dilemmas in 
international law posed by the recognition of indigenous knowledge and the conversation of 
biodiversity’ (1998) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 59 at 60.  
102
  Article 14. 
103
  Coombe (note 101) at 60.  
104
  Coombe (note 101) at 63. 
105
  See for example the decision in Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner, 
Western Cape 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) discussed in § 2.6.2. In this case, the property right to exclude 
others was restricted by the right to freedom of movement. The right to livelihood was considered 
in the case. 
106
  See annexure A. There is much debate on how these rights should be realised. For a 
comprehensive overview of the debate in the South African context see Karin Lehmann ‘In 
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These rights are justiciable and, to the extent that they are applicable, will bind 
a natural or a juristic person.107  
5.3.3 Rights to dignity, equality and life 
Dignity in the South African context is a central value of the Constitution’s 
‘objective, normative value system’108 ‘that informs the interpretation of many, 
possibly all, other rights’.109 On the one hand, critiques of dignity as a value in 
human rights adjudication110 point out that upholding dignity, because it 
entails minimising state interference with individual liberties, may not advance 
the redistribution of resources. On the other hand, it is argued there is in fact 
an important role to be played by dignity as a value in the achievement of 
socio-economic justice in South Africa. From this perspective ‘respect for 
human dignity requires that we pay close attention to conditions of material 
disadvantage and its impact on different groups in our society.’111 The idea is 
that dignity is a ‘two-edged sword’ which, depending on the circumstances, 
may uphold personal liberties but may also serve to restrict them.112 In other 
words, ‘the state is entitled to restrict the liberties of some members of society 
(provided this does not impinge on their basic human capabilities) in order to 
guarantee to everyone the social basis of basic human capabilities.’113  
Dignity is viewed, not as an individualistic notion, but as a relational value, 
recognising our interconnectedness.114 Hence, ‘society’s neglect to redress 
                                                                                                                                                                      
defence of the Constitutional Court: litigating socio-economic rights and the myth of the minimum 
core’ (2006) 22 Am U Intl L Rev 163-197. 
107
  Section 8(2) of the Constitution.  
108
  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para [56], cited in Iain 
Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (2005). See also Sandra Liebenberg ‘The 
value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 1-31. 
109
  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para [35] cited in Liebenberg (note 
108) at 3. 
110
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 5 indicates three major critiques being (1) ‘the alleged indeterminacy of 
human dignity as a normative concept’; (2) ‘that human dignity as a value is irrevocable linked 
with the protection of freedom and autonomy … [thus] ... it serves to discourage the positive 
redistributive measures needed to remedy … material inequality and disadvantage…’; and (3) that 
‘reliance on the value of dignity in the test for unfair discrimination promotes a narrow focus on 
individual personality issues’. 
111
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 9. 
112
  Ibid. 
113
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 10 (footnotes omitted). 
114
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 11. 
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conditions of socio-economic disadvantage represents a collective failure to 
value human dignity.’115  
Respect for human dignity requires society to marshal its resources 
and respond strongly to situations in which certain groups are unable to 
gain access to basic socio-economic needs.116 
To have dignity is to have self-worth and self-respect, both as an individual 
and as part of a community. Dignity is thus impaired when unfair, 
discriminatory, treatment is metered on an individual or on a group.117 Hence 
dignity is linked to equality and where discrimination and inequalities inhere in 
a formerly divisive society formal equality in which individuals simply receive 
equal treatment is insufficiently mindful of dignity. The approach to equality 
must be substantive, requiring a contextual analysis taking into account 
differences, such as racial or gender or socio-economic differences and 
modelling an approach that ensures an appropriate result is reached.118  
The South African Constitution seeks to transform one of the world’s most 
unequal societies and envisages the notion of ‘restitutionary equality’ requiring 
a process of transformation that may require treatment that favours the 
previously disadvantaged sectors of society.  
The measures that bring about transformation will inevitably affect 
some members of the society adversely, particularly those coming from 
the previously advantaged communities. It may well be that other 
considerations may have to yield in favour of achieving the goal we 
fashioned for ourselves in the Constitution. What is required, though, is 
that the process of transformation must be carried out in accordance 
with the Constitution.119  
Also linked to dignity is the right to life, which, as previously mentioned,120 
goes beyond the right to a mere existence: 
                                                          
115
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 13-14. 
116
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 17. 
117
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 15. 
118
  Liebenberg (note 108) at 14-15. See also The bill of rights handbook (note 108) at 232-233. 
119
  Bata Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 
(4) SA 490 (CC) at para [74] also cited in The bill of rights handbook (note 108) at 234. 
120
  See § 4.3.3. 
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[i]t is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but 
the right to human life: the right to live as a human being, to be part of a 
broader community, to share in the experience of humanity…. The right 
to life is more than existence, it is a right to be treated as a human 
being with dignity.121 
Dignity, in particular as a community-linked value, inheres in cultural and 
traditional practices such as those which occur in traditional medicine and 
agriculture and which often involve access to plant resources.122 The denial or 
restriction of access to such resources may impact on dignity, a value which is 
further protected in a more concrete ways through the rights to culture, 
development and the so-called farmers’ rights.  
5.3.4 Rights to culture, development and farmers’ rights 
The right to culture involves the right to take part in cultural life (to practice 
tradition) and is protected in domestic,123 regional124 and international125 law 
instruments. Linked to this is the right to share in scientific advancement 
which is usually juxtaposed in provisions expressing the protection of 
intellectual property.126  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognises the notion of 
‘peoples’ rights,’ and ‘third generation rights, including the right to 
development’.127 In other words, in addition to the more universal civil, 
                                                          
121
  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras [326-7] cited in Liebenberg (note 108) at 11. 
122
  See for example Rosemary J Coombe ‘Intellectual property, human rights and sovereignty: new 
dilemmas in international law posed by the recognition of indigenous knowledge and the 
conversation of biodiversity’ (1998) 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 59-115; Remigius 
N Nwabueze Biotechnology and the challenge of property (2007) 233–95; and Biber-Klemm and 
Cottier (eds) Rights to plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge: basic issues and 
perspectives (2005). 
123
  Section 30 of the Constitution (see annexure A). See also the decision in Nthlabathi v Fick 2003 
(7) BCLR 806 (LCC) discussed in § 2.2.1. 
124
  See the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, 21 ILM 58 (1982), acceded to by 
South Africa on 9 July 1996. See also the Cultural Charter for Africa (1976), which has been 
neither signed nor ratified by South Africa. 
125
  The UDHR (Article 27), ICESCR (Article 15), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Article 22). 
126
  See notes 90 and 91 above. 
127
  Dugard (note 10) at 548. Development encompasses the idea of advancements to improve the well-
being of the population. 
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political128 and socio-economic rights,129 the Charter also recognises collective 
or group rights by providing that ‘peoples’ have the right to equality,130 the 
right to self-determination,131 to freely dispose of their wealth and national 
resources,132 and the right to development133 and ‘a generally satisfactory 
environment’.134  
Development has been defined to involve ‘a comprehensive economic, social, 
cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their 
active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom’.135  
Although development is not specifically listed as a right in the South African 
Constitution, the constitutional imperative to transform the lives of previously 
disadvantaged persons necessarily entails some notion of development. In 
this regard, the UN Declaration on the Right to Development specifically 
indicates ‘that the elimination of the massive and flagrant violations of the 
human rights of the peoples and individuals affected by situations such as 
those resulting from colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, all forms of 
racism and racial discrimination … would contribute to the establishment of 
circumstances propitious to the development of a great part of mankind’ and 
                                                          
128
  The Charter recognises: the right to freedom from discrimination (Article 2 and 18(3)), equality 
(Article 3), life and personal integrity (Article 4), dignity (Article 5), freedom from slavery (Article 
5), freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5), rights to due 
process concerning arrest and detention (Article 6), the right to a fair trial (Article 7 and 25), 
freedom of religion (Article 8), freedom of information and expression (Article 9), freedom of 
association (Article 10), freedom to assembly (Article 11), freedom of movement (Article 12), 
freedom to political participation (Article 13), and the right to property (Article 14). 
129
  The Charter recognises right to work (Article 15), the right to health (Article 16), and the right to 
education (Article 17).  
130
  Article 19. 
131
  Article 20. 
132
  Article 21. At point, Article 21(4)(i) provides that ‘State Parties to the present Charter shall 
undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign exploitation particularly that practised by international 
monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their 
national resources’.  
133
  Article 22. 
134
  The Charter also recognises the family as the ‘natural unit and basis of society’ that ‘shall be 
protected by the State’ (Article 18). 
135
  Preamble to the UN Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986. 
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recognises ‘that the creation of conditions favourable to the development of 
peoples and individuals is the primary responsibility of their States.’136  
Development as a universal and inalienable human right is endorsed in the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.137 These instruments recognise 
that rights are ‘indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’, thus protection of 
one right may not eclipse another right. Limitations may be imposed in order 
to enhance the totality of the bundle of indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated human rights.  
5.3.4.1 Farmer’s rights in international law  
Member States138 of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)139 are provided with a multilateral system of 
access and benefit sharing in respect of the listed species140 and the 
opportunity to limit IP rights141 in respect of these species. In addition 
members may rely on the treaty to implement a regime for the protection of 
farmers’ rights. Farmers’ rights, ‘the right of farmers to use, exchange, and sell 
farm-saved seeds of traditional, as well as improved varieties’142 are however 
left to the discretion of governments. 
Article 9 of the ITPGRFA provides as follows: 
                                                          
136
  Ibid. 
137
  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights 
on 25 June 1993. 
138
  South Africa is not a member of the treaty. 
139  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, approved during the 
FAO Conference (31st Session resolution 3/2001) on 3 November 2001, entered into force 29 June 
2004. See generally in this regard H David Cooper ‘The International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture’ (2002) 11(1) RECIEL 1-16. The ITPGRFA seeks to regulate 
the conservation and sustainable use of certain listed PGRs specifically for agriculture and food 
security, as well as the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of such use through a 
multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing. On mechanisms for achieving access and benefit 
sharing, see Edgar Tabaro ‘Negotiating a standard material transfer agreement under the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: issues and concerns for 
Africa’ (2006) CILSA 309-332. 
140
  Article 1.1. The treaty lists (in annex I) numerous crops covered under the multilateral system, 
including oat, beet, chickpea, citrus, coconut, carrot, yams, strawberry, sunflower, barley, sweet 
potato, lentil, apple, cassava, banana, rice, beans, pea, rye, potato, eggplant, sorghum, wheat, and 
maize.  
141
  In so far as IP rights in respect of material obtained through the multilateral exchange system is 
concerned, the ITPGRFA prohibits such rights, although it does not necessarily prohibit IP 
protection over derivatives thereof (Article 12.3(d)).  
142
  Keith Aoki and Kennedy Luvai ‘Reclaiming “common heritage” treatment in the international 
plant genetic resources regime complex’ 2007 Mich St L Rev 35 at 53. 
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9.1 The Contracting Parties recognize the enormous contribution that 
the local and indigenous communities and farmers of all regions 
of the world, particularly those in the centres of origin and crop 
diversity, have made and will continue to make for the 
conservation and development of plant genetic resources which 
constitute the basis of food and agriculture production throughout 
the world. 
9.2 The Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility for realizing 
Farmers’ Rights as they relate to plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture rests with national governments. In accordance 
with their needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as 
appropriate, and subject to its national legislation, take measures 
to protect and promote Farmers’ Rights, including: 
(a) protection of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture; 
(b) the right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising 
from the utilization of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture; and 
(c) the right to participate in making decisions, at the national 
level, on matters related to the conservation and sustainable 
use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. 
9.3 Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to limit any rights that 
farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved 
seed/propagating material, subject to national law and as 
appropriate. 
The idea of protecting traditional knowledge, and for providing for appropriate 
rewards in this regard is fraught with difficulties and the protection of rights in 
seed, unless specifically legislated, is overcome by the granting of patents. 
The prevailing sentiment is that the concept of farmers’ rights ‘remains an 
empty shell’.143 In any event cotton is not a listed crop and South Africa is not 
a member state.  
Closer to home, the African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of 
Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders and for the Regulation of Access 
                                                          
143
  Biber-Klemm and Cottier (note 454) at xxv. 
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to Biological Resources144 also provides a mechanism for protection of 
farmers’ and other community rights. 
5.3.4.2  Community and farmers’ rights in regional law 
The African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, 
Farmers and Breeders and for the Regulation of Access to Biological 
Resources (the Model Law) provides Africa with ‘a legislative means to 
overcome the inequities of TRIPS’.145 The Model Law acknowledges the rights 
of local communities over their biological resources and that the technologies 
that have evolved over generations are of a collective nature and are a priori 
rights which take precedence over rights based on private interests.  
The Model Law endeavours to implement the relevant provisions of the 
CBD146 and applies to biological resources in both in situ and ex situ 
conditions; the derivatives of the biological resources; community knowledge 
and technologies; local and indigenous communities;147 and plant breeders.148 
Access to such biological resources, knowledge or technologies of local 
communities is by way of an application for prior informed consent (PIC) and 
written permit.149 The application (to the National Competent Authority)150 
must disclose full details of the project for which the resource is required, 
including the purpose for which access to the resource is requested, the risks 
to biological diversity and the proposed mechanisms and arrangements for 
benefit sharing.151 The sharing of benefits based upon customary practices of 
                                                          
144
  African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders 
and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources, 2000. 
145
  Andrew T Mushita and Carol B Thompson ‘Patenting biodiversity? Rejecting WTO/TRIPS in 
southern Africa’ (2002) 2:1 Global Environmental Politics 65-82 at 77. 
146
  Preamble of the Model Law. 
147
  The legislation however does not affect the traditional systems of access, use or exchange of 
biological resources. Article 2 of the Model Law. 
148
  Article 2 of the Model Law. 
149
  Article 3 of the Model Law. 
150
  The ‘National Competent Authority is the entity authorised by the State to supervise and watch 
over the implementation of one or more of the components of the present law.’ Article 1 of the 
Model Law. 
151
  A formula for ‘benefit-sharing’ is provided for in Article 12 of the Model Law. In addition to a 
share of the actual earning derived from the biological resource or knowledge, a ‘permit fee’ is 
also payable up front based on whether or not the collection is to be used for commercial purposes, 
and the number of samples, the area and duration of collecting and whether the collector is granted 
exclusive rights.  
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local communities does not apply to persons not living in the traditional and 
customary way of life.152 
Prior informed consent is also required from the concerned local community 
including its womenfolk153 and the granting of an access permit is by way of a 
signed written agreement between the three parties: the National Competent 
Authority; the community or communities concerned; and the applicant or 
collector.154 The contents of this tripartite agreement are regulated by Article 8 
of the Model Law. Specifically, the agreement requires the collector to 
contribute economically to the efforts of the State and communities concerned 
in the regeneration and conservation of the biological resource; and the 
collector may only apply for IP protection of the biological resource or parts or 
derivatives thereof or in respect of a community knowledge or technology with 
the additional prior informed consent of the original providers. Article 9 then 
goes on to provide that patents over life forms and biological processes will 
not be recognized and cannot be applied for; although it does provide for plant 
breeders’ rights.  
The Model Law recognises and protects community rights,155 farmers’ 
rights,156 and plant breeders’ right,157 and calls into question the suitability of 
intellectual property protection systems, particularly patent law, for developing 
countries where the battle is at the level of securing food and fighting abject 
poverty.158 Farmers’ rights in the context of IP law is discussed further in § 
5.5.4. 
South Africa has neither ratified the ITPGRFA nor adopted the Model Law.  
                                                          
152
  Article 2 of the Model Law. 
153
  Article 5 of the Model Law. 
154
  Article 7 of the Model Law. 
155
  Part IV of the Model Law. 
156
  Part V of the Model Law. 
157
  Part VI of the Model Law. 
158
  See Mushita and Thompson (note 145).  
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5.3.4.3 Community and farmers’ rights in domestic law 
Farmers’ rights are not explicitly protected in domestic law except to the 
limited extent provided for in terms of plant varieties protected in terms of the 
Plant Breeders’ Act.159.  
Certain farmers’ rights may be extrapolated on a purposive reading of the Bill 
of Rights, in particular socio-economic rights and the rights to dignity and 
culture. The environmental right and agricultural law provide some guidance in 
this regard.  
5.4 Environmental and agricultural law  
Under the banner of agricultural law, the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act,160 
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act,161 and Genetically Modified 
Organisms Act,162 among others, all play a role in circumscribing the extent to 
which rights in PGRs may be exercised and exploited. Although an instrument 
of agricultural law in South Africa, the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act will be 
discussed under IP below. Biosafety law will be discussed at § 5.4.2. 
Environmental law has in recent years come into its own as a legal 
discipline.163 Focus has mounted on the deterioration of the planet and the 
realisation that the resources of the earth and the environment need 
protection. Protection for the environment is often couched in the human 
rights paradigm. For example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights adopted in 1981, which has been described as one of the first 
international instruments of this kind, expressly provides for the right to a 
general satisfactory environment as a human right.164 Such protection is 
mirrored in s 24 of the South African which specifically provides that: 
24. Everyone has the right-  
                                                          
159
  Act 15 of 1976. See § 4.4.1.  
160
  Act 14 of 1976. 
161
  Act 43 of 1983. 
162
  Act 15 of 1997. 
163
  See Environmental law in South Africa (note 75) at 5-6.  
164
  Article 24. 
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(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; 
and  
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that-  
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
(ii) promote conservation; and  
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development.  
Section 24 embodies rights and duties involving the protection and 
management of the environment.165 Duties are imposed on the state to take 
measures to inter alia secure ecologically sustainable development166 and use 
of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development. The provisions of s 24, in particular s 24(b)(iii), make a 
consideration of the environment unavoidable when implementing social and 
economic development and vice versa when implementing environmental 
measures, consideration must be given to its impact on socio-economic 
development. In other words, the environment, social, and economic 
development are intertwined and due regard must be given to each. 
Development must be socially, environmentally and economically 
sustainable.167 
5.4.1 Sustainable development168 
In Director: Mineral Development Gauteng Region and Another v Save the 
Vaal Environment and Others169 the Court had to consider whether parties 
who wished to oppose an application for a mining licence were entitled to 
                                                          
165
  For a definition of ‘environment’ see chapter 2, note 277. 
166
  Sustainable development is defined in s 1(1) of NEMA as meaning ‘the integration of social, and 
environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision-making so as to ensure that 
development serves present and future generations.’ 
167
  Section 2(3) of NEMA.  
168  See generally Paterson, Alexander ‘Fuelling the sustainable development debate in South Africa’ 
2006 SALJ 53-62. Note in particular the important role to be played by environmental impact 
assessments. On sustainable development more generally see Klaus Bosselmann The principle of 
sustainability: transforming law and development (2008). 
169
  1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA).  
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raise environmental objections. The Supreme Court of Appeal pronounced 
that: 
[o]ur Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental, 
justiciable human rights, by necessary implication requires that 
environmental considerations be accorded appropriate recognition and 
respect in the administrative processes in our country. Together with 
the change in the ideological climate must also come a change in our 
legal and administrative approach to environmental concerns.170 
The approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal was reaffirmed in BP Southern 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land 
Affairs171 (BP) where the Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court 
reiterates the centrality of the Bill of Rights in South African law,172 and affirms 
that ‘all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights,’173 
in terms of which: 
the constitutional right to environment is on a par with the rights to 
freedom of trade, occupation, profession and property entrenched in ss 
22 and 25 of the Constitution. In any dealings with the physical 
expressions of property, land and freedom to trade, the environmental 
rights requirements should be part and parcel of the factors to be 
considered without any a priori grading of the rights. It will require a 
balancing of rights where competing interests and norms are 
concerned.174 
The concept of sustainable development, according to the Court in BP,175 is 
the fundamental building block around which environmental legal norms have 
been fashioned internationally and in South Africa. ‘Pure economic principles 
                                                          
170
  At para [20]. 
171
  2004 (5) SA 124 (W). 
172
  BP (note 171) at 144, quotes s 7(1) of the Constitution which provides that the Bill of Rights is 
‘the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa.’ 
173
  BP (note 171) at 141, citing Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at 558E-F.  
174
  BP (note 171) at 143. 
175
  BP (note 171) at 144. 
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will no longer determine, in an unbridled fashion, whether a development is 
acceptable.’176  
The Court in BP refused an application for authorisation to develop a filling 
station on the basis of the constitutionally imposed duty to protect the 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations, stating that ‘the 
department is obliged to develop an integrated environmental management 
programme, which takes cognisance of a wide spectrum of considerations, 
including international conventions and approaches as a result of the broad 
and extensive definition in the [Environmental Conservation Act],177 which, 
inter alia, includes the consideration of socio-economic conditions.’178 
The concept of sustainable development was considered further when s 24 of 
the Constitution was invoked in the Constitutional Court in Fuel Retailers 
Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental 
Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, 
Mpumalanga Province and Others (Fuel Retailers)179 a case which, like the 
BP matter, involved the application for the development of a filling station. On 
the obligation imposed on organs of the State to consider socio-economic 
conditions when making decisions that may impact on the environment, 
Ngcobo J states that:180 
[t]he need to protect the environment cannot be gainsaid. So too is the 
need for social and economic development. How these two compelling 
needs interact, their impact on decisions affecting the environment and 
the obligations of environmental authorities in this regard, are important 
constitutional questions.181  
                                                          
176
  BP (note 171) at 144. 
177
  Act 73 of 1989, which, in s 1, states that ‘environment’ means the aggregate of surrounding 
objects, conditions and influences that influence the life and habits of man or any other organism 
or collection of organisms. 
178
  BP (note 171) at 150. 
179
  2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) (Fuel Retailers). 
180
  Ngcobo J states at para [4] that ‘[o]ne of the declared purposes of NEMA is to establish principles 
that will guide organs of State in making decisions that may affect the environment. One of these 
principles requires environmental authorities to consider the social, economic and environmental 
impact of a proposed activity including its “disadvantages and benefits”.’ (Footnotes omitted). 
181
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [41]. 
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Importantly, the Court indicates two things: first, that s 24(b)(iii) explicitly 
obliges the promotion of justifiable economic and social development; and 
second, that socio-economic rights are vital to the enjoyment of other 
constitutionally protected human rights.182 As mentioned above, development 
entails ‘a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, 
which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire 
population’.183 However, although development is necessary, it may have a 
detrimental effect on the environment, and the key to balancing the tensions 
between development and the environment is sustainable development: an 
‘evolving concept of international law,’184 defined in the Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Report)185 as 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. The concept of 
sustainable development, according to the Court, has received ‘considerable 
endorsement by the international community’,186 including approval of the 
International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia)187 matter.  
The three pillars of sustainable development are economic development, 
social development and the protection of the environment. Sustainable 
development is the conceptual tool that mediates between these three 
considerations.188 The concept of sustainable development is evident in a 
                                                          
182
  As was recognised by the Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [44]. 
183
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) footnote 38 citing the UN Declaration on the Right to Development. 
Article 1 asserts that ‘[t]he right to development is an inalienable human right’. 
184
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [46]. 
185
  World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (Brundtland Report) 
General Assembly 42nd Session (1987). Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [47].  
186
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [46]. 
187
  37 ILM 162 (1998). Ngcobo J, in Fuel Retailer (note 179) quotes the following passage (at 204) 
from the Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry: 
‘The Court must hold the balance even between the environmental considerations and the 
development considerations raised by the respective parties. The principle that enables the 
Court to do so is the principle of sustainable development.’ (Fuel Retailers at para [55]. 
188
  Sustainable development, in terms of chapter 1 of NEMA requires the consideration of all relevant 
factors including the following:  
(i)  That the disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity are 
avoided, or, where they cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and 
remedied;  
(ii)  that pollution and degradation of the environment are avoided, or, where they 
cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied;  
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number of sources of international law,189 and in South Africa sustainable 
development is underpinned by the Constitution and located in statute, in 
particular the National Environmental Management Act190 (NEMA). 
NEMA applies to the actions of all organs of State that may impact on the 
environment. The preamble recognises that ‘the State must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the social, economic and environmental rights of everyone 
and strive to meet the basic needs of previously disadvantaged communities.’ 
In elaboration, NEMA provides national environmental management principles 
which require that environmental management ‘place people and their needs 
at the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, 
developmental, cultural and social interests equitably.’191  
Key provisions in NEMA are contained in chapter 1, the national 
environmental management principles, and in s 23 dealing with integrated 
environmental management. These provisions reveal the substance of the 
domestic approach. Importantly, the provisions of chapter 1 require, inter alia 
that:  
• Equitable access to environmental resources, benefits and services to meet 
basic human needs and ensure human well-being must be pursued and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(iii)  that the disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitute the nation's cultural 
heritage is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, is minimised and 
remedied;  
(iv)  that waste is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, minimised and 
re-used or recycled where possible and otherwise disposed of in a responsible 
manner;  
(v)  that the use and exploitation of non-renewable natural resources is responsible 
and equitable, and takes into account the consequences of the depletion of the 
resource;  
(vi)  that the development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the 
ecosystems of which they are part do not exceed the level beyond which their 
integrity is jeopardised;  
(vii)  that a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into account 
the limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions and 
actions; and  
(viii)  that negative impacts on the environment and on people's environmental rights 
be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be altogether prevented, 
are minimised and remedied.  
189
  Even in international trade law. See for example the preamble to the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation, (Marrakesh Agreement) 1867 UNTS 154; 33 ILM 1144 (1994) in § 
5.2.4 above.  
190
  Act 107 of 1998. 
191
  Section 2 of NEMA. 
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special measures may be taken to ensure access thereto by categories of 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.192  
• Decisions must take into account the interests, needs and values of all 
interested and affected parties, and this includes recognising all forms of 
knowledge, including traditional and ordinary knowledge. 193 
• Community wellbeing and empowerment must be promoted through 
environmental education, the raising of environmental awareness, the sharing 
of knowledge and experience and other appropriate means.194  
• The social, economic and environmental impacts of activities, including 
disadvantages and benefits, must be considered, assessed and evaluated, 
and decisions must be appropriate in the light of such consideration and 
assessment.195 
• The environment is held in public trust for the people, the beneficial use of 
environmental resources must serve the public interest and the environment 
must be protected as the people's common heritage.196 
These are substantive provisions in law, requiring co-ordination and 
mobilisation of state resources, as suggested in chapter 7.  
In so far as balancing socio-economic development and environmental 
interests are concerned, the Court in Fuel Retailers indicates that ‘[t]he 
principle that enables the environmental authorities to balance developmental 
needs and environmental concerns is the principle of sustainable 
development.’197 
Sachs J appears to be more cautious in his approach to the trilogy involving 
social and economic development vis-à-vis the environment. In his dissenting 
judgment in the Fuel Retailers case, Sachs J is of the opinion that ‘[w]hen 
economic development potentially threatens the environment it becomes 
relevant to NEMA. Only then does it become a material ingredient to put in the 
scales of a NEMA evaluation.’198 However, he is generous in his interpretation 
                                                          
192
  Section 2(4)(d). 
193
  Section 2(4)(g). 
194
  Section 2(4)(h). 
195
  Section 2(4)(i). 
196
  Section 2(4)(o). 
197
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [93]. 
198
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [113]. 
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of the environment, thus again widening the scope of matters for scrutiny, 
where he states that:  
[i]n my view, commercial sustainability only becomes a relevant factor 
under NEMA when it touches on actual or potential threats to the 
environment. Thus, if there were a genuine risk that the introduction of 
a new industry would be ruinous to traditional forms of livelihood, 
thereby dramatically changing the character of the neighbourhood, that 
could be a significant socio-economic environmental factor.199 
He concludes thus, that ‘an enterprise that promised long-term employment 
and major social upliftment at relatively small cost to the environment, with 
damage reduced to a minimum, could well be compatible with NEMA. On the 
other hand to allow a fly-by-night- undertaking either to spoil a pristine 
environment, or to use up scarce resources, or to introduce undue health 
hazards, will probably be in conflict with NEMA.’200 
The Constitutional Court once again had the opportunity to consider the 
relationship between development and the environment in MEC, Department 
of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment and Another v HTF Developers 
(Pty) Ltd201 In the majority judgment, Skweyiya J again indicates that a 
‘balancing act’ is to be performed by the concept of sustainable development. 
Environmental management, as considered by NEMA, is a process that 
induces tension with other rights contained in the Bill of Rights, most 
notably property rights and the right to freedom of trade and 
occupation.202 While the environmental right is a collective right, it does 
not supersede or eclipse other rights.203 
… 
Where more than one right comes into play, they must be appropriately 
balanced by the courts, which have a vital role to play in environmental 
matters in pursuit of sustainable development.204  
                                                          
199
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [116]. 
200
  Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [117]. 
201
  2008 (2) SA 319 (CC). In this case, the government sought to halt the Respondent’s development 
of property identified as ‘virgin ground’ until such time as the Respondent had obtained written 
authorisation to do so. 
202
  Section 22 of the Constitution. 
203
  Citing Fuel Retailers (note 179) at para [93] and [102]. 
204
  At para [28]. 
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The case reiterates the principle of sustainable development and its location 
within South African law.  
Law and policy around new developments require robust environmental 
impact assessment.205 While it is more tricky to curtail established rights206 it 
may be necessary to do so where developments become unsustainable.207 
Sustainable development in the context of the GM cotton case study is 
discussed in chapter 6.  
Sustainable development should also inform the parameters of biosafety law. 
5.4.2 Biosafety law 
Biosafety law may be defined as the law regulating ‘the safe transfer, handling 
and use of living modified organisms … that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health’.208 In a narrower sense, biosafety is defined as 
‘the level of safety when risk management measures must be taken to avoid 
potential risk to human and animal health and safety and to the conservation 
of the environment, as a result of exposure to activities with genetically 
modified organisms’.209 Biosafety law is therefore statutory law that may 
impact on the nature and extent of property rights in genetically modified 
PGRs. 
Biosafety is a relatively new concept in law, necessitated by scientific and 
technological advances. Modern biotechnologies allow scientists to create 
novel plants, animals and micro-organisms with properties that they are 
unable to acquire naturally.210 Biosafety law seeks to establish and maintain a 
balance between the benefits and risks associated with modern 
                                                          
205
  See Paterson (note 168) at 55. 
206
  See Bruce Ziff ‘The irreversibility of commodification’ 2005 Stell LR 283-301 
207
  It is recognised that while ‘intellectual property is an indispensable tool for development …[it] 
may also hamper sustainable development’. Tana Pistorius ‘The impact of intellectual property law 
and policy on sustainable development’ 2007 SAYIL 376-95 at 387. 
208
  Article 1 of the Protocol. 
209
  Section 1(a) of the Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Act 23 of 2006. 
210
  Robert Walgate Miracle or menace? Biotechnology and the third world (1990) at 2. See Collier 
and Moitui ‘Africa’s regulatory approach to biotechnology in agriculture: an opportunity to seize 
socio-economic concerns’ (2009) 17 RADIC 29 at 32.  
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biotechnology.211 Regulation is seen as necessary to protect the environment 
(biodiversity) and humans from the potential risks associated with the 
technology.  
International biosafety law takes a limited approach to the socio-economic 
consequences of the use of agricultural biotechnology.212 More extensive 
attention is paid to socio-economic concerns in a recent study prepared for 
the Dutch government in which the elements set out below were identified as 
the ‘building blocks in an assessment framework on the socio-economic and 
sustainability aspects of GMOs’:213 
1. Benefit to society; 
2. Economics and prosperity; 
3. Health and welfare; 
4. Local and general food supply; 
5. Cultural heritage; 
6. Freedom of choice; 
7. Safety; 
8. Biodiversity; and 
9. Environmental quality. 
 
GM cotton in the Makhathini Flats is assessed against these criteria in chapter 
6. 
Figure 3 in chapter 3 shows that by 2008 only 25 countries were growing GM 
crops commercially, indicating that globally there is a cautious approach to the 
                                                          
211
  See in this regard Genetically Modified Organisms Act: Guideline document for work with 
genetically modified organisms: Notice 1046 of 11 June 2004 (Government Gazette 26422) and 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act: Guideline document for use by the Advisory Committee 
when considering proposals / applications for activities with genetically modified organisms: 
Notice 1047 of 11 June 2004 (Government Gazette 26422). 
212
  Article 26 of the Protocol is limited to socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of 
LMOs on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with regard to the 
value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities. Other possible consequences 
might include a negative impact on small-scale and subsistence farmers coupled with the 
displacement of traditional or cash crops or traditional crops. Ruth Mackenzie et al An explanatory 
guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety IUCN (2003) at 8. 
213
  COGEM Report ‘Socio-economic aspects of GMOs: building blocks for an EU sustainability 
assessment of genetically modified crops’ CGM/090929-01 at 7. 
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deployment of modern biotechnology in agriculture. Consumer attitudes214 
toward GM crops compound the difficulty in regulating the technology and 
suggest that public participation215 is a vital component of the regulatory 
framework.  
South Africa is a signatory to the two major instruments of international 
environmental law that regulate biosafety law, namely the Convention on 
Biological Diversity216 (the CBD) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity217 (the Cartagena Protocol). The CBD 
came into effect in December 1993, and has as its objectives the conservation 
of biological diversity, and the sustainable use and fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the use of genetic resources.218 The Cartagena 
Protocol, which entered into force on 11 September 2003, provides substance 
to the objectives of the CBD by laying down an international regulatory 
framework for the transfer, handling, and use of living modified organisms 
resulting from modern biotechnology.219 The relevant provisions of the CBD 
and its Protocol are discussed below.  
                                                          
214
  Several consumer surveys have been conducted in South Africa.  Consumer attitudes are mixed. 
Most consumers indicated that they did not understand the term biotechnology. These surveys are 
discussed in Viljoen et al ‘Detection of GMO in food products in SA: implications of GMO 
labelling’ (2006) 5(2) African Journal of Biotechnology 73-82. Viljoen indicates that there is 
strong consumer opposition to GM foods in the EU and Japan.  
215
  Public participation is addressed in Article 23 which states that the parties shall: 
‘1(a) Promote and facilitate public awareness, education and participation concerning the safe 
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms in relation to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human 
health. In doing so, the Parties shall cooperate, as appropriate, with other States and 
international bodies;  
(b)  Endeavour to ensure that public awareness and education encompass access to 
information on living modified organisms identified in accordance with this Protocol that 
may be imported.  
2. The Parties shall, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, consult the 
public in the decision-making process regarding living modified organisms and shall 
make the results of such decisions available to the public, while respecting confidential 
information in accordance with Article 21’.  
216
  Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992).  
217
  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000, 39 ILM 1027 
(2000).  
218
  Article 1 of the CBD. 
219
  Article 1 of the Protocol. 
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5.4.2.1 The CBD  
The CBD was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP). Although a party to the CBD, which South 
Africa ratified on 2 November 1995, South Africa was not an active participant 
in the negotiations leading up to the Convention, and was largely isolated from 
the discussions.220 Provisions of the CBD have subsequently been 
implemented into South Africa’s national law, largely through the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act221 (the Biodiversity Act) and 
Regulations222 in terms of the Biodiversity Act.  
The CBD has three primary objectives which it seeks to balance, being the 
conservation of biological diversity; the sustainable use of its components; 
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of 
genetic resources.223 To control the risk that modern biotechnologies may 
pose to biodiversity, the CBD requires parties to provide the mechanism for 
regulating and managing the potential risks to human health and the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity attendant on the 
release of LMOs.224 For example, if the introduction of GM cotton crops in 
South Africa poses a threat to the existence of a naturally-occurring wild 
species of cotton, that would be an issue the authorities should address in the 
decision-making process. 
In so far as property rights are concerned, the CBD provides that ‘States have 
… the sovereign right to exploit their own resources’225 and that access to 
plant genetic resources shall be subject to the ‘prior informed consent’226 of 
the country providing such resources and ‘shall be on mutually agreed 
                                                          
220
  Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, media statement at 
www.deat.gov.za//PolLeg/Conventions/biodiversity.htm [Accessed 3 July 2009].  
221
  Act 10 of 2004. 
222
  See the Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations in terms of the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act: GNR 138 of 8 February 2008 (Government Gazette 
No 30739). 
223
  Article 1 of the CBD. See generally Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin and Synge A guide to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity IUCN at 15. 
224
  Article 8(g) of the CBD.  
225
  Article 3 of the CBD. 
226
  Article 15(5) of the CBD. 
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terms.’227 These provisions are implemented in domestic law through the 
Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing228 enacted in 
terms of the Biodiversity Act and are given substance by recent 
amendments229 to the Patents Act230 which require an applicant for a patent to 
furnish information relating to any role played by an indigenous biological 
resource, a genetic resource or traditional knowledge or use in an invention to 
the Patents Act. These provisions recognise collective rights which may be 
invoked to limit private rights.  
The flipside of access to PGRs is access to and the transfer of technology, 
particularly biotechnology. The CBD provides that parties shall implement 
measures to provide access to and transfer of technology, particularly to 
developing countries that provide the PGRs, including technology protected 
by patents and other intellectual rights, subject to national legislation and 
international law.231 The transfer of technology, not only a concern of the CBD 
but indeed one of the pillars of the justification for intellectual property remains 
an unrequited goal.232  
The CBD requires members, subject to national legislation, to:  
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices 
of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity 
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement 
of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and 
encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices…233 
Hence private property rights in PGR must not infringe on community rights. 
This provision in the CBD would appear to align with the more general 
                                                          
227
  Article 15(4) of the CBD. 
228
  GNR 138 of 8 February 2008 (Government Gazette No 30739), which Regulations came into 
effect on 1 April 2008 (GNR 137 of 8 February 2008: Commencement of Bio-Prospecting, Access 
and Benefit-Sharing Regulations, 2008 (Government Gazette No 30739). 
229
  Patents Amendment Act 20 of 2005. 
230
  Act 57 of 1978. 
231
  Article 16. 
232
  Christopher May and Susan Sell Intellectual property rights: a critical history (2006) at 185-9. 
233
  Article 8(j) of the CBD. 
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provision for collective or peoples’ rights contained in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.234  
In so far as genetically engineered PGRs are concerned, the CBD requires its 
parties to consider a protocol to the CBD to establish the appropriate 
procedures, specifically those relating to advance informed agreement, for the 
safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms.235  
In 1994 the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD 
considered the need for a protocol on biosafety and in 1995 an ad hoc Group 
of Experts on Biosafety recommended the establishment of a protocol on 
biosafety.236 The subsequent negotiations and the process leading to the 
adoption of the protocol were difficult and drawn-out, largely as a result of 
heavy commercial interests and conflict with the system of international trade 
rules.237  
5.4.2.2 Key provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
South Africa was a participant in the negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol, 
ratifying the Protocol on 15 August 2003 and hence its provisions, which 
entered into force on 11 September 2003, are binding on the Republic.238 The 
groupings involved during the negotiations include the Miami Group,239 the 
Like-Minded Group,240 the European Union,241 the Compromise Group,242 and 
                                                          
234
  See § 5.2.2. 
235
  Article 19(3) of the CBD. 
236
  Mackenzie et al (note 212) at 2. 
237
  Aaron Cosbey and Stas Burgiel The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An analysis of results An 
IISD Briefing Note, International Institute for Sustainable Development (2000) at 1. 
238
  Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism media statement (19 January 2004) at 
www.environment.gov.za [Accessed July 2008]. 
239
  Consisting of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the US and Uruguay, who are the major 
exporters of GM seed and crops and thus sought to have GMOs for food, feed or processing 
exempt from the advance informed agreement provisions and to limit the use of the precautionary 
principle and socio-economic considerations in national decision making. Cosbey and Burgiel 
(note 237).  
240
  Consisting of the majority of developing countries. The like-minded group were in favour of a 
strong Protocol in view of the unknown environmental and human-health impact of GMOs; and 
also to protect countries without the necessary capacity from becoming the guinea pigs for field 
trials. Cosbey and Burgiel (note 237). 
241
  The EU argued for the inclusion of GMOs intended for food, feed or processing and supported the 
inclusion of the precautionary principle. Cosbey and Burgiel (note 237). 
242
  Japan, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and New Zealand. The 
Compromise Group, which consisted of countries with high levels of biodiversity and of countries 
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the Central and Eastern European bloc of countries (CEE)243 and thus the final 
result is a compromise of the interests represented by the diverse parties to 
the negotiations.244 Although the Biosafety Protocol is in force, the major 
producers of GMOs (the USA, which has yet to even ratify the CBD, Canada, 
Argentina, Australia) notwithstanding their involvement in the negotiations, are 
not members.  
The Protocol provides a technical framework which applies when LMOs (such 
as GM cotton) are handled, used, released or moved from one Party to 
another Party (transboundary movement),245 and the overriding responsibility 
of members is to ensure that these activities ‘are undertaken in a manner that 
prevents or reduces the risks to biological diversity, taking also into account 
risks to human health’.246 The framework provided by the Protocol sets in 
place some parameters for the state’s so-called ‘police powers’ to regulate 
property in PGRs and thus the provisions of the Protocol are discussed in 
some detail below.  
To facilitate the operation of the Protocol, a Biosafety Clearing-House247 
(BCH) and an advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure have been 
established to ensure that countries are provided with the information 
necessary to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of LMOs. 
Parties must designate a focal point to liaise with the Protocol’s Secretariat 
and one or more national authorities responsible for the administration 
required by the Protocol.248 Parties are required to deposit their domestic 
biosafety laws with the BCH as well as any bilateral, regional and multilateral 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with advanced biotech industries, was generally supportive of a comprehensive scope of the 
Protocol and of the precautionary group. Cosbey and Burgiel (note 237). 
243
  The CEE generally took a middle-of-the-road approach, often in line with the EU or the like-
minded group and was supportive of an inclusive approach to GMOs for food, feed and processing 
and for the precautionary principle. Cosbey and Burgiel (note 237). 
244
  Cosbey and Burgiel (note 237). 
245
  Articles 17 and 24 of the Biosafety Protocol apply to the movement of LMOs between Parties and 
non-Parties. 
246
  Article 2(2) of the Biosafety Protocol. 
247
  Article 20 of the Biosafety Protocol establishes the Biosafety Clearing-House (BSH) as part of the 
clearing-house mechanism to promote technical and scientific cooperation in terms of Article 
18(3) of the CBD. In this regard, see bch.biodiv.org. The BCH is required to assist Parties 
(particularly developing countries) with implementation of the Protocol (Article 20(1)(b)). 
248
  Article 19 of the Protocol provides that one entity may be designated to fulfil the functions of both 
focal point and competent national authority. 
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agreements, decisions taken on the import of LMOs and summaries of risk 
assessments conducted in terms of the regulatory process.249 Implementing 
the Protocol can therefore place a significant resource burden on members, 
particularly developing countries and the Protocol therefore provides for 
capacity-building in developing countries.250 
The informed agreement (AIA) procedure251 is the backbone of the 
Protocol,252 and requires the Party of export to notify the competent national 
authority of the Party of import of the intended transboundary movement, prior 
to such movement, on the first occasion of LMOs destined for ‘intentional 
introduction into the environment’ of the Party of import. Products for the 
‘intentional introduction into the environment’ include products such as GM 
seeds and micro-organisms and expressly excludes LMOs intended for direct 
use as food or feed, or for processing, which are dealt with elsewhere in the 
Protocol.253 The Party of import is then required to acknowledge receipt and to 
inform the exporter whether the exporter should proceed in terms of the Party 
                                                          
249
  Article 20(3) of the Protocol. 
250
  Article 22 of the Protocol. Many developing countries are receiving assistance in their endeavours 
to comply with the biosafety protocol from the UNEP-GEF project for the development of national 
biosafety frameworks. See for example the Operational Handbook For Participating in the UNEP-
GEF Project for effective Participation in the Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) available online at 
www.unep.org [Accessed on 12 June 2008]. 
251
  The AIA procedure is generally not applicable to LMOs in transit (Article 6(1)) or the 
transboundary movement of LMOs intended for contained use by, and in terms of the standards of, 
the importing Party (Article 6(2)). The procedure also does not apply to the transboundary 
movement of LMOs which have been identified by a decision of the Parties of the Protocol as 
being unlikely to pose a risk to human health or the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity. The transboundary movement of LMOs that are pharmaceuticals and are regulated by 
other international arrangements are also excluded from the operation of the Protocol (Article 5). 
252
  Aaron Cosbey and Stas Burgiel (note 237). 
253
  Article 7(2). The procedure for LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing is 
established by Article 11 which allows Parties to take a decision on LMOs intended for direct use 
as food or feed or for processing in terms of its domestic regulatory framework, provided that it is 
consistent with the objectives of the Protocol. Parties are required to make available to the BCH 
‘copies of any national laws, regulations and guidelines applicable to the import of living modified 
organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, if available.’ (Article 11(5)). 
In the absence of a domestic framework, a Party may declare through the BCH that it will base its 
decision on a risk assessment in terms of the Protocol, bearing in mind the application of the 
precautionary principle. (Article 11 (6) and Article 11 (8)). 
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of import’s domestic regulatory framework254 or in terms of the Article 10 
procedure, which is discussed below.255  
In so far as decisions in terms of the Protocol are concerned, the Article 10 
procedure requires the Party of import to base any decisions it makes on risk 
assessment.256 Such risk assessment must be carried out in a ‘scientifically 
sound way’257 and at a minimum, may be based on the information provided 
by the Party of export in its notification. The Party of import must ensure that 
the risk assessment is carried out, but may require the Party of export to 
execute, and pay, for the assessment. The requirements for risk assessment 
appear to incorporate a version of the precautionary approach to the extent 
that ‘[l]ack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not 
necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of 
risk, or an acceptable risk’.258 The Protocol, purporting to be flexible, also 
provides that ‘[n]othing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as restricting the 
right of a Party to take action that is more protective of the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity than that called for in this Protocol’.259 
This flexibility is however curtailed by the rider: ‘provided that such action is 
consistent with the objective and the provisions of this Protocol and is in 
accordance with that Party’s other obligations under international law’.260 
These ‘other obligations under international law’ would include a party’s WTO 
                                                          
254
  This framework must comply with the provisions of the Protocol. 
255
  In the case of Monsanto’s GM cotton, Monsanto would have proceeded in terms of South Africa’s 
domestic regulatory framework which has been operative since 1999. See § 5.4.2.4 on the 
domestic framework in South Africa. 
256
  The requirements for risk assessment are set out in Article 15 and Annexure III of the Protocol. 
The Party of import must then inform the notifier (and the Biosafety-Clearing-House) within 270 
days of receiving the notification whether the import of the LMOs is prohibited (Article 10(3)(b)); 
or approved (Article 10(3)(a)) (with or without conditions); or if additional information in terms of 
the importing Party’s domestic regulatory regime or Annex 1 of the Protocol, or more time (Article 
10(3)(d), is required before a decision can be taken by the importing party. Reasons for the 
decision, unless the decision is an unconditional approval, must be given by the Party of import 
(Article 10(4)). 
257
  Article 15 of the Protocol. 
258
  Annexure III of the Protocol, item 4. The precautionary approach is embedded in principle 15 of 
the UN Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, 31 ILM 876 (1992) (the Rio 
Declaration) and provides that a lack of scientific certainty is not a reason to postpone cost 
effective measures to prevent environmental damages where there is a threat of serious or 
irreversible harm. See Philippe Sands Principles of international environmental law (2003) at 266-
279. 
259
  Article 2(4) of the Protocol. 
260
  Ibid.  
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obligations which are discussed below in the context of the Biotech 
Products261 dispute. 
 In addition to providing the foundations for a precautionary approach, the 
Protocol also provides for a party to take into account, in a limited way,262 
socio-economic considerations,263 in particular with regard to indigenous and 
local communities in reaching a decision on import under the protocol.264 The 
socio-economic considerations aspect of the Protocol was a contentious issue 
in the negotiations and negotiators were divided on their inclusion. 265 Parties 
generally against the inclusion (predominantly the developed countries) of 
socio-economic considerations agreed to allow its inclusion on the proviso 
that such considerations must be consistent with existing international 
obligations; in other words, the trade obligations of the Parties.266 Negotiators 
in favour of the inclusion of socio-economic considerations were concerned 
that the import of LMOs may ‘undermine the livelihoods of their farmers, and 
indigenous and local communities through the possible displacement of local 
varieties, loss of markets and employment, and [may pose a] … threat to their 
cultural and ethical values.’267 Some middle-ground might be found in the 
WTO preamble, cited above, which recognises trade as a means to raise 
standards of living, ensure full employment and which also seeks to allow for 
                                                          
261
 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (note 
79). See § 5.5.1 below. 
262
  Article 26 of the Protocol, which was a compromise arrangement, provides that: 
‘1. The Parties, in reaching a decision on import under this Protocol or under its domestic 
measures implementing the Protocol, may take into account, consistent with their 
international obligations, socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of living 
modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local 
communities. 
2. The Parties are encouraged to cooperate on research and information exchange on any 
socio-economic impacts of living modified organisms, especially on indigenous and local 
communities.’ 
263
  Socio-economic considerations may include concerns around poverty, unemployment, impact on 
cultural and traditional practices and knowledge, loss of biodiversity, etc. see further Collier and 
Moitui (note 210) at 39-40. See also the COGEM Report (note 213). 
264
  Article 26 of the Protocol. 
265
  Mackenzie et al (note 212) at 163; Convention on Biological Diversity note by the Executive 
Secretary ‘Socio-economic considerations: cooperation on research and information exchange 
(Article 26, paragraph 2)’ (‘CBD Note’) UNEP/BS/COP-MOP/2/12, Montreal, 20 May-3 June 
2005 at 2. 
266
  Mackenzie et al (note 212) at 163. 
267
  CBD Note (see note 265) at 2. The compromise arrangement, Article 26 of the Protocol, is set out 
in footnote 262. 
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the optimal use of the world’s resources in a manner that supports sustainable 
development, a concept which embraces both social and economic 
development, and which seeks to also preserve the environment, in a manner 
‘consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development.’  
Deliberations and national decisions within the broader biosafety framework 
are an exercise of ‘police power’ and as such impact on property rights in 
genetically modified PGRs. In making these decisions, parties should also be 
guided by their obligation to take measures to prevent unintentional 
transboundary movements of LMOs.268 In the event of an illegal 
transboundary movement,269 the affected Party may request the Party of 
origin, at its cost, to remedy the transgression.270 Parties should also bear in 
mind any other relevant international rules and standards271 regarding the 
handling, transport, packaging and identification of LMOs.272 The issue of 
liability in the event of adverse effects due to LMOs is also an important 
consideration.273 Although the issue of liability and redress was raised during 
the negotiation of the treaty, the resulting provision274 merely provides for a 
process of engagement on liability and redress and, as yet, no resolution has 
been reached.275 Although the Protocol does not specifically regulate dispute 
resolution in the event of a dispute between Parties, the parent treaty, the 
                                                          
268
  Article 16(3) of the Protocol. 
269
  That is, the transboundary movement of LMOs in contravention of its regulatory framework that 
implements the Protocol (Article 25(1)). 
270
  Article 25(2). 
271
  Mackenzie et al (note 212) at 128 indicate that ‘there are a number of existing rules and standards 
that would cover aspects of handling, packaging, transport and identification of LMOs and several 
international organizations are in the process of developing more relevant rules and standards such 
as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the OECD, the Interim Commission on Phytosanitary 
Measures (under the International Plant Protection Convention) and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe.’ 
272
  Article 18 of the Protocol. 
273
  In Hoffman v Monsanto Canada Inc [2005] 7 WWR 665 organic farmers in Canada 
(unsuccessfully) sought redress, in the Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan, from Monsanto for the 
contamination of organic crops by stray GMOs. Access to lucrative organic and GMO-free 
markets could be lost by the release of GMOs into the environment. An application for leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed. 
274
  The Article on Liability and Redress (Article 27) is reproduced in chapter 4, note 224.  
275
  At the first meeting of the Parties an ad hoc, open ended working group on liability and redress 
was established and has since met on a number of occasions to consider liability and redress, 
although no definitive resolutions have been taken. See also chapter 4, note 225.  
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CBD provides for the settlement of disputes by way of alternative dispute 
resolution.276 
The Protocol also makes provision for bilateral, regional and multilateral 
agreements and arrangements.277 Parties may, through such mechanisms, 
make arrangements for the transboundary movements of LMOs provided that 
such agreements do not result in a lower level of protection than that provided 
for in the Protocol.278 Parties may also determine that their domestic 
regulations apply in respect of imports to that country.279 One of the objectives 
of South Africa’s draft Biosafety Policy280 published for comment in 2005 is: 
to cooperate with other developing countries, especially countries in the 
region with overlapping borders, in harmonizing regulatory oversight in 
biosafety. Special attention must be given to developments within the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU)[281] and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).[282] 
Many of South Africa’s regional neighbours have however generally adopted a 
more cautious approach to GMOs than South Africa has.283 Some, for 
example, Namibia,284 are concerned that allowing GMO imports will constrain 
export options to the EU.285 Little headway has been made in setting up a 
regional arrangement.  
                                                          
276
  Article 27 provides for solution by negotiation, and if that fails, by mediation, and if that fails, by 
arbitration. Article 27 explicitly applies to any protocol, unless the protocol provides otherwise. 
277
  Article 14 of the Protocol. 
278
  Article 14(1). 
279
  Article 14(4). 
280
  Draft Biosafety Policy for comments 2005, Government Gazette No 27913, Notice No 1576 of 
2005. 
281
  The SACU countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. 
282
  The SADC countries are Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Republic of 
Tanzania and Mauritius. 
283
  See Debbie Collier ‘Access to and control over plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in 
South and Southern Africa: how many wrongs before a right?’ (2006) 7 Minnesota Journal of 
Law, Science and Technology at 530-1. 
284
  Namibia’s Biosafety Act 7 of 2006 requires a minister to refuse a permit if it would not be in the 
public interest. Factors to be taken into account in determining public interest include whether or 
not the GMO product is likely to: (a) contribute to sustainable development; (b) undermine 
indigenous knowledge or technology; or (c) affect the social and economic advancement of people 
and society including a particular community. (Section 25(4)). 
285
  See for example the NEPRU Policy Brief, Issue 06 (December 2003) ‘The SACU-USA Free Trade 
Agreement: what is in it for Namibia?’ 
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Another initiative under the auspices of the African Union286 is the Model Law 
on Safety in Biotechnology.287 
5.4.2.3 African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology288  
In 2001 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) finalised a model law to 
support its Member States in their efforts to regulate biosafety. After the 
transition from the OAU to the AU, the AU Executive Council, at the July 2003 
Maputo Meeting of the Council, adopted a decision289 urging Member States, 
‘in abiding by the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol, to use the African 
Model Law in Biosafety … as a basis for drafting their national legal 
instruments in Biosafety, taking into account their national peculiarities, in 
order to create a harmonized Africa-wide space and system in Biosafety for 
the regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms movement, transportation 
and importation in Africa’. The decision requests the AU commission to 
‘convene a meeting of experts and civil society organizations to give further 
consideration to this issue and come out with proposals for an African 
common position for adoption by the policy organs of the African Union’. The 
experts have subsequently met and revisions to the Model Law have been 
proposed.  
The Model Law provides a framework of biosafety regulations designed to 
protect Africa’s rich biodiversity and animal and human health from the risks 
inherent in modern biotechnology.290 The Model Law proposes strict 
regulations for the import, export, transit, contained use, release and placing 
on the market of any genetically modified organism, a product of 
                                                          
286
  The AU Commission has a special project on biosafety (see www.africa-union.org). The activities 
of the AU in this regard include a High Level Panel on Biotechnology and Capacity Building for 
an Africa-Wide Biosafety System.  
287
  There is a Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa, 1967 (CAB/LEG/24.4/11). The treaty has not 
been signed by South Africa and has not entered into force. 
288
  The African Model Law available at www.africa-union.org is dated April 2001. The Model Law is 
currently under revision. The recommended revisions are detailed in the annex of the report from 
the Experts meeting on the revised African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology, August 20-23, 
2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as presented at the African Ministerial Conference on Science and 
Technology (AMCOST III) Third Ordinary Session, 12-16 November 2007, Mombasa, Republic 
of Kenya, AUEXP/ST/17(III). 
289
  Decision on the report of the interim Chairperson on the Africa-wide capacity building in 
biosafety, EX/CL/Dec.26(III). 
290
  Mariam Mayet ‘Why Africa should adopt the OAU African Model Law on Safety in 
Biotechnology’ (2003) African Centre for Biosafety.  
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biotechnology, whether intended for use as a pharmaceutical, for food, feed or 
processing.291 It requires decision-making to be based on the precautionary 
principle, and provides for ‘public participation and access to information as 
important and indispensable components of environmental governance.’292 In 
terms of the Model Law,293 no approval for a GMO-related activity shall be 
given unless it is considered and determined by the Competent Authority that 
‘the import, transit, contained use, release or placing on the market of the 
genetically modified organism or the product of a genetically modified 
organism will:  
(a) benefit the country without causing any risk/significant risk to human 
health, biological diversity and in general the environment; 
(b) contribute to sustainable development; 
(c) not have adverse socio-economic impacts; and 
(d) accord with the ethical values and concerns of communities and does 
not undermine community knowledge and technologies’. 
The Model Law defines a ‘socio-economic impact’ as: 
the direct or indirect effect of a genetically modified organism, or a 
product of a genetically modified organism on the economy or on social 
or cultural conditions or on the livelihood or indigenous knowledge 
systems or technologies of a community or communities, including on 
the economy of the country. 
The approach to socio-economic impacts in South Africa’s GMO Act, 
discussed in the section below, is narrower than that of the Model Law. 
Although the proposed policy in South Africa is to co-operate on a regional 
level, the South African authorities do not appear to have deliberated on the 
provisions of the Model Law. This may be as a result of the fact that South 
Africa’s Genetically Modified Organisms Act294 (the GMO Act) was enacted (in 
1997) prior to both the drafting of the Model Law and ratification of the 
                                                          
291
  Article 2 of the Model Law. See Mayet (note 290). 
292
  Mayet (note 290) at 9. 
293
  Article 6(9) of the Model Law. 
294
  Act 15 of 1997. 
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Biosafety Protocol. Although an opportunity to consider the Model Law 
presented itself when the GMO Act was subsequently amended, these 
amendments, discussed in the section below, appear only to give effect to the 
Biosafety Protocol.  
5.4.2.4 National biosafety law (The GMO Act) and related 
legislation 
The GMO Act, the key biosafety law in South Africa, is administered by the 
Department of Agriculture, and establishes the procedures and institutions for 
the regulation of ‘specific activities involving the use of genetically modified 
organisms’. The GMO Amendment Act295 enacted to, amongst other things, 
give effect to the Protocol. South Africa’s department of foreign affairs has 
indicated that South Africa’s positions under the Cartagena Protocol have 
been informed ‘by the policy imperatives of eradicating poverty, food security, 
the NEPAD goals, and the promotion of the sustainable development agenda 
and the Millennium Development Goals. South Africa is also guided by the 
need to promote multilateralism, fair and equitable global governance and 
trade systems.’296 
The Act establishes an Executive Council of Genetically Modified Organisms 
(‘Council’)297 that advises the Minister of Agriculture on ‘all aspects concerning 
the development, production, use, application and release of genetically 
modified organisms, and to ensure that all activities with regard to the 
development, production, use, application and release of genetically modified 
                                                          
295
  Act 23 of 2006.  See also the guidelines contained in See in this regard Genetically Modified 
Organisms Act: Guideline document for work with genetically modified organisms: Notice 1046 
of 11 June 2004 (Government Gazette 26422) and Genetically Modified Organisms Act: Guideline 
document for use by the Advisory Committee when considering proposals / applications for 
activities with genetically modified organisms: Notice 1047 of 11 June 2004 (Government Gazette 
26422). 
296
  www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/cbd.htm [Accessed 1 July 2009].  
297
  Section 3. The following national departments of State must be represented in the Council: (i) The 
Department of Agriculture; (ii) the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology; (iii) the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism; (iv) the Department of Health; (v) the 
Department of Labour; and (vi) the Department of Trade and Industry. The 2006 amendments, 
when operative, expand the Council, requiring representatives from: (i) The Department of 
Agriculture; (ii) the Department of Science and Technology; (iii) the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism; (iv) the Department of Health; (v) the Department of Labour; (vi) the 
Department of Trade and Industry; (vii) the Department of Arts and Culture; and (viii) the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
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organisms are performed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.’298 In 
addition to the Council, the Act also establishes an Advisory Committee299 
which acts as a national advisory body to the Minister of Agriculture, the 
Council and also other Ministers or other appropriate bodies, ‘on matters 
concerning the genetic modification of organisms’.300 The Advisory Committee 
is required to ‘liaise through the relevant national departments with 
international groups or organisations concerned with biosafety’.301 General 
administration of the Act, including the issuing (amendment and withdrawal) of 
permits302 in terms of the Act, is entrusted to a registrar appointed by the 
Minister of Agriculture.303 
The Act makes provision for regulations304 to be made for, among other 
things, the application procedure and requirements for permits. Such 
regulations, issued in November 1999,305 require a permit from the Council in 
order to ‘import to or export from the Republic of South Africa, or develop, 
produce, use, release or distribute any genetically modified organism in the 
Republic of South Africa’.306 A permit is not required for organisms intended 
for contained use in academic and research facilities or for specified GMOs307 
(which includes a strain of insect resistant cotton where a permit has already 
been issued) that have been cleared for commercial release and / or for food 
and animal feed.308  
                                                          
298
  Section 4. 
299
  In terms of s 10 of the GMO Act 1997, the Advisory Committee shall consist of not more than ten 
persons, of whom not more than eight members shall be knowledgeable persons in those fields of 
science applicable to the development and release of GMOs. The remaining two persons shall be 
from the public sector and shall have knowledge of ecological matters and GMOs. The 2006 
amendments require the two persons from the public sector, to be one person with knowledge of 
ecological matters and GMOs, and the other person shall have knowledge of the potential impact 
of GMOs on human and animal health. 
300
  Section 11(1)(b). 
301
  Section 11(1)(c). 
302
  Section 9. 
303
  Section 8. 
304
  Section 20. 
305
  GMO Regulations in terms of the Genetically Modified Organisms Act: GNR 1420 of 26 
November 1999, as amended. New regulations, published for comment, are the Proposed GMO 
Regulations GNR 321 of 28 March 2008 (Government Gazette No 30892). Should these become 
operative, they will replace the existing regulations.  
306
  Regulation 2(1). 
307
  These specified GMOs are contained in table 3 of the Annexure to the Regulations.  
308
  Regulation 2 (2). 
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In so far as risk assessment is concerned,309 the current regulations provide 
that ‘[n]o person shall undertake any activity involving genetic modification 
unless a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks created thereby to the 
environment and human health has been made.’310 The regulations invoke the 
precautionary principle by providing that ‘[l]ack of scientific knowledge or 
consensus on the safe use of genetically modified organisms shall not be 
interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, an acceptable risk or an 
absence of risk.’311 The regulations require the applicant for a permit to notify 
the public by way of notice in the ‘printed media’ (at least three newspapers 
circulating in the area where the proposed release is to take place) of any 
proposed release (including the planting) of GMOs prior to the application for 
a permit. Any objections are referred to the Council for consideration along 
with the application for a permit. In addition to scientific assessment, in terms 
of the GMO Amendment Act (which is not yet operative) the Council must 
determine whether an applicant is required to submit an assessment ‘of the 
impact on the environment and an assessment of the socio-economic 
considerations of such activities’,312 and, in making a decision on an 
application for a permit, the Council may consider public input, the 
environmental impact assessment, or the potential socio-economic impact of 
such activities.313 The draft Regulations314 which are likely to replace the 
existing Regulations give effect to these amendments by indicating that the 
Council may require an environmental impact assessment and an assessment 
of the socio-economic considerations of the activity.315 
In so far as the determination of liability is concerned, the Act imposes a 
statutory duty of care on users316 ‘to ensure that appropriate measures are 
                                                          
309
  See generally Nadine Barron ‘A Case of throwing caution to the wind; a critical analysis of the 
EIA provisions contained in the Genetically Modified Organisms Act of South Africa’ (2003) 10 
South African Journal on Environmental Law and Policy 93-110 and L Feris ‘Risk Management 
and liability for environmental harm caused by GMOS – The South African regulatory framework’ 
(2006) (1) PER 1-26.  
310
  Regulation 3 (1). 
311
  Regulation 3 (2). 
312
  Section 4 of the Amendment Act which substitutes s 5 of the GMO Act. 
313
  Ibid. 
314
  Proposed GMO Regulations GNR 321 of 28 March 2008 (Government Gazette No 30892). 
315
  Regulations 5 and 6 of the proposed Regulations (ibid).   
316
  The term ‘user’ is defined in s 1 of the GMO Act to mean ‘any natural or legal person or institution 
responsible for the use of genetically modified organisms and includes an end-user or consumer.’ 
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taken to avoid an adverse impact on the environment [and human and animal 
health]317 which may arise from the use of genetically modified organisms.’318 
The user will be liable for damage caused by the use or release of a GMO.319 
To date there are no incidences of litigation in the South African courts on this 
point. 
The draft Biosafety Policy320 points out that factors not directly related to 
biosafety may be taken into account and gives some guidance on the kinds of 
factors and laws that may be taken into account in the decision-making 
process involved in GMO-related activities.321 The draft policy provides that 
GMO-related activities ‘are accompanied with potential risks in various 
sectors, including agriculture, health, environment, labour, science and 
technology, and trade and industry’, rendering it necessary to consider 
‘national or even international agreements or legislative requirements 
pertaining to the sector’. To this end, the draft policy lists the statutes set out 
below which should be included in such a consideration. Although not all of 
the statutes are relevant for the immediate purpose of this thesis, they are 
included for the sake of completeness.322  
                                                                                                                                                                      
This definition is substituted in the GMO Amendment Act to read ‘a person who conducts an 
activity with a genetically modified organism’. (Section 1 of the Amendment Act). 
317
  As amended by s 11 of the Amendment Act. 
318
  Section 17(1). The Amendment Act (s 11) substitutes the term ‘use and release of’ with the term 
‘activities relating to’, and inserts s 17A which provides for the recovery of costs incurred by 
Council (in terms of a new s 17(3) provision for Council to remedy damage. 
319
  Section 17(2). 
320
  Draft Biosafety Policy for comments 2005, Government Gazette No 27913, Notice No 1576 of 
2005. 
321
  Para 3.6. Regulation 5 of the proposed Regulations lists factors which may be considered in a 
socio-economic assessment, such as the impact on the range of diversity of biological resources, 
loss of access to genetic and other natural resources previously available to local communities, loss 
of traditions, knowledge and practices, loss of income, competitiveness or economic markets, and 
the loss of food security. Proposed GMO Regulations GNR 321 of 28 March 2008 (Government 
Gazette No 30892). 
322
  In addition to those listed, the Plant Improvement Act 53 of 1976 provides for the registration of 
premises from which the sale of certain plants or propagating material may take place and the 
conditions subject to which such plants or propagating material may be sold for the purposes of 
cultivation; and for the recognition of certain varieties of plants; a system of certification of plants 
with the object of maintaining the quality and ensuring the usefulness of the products thereof for 
agricultural and industrial purposes; and for the control of the import and export of certain plants 
and propagating material. 
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1. The Genetically Modified Organisms Act,323 which has been discussed 
above. 
 
2. The Environmental Conservation Act324 (the ECA). The ECA (now largely 
repealed) contained provisions in terms of which the Minister may 
identify potentially detrimental activities which require an impact 
assessment and the Minister’s authorisation.325 Regulations in terms of 
the Act had identified ‘[t]he genetic modification of any organism with the 
purpose of fundamentally changing the inherent characteristics of that 
organism’ as a potentially detrimental activity.326 These provisions have 
been replaced by the NEMA regime for impact assessment.327  
 
3. The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA).328 NEMA 
embodies both the precautionary principle and the concept of 
sustainable development. The impact assessment regime329 in terms of 
NEMA regulates listed activities330 which make no reference to GMO 
related activities and thus the prevailing regime for impact assessment is 
that contained in the GMO Act and its Regulations.  
 
4. The National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act331 (the 
Biodiversity Act). The Biodiversity Act gives effect to the CBD and aims 
to provide for the ‘sustainable use of indigenous biological resources; 
                                                          
323
  Act 15 of 1997, as amended. 
324
  Act 73 of 1998.  
325
  Sections 21 and 22, which are to be repealed by s 50(2) of NEMA from a date still to be published. 
326
  Regulations regarding the identification under s 21 of activities which may have a substantial 
detrimental effect on the environment: GNR 1182 of 5 September 1997 (Government Gazette No 
18261). See generally Jan Glazewski Environmental law in South Africa (2005) at 237. On the 
limitations of these (now repealed) provisions see L Feris ‘Risk Management and liability for 
environmental harm caused by GMOS – The South African regulatory framework’ (2006) (1) PER 
1 at 13-14.  
327
  Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations in terms of the National Environmental 
Management Act: GNR 385 of 21 April 2006 (Government Gazette No 28753). 
328
  Act 107 of 1998.  
329
  Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations in terms of the National Environmental 
Management Act: GNR 385 of 21 April 2006 (Government Gazette No 28753). 
330
  List of activities and competent authorities identified in terms of ss 24 And 24D of the National 
Environmental Management Act, 1998: GNR 386 of 21 April 2006 (Government Gazette 28753); 
and List of activities and competent authorities identified in terms of 
 ss 24 And 24D of the National Environmental Management Act, 1998: GNR 387 of 21 April 2006 
(Government Gazette 28753). 
331
  Act 10 of 2004. 
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[and] the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from 
bioprospecting involving indigenous biological resources.’332  
Section 78(1) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity 
Act provides that: 
[i]f the Minster has reason to believe that the release of a genetically 
modified organism into the environment under a permit applied for in 
terms of the Genetically Modified Organisms Act, 1997 (Act No. 15 of 
1997), may pose a threat to indigenous species of the environment, no 
permit for such release may be issued in terms of that Act unless an 
environmental assessment has been conducted in accordance with 
Chapter 5 of the National Environmental Management Act as if such 
release were a listed activity contemplated in that Chapter. 
The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism may thus veto 
decision-making in terms of the GMO Act. 
5. The Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act.333 This Act aims to 
control the sale, manufacture and importation of foodstuffs, cosmetics 
and disinfectants. Although not impacting directly on GM cotton, the Act 
may be extended to apply to GMOs in foodstuffs. The Act prohibits both 
the sale of certain goods and the false description of any foodstuffs, 
cosmetics or disinfectants.  
 
6. The Animal Diseases Act.334  Now repealed, the Act was to provide for 
the control of animal diseases and parasites and measures to promote 
animal health. Its replacement, the Animal Health Act,335 would need to 
be considered in the event that animal health is negatively implicated by 
the release of particular GMOs. 
 
                                                          
332
  Preamble. Bioprospecting involves ‘any research on, or development or application of, indigenous 
biological resources for commercial or industrial exploitation, and includes – (a) the systematic 
search, collection or gathering of such resources’ (section 1). 
333
  Act 54 of 1972. 
334
  Act 35 of 1984.  
335
  Act 7 of 2002. 
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7. The Agricultural Pests Act.336 This Act, amongst other things, regulates 
the importation of controlled goods including plants.337  
 
8. The Fertilizers, Farm Feed, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies 
Act.338 This Act controls and regulates these matters.  
 
9. The Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Control Act.339  
This Act provides for the registration of medicines and related 
substances intended for human or animal use. The Act, which regulates 
the generic substitution of medicines and establishes a pricing 
committee, may apply when PGRs are used for medicinal purposes. 
 
10. The Promotion of Access to Information Act340 (PAIA). PAIA gives effect 
to the constitutional right to information341 and establishes procedures by 
which a citizen can access information relevant to a particular matter that 
affects that citizen. In Trustees, Biowatch Trust v The Registrar: Genetic 
Resources342 (although PAIA was not yet operative) the court, within the 
framework of the right to information, held that citizens are entitled to 
information regarding GMO-related activities including information 
relating to (existing and pending) GMO permits, risk assessment and 
compliance with public participation requirements. This right of access to 
information is affirmed by the provisions in PAIA. Some information, such 
as trade secrets, need not be disclosed.343  
 
                                                          
336
  Act 36 of 1983. 
337
  Measures  in terms of this Act include the Control measures relating to cotton, GNR 1902 of 12 
September 1986 (Government Gazette No 10431), which required the destruction of the top 
growth in certain cotton fields and the control of regrowth and the destruction of cotton plants in 
certain areas.  
338
  Act 36 of 1947. 
339
  Act 90 of 1997. 
340
  Act 2 of 2000.  
341
  Section 32 of the Constitution. 
342
   Trustees, Biowatch Trust v The Registrar: Genetic Resources (TPD) 2005 (4) SA 111 (T).  
343
  For the limits on the duty to disclose see for example Transnet and Another v SA Metal Machinery 
Company 2006 (6) SA 285 (SCA). 
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11. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act344 (PAJA). PAJA which 
gives effect to the Constitutional right to fair administrative justice,345 
states that ‘everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.’346 In 
terms of PAJA, ‘an administrator…must give a person [whose rights will 
be adversely affected] firstly, adequate notice of the nature and purpose 
of the proposed administrative action; secondly, reasonable opportunity 
to make representations; thirdly, a clear statement of the administrative 
action; fourthly, adequate notice of the right to request reasons’.347 
Where administrative action will affect the public, the administrator must 
firstly, hold a public inquiry; secondly, follow a notice and comment 
procedure; thirdly, follow both the above procedures; or follow another 
procedure which is fair.348  
The socio-economic considerations are, as yet, an unsettled aspect of 
property rights analysis and an important factor influencing the scope of the 
State’s regulatory powers over rights in GM cotton.349 In this regard three 
questions arise for further consideration:  
• Firstly, how broadly will socio-economic impacts be defined;  
• Secondly, whether objections may be raised on socio-economic 
grounds linked to existing permits (and thus have such permits revoked 
or the conditions amended);350 and 
• Thirdly, whether decisions of the Council based on socio-economic 
grounds would stand up to WTO scrutiny in light of the outcome of the 
Biotech Products351 dispute. 
                                                          
344
  Act 3 of 2000. On the application of PAJA in matters involving natural resources and the 
environment see for example Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 
2004 (4) 490 (CC) and Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Eskom Holdings Limited 2005 (3) SA 156 (C). 
345
  Section 33 of the Constitution. 
346
  Section 33(2) of the Constitution the PAJA preamble. 
347
  Section 3(2)(b). 
348
  Section 4(1)(a)-(d). 
349
  The proposed regulations (note 321) do provide a list of factors to be considered.  These are 
however not mandatory. 
350
  The issue of compensation or breach of the TRIPS Agreement may be raised. 
351
  European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(note 79) discussed at § 5.5.1. 
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With regard to the first enquiry – the scope of socio-economic concerns: the 
term ‘socio-economic’ is not defined by the GMO Amendment Act. Although 
the (amended) long title of the Act states that the purpose of the Act is ‘to lay 
down the necessary requirements and criteria for … socio-economic 
consideration’ (emphasis added) the amended Act simply requires that the 
Council must (‘shall’) determine whether an applicant for a permit must submit 
an assessment of the socio-economic considerations and that the Council 
may, before making a decision regarding an application for a permit, consider, 
inter alia, the potential socio-economic impact of such activities. Regulation 
The proposed Regulations lists several factors which may be considered in a 
socio-economic assessment, such as the impact on the range of diversity of 
biological resources, loss of access to genetic and other natural resources 
previously available to local communities, loss of traditions, knowledge and 
practices, loss of income, competitiveness or economic markets, and the loss 
of food security.352 
In so far as socio-economic issues are concerned, the constitutionally 
endorsed notion of sustainable development,353 the principles in NEMA and 
related statutes, and the concept of batho pele,354 unequivocally require a 
consideration of socio-economic concerns when deploying technology such 
as modern biotechnology.   
Returning to the remaining two enquiries: the second is whether objections 
may be raised on socio-economic grounds linked to existing permits (and thus 
have such permits revoked or the conditions amended). The GMO Act,355 as 
                                                          
352
  Regulation 5 of the Proposed GMO Regulations GNR 321 of 28 March 2008 (Government Gazette 
No 30892). 
353
  Section 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution.  See the discussion on sustainable development in § 5.4.1. 
354
  Batho pele is a Sesotho phrase meaning ‘People First’. The phrase is referred to in the judgment of 
Ngcobo J in Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental 
Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 
and Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at para [60] where Ngcobo J states that ‘[o]ne of the key principles 
of NEMA [s 2(2)] requires people and their needs to be place at the forefront of environmental 
management – “batho pele.” It requires all developments to be socially, economically and 
environmentally sustainable. In October 1997 government launched a Batho Pele campaign (aimed 
ultimately at improving access to government services to persons from disadvantaged societies.’ 
355
  There is an appeal procedure in s 19 of the GMO Act for appeals in respect of decisions or action 
taken by the Council; however, an appeal in terms of s 19 must be taken within 30 days of 
notification of the decision or action and is therefore only useful if a socio-economic impact can be 
anticipated.  
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amended, affords the Council the opportunity to reconsider any decision taken 
by the Council ‘if the Council receives new and scientific and technological 
evidence about activities conducted in terms of the Act, which may have an 
impact on the factors referred to in … paragraph (a)’.356 (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph (a) refers to the following factors: (i) public input; (ii) the 
environmental impact assessment; or (iii) the potential socio-economic impact 
of such activities. Any socio-economic impact would thus have to be shown 
within the parameter of ‘scientific and technological evidence’.   
The third issue is whether amendments to the Act or decisions that negatively 
impact on the property rights in GMOs, based on socio-economic grounds, 
would stand up to WTO scrutiny in light of the Biotech Products357 dispute. 
This is addressed in the next section which discusses the restrictions imposed 
on the State’s regulatory powers by international trade law. Whereas 
international law measures are inherently infused with a sense of laissez-faire 
liberalism, biosafety law (and human and environmental rights) adopts a more 
interventionist, balancing approach. 
5.5 Trade and IP law  
South Africa is a member of the WTO and as such is bound by a series of 
WTO agreements,358 including a ‘package’ of agreements particularly relevant 
to agriculture and trade in agricultural products, such as the Agreement on 
Agriculture,359 which lays the foundation for the reform of trade in agriculture, 
the ultimate goal being to achieve ‘substantial progressive reductions in 
agricultural support and protection … resulting in correcting and preventing 
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets.’360 The Agreement on 
Agriculture requires its Members (except least developed countries) to 
liberalise agricultural trade, in other words to improve market access and also 
                                                          
356
  Section 4 of the Amendment Act, which substitutes s 5 of the GMO Act. 
357
  European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(note 79).  
358
  The WTO website indicates that ‘[m]ost of the WTO agreements are the result of the 1986–94 
Uruguay Round negotiations, signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in April 1994. There are 
about 60 agreements and decisions totalling 550 pages’. At 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm [Accessed 1 September 2008]. 
359
  Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UNTS 3. 
360
  Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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reduce trade-distorting subsidies361 (domestic support) in agriculture. In its 
preamble the agreement notes that commitments on market access should be 
made ‘in an equitable way … having regard to non-trade concerns, including 
food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to the 
agreement that special and differential treatment for developing countries is 
an integral element of the negotiations’.  
The Agreement on Agriculture is bolstered by the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade362 (the TBT Agreement), which requires that Members’ 
‘technical regulations and standards, including packaging, marking and 
labelling requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity with 
technical regulations and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade’.363 (Emphasis added). In addition, the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures364 (the SPS Agreement) 
requires that the measures taken by Members necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health may not unfairly discriminate between Members 
or constitute ‘disguised restrictions’ on international trade. (Emphasis added). 
These agreements (the Agreement on Agriculture, the SPS and TBT 
Agreements), together with the GATT 1994 Agreement,365 formed the basis of 
the GM food dispute (the Biotech Products366 dispute) between the United 
States, Argentina and Canada, on the one hand, and the European Union on 
the other, discussed in the section below.  
                                                          
361
  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement 
(SCM Agreement). The SCM disciplines the use of subsidies and it regulates the actions countries 
can take to counter the effects of subsidies. Under the agreement, a country can use the WTO’s 
dispute-settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its adverse 
effects. Or the country can launch its own investigation and ultimately charge extra duty 
(‘countervailing duty’) on subsidized imports that are found to be hurting domestic producers. 
362
  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement, 1867 UNTS 3 
(TBT Agreement). 
363
  Preamble to the TBT. 
364
  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures, 1867 UNTS 493 (SPS 
Agreement). 
365
  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) 33 ILM 1153 (1994). 
366
  European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(note 79). The USA and others challenged, inter alia, the EC’s five-year moratorium on the 
approval of new GM crops and GM foods. The dispute settlement panel handed down its lengthy 
(over 1000 pages) report on 29 September 2006. 
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5.5.1 The GATT Agreement (GATT 1994) and the Biotech Products dispute 
The Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment principle, a principle which places 
major restrictions on the State’s regulatory powers, is the cornerstone of the 
GATT367 and permeates international trade law. The crux of the principle, 
which, in the case of the GATT, applies to the rules and formalities and the 
duties, charges and payments for imports and exports, as well as the method 
of levying such duties and charges, is that: 
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.368 [Emphasis added]. 
The application of the principles of the GATT Agreement to agricultural 
biotechnology products is well illustrated in the arguments advanced by the 
complainants in the Biotech Products dispute.  
The Biotech Products dispute involved complaints by Canada, Argentina and 
the USA against the European communities arising out of the European 
Communities’ effective moratorium (the ‘general suspension by the European 
Communities of its own processes for the consideration of applications for, or 
the granting of, approval for biotech products’) in relation to specific 
agricultural products on the basis that the moratorium (and its related 
activities) breached the European Communities obligations in terms of GATT 
1994 and also the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. The complaint 
was not raised in objection to the European Communities’ regime369 for the 
approval of biotechnology products per se but rather its application or 
implementation. The objective of the EC regime is the protection of 
                                                          
367
  For background on the GATT, see § 5.2.1.3. 
368
  Article 1.1. 
369
  The approval of biotech products in the EC is regulated by EC Directive 2001/18/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 regulating the deliberate release into 
the environment of genetically modified organisms (its predecessor was EC Directive 90/220 
(Directive 90/220/EEC, OJ 8 5 1990 L117/15 as amended by Directive 94/15/EC, OJ 22 4 1994 
L103 and Directive 97/35/EC, OJ 27 6 1997 L169) and EC Regulation 258/97 regulating novel 
foods and novel food ingredients. 
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environmental and human health 370 and case-by-case evaluations of the risks 
of a particular biotechnology product are conducted by the EC before deciding 
whether to approve the product for market. In addition, the EC legislation 
permits its member States to take ‘safeguard measures’ in respect of 
biotechnology products that have been approved for EC-wide marketing. The 
complaints raised in the Biotech Products dispute relate to both the EC regime 
and certain measures by member states. 
In so far as alleged violation of GATT 1994 is concerned, although the dispute 
settlement panel did not find it necessary to rule on these allegations,371 the 
arguments by the complainants are set out below in order to illustrate how 
GATT 1994 may be applied.  
Complaint by the United States. The US argued that the Greek import ban372 
is in violation of Article XI:1 of GATT which provides that: 
No prohibitions or restriction other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quota, import or export licences or 
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory or any other contracting party. 
In other words the argument was that a total ban on GM seed (and related 
products) is prohibited in international trade in terms of the GATT Agreement, 
unless it can be justified on the health and safety reasons established in terms 
of the SPS Agreement. 
Complaints by Canada. Canada relied on GATT 1994 for the following 
arguments: 
                                                          
370
  Page 3, para [2.4] of the Reports of the Panel. 
371
  The panel found against the EC countries, on the basis of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement 
(explained in §5.5.2), and therefore, exercising ‘judicial economy’, found that it was unnecessary 
to rule on the claims under the GATT. 
372
  The wording of the Greek measure provided that: ‘[w]e prohibit the importing into the territory of 
Greece the seeds of the genetically modified rape-plant line bearing reference number 
C/UK/95/M5/1’. 
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i) that the so-called product-specific marketing bans373 and the national 
measures374 of several of the EC member States violate Article III:4 of 
GATT which requires that ‘like’ products be treated equally. 
Specifically, Article III:4 provides that: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in 
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The 
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of 
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively 
on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the 
nationality of the product. (Emphasis added). 
Canada argued that the marketing bans and the national measures violate the 
GATT agreement by according the specific products treatment that is less 
favourable than the treatment accorded to respective like non-biotechnology 
products (ie domestically-grown canola or oilseed rape). The argument was 
advanced that the product-specific marketing bans and the national measures 
fall within the ambit of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ and that the 
specific produces are ‘like’ non-biotechnology comparative products on the 
basis of the following four criteria: 
• Physical similarities: the physical differences between the 
biotechnology and non-biotechnology specific products can only be 
perceived at the molecular level and the European Communities 
science-based risk assessment suggests that the biotech products 
pose no greater risk to human health or the environment than the 
product's non-biotechnology comparative. 
• Interchangeability: the biotechnology and the non-biotechnology 
comparative products are intended to be used interchangeably. 
                                                          
373
  The marketing bans arose out of the moratorium and, it was argued, are proof of the moratorium.  
374
  EC member States may in terms of ‘safeguard’ clauses in EC legislation ‘provisionally restrict or 
prohibit the use or sale of an approved biotech product in its territory if that member State has 
evidence that the product constitutes a risk to human health or the environment’ (Reports of the 
Panel at 40-41). The EC member State national measures complained about were established in 
terms of these ‘safeguard’ clauses. 
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• Consumer tastes and preferences: as there is no reliable evidence 
regarding consumer tastes and preferences, it was argued that this 
criterion should be given ‘little practical weight’. 
• Tariff classification: the tariff classification of biotechnology products 
and their non-biotechnology comparative products is identical. 
Canada argued, on this basis, that the biotechnology products are ‘like’ the 
respective non-biotechnology comparative products of national origin for the 
purposes of Article III:4 and the fact that the biotechnology products are not 
being given ‘equality of competitive opportunities’ violates Article III:4 of 
GATT. Canada asserted that the measures taken by the four member states 
prevented the biotechnology products from competing in the same markets as 
domestically-grown non-biotechnology comparative products. 
ii) that Greece’s import ban375 on Topas 19/2 (oilseed rape) violates 
Article XI:1 (set out under Complaints by United States above). Canada 
argued that Greece’s import ban amounts to an ‘other measure’ in 
terms of Article XI:1 and accordingly violates that provision.  
These complaints by Canada opened up the debate that GM seed and related 
products should not be treated any differently to their non-GM ‘equivalent’. For 
the same reasons set out in footnote 371, the panel made no finding on this 
issue.  
Complaints by Argentina. Argentina argued, as Canada did, but in a slightly 
different fashion, that the EC’s suspension of approval processes for 
biotechnology agricultural products violates the GATT. Argentina argued as 
follows: 
(a)  the products are "like products" within the meaning of Article III:4;  
(b)  the suspension is a "requirement" that affect "the sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of these products 
in the internal market"; and  
(c)  ‘less favourable treatment’ has been accorded.376 
                                                          
375
  Referring to the Greek ministerial decision of 9 September 1998. 
376
  Reports of the Panel at 57. 
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In so far as (a) (‘like’ products) is concerned, it was argued that ‘like’ does not 
mean identical but rather requires a consideration of the four criteria 
established in terms of GATT/WTO case law.377 The criteria being those 
reflected in the Canadian complaint, set out above, although the criteria are 
formulated slightly differently by Argentina, ie: 
• Physical properties. Argentina argued that a risk assessment has 
determined that there is no difference between the risks associated 
with the biotechnology agricultural products and the risks associated 
with the non-biotechnology comparative product 
• Similar end-uses. The biotechnology and the comparative non-
biotechnology agricultural products have similar end-uses. 
• Consumer perception. Argentina pointed out that the suspension, and 
related measures, may have a negative impact on the consumer’s 
perception of the biotechnology products. 
• International tariff classification. There is no difference in the tariff 
classification between the biotechnology and comparative non-
biotechnology agricultural products. 
The measure (the suspension) affected the ‘sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transport, distribution and use of products on the domestic market’, Argentina 
argued, and the products, therefore were accorded ‘less favourable 
treatment’. Again, no ruling was made by the panel on the complaint. 
These arguments are set out in some detail to illustrate the complexities of 
regulation and the consequences and the types of complaints that could be 
made against South Africa in the event that measures are taken to restrict 
trade in GM products. Sufficient argument will need to be advanced at 
international law level to counter complaints and convince regulators that a 
more restrictive approach is necessary.  
                                                          
377
  Argentina referred to the EC – Asbestos case where it has held that each of the criteria should be 
analysed. European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/R, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R. 
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In so far as the State’s powers and responsibilities to regulate the health and 
safety of GMO-related products is concerned, the SPS Agreement (on which 
the Biotech Products dispute was decided) is particularly important.  
5.5.2 The SPS Agreement and the Biotech Products dispute  
The SPS Agreement determines the extent to which free trade in GMO-
related agricultural products can be interfered with by a member state. Such 
interference is generally limited to the sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
permissible in terms of the SPS Agreement. The SPS Agreement regulates 
(and seeks to harmonise)378 national provisions for food safety and animal 
and plant health. In terms of the agreement, members may take sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures that are necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health and are encouraged to use international standards379 where 
these exist.380 Such measures must however not amount to a ‘disguised 
restriction on international trade’ and members may not discriminate arbitrarily 
or unjustifiably between members. Annex A of the SPS Agreement defines 
sanitary and phyosanitary measures as: 
[a]ny measure applied: 
(a)  to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing 
organisms;  
(b)  to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;  
                                                          
378
  Some guidelines on harmonisation are provided for in the Appellate Body’s decision in  
European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (EC-Hormones) AB-
1997-4, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (1998) (Appellate Body) where the measure at issue 
was the EC prohibition on the importation and marketing of meat and meat products treated with 
certain hormones. The Appellate Body found that the requirement that SPS measures be ‘based on’ 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations (Article 3.1) does not mean that SPS 
measures must ‘conform to’ such standards. 
379
  Such as the ‘international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed by the relevant 
international organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International 
Office of Epizootics, and the relevant international and regional organizations operating within the 
framework of the International Plant Protection Convention’ (preamble of the SPS Agreement). 
380
  EC-Hormones (note 378). 
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(c)  to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products 
thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or 
(d)  to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member 
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.  
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, end product 
criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification 
and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant 
requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the 
materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant 
statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; 
and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety.  
In the Biotech Products dispute it was alleged that the EU moratorium, the 
product-specific EC measures, and the safeguard measures of the member 
States’ violated the SPS Agreement, in particular the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement concerned with ‘scientific justification’ and ‘risk assessment’.381 
The complainants all advanced similar arguments in this regard.  
Complaint by the United States.382 The US argued that the EC moratorium 
violated numerous provisions of the SPS Agreement383 and the panel 
concluded that, although the so-called moratorium was not, in itself, an SPS 
measure, the effect of the moratorium was that individual approval processes 
were generally not completed without undue delay and this was inconsistent 
with the provisions of Article 8 of the SPS Agreement.384 Likewise, the 
product-specific EC measures in respect of 21 out of the 25 products 
complained about, failed to meet the obligations imposed by the first clause of 
Annex C(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement and hence Article 8 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
                                                          
381
  Articles 2.2 and 5.1 require SPS measures to be based on sound scientific principle and risk 
assessment. 
382
  DS291. 
383
  In particular, Article 8 of the SPS Agreement; Annex B(1) and Article 7, Article 5.1, Article 5.5, 
Article 2.2 and Article 2.3. 
384
  Reports of the Panel at 1068 (para [8.6]). 
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The Panel made numerous findings against the EC385 regarding the US 
complaints about the nine safeguard measures386 of certain EC member 
States,387 which measures were imposed notwithstanding risk evaluation by 
the EC and the granting of Community-wide approval.  
Complaint by Canada.388 In so far as Canada’s complaints were concerned, 
the Panel held that the EC had effectively placed a moratorium on the 
approval of biotechnology products which was inconsistent with its obligations 
under the first clause of Annex C(1)(a) and Article 8 of the SPS Agreement. 
Likewise, the product-specific measures relating to four products389 breached 
the EC’s obligations under the first clause of Annex C(1)(a) and Article 8 of 
the SPS Agreement, and the EC member State safeguard measures390 are 
inconsistent with the SPS Agreement.391 
Complaint by Argentina.392 Although the Panel found that the EC had applied 
a de facto moratorium, in the case of Argentina, such moratorium did not 
amount to a breach of the EU obligations.393 In so far as Argentina’s 
complaints in respect of the product-specific394 EC measures were concerned, 
the Panel concluded that the EC had breached its obligations under the first 
clause of Annex C(1)(a) and under Article 8 of the SPS Agreement. In 
addition, the six member State safeguard measures395 challenged by 
Argentina were found to be in breach of Articles 5.1, 5.7 and the second and 
third requirements in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. 
As a result of its findings in favour of the three complainants, the Panel 
recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European 
                                                          
385
  Based on the obligations in Article 5.1, Article 5.7 and the second and third requirements in Article 
2.2. 
386
  These safeguard measures took the form of prohibitions on particular biotech products that have 
otherwise been approved for use within the EC.  
387
  The countries complained about were Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg. 
388
  DS292. 
389
  MS8/RF3 oilseed rape; RR oilseed rape (EC-70); MS1/RF1 oilseed rape (EC-89); and MS1/RF2 
oilseed rape. 
390
  These being measures taken by Austria, France, Greece and Italy. 
391
  Specifically Article 5.1, Article 5.7 and the second and third requirements in Article 2.2. 
392
  DS293. 
393
  Reports of the Panel at 1081 (para [8.50]).  
394
  These involved Bt-531 cotton, RR-1445 cotton, LL soybeans (EC-71), NK603 maize, GA21 maize 
(EC-78), GA21 maize (food), and NK603 maize (food). 
395
  These measures were applied by Austria, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
226 
 
Communities to bring the following into conformity with its obligations under 
the SPS Agreement: 
• the de facto moratorium on approvals; 396 
• the relevant product-specific measures; and 
• the relevant member State safeguard measures. 
Some commentators are of the view that the Biotech Products decision will 
have a negative impact on members’ national decision-making ability.  
The outcome of Biotech Products carries profound implications for the 
balance between state and global power and the relationship of 
science to democracy. WTO adjudicators will define the extent to which 
particular conceptions of sound science can be used to set boundaries 
on members’ precautionary health and environmental measures …At 
stake in the answers to these questions are the very parameters of 
state self-determination with regard to food biotechnology and risk-
based decision-making – not just for the EU, but for all WTO 
members.397 
The ruling effectively restricts the use of the precautionary principle (allowing 
only for appropriate SPS measures ‘reasonably supported by a risk 
assessment’) where its use impacts negatively on trade.398 An alternative 
approach which has been suggested is that the WTO use the Biosafety 
Protocol as an appropriate ‘international standard’ under the SPS 
Agreement399 and the TBT Agreement400.401 The difficulty in such an approach 
is that, in effect, it would require the WTO to impose the Biosafety Protocol on 
parties that are not signatories to the Protocol. 
                                                          
396
  This recommendation was made in the case of the complaints by the US and Canada. No 
recommendation was made in this regard in the complaint by Argentina. 
397
  David Winickoff et al ‘Adjudicating the GM food wars: science, risk, and democracy in world 
trade law’ (2005) 30 The Yale Journal of International Law 81 at 84. 
398
  The precautionary principle is legislated (in s 2(4)(a)(vii) of NEMA) in domestic law in South 
Africa.  
399
  In terms of Article 3.1 and Annex A. 
400
  In terms of Article 2 and Annex 1. 
401
  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and CG Weeramantry (eds) Sustainable justice: reconciling 
economic, social and environmental law (2005) at 104. 
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5.5.3 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) 
The TBT Agreement seeks ‘to ensure that technical regulations and 
standards, including packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and 
procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and 
standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade.’402  
Whereas the SPS Agreement covers health protection measures (for example 
additives in food, food safety generally and labelling in respect of food safety), 
the TBT Agreement covers any remaining technical aspects such as labelling 
in respect of the composition or quality of food and the packaging and 
labelling of toxic matter. TBT measures include regulations for electrical 
appliances and the labelling of textiles and garments.403 
Any decisions taken by South Africa on GM cotton may therefore not amount 
to technical barriers to trade. This restricts decisions to the extent that: 
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment 
would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security 
requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of 
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical 
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products.404 (Emphasis added). 
Although the TBT Agreement was raised in the Biotech Products dispute, the 
Panel made no findings in this regard.  
International law trade restrictions are also imposed on domestic regulatory 
powers in relation to IP. These are contained in the TRIPS agreement.405 The 
overriding objective of the TRIPS agreement is to strengthen the international 
                                                          
402
  Preamble to the TBT Agreement. 
403
  Para 1.4 of the WTO’s SPS Agreement Training Module at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/intro1_e.htm [Accessed 1 September 
2008]. 
404
  Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. 
405
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 ILM  81 (1994) (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
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protection of intellectual property rights and to this extent, the agreement has 
been accused of ‘contradict[ing] the general direction of the WTO, that is trade 
liberalization, since it increases the monopolistic features of international trade 
in knowledge products.’406 Some economics therefore argue that intellectual 
property should not be coupled with trade negotiations.407 
Many WTO member States signed the TRIPS agreement having had very 
little involvement408 in the negotiation of the agreement and with very little 
knowledge of its potential effect in regulating domestic affairs.409  
5.5.4 Intellectual property and the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement requires member states to provide adequate 
(universal) standards of trade-related IP rights. In so far as PGRs are 
concerned, Article 27(1) of TRIPS obligates member states to provide for the 
patenting of any inventions, whether product or process, ‘in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are 
capable of industrial application’. (Emphasis added). Although members are 
permitted to exclude from patentability plants, animals, and biological 
processes for the production of plants and animals, micro-organisms and non-
biological and microbiological processes are not exempt. If plant varieties are 
excluded from patentability, members must provide for their protection by an 
effective sui generis system.410 
                                                          
406
  Meir Perez Pugatch The international political economy of intellectual property rights (2004) at ix. 
See generally also Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite Information feudalism: who owns the 
knowledge economy? (2002) and Stiglitz (note 58).  
407
  Stiglitz (note 58). 
408
  ‘[P]robably less than 50 people were responsible for TRIPS.’ Drahos with Braithwaite (note 406) 
at 10 citing a US trade negotiator. The process leading up the signing of the TRIPS agreement is 
comprehensively described by Braithwaite and Drahos; and also Meir Perez Pugatch (note 406). 
The drivers of the TRIPS agreement were the giant US and EU chemical, pharmaceutical and 
technology industries, with major players being companies like Pfizer and IBM. 
409
  Drahos with Braithwaite (note 406) at 190-1, explain: 
‘The African states signed up for 20-year patent terms on pharmaceuticals, for example, 
without understanding that the effect of this could be millions of preventable AIDS deaths 
among their people. It was not just that they were not effectively represented by being in the 
room. Even if they had been in the room, because none of them had intellectual property 
experts on their WTO delegations, the implications of TRIPS for the health of their people 
would not have been clear to them.’ 
410
  Article 27(3)(b). One such sui generis system is that under the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) based on the International Convention for the 
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Article 28 of TRIPS requires member states to confer exclusivity rights in 
respect of both product and process inventions; and where the patent involves 
a process, these rights extend to the product obtained by using that process.  
Article 27.3(b), which requires IP protection for plant varieties, whether by 
patent or otherwise, provides for a review of the subparagraph after four years 
from the date of entry into force; which review is now overdue.411 The 
submissions412 from the Africa Group413 in this regard can be summarized414 
as follows:  
• There is a likelihood that the intellectual property protection required 
in respect of plant varieties could negatively impact food security and 
exacerbate poverty;415  
• There is a lack of international mechanisms to deal with the 
misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge from 
developing countries;416 and 
• The patenting of life forms is abhorrent to African tradition and 
culture.417 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec 1, 1961 (revised on 10 Nov 1972, 23 Oct 1978, and 19 
Mar 1991). 
411
  The review was to have been finalised by December 2002. Paragraph 19 of the 2001 Doha 
Declaration requires the TRIPS Council to consider the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the protection of traditional 
knowledge and folklore, which may result in a requirement to disclose the source of any genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge used in inventions. At 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm [Accessed 3 July 2009]. 
412
  As contained in the Joint Communication from the African Group, Taking forward the review of 
Article 27.3B of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. IP/C/W404 (June 26, 2003). 
413
  The African Group represents all African countries that are members of the WTO. At 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_e/brief25_e.htm [Accessed 1 September 
2008]. 
414
  Collier (note 283) at 544. 
415
  The Group is of the view that although the ‘legitimate rights of commercial plant breeders should 
be protected, these should be balanced against the needs of farmers and local communities’. 
African Group Joint Communication (note 412) at 4-5. 
416
  Although discussions in this regard are taking place at WIPO, these, according to the Africa Group 
have been slow. The Africa Group cautions against a ‘wait and see’ attitude and urges the WTO to 
seek its own measures to protect the misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. To this extent the Africa Group has drafted a Decision on Protecting Traditional 
Knowledge (Annex 1 to the Africa Group communication) which it urges the WTO to adopt. 
African Group Joint Communication (note 412) at 6-7. As indicated above also, there is talk about 
negotiations at WTO level on requiring the disclosure of the origin of traditional knowledge and 
genetic material in patent applications. Intellectual Property Watch (note 87). 
417
  African Group Joint Communication (note 412) at 2, noting that these ‘patents are contrary to the 
moral and cultural norms of many societies in Members of the WTO … [and many Members] 
consider patents on life forms to be contrary to the fabric of their society and culture, and to be 
immoral’. 
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The Africa group implores its members not to derogate from the provisions of 
the CBD and the ITPGRA, and encourages its members to explore ways to 
accommodate these instruments. To this extent, the Africa Group favours the 
adoption by African states of the African Model Law for the Protection of the 
Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation 
of Access to Biological Resources418 particularly in relation to a sui generis 
system for the protection of plant varieties.  
In so far as regulating access to PGRs is concerned, the Africa Group 
discusses the potential use of Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement to modify 
rights and obligations created by the substantive provisions of TRIPS. Article 
29, titled ‘Conditions on Patent Applicants,’ provides for disclosure of 
information by the Applicant. The African Group suggests adding the following 
provision: 
Members shall require an applicant for a patent to disclose the country 
and area of origin of any biological resources and traditional knowledge 
used or involved in the invention, and to provide confirmation of 
compliance with all access regulations in the country of origin.419 
The TRIPS Agreement also contains a number of leniencies and flexibilities. 
Article 30, for example, states that:  
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
While this may free up some room for regulators to factor in the public 
interest, there are questions around what would be an ‘unreasonable conflict’, 
a ‘normal exploitation’, ‘unreasonable prejudice’ and ‘legitimate interests.’ The 
answers, in a WTO setting are likely to differ from that in the national context.  
                                                          
418
  See § 5.5.4.2. 
419
  African Group Joint Communication (note 412) at 8. See for example similar provisions contained 
in the Patents Act in South Africa, discussed in the text below.  
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In addition Article 8(1)420 provides for a public interest principle, allowing 
members to: 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital important to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of … [the TRIPS] 
Agreement. 421  
The public interest principle qualifies the scope of harmonisation at the 
national level.422 Although there is concern about the proviso that any 
measures taken should be consistent with the provisions of TRIPS, the 
provisions of TRIPS should be broadly interpreted to include its preamble and 
objectives which mitigate in favour of a public interest approach.423 
Article 8(2) allows Member’s to take measures necessary to prevent the 
abuse of IP rights by rights holder which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology.  
Members may also provide for compulsory licences in certain circumstances 
in terms of Article 31. Members may allow for the use of ‘the subject matter of 
a patent without the authorization of the right holder’ as long as certain 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are respected. In particular, Article 31 
requires, among others, prior negotiation unless there is extreme urgency, a 
grant limited in scope and duration (possibly to remedy an anti-competitive 
practice) that is predominantly for the domestic market, and the rights holder 
must receive adequate remuneration.  
If the compulsory licence is to remedy an anti-competitive practice, TRIPS 
does not require prior negotiation and the licence need not be predominantly 
                                                          
420
  Which should be read together with Article 7 (the objectives clause) which provides that: 
‘The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to 
the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations’.  
421
  The principle in Article 8(1) was proposed by the Group of 14 developing countries and the 
proviso or limitation was insisted upon by the developed countries. Carlos M Correa and 
Abdulqawi A Yusuf Intellectual property and international trade: the TRIPS Agreement (2008) at 
13-4. 
422
  Intellectual property and international trade: the TRIPS Agreement (note 421) at 14. 
423
  Ibid. 
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for the domestic market.424 In addition, an anti-competitive practice may be 
taken into account when determining the amount of remuneration.425 
The prevailing view is that this ‘doctrine of abuse’ will apply if the patentee, 
among other things, ‘refused to grant licenses on reasonable terms and 
thereby hampers industrial development, or does not supply the national 
market with sufficient quantities of the patented product, or demands 
excessive prices for such products’.426  
While these provisions arguably give countries some flexibility to cast a level 
of protection for communities and their access to PGRs, developing countries 
have their hands tied in the process of bilateral negotiations. Trading parties 
often seek to impose ‘TRIPS plus’ provisions on the poorer South, seeking a 
heightening of protection and a closure of space to regulate IP rights. Through 
this process ‘[c]ountries are barred from making use of the existing flexibility 
or public interest safeguards in the intellectual property regimes.’427 Coupled 
with this are threats of trade sanctions and the use of mechanisms such as 
the US Special 301 Reports which all play a role in curtailing flexibility in the 
regulation of IP rights.428 
As mentioned above, an alternative to patent protection for plants is the 
UPOV arrangement, which may offer greater flexibility than TRIPS.  
5.5.4.1 Sui generis protection of plant varieties: UPOV429 
UPOV was established by the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants, which was adopted in 1961 (UPOV 1961), and 
revised in 1972, 1978 (UPOV 1978) and 1991 (UPOV 1991).430 
                                                          
424
  Article 31(k). 
425
  Ibid. 
426
  GHC Bodenstein Guide to the application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property as revised at Stockholm in 1967 (1968) at 71 cited in Intellectual property and 
international trade: the TRIPS Agreement (note 421) at 34. 
427
  Pistorius (note 207) at 380. 
428
  Ibid. 
429
  International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec 1, 1961 (revised on 
Nov 10, 1972, Oct 23, 1978, and Mar 19, 1991). 
430
  The 1972 revisions were minor, whereas the 1978 and 1991 revisions were more substantive. 
Margaret Llewelyn and Mike Adcock European plant intellectual property (2006) at 105. 
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 The thinking behind UPOV was to provide a ‘uniform system of protection 
specifically for plant inventions,’431 and the focus was on agricultural plants.432 
Membership of UPOV does not preclude Member States from making 
provision in domestic law for the protection of plants via both patents and 
plant variety rights, provided that the protection accorded by the patent 
system differs from that prescribed by the UPOV.433 Although the future of the 
UPOV regime, in light of developments in patent law at the WTO, has been 
questioned,434 its 1991 revisions have brought it closer to a patent-type right, 
and it remains a well used regime.435  
South Africa is a signatory to UPOV 1978, which is more attractive to 
developing countries, and which remains open for ratification. UPOV 1978 
proclaims in its preamble that the contracting parties: 
are conscious of the special problems arising from the recognition and 
protection of the rights of breeders and particularly of the limitations 
that the requirements of the public interest may impose on the free 
exercise of such a right… . 
This preamble, although worded slightly differently, is contained in both UPOV 
1961 and UPOV 1978. There is no such preamble in UPOV 1991.436  
Limitations on plant breeders’ rights in terms of the UPOV regime are the 
breeders’ exemption and the farmers’ privilege in respect of farm saved seed 
(which is more restricted in the case of UPOV 1991). The breeders’ exemption 
permits the use of protected material for research purposes, and if a new 
variety is derived from the research, the breeder may register rights without 
the consent of the first breeder.437  
                                                          
431
  Llewelyn and Adcock (note 430) at 146. According to Llewelyn and Adcock (at 152): 
‘Laclaviere, writing in 1969, said that the ultimate objective of the Convention was to promote 
the creation of new plant varieties which were more useful or better adapted to human needs to 
provide a contribution to the “material betterment of mankind’s future”.’ (Footnotes omitted).  
432
  Llewelyn and Adcock  (note 430) at 196. 
433
  Llewelyn and Adcock  (note 430) at 147. 
434
  See for example the comments of Professor Cornish and the International Chamber of Commerce, 
cited in Llewelyn and Adcock (note 431) at 154-6. 
435
  Llewelyn and Adcock (note 430) at 158. 
436
  The USA has signed UPOV 1991.  
437
  Article 5(3) of UPOV 1961 and UPOV 1978 and Article 15 of UPOV 1991. 
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The farmers’ ‘privilege’438 to save seed (UPOVs 1961 and 1978 only) has 
been read into the restriction requiring the right-holders authorisation for the 
use of the protected materials only when production is for the commercial 
marketing of the protected variety.439 UPOV 1991 requires the breeder’s 
authorisation for the production or reproduction of the protected material440 
(whether or not it is for commercial marketing); although, in terms of Article 
15, the breeders’ right does not extend to ‘acts done privately and for non-
commercial purposes.’ Article 15(2) also provides an optional exception in 
terms of which contracting parties may restrict the breeders’ right in order to 
‘permit farmers to use, for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the 
product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own 
holdings, the protected variety’. Adcock explains that, in terms of UPOV 1991, 
farmers’ are required to recognise the breeders’ legitimate interests, and that 
this is likely to require payment of compensation (equitable remuneration) for 
the use of farm saved seed.441 
South Africa is party to UPOV 1978 and therefore entitled to the more lenient 
approach to the ‘farmer’s privilege’ in respect of plant varieties registered in 
terms of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act.442 The privilege would not apply 
however where plant genetic resources are protected in terms of the Patents 
Act.443  
Although UPOV provides an alternative to patent protection for plant genetic 
resources, and is therefore more developing-country-friendly, UPOV has not 
enjoyed much support in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The … (UPOV) system is viewed with great hostility by most southern 
African countries with the exception of Kenya and South Africa, which 
are members of the 1978 UPOV system. 
                                                          
438
  A public-centred notion of property in natural resources might view the farmers’ privilege as a 
right and industries rights as privilege. 
439
  Article 5(1) of UPOV 1961 and UPOV 1978. 
440
  Article 14 of UPOV 1991. 
441
  Adcock ‘Farmers’ right or privilege’ [2001/2] 3 BSLR 90 at 92, as cited in Burton Ong (ed) 
Intellectual property and biological resources (2004) at 124 (footnote 229). 
442
  Act 15 of 1976. 
443
  Act 57 of 1978. 
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It is not quite understood why southern African countries view the 
UPOV system with such suspicion, but arguments against it are that 
the system [UPOV 1991] is excessively monopolistic and protects the 
breeder to the disadvantage of farmers’ rights and indigenous 
knowledge.444 
In response to these issues, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now the 
African Union) published the African Model Law for the protection of the rights 
of local communities, farmers, and breeders and for the regulation of access 
to biological resources (the African Model Law on Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders), which was also discussed in § 5.3.4.2.  
5.5.4.2 Regional arrangements and a model law on the rights of 
local communities 
Many African countries are sceptical of strong IP protection, even more so 
when it involves the moral and ethical issue of patenting life forms such as 
PGRs.445 Africa inherited its IP systems from its colonial masters, which laws 
have yet to be adapted to incorporate the systems, values and needs of the 
citizens of their host countries.446 It is not surprising therefore that domestic 
and regional IP systems in Africa lag behind the developed North and even 
that of many other developing countries, bringing with it associated economic 
and development costs. The rate of patent registrations in Africa remains 
low.447  
Most English speaking African countries, excluding South Africa448  are 
members of the African Regional Industrial Property Organisation (ARIPO).449 
                                                          
444
  Steven Were Omama and Klaus von Grebmer (eds) Biotechnology, agriculture, and food security 
in Southern Africa (2005) at 177. 
445
  See in this regard the submissions by Mr Edgar Tabaro and others to the Uganda National Council 
for Science and Technology on the occasion of the ‘Proceedings: dialogue on a national policy for 
intellectual property’ (28 November 2008), Grand Imperial Hotel, Kampala. 
446
  Ibid at 7. 
447
  See in this regard chapter 2, note 215. 
448
  South Africa has however signed and implemented the Patent Co-operation Treaty, 1970, 9 ILM 
978 (1970). The Patents Act provides for international applications under the treaty.  
449
  ARIPO is intended for the ‘study and promotion of and co-operation in industrial property 
matters’, preamble to the Lusaka Agreement on the Creation of the African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organization (ARIPO), 1976, as in force from November 13, 2004 (the Lusaka 
Agreement). The objectives of ARIPO, set out in Article II of the Lusaka Agreement, include, in 
subsection (a), the promotion of ‘the harmonization and development of the industrial property 
laws, and matters related thereto, appropriate to the needs of its members and of the region as a 
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The protocol on Patent and Industrial Designs within the Framework of ARIPO 
(the Harare Protocol)450 entitles the ARIPO Office to grant patents (and 
register designs) on behalf of its member states. Patent applications are 
forwarded to member states designated by the applicant and are given a 
period of six months within which to object to the registration of the patent. A 
view has been expressed that the ARIPO office is under-resourced and its 
staff lack the requisite skills and expertise.451  
Another regional IP organisation is the African Intellectual Property 
Organisation (OAPI)452 with its members drawn predominantly from 
francophone Africa, which is empowered to grant patents on behalf of its 
members.453 The work in these offices predominantly involves the uncritical 
registration of patents of foreign applicants. There is still much to be done in 
the African context if patents are indeed to serve the public interest, as it 
should, through the stimulation of innovation and technology transfer.  
IP systems should serve the greater public interest. Evolving systems in the 
African context may therefore seek to align with principles similar to those in 
the Model Law on the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders. 
The Model Law asserts a country’s sovereign rights over its biological 
resources and defines the following related rights:454 
• Collective rights of communities to their biological resources, thus 
requiring prior informed consent and benefit sharing;  
• Farmers’ rights, including the right to save, use, exchange; and  
• Plant breeders’ rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
whole’. There are currently 16 members of ARIPO: Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
450
  Signed in 1982.  
451
  TD Burrell Burrells South African patent and design law (1999) in § 1.19. 
452
  OAPI was established in 1962 by the Libreville Agreement, 1962. The Libreville Agreement has 
subsequently been revised, most currently by the Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of 
1977, on the Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organisation, Bangui, February 24, 1999. 
453
  The members of OAPI are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Congo, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo. 
454
  S Biber-Klemm and T Cottier Rights to plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge (2005) 
at 83-4. 
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There is some debate as to whether the approach in the model law will stand 
up to international scrutiny in light of TRIPS requirements, and even the 
requirements of the more moderate UPOV system.455 On the other hand, the 
Model Law is credited with being ‘much more adapted to local circumstances 
and needs than a regime solely based on the UPOV Convention’.456  
South Africa, while it has not adopted the Model Law as such, has gone some 
way to accommodate the collective rights of communities within its 
biodiversity457 and patent458 system. Broad protection is also offered to 
industry in both patent and plant breeders’ rights systems.  
5.5.4.3 IP in South Africa: patents and PBRs 
South Africa is duty-bound to implement and enforce the IP rights prescribed 
by the TRIPS Agreement. This is achieved through the Patents Act459 and the 
Plant Breeders’ Rights Act.460 
The Patents Act provides that a patent may be granted for any new invention 
involving an inventive step and which is capable of being used or applied in 
trade, industry or agriculture.461 Notwithstanding the exclusion from 
                                                          
455
  George Wei ‘Fitting biological products within the intellectual property framework: challenges 
facing the policy makers’ in Burton Ong (ed) Intellectual property and biological resources (2004) 
at 124 (footnote 229) where he states that ‘UPOV … objects to the farmers’ right defences 
proposed by the OAU’s Model Law for protecting the rights of local communities, farmers and 
breeders and for the regulation of access to biological resources’. 
456
  Biber-Klemm and Cottier (note 454) at 84. 
457
  See the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 and the Bio-
Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations in terms of the National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act: GNR 138 of 8 February 2008 (Government Gazette No 30739). 
These provisions would be relevant in the event of a dispute involving indigenous genetic 
resources.  
458
  A declaration of origin is required by a patent applicant in respect of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge. 
459
  Act 57 of 1978.  
460
  Act 15 of 1976. 
461
  Section 25(1). In addition, ‘[a]nything which consists of- 
  (a) a discovery; 
  (b) a scientific theory; 
  (c) a mathematical method; 
  (d) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation; 
  (e) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or  
  doing business; 
  (f) a program for a computer; or 
  (g) the presentation of information, 
shall not be an invention for the purposes of this Act’ (s 25(2)). The duration of a patent is also 
limited. While not of any obvious relevance to GM cottonseed, it should also be noted, in so far as 
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patentability of ‘any variety of animal or plant or any essentially biological 
process for the production of animals or plants’462 it would appear for the 
discussion of Monsanto’s patents in chapter 3 that claims for plants which are 
the product of a process that is not essentially biological qualify for 
protection.463 For the purposes of establishing the scope of the ‘essentially 
biological process’ exclusions, the Guidelines for Examiners in the European 
Patent Office464 are likely to be persuasive.465 These guidelines indicate that: 
[t]he question whether a process is ‘essentially biological’ is one of 
degree depending on the extent to which there is technical intervention 
by man in the process; if such intervention plays a significant part in 
determining or controlling the result it is desired to achieve, the process 
would not be excluded. To take some examples, a method of crossing, 
inter-breeding, or selectively breeding, say, horses, involving merely 
selecting for breeding and bringing together those animals having 
certain characteristics would be essentially biological and therefore 
unpatentable. On the other hand, a process of treating a plant or 
animal to improve its properties or yield … would not be essentially 
biological since although a biological process is involved, the essence 
of the invention is technical; the same could apply to a method of 
treating a plant characterized by the application of a growth-stimulating 
substance or radiation. The treatment of soil by technical means to 
suppress or promote the growth of plants is also not excluded from 
patentability.466  
                                                                                                                                                                      
indigenous PGRs are concerned, that the Patents Act was amended in 2005 to require an applicant 
for a patent to furnish information relating to any role played by an indigenous biological resource, 
genetic resource or traditional knowledge or use in an invention (s 3A). 
462
  Section 25(4)(b). The section goes on to exclude from non-patentability ‘micro-biological process 
or the product of such a process.’ Microbiology is defined as ‘the study of single-celled organisms 
too small to be observed with the naked eye. Classically, this field has included the study of algae 
and protozoa.’ Williams & E Lansford Encyclopaedia of Biochemistry (1967) in Burrell (note 451) 
at § 1.26.7 footnote 310. 
463
  Although another explanation may be that the patents have simply been granted without 
examination – the South African patent office does not conduct substantive examinations of 
patents. David Kaplan ‘Intellectual property rights and innovation in South Africa: a framework’ 
in WIPO The economics of intellectual property in South Africa (2009) at 3.  
464
  Guidelines for substantive examination reproduced in chapter 61 of the European patents 
handbook by the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (2ed). Burrell (note 451) at § 1.26.7, footnote 
309.  See also Kidd and Mayet ‘Access to genetic resources in South Africa’ in Kent Nnadozie et 
al (eds) African perspectives on genetic resources: a handbook of laws, policies, and institutions 
(2003) at 240. 
465
  Article 53(a)  
466
  Burrell (note 451) at § 1.26.7. 
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Biotechnology inventions, such as disclosed in Monsanto’s patents, provided 
they meet the new, inventive and useful patentability criteria, are therefore 
likely to be patentable unless policy and law clearly indicate otherwise. TRIPS 
prescribes that process patent rights also protect the product produced using 
that process, although this could be limited by using the TRIPS exception in 
respect of plants.  
Although the opinion has been expressed that the extension of protection 
from the process to the product should not be applied in cases where the final 
product is not patentable, such as in the case of plants and animals,467 foreign 
case law (the Schmeiser case)468 decided that it did. A number of policy and 
legislative techniques that could avoid an overly broad reach of patents are 
discussed in chapter 7. For example, patent offices should only accept narrow 
claims on products and processes and a narrow approach to the doctrine of 
equivalence469 should be followed, meaning that the product should only be 
protected, and the patent infringed when there is, literally speaking an 
infringement of the patent description and claims, and not when the product or 
process is simply ‘equivalent’ to the protected product or process.470  
In addition to the availability of patent protection in respect of plant-related 
inventions that are not essentially biological, certain plant varieties471 may be 
protected in terms of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act.472 The Plant Breeders’ 
Rights Act effectively implements UPOV 1978 and provides ‘for a system 
whereunder plant breeders’ rights relating to varieties of certain kinds of plants 
                                                          
467
  Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf Intellectual property and international trade: the TRIPS 
Agreement (2008) at 241. 
468
  See § 4.5.1. 
469
  The doctrine of equivalence is ‘[a] conceptual framework to determine whether a violation exists 
when there is no literal infringement of patent claims’. Carlos Correa Integrating public health 
concerns into patent legislation in developing countries (2000) at xiii.  
470
  Integrating public health concerns into patent legislation in developing countries (note 469) at 87-
91. 
471
  The variety must be one of a plant species prescribed in the regulations to the Plant Breeders’ 
Rights Act, although it is possible to apply to have a plant added to the prescribed list. Kidd & 
Mayet ‘Access to genetic resources in South Africa in Kent Nnadozie et al (eds) African 
perspectives on genetic resources: a handbook of laws, policies, and institutions (2003) at 239. 
472
  Act 15 of 1976. Delta & Pine Land Co (which, in South Africa, is owned by Monsanto) has 
applied for and been granted statutory plant breeders’ rights for gossypium hirsutum L. (cotton) in 
respect of DeltaOPAL RR, NuOPAL RR and DP 677 BG/RR. (Notice 168, Government Gazette 
28519, 24 February 2006). 
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may be granted and registered.’473 The Act does not require the prior informed 
consent of affected communities and does not provide for material transfer or 
benefit-sharing agreements. A plant breeder’s right is granted for twenty-five 
years with respect to vines and trees and twenty years for everything else.474 
During the currency of the protection, a license is required for: 
(a)  production or reproduction (multiplication); 
(b)  conditioning for the purposes of propagation; 
(c)  sale or any other form of marketing; 
(d)  exporting; 
(e)  importing; 
(f)  stocking for any of the purposes referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e), 
of – 
(i)  propagating material of the relevant variety; or 
(ii)  harvested material, including plants, which was obtained 
through the unauthorized use of propagating material of the 
relevant variety.475 
However, where a person has procured propagating material of a protected 
variety in a legitimate matter it shall not be an infringement to resell the 
propagating material or any plant or product derived from the propagating 
material, or to use or multiply the propagating material in the development of a 
different variety.476 Neither is it an infringement to use the propagating 
material for bona fide research or private or non-commercial purposes,477 nor 
where the person who acquires the material is a farmer who uses harvested 
material obtained on land occupied by him from the propagating material for 
purposes of propagation, provided that the harvested material shall not be 
used for propagation by any person other than that farmer.478  
                                                          
473
  Preamble, Plant Breeders’ Rights Act.  
474
  Section 21. 
475
  Section 23(1). 
476
  Section 23(6)(a)-(c). 
477
  Section 23(6)(d)-(e). In addition, ss 26 and 27 of the Plant Breeders’ Act provide mechanisms and 
principles for the application for and granting of a compulsory license to deal with a protected 
plant variety where the holder of a plant breeders’ right has unreasonably refused to grant a license 
or has imposed unreasonable conditions. 
478
  Section 23(6)(f). 
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In so far as compliance with the provisions of the CBD479 regarding 
indigenous knowledge, control, and access to plant genetic resources is 
concerned, recent amendments480 to the Patents Act require: 
(3A) Every applicant who lodges an application for a patent . . . shall . . 
. lodge with the registrar a statement in the prescribed manner stating 
whether or not the invention for which protection is claimed is based on 
or derived from an indigenous biological resource, genetic resource, or 
traditional knowledge or use. 
(3B) The registrar shall call upon the applicant to furnish proof in the 
prescribed manner as to his or her title or authority to make use of the 
indigenous biological resource, genetic resource, or of the traditional 
knowledge or use if an applicant lodges a statement that acknowledges 
that the invention for which protection is claimed is based on or derived 
from an indigenous biological resource, genetic resource, or traditional 
knowledge or use.481 
The Patents Act provides482 for a patent to be revoked in the event that the 
statement lodged in this regard together with the application for the patent 
contains a false statement or representation. These amendments to the 
Patents Act should be read with the provisions for benefit sharing 
agreements483 in the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act,484 
thus meeting the requirements of the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines485 
regarding benefit-sharing schemes in relation to genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge used in patent inventions. 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
Chapter 5 explored the extent and limitations of the states’ regulatory powers 
which are derived from a plethora of rules located in international and 
                                                          
479
  See also National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
480
  Patents Amendment Act 20 of 2005 which amends the Patents Act so as to require an applicant for 
a patent to furnish information relating to any role played by an indigenous biological resource, a 
genetic resource or traditional knowledge or use in an invention. 
481
  These amendments were contained in s 2 of the Patents Amendment Act 20 of 2005. 
482
  Section 61 (1)(g). 
483
  Section 83 which should be read together with the Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing 
Regulations in terms of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act: GNR 138 of 8 
February 2008 (Government Gazette No 30739). 
484
  Act 10 of 2004. 
485
  Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization, approved in 2002 at the Sixth COP of the CBD. 
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domestic law.486 The chapter demonstrates the complexities and dislocation of 
the laws regulating PGRs making regulation difficult.487  
Two things remain in this thesis: the first is a discussion on the case study 
within the framework of sustainable development established in this chapter. 
This is undertaken in chapter 6. Finally, recommendations for reform are 
suggested in chapter 7. 
 
  
                                                          
486
  These laws originate from diverse and intertwined bodies and instruments in human rights, 
agricultural / environmental and international trade and intellectual property law. Indeed, ‘[t]he 
current legal status of plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge and its institutional 
implementation … reflects the fragmentation of the international system and the lack of coherence 
and global governance. A number of fora deal with the matter without close cooperation.’ Biber-
Klemm and Cottier (note 454) at xxvi. 
487
  See generally Michel Petit et al Why governments can’t make policy: the case of plant genetic 
resources in the international arena (2000).  
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CHAPTER 6  
FINDINGS 
 [T]he rhetoric of ‘GM technology helping the poor’ seems to serve the 
needs of the promoters of the technology, rather than the residents of 
Makhathini.1 
 
[While] [t]he direct impacts of Bt cotton on small farmers are ambiguous 
… the indirect impacts on rural poverty are overwhelmingly negative.2 
6.1 Introduction 
The thesis aims and objectives are set out in chapter 1. While the main aim of 
the thesis is to evaluate current practice, the claim is that the current practice 
(including strong IP rights) around modern biotechnology in agriculture is 
unsustainable; and that this has contributed towards the weakening of the 
agricultural sector; and that by reining in private rights, some space will be 
created for improvement in the sustainability of the agricultural sector. This 
claim is tested in chapter 6.   
Chapter 7, the final chapter, concludes the theoretical aspects of property in 
PGRs and suggests some mechanisms for reining in private rights in the 
public interest. 
6.2 Is the current practice sustainable? 
The rationale for encouraging agricultural biotechnology is to further important 
socio-economic goals.  The same is true of the underlying rationale for IP 
rights: the idea is that strong IP rights will lead to transfer of technology and to 
innovation, which are key drivers of economic growth. The aim of this section 
is to test the validity of these assumptions by considering the impact of the 
current regime against the backdrop of the case study in chapter 3. 
                                                          
1
  Harald Witt et al ‘Can the poor help GM crops? Technology, representations & cotton in the 
Makhathini Flats, South Africa’ (2006) 109 Review of African Political Economy at 497. 
2
  Aaron deGrassi ‘Genetically modified crops and sustainable poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan 
Africa: an assessment of current evidence’ (June 2003) Third World Network at 34. 
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An assessment of the impact of both agricultural biotechnology and the 
deployment of strong IP rights may be loosely grouped under the three pillars 
of sustainable development, namely economic development, social 
development and the protection of the environment.3 The interdependence 
and interrelatedness of these pillars is sometimes illustrated in a Venn 
diagram as shown in figure 8.4 Sustainable development occurs at the 
intersection of these pillars.  
 
= sustainable development 
Figure 8: The three pillars of sustainable development 
The achievement of sustainable development requires ‘the simultaneous 
attainment of three objectives: (i) environmental and natural resource 
sustainability, (ii) economic growth and (iii) social equity.’5 Although not 
without criticism, the principle of sustainable development is recognised in 
national and international law.6  
                                                          
3  Section 2(3) of NEMA provides that ‘[d]evelopment must be socially, environmentally and 
economically sustainable’. 
4
  Use of a Venn diagram to illustrate sustainable development appears to have first been used in 
1987 by Edward Barbier in his article ‘The concept of sustainable economic development’ (1987) 
14 Environmental Conservation 101-110. On sustainability generally, see Klaus Bosselmann The 
principle of sustainability: transforming law and development (2008).  
5
  FAO Report of the first session of the Working Party on Human Capacity Development in 
Fisheries, Rome, 19-22 April 2004, FIPL/R745 (En) at 17. 
6
  See § 5.4.1. Concerns have been expressed about, among other things, the consequences and the 
vagueness of the term sustainable development. See for example A Dan Tarlock ‘Ideas without 
institutions: the paradox of sustainable development’ (2001) 9 Ind J Global Legal Stud 35-49 and 
David G Victor ‘Recovering sustainable development’ (2006) 85 Foreign Affairs 91-103. 
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There are a number of (often fluid and intertwined) elements which make up 
each of these pillars. Figure 9 lists the typical elements that may be 
considered in an analysis of the sustainability of GM crops.7  
Economic 
development 
Social development Environmental 
aspects 
Technology transfer8 Harvest security Environmental safety 
Innovation Food security Agrobiodiversity 
Employment Food quality Protected or vulnerable biodiversity 
Efficiency of the 
production process Recreation Places of origin 
Productivity Human rights Quality of soil, water, air 
Profit Working environment 
Emission of hazardous 
substances (incl 
greenhouse gases) 
along the chain 
Terms of employment 
Fair trade 
Traditional practices 
Local autonomy 
Public participation 
Freedom of choice 
(labelling /co-existence) 
Freedom of research 
 
Human safety 
 
Figure 9: Elements in assessing the sustainability of GM crops 
6.2.1 An assessment of economically sustainable development criteria 
It would appear that technology transfer and innovation as a result of IP rights 
in GM cotton has not occurred in the case of Monsanto’s technology.9 The 
technology has not been licenced in South Africa, whether to other public or 
private institutions, except to Deltapine, which was subsequently bought out 
                                                          
7
  These elements are extracted mainly from two sources: the European Group on Ethics in Science 
and new Technologies to the European Commission ‘Ethics of modern developments in 
agriculture technologies Opinion No 24’ (17 December 2008) and the COGEM Report ‘Socio-
economic aspects of GMOs: building blocks for an EU sustainability assessment of genetically 
modified crops’ CGM/090929-01. 
8
  The impact of IP-protected GM crops on the diffusion of science and of freedom to research are 
important considerations in this regard. See for example Wright and Pardey ‘Changing IP regimes: 
implications for developing country agriculture’ (2006) 2 Int J Technology and Globalisation 93-
114. 
9
  Communication with the Agricultural Research Council (ARC). 
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by Monsanto.10 It is indicated that, to date, researchers have not been able to 
add value to Monsanto’s patents, although this may change as their patents 
begin to expire.11 The impact of the expiry of the remaining patents on 
research, competition and the cost of GM cotton remains to be seen and 
provides an opportunity for further research. 
There are studies that indicate that farmers who have successfully cultivated 
GM cotton over the past decade are, notwithstanding the high cost of the 
seed, better off financially than if they had cultivated conventional cotton.12 
This is as a result of higher yields, less pesticide applications and labour 
saving – all of which indicate increased efficiency of production as a result of 
the technology.  On the other hand, there are farmers who have paid the 
additional cost for GM seed, through the provision of credit, and who have, 
because of crop failures as a result of drought or floods, suffered financial 
ruin, more so than would have occurred with conventional cotton.13  
Optimism in respect of farmers who have shown an increase in profit should 
be cautious for the gains are slight. 
                                                          
10
  The ARC is only aware of one licenced producer which is Australia's Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO).  
11
  ARC Communication (note 9). 
12
  General optimism is expressed by Yousouf Ismael, Richard Bennett, and Stephen Morse ‘Can 
farmers in the developing countries benefit from modern technology? Experience from Makhathini 
Flats, Republic of South Africa’ 2001 (Vol 1 No 5) Crop Biotech Brief; Stephen Morse and 
Richard Bennett ‘Impact of Bt cotton on farmer livelihoods in South Africa’ (2008) 10 Int J 
Biotechnology 224-239; Colin Thirtle, Lindie Beyers, Yousouf Ismael and Jenifer Piesse ‘Can GM 
technologies help the poor? The impact of Bt cotton in Makhathini Flats, KwaZulu-Natal (2003) 
31 (4) World Development 717-732; M Gouse, JF Kirsten and L Jenkins ‘Bt cotton in South 
Africa: Adoption and the impact on farm incomes amongst small-scale and large-scale farmers’ 
(2003) 42(1) Agrekon 15-28; and M Gouse, C Pray and David Schimmelpfennig ‘The distribution 
of benefits from Bt cotton adoption in South Africa’ (2004) 7(4) AgBioForum 187-194. 
13
  For a more pessimistic outlook see Harald Witt, Rajeev Patel and Matthew Schnurr ‘Can the poor 
help GM crops? Technology, representation & cotton in the Makhathini Flats, South Africa’ 
(2006) 109 Review of African Political Economy 497-513; Aaron deGrassi ‘Genetically modified 
crops and sustainable poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa: an assessment of current 
evidence’ (June 2003) Third World Network; Devlin Kuyek ‘Genetically modified crops in 
African agriculture: implications for small farmers’ (August 2002) 
www.grain.org/briefings/?id=12 [Accessed 11 November 2009]; Stephen Greenberg ‘Global 
agriculture and genetically modified cotton in Africa’ (October 2004) African Centre for 
Biosafety; and Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss ‘Bt cotton in South Africa: the case of the Makhathini 
farmers’ (2005) in Seedling Barcelona, Spain: Grain. 
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To illustrate the precarious economics of small-scale cotton production, 
gross margins are frequently less than R1,000 per hectare, roughly 
equivalent to the current monthly old-age pension.14 
The AU technical task force makes that point that ‘if genetically modified crops 
are ever to be economically attractive for smallholder farmers, they have to be 
developed within Africa using constructs that include no genes patented by 
foreign companies that will charge high royalties.’15 It should be noted 
however that in order for a biotechnology patent to be enforceable in a 
particular country it must be registered in that country. Exploiting unregistered 
patents however may result in a loss of export markets. 
From an employment and creation of employment perspective, GM cotton has 
been a double-edged sword. While GM cotton eases the production process – 
it is a labour-saving device, generally freeing up the farmer up to pursue other 
interests – it has also contributed to the loss of employment for thousands of 
farm-workers.16 These workers enter a world of deeper poverty and high 
unemployment with little prospect of securing work.  
Any economic benefits derived from GM crops may also be undermined if the 
labelling of GM products is required by statute.17 Additional resources and 
capacity will be needed to meet a requirement to label, which would likely 
increase cost at all points along the production chain and will ultimately 
increase the cost to consumer. Although not legally required in the current 
South African context, there are provisions in consumer protection law for the 
labelling of GM products to be prescribed by regulation.18 Labelling may be 
                                                          
14
  Marnus Gouse, Johann F Kirsten and Wynand J van der Walt ‘Bt cotton and Bt maize: an 
evaluation of direct and indirect impact on the cotton and maize farming sectors in South Africa’ 
(2008) Study conducted for the South African Department of Agriculture. 
15
  4th Conference of the African Union Ministers of Agriculture ‘An African Position on Genetically 
Modified Organisms in Agriculture Report of the Technical task force’ (2008) at para [54]. 
16
  Cotton SA quoted in deGrassi (note 2) at 34. GM cotton is a labour-saving technology which has 
lead to major labour cuts on large commercial farms – since 1998 more than 58 000 cotton-farm 
workers have lost their jobs. A Cotton SA statistic cited in Aaron deGrassi (note 19) at 34. 
17
  See for example Harvey E Lapan and GianCarlo Moschini ‘Innovation and trade with endogenous 
market failure: the case of genetically modified products’ (2004) 86(4) Amer J Agr Econ 634-648.   
18
  See § 4.4.4. For a discussion on the implications of GMO labelling see Viljoen et al ‘Detection of 
GMO in food products in SA: implications of GMO labelling’ (2006) 5(2) African Journal of 
Biotechnology 73-82. 
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beneficial to social development (freedom of choice) but does not necessarily 
augur well for economic development. 
Overall, if there has been any economic success of GM cotton in the South 
African context it has been curtailed by the global over-production of cotton 
and the resultant falling world price for cotton, which it is said has been 
‘prompted by Developed Countries' heavy subsidies and new technologies 
such as Bt varieties – leading to deeper and wider poverty in the South 
African countryside.’19 If the profits generated by GM cotton are increasingly 
concentrated in fewer hands, then social development also is compromised. 
6.2.2 An assessment of social sustainability 
Social sustainability has been defined as ‘the just and fair distribution of food, 
work, income and housing, as well as healthcare, education and provision for 
old age.’20 Three components to social sustainability (cultural, social and 
political) have been identified.21 While the cultural element is about abstract 
values and beliefs, the social component is about social cohesion, sustainable 
livelihoods / employment and broader social security. The political component 
is about information sharing and public participation in the appropriate 
decision-making processes.22 
There are some social benefits for the individual farmer growing GM crops: 
the cultivation process is less intensive, less spraying is required thus freeing 
up the farmer for other activities, and profit margins are increased. For the 
community as a whole however the introduction of Bt cotton has had a 
negative impact on social sustainability. Thousands have lost their 
livelihoods.23  
DeGrassi highlights the importance of participation and demand-led, cost 
effective developments that are site specific and poverty focused.24  Yet it 
                                                          
19
  Aaron deGrassi ‘Genetically modified crops and sustainable poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan 
Africa: an assessment of current evidence’ (June 2003) Third World Network at 34. 
20
  COGEM Report (note 7) at 31. 
21
  Ibid. 
22
  Ibid. 
23  See note 16. 
24
  DeGrassi (note 19) at 1-3. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
249 
 
would appear that the technology has more or less been thrust upon its 
recipients, however well intended, without due process. The welfare of the 
Makhathini farmers does not appear to have been prioritized, and there seem 
to be few social benefits arising out of the use of Bt cotton.25 The impacted 
society has suffered from a lack of choice (choice of seed / alternative crop 
support), limited infrastructure and infrastructure oriented toward the 
cultivation of cotton only.26 The result is precarious livelihoods and increased 
unemployment and, in many cases, increased indebtedness. This is 
particularly striking in an area (the Makhathini flats) which is said to be one of 
the most fertile areas for agriculture in South Africa.27 From the time that the 
activities of the original occupants of the land were disturbed by the 
expansionist intentions of the colonial occupiers, until the present day, a fair 
deal for the Makhathini community has yet to be struck, and the basic rights of 
many in the community remain unfulfilled.28  
Another aspect of permitting the technology that may have a negative social 
impact is the opportunity and resource cost of having to resource and sustain 
the complex regulatory infrastructure for modern biotechnology. These costs 
should be met by application fees and should not impact negatively on other 
social expenditure, including agricultural research or, more broadly, 
expenditure on education and health or other social upliftment programs.29 
Any costs incurred by government must be outweighed by social benefit 
gains. 
Social and economic considerations should also play a part in deciding 
whether or not to permit the import of GM cotton produced by heavily 
                                                          
25
  See generally the discussion in chapter 3. 
26
  Some capabilities of the community are constrained, and rights violated, by the current practice. 
See generally Amartya Sen ‘Human rights and capabilities’ (2005) 6 J of Human Development 
151-166. 
27
  See for example M Gouse, JF Kirsten and L Jenkins ‘Bt cotton in South African: adoption and the 
impact on farm incomes amongst small-scale and large scale farmers’ (2003) 42(1) Agrekon 15-28 
28
  See generally the discussion in chapter 3. 
29
  The same should apply to the costs of an IP system. See the Report of the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights ‘Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy’ 
(September 2002) at 145-146. 
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subsidised farmers that may unfairly impact on local and regional cotton 
farmers.30  
The reduction in pesticide use is both a social and an environmental 
sustainability benefit. 
6.2.3 An assessment of environmental sustainability  
Environmental concerns will differ depending on the particular GM crop, 
whether it is being planted in a centre of origin or in an area of vulnerable 
biodiversity, and depending on agricultural circumstances, which differ from 
country to country.31  
GM cotton would appear to have some benefit for the environment as it 
reduces the need for pesticide spraying, although there is some concern 
about this benefit decreasing over time.32  
Additional concerns raised by the introduction of GM cotton in the SA context 
include the spread of antibiotic resistance to farm animals that consume seed 
cake from the GM cotton and through gene transfer to soil bacteria.33  
Sustainable development is about balancing the three pillars (social, 
economic and environment) and ensuring that there is not an overemphasis 
on any of the pillars to the detriment of any one or both of the others. In the 
case of GM cotton much of the negativity around the technology is its impact 
on social development.  
                                                          
30
  African Centre for Biosafety ‘Objection to Bayer Crop Science’s application for commodity 
clearance of Genetically Modified Cotton LL 25’ (June 2007) available online at 
www.biosafetyafrica.net [Accessed 3 November 2009]. 
31
  Kinderlerer explains that ‘[t]he size of farms in the United States means that “gene drift” is not 
likely to engender the same type of fearful reaction found in Europe where farms are small and the 
crops grown in one field may impact those in adjacent fields owned by other farmers.’ Julian 
Kinderlerer ‘Genetically modified organisms: a European scientist’s view’ (2000) 8 NYU 
Environmental Law Journal 556 at 562.  
32
  See notes 129 and 172 in chapter 3. 
33
  African Centre for Biosafety ‘Objection by the African Centre for Biosafety to: Monsanto (SA)’s 
application for the general release of the combined events of Bollgard II cotton (MON 15989) and 
Roundup Ready Flex Cotton (MON88913) and all cotton varieties derived from these events’ 
(October 2007) available online at www.biosafetyafrica.net [Accessed 3 November 2009]. See 
also chapter 3, footnote 129. 
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The following elements indicate the present unsustainability of GM cotton in 
the South African context: 
• The lack of technology transfer and innovation, resulting in high cost, 
stifled local research and lack of competition;  
• Marginal economic gains; 
• Indebtedness; 
• Loss of employment; 
• Global over-production and low world prices; 
• Exclusion from the political process; and 
• Lack of choice. 
The thesis proposition is that reining in some of the private rights in respect of 
the technology should enhance sustainability. The sections below consider 
the processes for reining in private rights and what the impact may be. 
6.3 Reining in private rights: how? 
It is inappropriate for farmers to have to pursue a rights dispute in order to 
achieve redress. Rather, government should act on its duty to protect 
fundamental rights.34 
In a rights dispute farmers could possibly challenge the terms and conditions 
in the Monsanto Agreement based on consumer protection or competition law, 
or on the basis of the right not to be subjected to unconscionable terms. 
Monsanto would assert its intellectual property rights and the pacta sunt 
servanda principle. Most likely, an adjudicator’s decision in such a dispute 
would pivot, not on a (duty to protect) fundamental rights discourse, but on the 
provisions of consumer protection law, competition law, and the common law 
principles of contract, which together prohibit unconscionable conduct, 
including prices and terms and conditions that are unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust.35 An adjudicator would develop (if it is necessary) the common law or 
interpret statute in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights. Although 
                                                          
34
  See § 5.3. 
35
  See the discussion in chapter 4. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
Ca
pe
 T
wn
 
252 
 
Monsanto does not carry the burden of realising others’ socio-economic 
rights, the state may limit Monsanto’s rights to the extent that these might 
frustrate the achievement of social justice.   
It is undesirable that relief to the farming community should have to come 
from litigation which the community is required to institute.  Furthermore, an 
adjudicator would be limited in the extent to which he or she can provide relief. 
Litigation on the Monsanto Agreement would not assist the broader 
community impacted by the introduction of Bt cotton. Legal redress should 
rather take place through law and policy in which the state makes every effort 
to comply with its duty to protect the rights of the communities.  
The State’s ‘duty to protect’ approach provides a direct human rights 
perspective on the relationships that are formed around GM cotton. The state 
has a duty to make progress toward the achievement of socio-economic 
rights, including the achievement of sustainable development in agriculture, 
and to protect the fundamental rights to dignity, equality and life of its 
people.36 Thus, in the event that proprietary rights are used in a manner that 
infringes these fundament rights, the state has a duty to intervene, and its 
failure to do so is justiciable.   
The impact of reining in private rights is considered in the section below.  
6.4 Reining in private rights: its impact 
There are a number of mechanisms (in environmental, agricultural, biosafety, 
competition, consumer protection, and IP law) through which proprietary rights 
in PGRs may be restricted.37 The circumstances which prevail in a particular 
case would most likely dictate which of these mechanisms should be invoked 
in order to rein in these rights. Consider for example the following: 
1. Scenario 1: If the deployment of GM cotton has the potential to meet 
the criteria for sustainability, except that the price of the technology and 
the seed prevents this. In this case, competition and consumer 
                                                          
36
  See § 5.3. 
37
  These mechanisms are explored more fully in chapters 5 and 7. 
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protection law, or, the regulation of the marketing of agricultural 
products, might be used to control excessive pricing and unfair 
licencing conditions. Excessive prices and unfair licencing conditions 
may possibly also have been avoided upfront through a patent system 
with stricter criteria for patenting.  
2. Scenario 2: If the deployment of GM cotton does not have the potential 
to lead to sustainable development. Biosafety law might then be used 
to restrict the deployment of the technology. If its unsustainability is 
only in respect of small-scale farmers, such as those located in the 
Makhathini Flats, conditions on the grant of a permit or possible 
measures in terms of the marketing of agricultural products legislation 
might provide a solution. Good agricultural policy may also provide 
farmers with viable alternatives to cotton.  
Excessive pricing and the frustration of competition may constitute grounds for 
a remedy in consumer protection and/or competition law, although this would 
require the farmer or the cotton industry to incur the cost of taking action. IP 
policy and law should ensure that research and innovation are not unduly 
stifled. 
If the cost of cottonseed was reduced, farmers’ profit margins would increase 
and their indebtedness would decrease or may not be incurred in the first 
place. However in the current global market it is unlikely that that any real 
prospect of upliftment and sustainability would be in store for small-scale 
farmers, and it would also not assist farm workers who have lost their 
employment as a result of the introduction of the labour-saving technology. In 
order to address these issues communities need to be engaged and bold 
policy initiatives need to be pursued.  
The remaining two patents over Monsanto’s technology will expire during 
2010 and it remains to be seen whether the exhaustion of these rights will 
improve the sustainability ratings of GM cotton. If the current technology is 
simply replaced by similar technology, also protected by strong IP rights, then 
the unsustainability cycle will continue. Holders of IP rights such as Monsanto 
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wield great power and lobbying influence made all the more possible by their 
monopolistic gains. Industry has a power base from which to launch legal 
action in the event of a deprivation of their perceived property entitlements, 
which makes bold policy interventions all the more difficult and all the more 
necessary. Reining in these rights (using the mechanisms described in the 
next chapter) has the potential to open up the space for communities and 
governments to develop more appropriate and sustainable responses to their 
agricultural needs. It might even be the case that GM cotton should be part of 
the agricultural plan; but the decision to include it should only be taken if all 
the criteria for sustainability have been considered and are satisfied.  
6.5 Concluding remarks 
The task of establishing and assessing the impact of private rights in PGRs is 
complex and should not be left to scientists and economists38 alone. The 
Constitution requires redress in respect of marginalized communities which 
cannot be measured in simple terms of scientific efficiency or individual farmer 
output and economic growth. The case of the Makhathini community 
illustrates this.39 
The state’s duty to protect fundamental rights extends to the livelihoods and 
the dignity of vulnerable communities. The state’s duties in respect of the 
private rights of corporate entities such as Monsanto are less onerous; only 
certain core aspects of IP rights are protected in international law and 
provision is made for the lawful deprivation of property rights in both 
international and domestic law. South Africa’s international commitments 
leave some room for reining in private rights, as the next chapter explains.  
                                                          
38
  Economists themselves, in the South African context, show little interest in researching the 
economic impact of intellectual property. David Kaplan ‘Intellectual property rights and 
innovation in South Africa: a framework’ in WIPO The economics of intellectual property in South 
Africa (2009) at 15.  
39
  Addressing the needs of the Makhathini community requires a strengthening of the partnership 
between the community and government. ‘[P]ublic representatives [must] use their positions and 
power to defend and represent the interests of the poor, not the interests of corporations which 
spend millions lobbying them’. ‘Seeds of the future’ Mail&Guardian January 23 to 29, 2009 at 9. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND THESIS CONCLUSION 
[O]ur people … must regain confidence in their genius and their 
capacity to face obstacles and be involved in the building of the new 
Africa…1 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 proposed the reining in of private rights in PGRs in order to support 
sustainable development. The aim of this final chapter is to convey some 
theoretical and practical tools for limiting such rights and to comment on how 
these might apply to PGRs. The same regulatory regime complex that 
enables these private rights also provides for the limitation thereof.2 
The first part of the chapter focuses on theoretical tools including the impact of 
the Constitution, the ideas of contemporary theorists, and the development of 
the common law. The second part of the chapter considers practical 
mechanisms to rein in private rights within the existing regime complex. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are made. 
7.2 Theoretical tools for limiting private rights 
7.2.1 The Constitution and its impact on legal theory and practice 
The Constitution upholds the principles of dignity, substantive equality,3 and 
ultimately the pursuit of social justice. Its enactment ushered in a new legal 
                                                          
1
  NEPAD Framework Document, October 2001. 
2
  This is a pragmatic approach, a way of dealing with the inequalities in the global trade regime. 
Stiglitz gives the example of Chile, which has fared better than many of its regionally neighbours 
by ‘not simply succumb[ing] to … the dictates of the Washington consensus willy-nilly. … [I]t 
was selective, adding and subtracting to the standard recipes in ways that allowed it to shape 
globalization for its purposes.’ Stiglitz ‘Development policies in a world of globalization’ (2002) 
Paper presented at the seminar ‘New international trends for economic development’ on the 
occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank. 
3
  See ss 9 and 10 in annexure A. Section 9, the equality clause provides for ‘legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons … disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’ and 
thus embraces a substantive as opposed to a formal, approach to equality. ‘A formal approach to 
equality assumes that inequality is aberrant and that it can be eradicated simply by treating all 
individuals in exactly the same way. A substantive approach to equality, on the other hand, does 
not presuppose a just social order. It accepts that past patterns of discrimination have left their 
scars upon the present. Treating all persons in a formally equal way now is not going to change the 
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order, and at the same time signalled important changes of an economic 
nature.4 The property clause5 in the Constitution is more than a mere 
codification of the traditional private law rules. 
The spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights prioritise socio-political and 
economic transformation. Klare explains, ‘[u]nlike classical liberal bills of 
rights, whose chief purpose was to secure individual liberty and property from 
imposition by government, the South African Constitution embodies the idea 
that the power of the community can (and must) be deployed to achieve goals 
consistent with freedom, that collective power can be tapped to create social 
circumstances that will nurture and encourage people’s capacity for self-
determination’.6  
Although the old legal order was not entirely ousted (this was mooted),7 its 
retention may frustrate transformation unless it is able to prioritise matters of 
public interest.8 This requires a ‘softening of the “bright-line” distinctions 
between law and politics and between the professional and the strategic.’9 
Commentators suggest that progress in this regard will be slow unless there is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
patterns of the past, for that inequality needs to be redressed and not simply removed. This means 
that those who were deprived of resources in the past are entitled to an “unequal” share of 
resources at present’. J Kentridge ‘Equality’ in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(1996) at para 14.2. 
4
  See in this regard governments’ broad strategies for reform packaged initially as the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994 (the RDP) which links reconstruction and 
development and highlights the importance of sustainable growth and a fair distribution of growth 
(para 1.3.6).  The RDP requires government to ensure decent quality of life through the equitable 
access to natural resources and participatory decision-making in this regard (at para 2.10.2). 
Subsequent government policy is contained in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) policy and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA).  
5
  Section 25 of the Constitution. See annexure A. 
6
  Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ 1998 SAJHR 146 at 153. 
7
  See the discussion in Van der Walt ‘Tradition on trial: a critical analysis of the civil-law tradition 
in South African property law’ 1995 SAJHR 169-206. 
8
  Van der Walt explains that ‘what is generally seen as the greatest strength of the civil-law 
tradition, namely its theoretical and methodological pretensions to scientific neutrality and 
objectivity, presents a danger to the new legal order. The complacent kind of essentialist, 
conceptualist thinking so familiar to civil law might make transformation more difficult by hiding 
from view the real struggles about value choices and power, and it might fail to address the kind of 
discussions, choices and changes that are needed if the law of property is to take part in and 
promote the transformation of society.’ Van der Walt ‘Tradition on trial: a critical analysis of the 
civil-law tradition in South African property law’ 1995 SAJHR 169 at 203. 
9
  Klare (note 6) at 159 (footnotes omitted). Klare references the work of Dworkin which, Klare says, 
‘goes farthest along the path of blurring the law/politics distinction’ and sketches a critical theory 
of adjudication drawn from, inter alia, Duncan Kennedy’s Critique of adjudication (1997). 
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deliberative legislative intervention.10 Such interventions should be 
underpinned by a theoretical position on property.  
7.2.2 Ideas in customary and contemporary property theory 
The developing property concept in South Africa is increasingly mindful of the 
core values underlying the African philosophy of Ubuntu.  
[A]dherance to the value of ubuntu demands that we deal with 
individuals in the context of their historical and current disadvantage 
and that equality issues must address the actual conditions of human 
life …11 
Ubuntu recognises our interdependence and our responsibility toward others. 
A similar concern for the public is evident in the approaches to property of a 
number of contemporary authors. Examples include Nedelsky’s dialogue of 
democratic accountability, Michelman’s distributory rather than possessory 
conception of property, and Underkuffler’s idea of common and operative 
conceptions of property, which were discussed in chapter 2.  
Michelman urges that we pay more attention to the distributory side of 
property which has receded in the dominant way of thinking about property. 
Nedelsky highlights the importance of public participation and indicates that 
property should be accountable to equality, dignity and autonomy and not the 
reverse which occurs in a liberal framework. Liberal theory focuses on rights 
(‘rights as trumps’) and individual protection of property and views the 
collective as a threat to the individual. Nedelsky’s framework deals with this by 
focusing on the conceptualisation of rights as relationships.  
[In liberalism] the idea is that rights are barriers that protect the 
individual from intrusion by other individuals or by the state. Rights 
                                                          
10
  The reason is this: ‘the court is aware of the possibility that it may have to decide some [property 
rights] cases with reference to social, economic and political considerations that are well outside 
the traditional framework of private law property, but … it is conservative in adopting this wider 
constitutional responsibility unless the reform law in question clearly and unambiguously instructs 
it to do so and explicates the considerations required for such a policy-conscious decision’. A J van 
der Walt ‘Ownership and eviction: constitutional rights in private law’ (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law 
Review 32 at 48. See also Karl E Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 
14 SAJHR 146-188 where he talks about the intractability of legal culture. 
11
  Narnia Bohler-Muller ‘Beyond legal metanarratives: the interrelationship between storytelling, 
ubuntu and care’ (2007) 1 Stell LR 133 at 147. 
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define boundaries others cannot cross and it is those boundaries, 
enforced by the law, that ensure individual freedom and autonomy. … 
But my argument is that this is a deeply misguided view of autonomy. 
What makes autonomy possible is not separation, but relationship.12 
This echoes the notion in Ubuntu that a person is a person through other 
persons.13 Our property and our autonomy cannot be conceptualised and 
validated separate from the effect which our property and our autonomy may 
have on others. It is Laura Underkuffler who provides us with a framework to 
develop an approach to predict when individual rights may be required to give 
way.  
Underkuffler identifies a common and an operative conception of property as 
a mechanism for predicting or explaining the outcome of property-related 
disputes between a proprietor and the public interest.14 The common 
conception of property represents the typical understanding of property as 
protection for the individual from the public sphere. Under the common 
conception of property, the proprietor’s rights may only be overridden, without 
legal consequence, by a public interest of a particularly compelling health and 
safety nature.15 Under the operative conception of property, the proprietor’s 
property rights are less stringently protected: property in this case ‘simply 
describes, or mediates, the tensions between individual interests and 
collective goals, which are resolved and re-resolved as circumstances 
warrant.’16  
                                                          
12
  Jennifer Nedelsky ‘Should property be constitutionalized? A relational and comparative approach’ 
in GE van Maanen and AJ van der Walt (eds) Property on the threshold of the 21st century (1996) 
417-432.  
13
  For Nedelsky, ‘[t]he constitutional protection of autonomy is no longer an effort to carve out a 
sphere into which the collective cannot intrude, but a means of structuring the relations between 
individuals and the sources of collective power so that autonomy is fostered rather than 
undermined.’ (At 430).  
14
  Underkuffler makes the important point that ‘[a]lthough public-interest demands are typically 
framed by courts in very general terms, we find that they involve, in operation, the same content-
specificity and reason-dependency that rights involve.’ Laura S Underkuffler The idea of property: 
its meaning and power (2003) at 73. In the South African Constitution, public interest includes 
‘reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources’ (s 25 (4)(a)).  
15
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 53. 
16
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 54. 
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If the common conception of property is used, individual interests are 
afforded strict protection. If the operative conception is used, individual 
interests are – as a practical matter – afforded none.17 
Under the common conception, claimed property rights have presumptive 
(normative) power over competing public interest and under the operative 
conception, there is no such presumptive power and the claimed property 
right and public interest are of presumptively equal power.18 In Underkuffler’s 
model, invoking the operative conception of property is justified when the ‘core 
values’ underlying the individual right and the public interests are the same in 
kind. Where the underlying values are different, the individual right is 
presumed to be normatively superior.19  
Underkuffler illustrates this model more generally (the model can be applied to 
all rights/public interest disputes) with reference to the right to free speech. 
When a government seeks, on the grounds of national security, to restrain the 
media’s right to publish a story (free speech), the underlying values are 
different (free speech/national security) therefore the media’s right to publish 
the story has presumptive power. Where the claimed right to publish 
pornography or hate speech (free speech) is juxtaposed against the ‘silencing’ 
(an aspect of free speech)20 of particular communities within society in the 
event of publication, the core values are the same and the individual’s right to 
publish does not have presumptive power.21  
In so far as the presumptive power of property rights is concerned, 
Underkuffler illustrates this using title in land (core values may include: to 
encourage individual investment, reward labour, community stability, etc) 
which is sought to be restricted by the construction of a public highway 
(values may include efficient movement of goods and services, prevention of 
                                                          
17
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 54. 
18
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 86. 
19
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 74. 
20
  The argument is that women are degraded and silenced by the publication of pornography. 
Underkuffler (note 14) at 78.  
21
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 77-8. 
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accidents, reduction in pollution, etc). The underlying values differ and the 
claimed right will have presumptive power. 22  
In the case of property rights in PGRs the underlying values of both industry 
and farmers / breeders appear to be the same: the encouragement of 
innovation, investment and labour. Arguably therefore industry should not 
have presumptive power. Underkuffler however cautions against abstracting 
the underlying values to the extent that they are both the same – for example, 
both the land title and the public highway, in the example above, may share 
‘the promotion of economic interests’ as an underlying value. Rather, the most 
immediate core values must be considered.23  
Underkuffler’s model presents an opportunity to, among other things, develop 
new ways of thinking about the values underlying law and policy choices. This 
is an area for further research.  
Contemporary authors on IP and development make the point that the IP 
paradigm, in order to be responsive to development, must shift beyond 
utilitarianism by the introduction of a normative principle. It is argued that 
‘intellectual property should include a substantive equality principle, 
measuring its welfare-generating outcomes not only by economic growth but 
also by distributional effects.’24 Others focus on a human rights approach as a 
means to contain the boundaries of IP.25 These constraints may be more 
effective if the terminology used was more articulate. Private rights in this 
case (IP rights and rights in PGRs) are privileges – limited use-rights at best – 
that are only sometimes tolerated over collective and publicly held resources 
for policy reasons. The inarticulate use of terminology (found also in this 
thesis) should be recognised. 
                                                          
22
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 87-8. 
23
  Underkuffler (note 14) at 88. 
24
  Margaret Chon ‘Intellectual property and the development divide’ (2006) 27 Cardozo LR 2821 at 
2823.  
25
  See for Peter K Yu ‘Reconceptualizing intellectual property interests in a human rights framework’ 
2007 UC Davies L Rev 1039-1150 and Micheal A Carrier ‘Cabining intellectual property through a 
property paradigm’ (2004) 54 Duke L J 52-144. On the convergence and synergy between the 
rights-based and development-based approaches, see Amartya Sen ‘Human rights and capabilities’ 
(2005) 6 J of Human Development 151-166 and Henry Steiner ‘Social rights and economic 
development: converging discourses?’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 25-42.  
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A dysfunctional IP system can result in the locking up of resources and 
knowledge that should otherwise be public goods. Gray, in his seminal 
treatment of excludability, provides a mechanism for determining when that 
has occurred. 
7.2.3 Gray’s notion of excludability and PGRs 
For Gray private property is that which is capable of physical, legal and moral 
excludability and which has so been excluded. Resources that are not 
capable of exclusion or which have not been legally excluded are outside the 
field of private property and remain in the commons.26  
The physical excludability of patented PGRs, especially their progency, is 
questionable. ‘[P]lants and animals that have had their genes molecularly 
engineered … are impulsively self-propagating.’27 This makes it nearly 
impossible to find a balance between private and public interest.28  
Resources that have not been excluded remain in the commons aligning with 
the ancient law principle that some things should not be commodified.29  
7.2.4 Building on the common law  
The principle that some resources fall outside of commerce, coupled with the 
recognition of collective indigenous property rights30 provides a platform for an 
inclusive approach to property and rights in resources which values the 
interests of the public, the private and the collective. This public-centred 
                                                          
26
  Kevin Gray ‘Property in thin air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 269. 
27
  Jeremy de Beer ‘Rights and responsibilities of biotech patent owners’ (2007) 40 UBCL Rev 343 at 
343. Moral, ethical and religious objections have been raised against the patenting of higher life 
forms. On the ethical concerns of patenting in the field of agricultural biotechnology see Christoph 
Baumgartner ‘Exclusion by inclusion? On difficulties with regard to an effective ethical 
assessment of patenting in the field of agricultural bio-technology’ (2006) 19 Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 521-539. 
28
  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 1999 quoted in Steven Were Omamo and Klaus von 
Grebmer Biotechnology, agriculture and food security in southern Africa (2005) at 89-90. 
29
  Honoré ‘Ownership’ in Guest et al Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) at 109 comments that 
‘[t]he notion of things “outside commerce”, not subject to private ownership but to special 
regulation by the state or public authorities, is an ancient one and has retained its importance in 
modern continental law.’ (footnotes omitted). 
30
  See § 2.5.3 and the discussion on Alexkor Ltd and Another v The Richtersveld Community and 
Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) and Prinsloo and Another v Ndebele-Ndzundza Community and 
Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA). 
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notion of property and resources aligns with the recognition of state 
sovereignty over PGRs.31 The state holds these resources in a fiduciary and 
not a proprietary sense.32  
This approach is endorsed in South Africa where the notion of public trust is 
statutorily employed in respect of water,33 minerals,34 and the environment.35 
Borrowing from the National Water Act, the state has a duty to ensure that 
resources are ‘protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and 
controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons 
and in accordance with its constitutional mandate.’36   
While open to criticism, in particular for its vagueness, the public trust doctrine 
is useful in reconciling sovereignty and public and common property. The 
public trust doctrine, together with the principle of sustainable development, 
establish a framework for managing development and natural resources.37 
With this in mind, chapter 2 tentatively suggests a public-centred notion of 
private and public property in which trespass rules are evaluated with 
reference to their effect on the rights of others and on the pool of limited public 
resources. Private ‘rights’ in PGRs should only be tolerated if the enclosure it 
creates is socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable.  
The trend of awarding excessive rights in what might otherwise be considered 
public goods for the core reason of stimulating economic growth deprives the 
social and the environment of an opportunity to determine a different 
                                                          
31
  Section 2(4)(o) of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. In international law 
provisions see for example Article 15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity 31 ILM 818 
(1992).   
32
  Peter H Sand ‘Sovereignty bounded: public trusteeship for common pool resources?’ (2004) 4.1 
Global Environmental Politics at 48. 
33
  See s 3 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998.  
34
  See the preamble to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002. 
35
  See s 2(4)(o) of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.  
36
  Section 3(1). 
37
  Notwithstanding criticism of the doctrine (see chapter 6, note 6), sustainable development has been 
put to good effect in South Africa. See for example the decisions in Director: Mineral 
Development Gauteng Region and Another v Save the Vaal Environment and Others 1999 (2) SA 
709 (SCA); BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and 
Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W); Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-
General: Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, 
Mpumalanga Province and Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC); and MEC, Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and Environment and Another v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd 2008 (2) SA 319 (CC),  
These decisions are discussed in §  5.4.1. 
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developmental path. Changes at an institutional, policy, and legal level may 
open up the space in which these competing interests may be mediated. 
7.3 Practical tools for limited private rights 
The complex regulatory regime that applies to PGRs gives rise to institutional 
challenges. The foremost challenge is the lack of institutional co-ordination. 
Chapter 1 discussed the mandate of numerous government departments in 
respect of PGRs and indicated the lack of an overarching institutional body to 
overcome some of the institutional challenges.38 Whereas IP is about 
economic policy, its impact is felt in many sectors, including health, 
agriculture, and the environment (biodiversity). It impacts on researchers’ 
freedoms and on the diffusion of scientific knowledge.   
7.3.1 An overarching inclusive authority and framework for PGRs  
The principle of co-operative governance requires the co-ordination of the 
actions and legislation of the various spheres of government.39 In order to 
achieve this it is suggested that changes to existing institutional structures be 
effected so that one institution has a broad mandate on policy issues around 
natural resources and another has a mandate to study and advise on  
sustainable development and the IP system.  
The idea of a Common Heritage Authority in international law has been 
mooted,40 and, in South Africa, a National Heritage Council41 as well as a 
                                                          
38
  Although many institutional structures are created (such as the Conservation Advisory Board, the 
Executive Council of GMOs, the National Environmental Advisory Forum, the Committee for 
Environmental Coordination which are discussed in § 1.2.2)  these are low-level, insular and 
insufficiently representative bodies ill-equipped to deal with the broader ramifications of IP, 
agricultural biotechnology and social and economic policy.   
39
  Section 41(h)(iv) of Chapter 3 (co-operative governance) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996.  In addition to these constitutional provisions, the legislative framework for 
co-operative governance includes the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 and 
Chapter 3 of NEMA. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 provides for the 
establishment of intergovernmental forums. 
40
  See Craig Forrest ‘Cultural heritage as the common heritage of humankind: a critical re-
evaluation’ (2007) XL CILSA 124 at 151. Even in the unlikely event that a ‘Common Heritage 
Authority’ is established in international law, it is unlikely that PGRs would fall within its 
authority.  
41
  The Council, a statutory body, is established by the National Heritage Council Act 11 of 1999. 
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South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) and a SAHRA Council42 
have been established to develop, promote and protect national heritage for 
present and future generations.43 In their current form, none of these 
institutions have a mandate to deal with ownership issues in natural 
resources, whether PGRs, land, minerals, or water or other such natural 
resources.44 The existing focus is on other objects of heritage and issues of 
living heritage such as indigenous knowledge systems and cultural tradition. 
Often these issues of living heritage cannot be separated from land or PGRs, 
indicating that there may be merit in an argument for expanding the mandate 
of the National Heritage Council (possibly to a National Heritage and Natural 
Resources Council), or in forming a similar Council to deal specifically with 
natural resources, and ensuring that its members are representative of all 
stakeholders. 
An existing high-level overarching organisation dealing with social and 
economic policy that accommodates representation and engagement of many 
stakeholders is the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC).45 In broad overview,46 NEDLAC is a social dialogue forum where 
government comes together with business, labour and community groupings 
that have organised on a national level to discuss and seek consensus on 
issues of social and economic policy. This makes NEDLAC an attractive 
forum to reflect on IP. The main government department at NEDLAC is the 
Department of Labour, but Trade and Industry, Finance and Public Works are 
also centrally involved while other departments attend from time to time 
should a matter within their sphere of governance arise. NEDLAC conducts its 
work through four chambers,47 each focused on a different aspect of social 
and economic policy. Sub-committees and task groups of the Chambers deal 
                                                          
42
  The legislative framework for the SAHRA and the SAHRA Council is the National Heritage 
Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
43
  Section 4(a). 
44
  See in this regard the scope of both the National Heritage Council Act 11 of 1999 and the National 
Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
45
  NEDLAC is a statutory body established by the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council Act 35 of 1994 (the NEDLAC Act).  See Roux’s civil society model discussed in § 2.4.2, 
in particular see chapter 2, note 123.  
46
  For a detailed account of NEDLAC, see www.nedlac.org.za [Accessed 14 July 2009].  
47
  These are the Labour Market Chamber, the Trade and Industry Chamber, the Development 
Chamber and the Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber. 
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with specific issues.48 An administrative infrastructure and systems of 
accountability are in place. NEDLAC has an important role to play in the 
formulation of policy and law, for example the NEDLAC Act stipulates that 
NEDLAC shall ‘consider all proposed labour legislation relating to labour-
market policy before it is introduced in Parliament’.49 All significant changes to 
social and economic policy must come before NEDLAC before being 
implemented or introduced to Parliament.50 One possibility is to bring the 
issues raised in this thesis squarely within the purview of a NEDLAC forum at 
which all stakeholders,51 including the proposed National Heritage and Natural 
Resources Council, are represented. This would require some engineering of 
NEDLACs enabling framework to ensure the issues are properly aired and 
that all interested stakeholders are properly represented.  
Another possibility is to establish a new Council although this seems 
unwarranted given the existing structures already in place. The detail and 
complexities of such a body would be a matter requiring some thought. Any 
overarching body that was given the mandate to mediate between the 
commercial interests of industry and the public interest (whether it be food 
security, sustainable livelihoods or the right to cultural and traditional 
practices) would be required to provide a platform for public participation. 
7.3.2 Ensuring public participation 
Public participation is ‘[t]he participation of all residents of a country, including 
citizens and non-citizens, in the decision-making process of all three spheres 
of government’.52 Public participation is at the heart of a democracy and 
should be the jewel of the development of law and policy in South Africa.53 
                                                          
48
  www.nedlac.org.za [Accessed 14 July 2009].  
49
  Section 5(1)(c) of the NEDLAC Act. 
50
  Section 5(1)(d) of the NEDLAC Act. 
51
  This would include for example the organised farming community (such as the National African 
Farmers Union of South Africa (NAFU) and Agri SA) and civil society organisations concerned 
with agriculture. All sectors concerned about the impact of IP should be represented. Additional 
stakeholders include those listed in note 38. 
52
  National Policy Framework for Public Participation (2007) at 5.  See generally Linda Nyati ‘Public 
participation: what has the Constitutional Court given the public? (2008) 12 Law Democracy and 
Development 102-110.  
53
  A policy framework for public participation in the South African context is contained in the 
National Policy Framework (note 53).  
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The idea of a participatory democracy was explored by the Constitutional 
court in the Doctors for Life54 case, where the majority decision was of the 
view that the: 
constitutional provisions … require national and provincial legislatures 
to facilitate public involvement in their processes. Through these 
provisions, the people of South Africa reserved for themselves part of 
the sovereign legislative authority that they otherwise delegated to the 
representative bodies they created.55 
The court acknowledges that the extent (and model)56 of public participation in 
any given circumstance will depend on what is a reasonable opportunity in 
that instance.57 The benefits of public participation, summarised from 
empirical experience globally, suggests that improving public participation in 
government improves governance through: increased levels of information in 
communities, better needs identification for communities, improved service 
delivery, community empowerment, greater accountability, better wealth 
distribution, greater community solidarity, and greater tolerance of diversity.58  
Achieving public participation should theoretically come naturally. As Sachs J 
in the Doctors for Life case points out, ‘[w]e have developed a rich culture of 
imbizo, lekgotla, bosberaad, and indaba. Hardly a day goes by without the 
holding of consultations and public participation involving all “stakeholders”, 
“role-players” and “interested parties”, whether in the public sector or the 
private sphere. The principle of consultation and involvement has become a 
distinctive part of our national ethos.’59 
Communities need to be informed about developments and have the space to 
debate these issues. In addition, ‘the public’s awareness of the reasons 
                                                          
54
  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 
(CC). 
55
  At para [110]. 
56
  See National Policy Framework (note 53) at 16. 
57
  In the Doctors for Life case the court maintained that the failure of most of the provinces to hold 
public hearings around the Traditional Health Practitioners Act and the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Amendment Act, which had generated much public interest, was unreasonable and thus 
the Acts were declared invalid for a period of 18 months during which time the appropriate 
hearings were to be held. 
58
  National Policy Framework (note 53) at 17.  
59
  At para [227]. 
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underlying intellectual property rules needs to be developed more effectively, 
so that the basis for a positive moral climate can be created.’60 The challenge 
(which academics, too, should be rising to meet) is such that not even 
government officials are fully appraised of these issues.61 Although 
government acknowledges that there is a ‘broad spectrum of biotechnologies 
… which … the public remains unaware or uninformed about,’62 this appears 
to be true also of their officials. Public interest may be better infused and 
better protected within the current regulatory regime through some of the 
measures discussed below. 
7.3.3 Practical measures in international and regional fora 
Existing development and development economics studies and ongoing 
research should inform domestic policy and the state’s position in trade 
negotiations.63 There should be ongoing engagement on, and resistance to, 
further harmonisation, or further narrowing of flexibilities, of IP laws.64 Further 
concessions, such as Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public 
                                                          
60
  Tom R Tyler ‘Compliance with intellectual property laws: a psychological perspective’ (1997) 29 
New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 219-235 at 229 cited by Christopher 
May and Susan K Sell Intellectual property rights: a critical history (2006) at 19. 
61
  Munyaradzi Saruchera (from Biowatch) explains: ‘[m]y understanding has been there’s no 
capacity [among agriculture officials] to engage … . I met two senior agronomists in the Eastern 
Cape at the provincial department of agriculture in East London. They didn’t know what a GMO 
is.’ The article goes on to indicate that ‘[a]t the time of going to press, comment from the national 
department of agriculture was unclear as to whether the officials that assist small-scale farmers are 
properly briefed on GMOs.’ ‘Seeds of the future’ Mail&Guardian, January 23 to 29 2009 at 9.  
62
  Draft Discussion Document on Agricultural Biotechnology 2004, Government Gazette No 27936, 
Notice 1591 of 2005 (August 2004) at 38. 
63
  See for example Joseph E Stiglitz ‘Towards a pro-development and balanced intellectual property 
regime’ (2004) Keynote address at the Ministerial Conference on Intellectual Property for Least 
Developed Countries, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Seoul, October 25, 2004 
and C Fink and K Maskus (eds) Intellectual property and development: lessons from recent 
economic research (2005).  See also Schneider, Patricia Higino ‘International trade, economic 
growth and intellectual property rights: a panel data study of developed and developing countries’ 
(2005) 78 J of Development Economics 529-547, which suggests that IPRs have a stronger impact 
on domestic innovation for developed countries and may in fact impact negatively on innovation in 
developing countries. 
64
  Such as the efforts of WIPO to further harmonise patent law through the proposed Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty.  For a comprehensive overview of the reasons why further international 
harmonisation is inadvisable, particularly for developing countries, see Carlos Correa 
‘Internationalization of the patent system and new technologies’ (2002) 20 Wis Intl LJ 523-550. 
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health,65 should be sought, existing flexibilities should be utilised and the case 
should be made for greater flexibility.66  
7.3.3.1 TRIPS flexibilities and further lobbying  
Article 8(1) of TRIPS allows member states to adopt measures in their IPR 
regimes that are necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the TRIPS provisions.67 This public interest principle ‘offers a 
considerable degree of legislative flexibility to Member States, on the basis of 
socio-economic … considerations’.68 Agriculture, in most African countries, is 
a sector of vital socio-economic importance, as chapter 2 indicates. The 
sustainable livelihood of communities engaged in small-scale agriculture is a 
matter of public interest and Member States should make creative use of 
these flexibilities to promote the public interest. If broader / cheaper access to 
the seed is required, or if access to the seed should be restricted, or if the 
‘licencing’ terms and conditions should be prescribed, provided such 
measures have a socio-economic public interest component, they are 
defensible. 
                                                          
65
  Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, adopted on 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. 
66
  One example of greater flexibility being suggested is permitting a shorter duration for plant 
patents:  
‘One way to address and limit the dominance of the western seed corporations is to reduce the 
length of time patents extend protection to plant varieties. This has the advantage of releasing 
bio-engineered seeds and hybrids to farmers far earlier than under the normal patent structure, 
making plant genetic information more readily available to the public and to other plant 
breeders, and perhaps beneficially influencing genetic diversity.’  
Ewens, Lara E ‘Seed wars: biotechnology, intellectual property and the quest for high yield seeds’ 
(1999) 23 Boston College Intl and Comparative Law Review 285-310 at 308. The optimum length 
of a patent is the subject of much debate. 
67
  The ‘consistency’ proviso is perhaps a little less daunting if recourse is had to the provisions of the 
TRIPS preamble and Article 7 on technology transfer. The preamble indicates that members 
recognise ‘the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of 
intellectual property, including the developmental and technological objectives.’ Article 7 
indicates that ‘[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to 
the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.’ 
68
  Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A Yusuf Intellectual property and international trade: the TRIPS 
Agreement (2008) at 14. 
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In addition, Article 8(2) provides that ‘appropriate measures … [consistent with 
TRIPS]69 … may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights 
by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology.’ Read together with 
Article 4070 of TRIPS, ‘these two provisions appear to provide adequate 
leeway to national authorities to adopt a broad legislative framework for the 
control of abuses or anti-competitive practices which may arise from the 
exercise of intellectual property rights.’71 
TRIPS does not require the patenting of higher life forms, although, if not 
protectable by patents, a sui generis system for the protection of plant 
varieties must be provided.72 This gives scope for the development of a sui 
generis system for the protection of plant related innovations more 
accommodating than the patent system of the rights of farmers, breeders and 
researchers. Maximum flexibility should be sought in respect of agriculture 
(and other public interest sectors) including the possible exclusion from 
patentability of gene and other biotechnology inventions. 
One of the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement is the transfer and 
dissemination of technology73 which TRIPS anticipates will take place 
because of stronger protection of IP rights. However, in many developing 
countries there may be difficulties in accessing the information and 
technology. Patents may be filed, without proper publication, in inaccessible 
offices. The role of patents may also not be properly understood, and licences 
may not even be sought or may be refused. This, together with resource and 
capacity shortages, and with poor agricultural policies in place, sets the scene 
for a host of social ills. Member states should utilise the room for movement 
within the TRIPS framework, partnering if necessary with appropriate 
academic, UN or non-governmental organisations to assist with drafting and 
                                                          
69
  See note 67 on the ‘consistency’ proviso. 
70
  Article 40 provides mechanisms for the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual 
licences. In terms of Article 40(2), members may specify in their legislation ‘licensing practices or 
conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.’  
71
  Intellectual property and international trade (note 68) at 16. 
72
  Article 27(3)(b). 
73
  Article 7, reproduced in note 67. 
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implementing the measures.74  Member States should also resist bilateral 
trade agreements that require TRIPS plus provisions.75 
7.3.3.2 Treaty ratifications 
South Africa should ratify the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA).76 The ITPGRFA is committed to 
sustainable agriculture and food security and it recognises farmers’ 
contributions in the conservation, improvement and access to PGRs. It 
recognises the rights to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed and 
other propagating material and farmers’ rights to participate in decision-
making. The ITPGRFA sets up a multilateral system for access in respect of 
certain listed resources, and the sharing of commercial benefits from such 
access. The treaty facilitates access to and transfer of technologies for the 
conservation and use of PGRs for food and agriculture (including those 
protected by IPRs) under favourable conditions77 and requires that recipients 
shall not claim any IP or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the 
PGRs or their genetic parts or components in the form received under the 
multilateral system.78 
 
In addition, South Africa should ratify the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).79 The provisions of the ICESCR provide 
member states with an international law means to restrict property rights that 
impede ‘the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and 
his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
                                                          
74
  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ‘Integrating intellectual property rights and 
development policy’ (September 2002) at 167.  The important role to be played by NGOs is 
considered in Duncan Matthews ‘NGOs, intellectual property rights and multilateral institutions’ 
(2006) Report of the IP-NGOs research project. 
75
  TRIPS plus provisions are IP law provisions required by regional or bi-lateral agreements that 
require a level of protection higher than that required by TRIPS – for example an agreement which 
requires patent protection for a period of 25 years, when the TRIPS Agreement requires 20 years.  
76
  International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, approved during the 
FAO Conference (31st Session resolution 3/2001) on 3 November 2001, entered into force 29 June 
2004. A note on the previous website of the Department of Agriculture indicated that South Africa 
intends to ratify the ITPGRFA. 
www.nda.agric.za/docs/GeneticResources/Genebank/plant_genetic.htm [Site no longer available 
on 18 August 2009]. 
77
  Article 13. 
78
  Article 12(3)(d). 
79
  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976, 6 ILM 360 (1967). 
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continuous improvement of living conditions.’80 The Covenant recognises the 
right of everyone to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress.81 Member states are required to take steps necessary for 
the conservation, development and diffusion of science and culture. IP laws 
should be measured against these commitments. Member states are required 
to report to the UN on their progress in achieving the rights set out in the 
ICESCR and on any factors and difficulties, including the intransigence of IP 
rights holders, in making progress, which provides member states with an 
opportunity to seek the assistance and technical advice of the UN and its 
specialised agencies.82 In addition, the Covenant states that its provisions 
should not be interpreted ‘as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to 
enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.’83 
In a human rights approach to IP the provisions of the ICESCR, if ratified, 
would provide a bottom line in international law fora for establishing the point 
at which ‘the short-term social costs of patent monopolies must be deemed 
unacceptable, regardless of anticipated longer-term benefits.’84   
7.3.3.3 Regional and local initiatives and innovation 
While strategic and pragmatic partnerships may be pursued to improve 
access to IP,85 this should not be to the detriment of possible home-grown 
solutions in which farmers play a greater role in development. For example 
NEPADs Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
                                                          
80
  Article 11. 
81
  Article 15, which requires balance in this regard as it also protects the ‘moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.’ 
82
  Part V. 
83
  Article 25. 
84
  Barratt The battle for policy space: strategic advantages of a human rights approach in 
international intellectual property negotiations (2008) PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town at iii. 
85
  See Delmer et al ‘Intellectual property resources for international development in agriculture’ 
(2003) 133 Plant Physiology 1666-1670. See in particular the discussion on the African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) at 1669.  See also the discussion on institutional 
initiatives in Wright and Pardey ‘Changing IP regimes: implications for developing country 
agriculture’ (2006) 2 Int J Technology and Globalisation 93 at 106 and Zakir Thomas 
‘Agricultural biotechnology and proprietary rights: challenges and policy options’ (2005) 8(6) J of 
World Intellectual Property 711-734 on the challenges and opportunities presented by 
University/Public Sector strategies, open-source initiatives, and public-private collaboration 
(AATF). 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
272 
 
(CAADP):86 it is said that ‘[u]nlike numerous externally driven efforts, which 
have failed to produce tangible results to improve food security and economic 
growth in Africa in the past 50 years, the CAADP is succeeding in 
coordinating action across the continent on important regional policies such as 
agriculture, food safety standards and the control of transboundary pests and 
diseases. 87 CAADP's goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through 
agriculture.88  
Practical measures in domestic law should also be explored for their potential 
to mitigate possible human rights implications of strong proprietors’ rights in 
PGRs. 
7.3.4 Practical measures in domestic law 
7.3.4.1 Common law of property and contract 
The discussion on the common law of property and contract in chapter 4 
illustrates the intricacies and technicalities of doctrinal private law principles 
and the uncertainty as to how disputes around PGRs might be conceptualised 
and resolved.89 This suggests that legislative intervention is desirable. If 
common law is applied, the courts may avail themselves of legal principles 
which limit the ‘sanctity’ of contract and the ‘absoluteness’ of property.90  
Legislative interventions may however be enhanced by taking into account 
certain aspects of common law. One aspect is the general principle of private 
law that personality rights are not a property right, thus, under common law, 
the interference with ones rights to common or public property does not give 
                                                          
86
  This African led programme is driven by Professor Mkandawire, an agricultural economist from 
Malawi (where agriculture has been transformed in the past decade) who is also NEPAD’s 
agricultural advisor. See Busani Bafana ‘From famine to food surplus’ Mail& Guardian 
September 5 to 11, 2008 at 24. Malawi implemented a subsidy programme, notwithstanding 
pressure to the contrary, to much good effect. See also Thabo Mohlala ‘Greenprint for survival’ 
Mail&Guardian November 28 to December 4 2008. 
87
  Mitzi du Plessis ‘Sowing seeds for the upswing’ Mail&Guardian October 31 to November 6, 2008 
at 15. 
88
  In order to achieve this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in 
agriculture by a minimum of 10 percent of their national budgets and to raise agricultural 
productivity by at least 6 percent. www.nepad-caadp.net/about-caadp.php [Accessed 18 August 
2009]. 
89
  On the uncertainties of the common law, see for example Maria Lee and Robert Burrell ‘Liability 
for the escape of GM seeds: pursuing the “victim”?’ (2002) 65:4 Modern Law Review 517 at 537. 
90
  These are discussed in chapters 2 and 4. 
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rise to a proprietary remedy.91 The second, which can be linked to the first, is 
the increasing fragmentation of property resulting in multiple exclusion rights 
over certain resources.92 These fragments may comprise of both patrimonial 
and non-patrimonial interests.93 The question arises as to how such 
fragmentation should be managed and regulated by law, bearing in mind the 
deference of property to human rights. The rules against arbitrary deprivation 
and expropriation in this context also suggest an area for further research.  
Given the national importance of access to PGRs and access to knowledge 
that might otherwise be in the public domain but instead is locked up in IP, it is 
inappropriate to leave these matters to the courts. Certainty and an equitable 
balance between private and public require legislation and policy. Possible 
interventions may include the following.  
7.3.4.2 Patent law: institutional concerns, patentability, 
examination, interpretation and licence restrictions 
Concerns about patent law are not only about the provisions of the law, but 
also about institutional resources and capacity.94 The establishment of a 
development-oriented IP system requires, in addition to a robust questioning 
of the assumptions of IP,95 skilled personnel (which might include contracting 
in academic technical experts) and appropriate infrastructure and IT 
                                                          
91
  Silberberg and Schoeman (note 151) at 9. Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality (2004) have classified personality rights as the right to body and life, the right to 
physical liberty, the right to good name (reputation), the right to dignity, the right to feelings, the 
right to privacy, and the right to identity. The remedy for an infringement of a personality right is 
the actio injuriarum. 
92
  While fragmentation, which is counter to the traditional common law unitary composite of 
property, can explain the carving out of rights for those who have been unfairly excluded from 
property, also adds legitimacy to the increasing trend toward the granting of proprietary rights over 
public resources. It also raises the concern that once rights have been recognised, withdrawing 
them becomes difficult (and costly). Bruce Ziff ‘The irreversibility of commodification’ 2005 Stell 
LR 283-301.  
93
  See for example Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commission, Western Cape, 2004 
(4) SA 444 (C) and Nhlabathi & Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) discussed in § 2.2.1. 
94
  See for example chapter 7 ‘Institutional capacity’ of the report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights ‘Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy’ (September 
2002). See also Zakir Thomas ‘Agricultural biotechnology and proprietary rights: challenges and 
policy options’ (2005) 8(6) J of World Intellectual Property 711-734.  
95
  See in this regard Gold et al ‘The unexamined assumptions of intellectual property: adopting an 
evaluative approach to patenting biotechnological Innovation’ (2004) 18 Public Affairs Quarterly 
299-344. 
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systems.96 Although it has been suggested that maintenance costs should be 
generated from registration fees,97 costs should not be such that ill-resourced 
innovators are unable to pursue protection in appropriate cases.  
In developing a public interest embued patent policy, it should be remembered 
that once granted, commodification is difficult to reverse.98 The following 
elements should be reflected on and should be spelt out in policy and in 
patenting guidelines: 
• The morality and ordre public exceptions. These should be interpreted 
broadly and clear policy should exist in this regard.99 All interest groups 
should be included in determining exceptions to patentability (for example 
life forms) in terms of the morality / ordre public rule. It should not be left to 
the courts, after the fact of registration. Reflection on the rule should 
include a reflection on the implications (for research and the commodities 
market) of the commercial exploitation of inventions before patents are 
awarded.100  
• A substantive examination procedure.101 A substantive and timely 
examination procedure to ensure that non-patentable inventions do not get 
registered is lacking in the South African patent system.102 In South Africa 
there is no substantive examination of the patentability criteria.103  
• The publication of patent applications and mechanisms for challenging 
patents prior to granting.104 The cost of challenging patents after they have 
                                                          
96
  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights report (note 94) at 141-142. 
97
  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights report (note 94) at 145. 
98
  Bruce Ziff ‘The irreversibility of commodification’ 2005 Stell LR 283-301. 
99
  Prior to amendments, the Patents Act, 1970 in India excluded the patentability of life forms and 
methods of agriculture and horticulture. 
100
  Ibid.   
101
  It is ‘harder to undo a patent award than not to grant one in the first place’. Jaffe Adam Jaffe and 
Josh Lerner Innovation and its discontents: how our broken patent system is endangering 
innovation and progress, and what to do about it (2004) at 153.   
102
  South Africa’s Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office indicates that examination 
by the office is on formalities only. www.cipro.co.za//products_services/patents_registration.asp 
[Accessed 20 August 2009]. 
103
  For example the patent office would not have applied its mind to the question as to whether 
Monsanto’s patent claims (discussed in § 3.2.5) which extend to seeds and plants is valid.  
104
  Jaffe and Lerner (note 101) make useful suggestions for reform and the creation of a patent 
opposition system. 
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been granted is prohibitive. Such mechanisms are currently lacking in 
South African law. 
• Optimum thresholds (which are exceedingly difficult to determine) for 
patentability and the novelty, inventiveness and utility requirements. 
Discoveries,105 higher life forms,106 including plants and animals, may be 
excluded from patentability. The possibility of excluding gene patents 
should also be excluded. ‘Micro-organisms’ and other exceptions could be 
narrowly defined. Higher patentability thresholds keep more goods in the 
public domain but should be checked for their overall impact on levels of 
innovation and development. The possibility of different thresholds for 
different industries should be considered. 
• Over-broad patent claims. The extent of patent claims should be limited to 
the TRIPS minimum standards.107 Broad functional claims which describe 
an invention in terms of what it does rather than what it is should not be 
permitted, and product-by-process claims should only extend protection to 
a product obtained with the claimed process. ‘Narrowing the scope of 
patents through strict claim description and coverage requirements creates 
more room for innovation and competition.’108 
 
• A narrow approach to the interpretation of patents.109 National legislation 
may adopt a narrow approach to the doctrine of equivalents, which would 
                                                          
105
  As Correa indicates, the advent of modern biotechnology has blurred the distinction between 
‘inventions’ (patentable) and ‘discoveries’ (not patentable). Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawi A 
Yusuf Intellectual property and international trade: the TRIPS Agreement (2008) at 235. Clear 
guidelines should be given in this regard to avoid the patenting of what are essentially discoveries.  
106
  As previously stated, the protection of self-propogating higher life forms by way of patent raises 
conceptual difficulties and ‘granting the patent holder exclusive rights that extend not only to the 
particular organism embodying the invention but also to all subsequent progeny of that organism 
represents a significant increase in the scope of rights offered to patent holders. It also represents a 
greater transfer of economic interests from the agricultural community to the biotechnology 
industry than exists in other fields of science.’ The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, 
Patenting of Higher Life Forms and Related Issues (June 2002) cited at para [165] in Monsanto 
Canada Inc v Schmeiser 2004 SCC 34.  
107
  Graham Dutfield ‘Intellectual property rights, trade and biodiversity: the case of seeds and plant 
varieties’, written for the IUCN Project on the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
International Trade Regime (Intersessional Meeting on the Operations of the Convention 
(Montreal, Canada, 28-30 June 1999) at 78. 
108
  Carlos Correa Integrating public health concerns into patent legislation in developing countries 
(2000) at 33. 
109
  Correa (note 108) at 86. 
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require infringements of a patent to be a literal infringement of the patent 
specification.110 A doctrine of equivalents approach allows infringement 
claims even where there is not a literal infringement.111  
 
• Abuse by patent holders. This should be prohibited by restricting certain 
terms in licence agreements. Such measures should ensure the 
mandatory termination of licencing agreements on expiry / invalidation of 
the patents,112 a mandatory right in a licence agreement to dispose of a 
patented article,113 and a mandatory exhaustion of rights.114  
 
• A declaration of origin for biological raw materials and traditional 
knowledge. This is required in South Africa.115 
 
• The impact of the broader patent system on academic research. South 
Africa’s Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and 
Development Act 51 of 2008 should be critically scrutinised and 
deliberated on.116 Researchers should retain rights to knowledge that is 
necessary for research in areas of vital public interest. 
                                                          
110
  In South Africa, infringement requires the taking of what a patentee has actually claimed, as 
distinct from what he might have claimed. See for example Frank & Hirsch (Pty), ltd v Rodi & 
Wienenberger Aktiengesellschaft 1960 (3) SA 747 (A). 
111
  Guidelines, such as those contained in the Intellectual Property Office ‘Examination guidelines for 
patent applications relating to biotechnological inventions in the Intellectual Property Office’ 
(April 2009) could serve as a template for a discussion (and not simply for adoption) on 
patentability criteria and the scope and construction of claims. 
112
  Section 57 of the Patents Act provides for the termination of contracts relating to licences on 
expiry / invalidation of patents. 
113
  Section 58 of the Patents Act provides for this as a default and the parties are free to agree 
otherwise. 
114
  Section 90(1)(e) of the Patents Act provides for this. 
115
  The Patents Act was amended in 2005 to provide for this. Section 30 (3A) requires an applicant for 
a patent to lodge a statement as to whether or not the invention is based on or derived from an 
indigenous biological resource, genetic resource, or traditional knowledge or use. If an invention is 
so based, s 30(3B) requires the applicant to furnish proof of authority to use the resources or 
knowledge. 
116
  See for example Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott ‘Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the 
free flow of scientific knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis’ (2007) 63 
Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 648-687 whose research into dual knowledge 
exploited in patent-paper pairs in which a publication is coupled with the patent shows a citation 
rate decline for such papers after formal IP rights have been granted, thus suggesting that IP rights 
may have a negative impact on the diffusion of scientific knowledge. 
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Outside of the patent system, the use of other mechanisms (for example 
tenured positions, grants, awards and tax incentives) for stimulating research 
and innovation should also be explored. 
Patent law in South Africa lacks on a number of fronts and a review of law, 
policy and practice is desirable. Although government has acknowledged 
some shortfalls,117 it seems unlikely that the IP regime will be overhauled in 
the near future and reform is only likely to occur incrementally. A starting point 
might be to determine policy and, in broad consultation, draft patentability 
guidelines in respect of areas of public importance.118 Although they are not 
an examining office, this will provide some certainty to applicants and to the 
public.  
The differences between the patent system and a plant breeders’ rights 
system should also be exploited to maximum public benefit.  
7.3.4.3 Patents, plant breeders’ and farmers’ rights 
In a patent system ‘the emphasis is on the individual, which contrasts with the 
plant variety rights system, which seeks specifically to place the interests of 
the rights holder vis à vis those of others engaged within the sector.’119 In 
other words, using a sui generis or the UPOV system rather than the patent 
system allows for a greater balancing of interests.   
Each country will have its own needs, making a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to 
plant breeders’ rights undesirable.  This is confirmed in a report commissioned 
by the World Bank in 2004 on the impact of strengthened IP regimes on the 
plant breeding industry in developing countries.120  In summary, the report 
                                                          
117
  The Draft Discussion Document on Agricultural Biotechnology 2004, Government Gazette No 
27936, Notice 1591 of 2005 at 27 indicates that ‘there is a lack of clarity on a number of issues that 
may have implications for the harnessing of both intellectual property and indigenous knowledge 
in agricultural biotechnology such as: … (b) SA’s last of capacity for “search and examine” … (c) 
Poor public understanding of the patent system within SA and how it could impact upon 
innovation and agricultural biotechnology.’ 
118
  See for example the Intellectual Property Office ‘Examination guidelines for patent applications 
relating to biotechnological inventions in the Intellectual Property Office’ (April 2009). 
119
  Margaret Llewelyn and Mike Adcock (eds) European plant intellectual property (2006) at 18. 
120
  Louwaars et al ‘Impacts of strengthened intellectual property rights regimes on the plant breeding 
industry in developing countries: a synthesis of five case studies’ (2005) commissioned by the 
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indicates that IP regimes must be priority specific and moulded to specific 
situations121 and that IPR regimes should be informed by broader issues of 
national agricultural policy. Because of the potentially positive role that IP 
rights could play,122 the reporters conclude that IP rights should not be treated 
as ‘negotiable bargaining chip(s)’ in trade negotiations.123  
The US approach to plant protection is to permit both patent protection over 
plant as well as plant variety protection. The Plant Patents Act124 provides 
protection for asexually reproduced plant varieties.  In addition to this, the 
cases of Chakrabarty125 and Hibberd126 laid the foundation for the principle 
that any plant invention which involves human intervention is patentable.127 
US breeders view plant variety protection128 as less attractive and as an 
inadequate form of protection.129  
In South Africa, the protection of plant varieties in the Plant Breeders’ Act,130 
and the protection of all other plant material by patents, is similar to the 
position in the EU.131 It would seem to be in the public interest for the scope of 
patentability of PGRs to be narrowed and rather, where it is appropriate, plant 
innovations should be protected through the use of a plant breeders’ rights 
                                                                                                                                                                      
World Bank. The countries considered in the study are China, Colombia, Kenya, India and 
Uganda. 
121
  Ibid at 6. 
122
  Countries should reflect on the broader implications of their property regimes for PGRs.  For a 
discussion on some aspects of the economic benefits and transaction costs of a property regime for 
PGRs see Swanson and Goschl ‘Property rights issues involving plant genetic resources: 
Implications of ownership for economic efficiency’ (2000) 32  Ecological Economics 75-92. 
123
  Ibid at 8. 
124
  Plant Patent Act 1930. 
125 
 Diamond v Chakrabarty 447 US 303 (1980). The case involved the patenting of a bacterium 
designed to consume oil which was held to be patentable. It was held that prohibition on the 
patenting of products of nature did not extend to ‘living’ products manufactured through human 
intervention. See generally the discussion in European plant intellectual property (note 119) at 86-
90. 
126
  Ex parte Hibberd 227 USPQ 443 (1985). The case involved protection being awarded over a 
maize plant, and its progeny, which had been breed through conventional plant breeding methods 
to contain increased trypophan. See generally the discussion in European plant intellectual 
property (note 119) at 86-90. 
127
  European plant intellectual property (note 119) at 86. 
128
  In terms of the Plant Variety Protection Act 1970 which provides protection for sexually (seed) 
reproduced varieties. 
129
  European plant intellectual property (note 119) at 85. 
130
  Act 15 of 1976. 
131
  The Council Regulation on Community Plant Variety Rights, 1994 (EC) No 2100/94 provides for 
the protection of plant varieties and the European Patent Convention (EPC) for the patenting of 
plant material. The EPC is strengthened by the European Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 No 98/44/EC. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
279 
 
system which provides more scope for other breeders’, researchers and 
farmers’ rights.132 A patent holder who has claims over seed is likely to 
challenge seed saving.133 A counter argument is that seed saving, where it 
goes to dignity, sustainable livelihoods and the right to life, is a protected right 
to which property, in this case the patent holder’s rights, should defer.134 
7.3.4.4 Consumer protection and competition law 
Approaching the concerns from the angle of consumer protection and 
competition law may serve as useful checks on monopoly abuses. Excessive 
pricing, among other things, is prohibited by competition law; and similarly 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust prices and contractual terms are prohibited by 
consumer protection law. In addition, the possibility for a statutory measure 
regulating the marketing of GM cotton might be considered in terms of the 
Agricultural Products Act.135 
Finally, biosafety law provides an opportunity to reconcile social and economic 
consequences with rights in the products and processes of modern 
biotechnology in agriculture. Although the provisions of biosafety law, and the 
other measures discussed above, may fall within the scope of the WTO trade 
agreements, these agreements should not be slavishly applied.136  
7.3.4.5 Biosafety law   
Socio-economic concerns are increasingly coming to the fore in the regulation 
of biosafety. Whereas in the past, environmental and health concerns have 
dominated the debate, the socio-economic impact is beginning to be factored 
                                                          
132 
 A example of such a system is provided for in India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act, 2001. The Act provides for, among other things, a comprehensive set of farmers’ 
rights. See in this regard Brahmi, Pratibha et al ‘The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act of India’ (2004) 86 Current Science 392-398. 
133
  See the discussion in Endres, A Bryan ‘State authorized seed saving: political pressures and 
constitutional restraints’ (2004) 9 Drake J Agric Law 323-357. 
134
  It could be argued that to the extent that patent law authorises the exclusion of a resource necessary 
to fulfil human rights, it is unconstitutional. Decisions such as Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) 
Ltd v Police Commission, Western Cape 2004 (4) SA 444 (C) and Nhlabathi & Others v Fick 
[2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC), discussed in § 2.2.1, support this argument. 
135
  Act 47 of 1996. The Act is explored in § 4.4.3. 
136
  See Stiglitz (note 2). 
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in.137 Thus regulators have to deal with increasingly complex social issues 
which impact on the design of a regulatory system for biotechnology.138 While 
the role of the state remains core in the regulatory process, traditional 
command regulatory practices may need to be reconsidered in view of the 
complex scientific, social and economic issues raised by modern 
biotechnology.139 
In chapter 5 it is indicated that the South African approach to socio-economic 
impacts in the GMO Act140 does not unequivocally require a consideration of 
socio-economic factors in decision making.141 Namibia’s legislative 
framework, the Biosafety Act,142 is more direct on the point. Namibia’s law 
requires the Minister (responsible for science and technology) to be satisfied 
that any approved GMO dealings will be in the public interest, and, in 
determining this, the factors which may be taken into account include the 
extent to which such dealings are likely: 
(a) to contribute to sustainable development; 
(b) to undermine indigenous knowledge or technology; or 
                                                          
137
  See for example the COGEM Report ‘Socio-economic aspects of GMOs: building blocks for an 
EU sustainability assessment of genetically modified crops’ CGM/090929-01. See also Debbie 
Collier and Charles Moitui ‘Africa’s regulatory approach in biotechnology in agriculture: an 
opportunity to seize socio-economic concerns’ (2009) 17 RADIC 29-56. 
138
 See for example Neil Gunningham ‘Regulating biotechnology: lessons from environmental policy’ 
in Somsen, Han (ed) The regulatory challenge of biotechnology: human genetics, food and patents 
(2007) Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.   
139
 Gunningham (note 138) identifies possible approaches such as meta regulation (a system of own 
self-regulation), regulatory pluralism, civil regulation and a licence model.  He suggests that there 
is some value in each. Lee and Burrell point out that ‘intellectual property and environmental 
lawyers need to enter into a dialogue about the regulation of biotechnology. Intellectual property 
lawyers must not assume, as has often been the case, that they are dealing with a narrow and 
technical set of questions and that environmental regulation will address the broader concerns 
raised by GM technology. Similarly environmental lawyers, who have focused on the 
environmental and public health concerns surrounding GMO regulation, must begin to engage with 
the potential socio-economic impacts of the technology and the absence of adequate mechanisms 
to deal with these issues.’ (Footnotes omitted). Maria Lee and Robert Burrell ‘Liability for the 
escape of GM seeds: pursuing the “victim”?’ Modern Law Review (2002) 65:4 at 520. 
140
  Act 15 of 1997. 
141
  The impact assessment regulatory regime is discussed at §5.4.2.4. Impact assessment is dealt with 
in the GMO Act and the Proposed GMO Regulations GNR 321 of 28 March 2008 (Government 
Gazette No 30892). The draft regulations do allow for an (optional) socio-economic assessment, 
such as the impact on the range of diversity of the biological resources, to loss of access to genetic 
and other natural resources previously available to local communities, the loss of traditions, 
knowledge and practices, the loss of income, competitiveness or economic markets, and the loss of 
food security. 
142
  Act 7 of 2006. 
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(c) to affect the social and economic advancement of people and 
society, including a particular community.143 
While the regulatory framework for GMOs is increasingly becoming more 
inclusive of the principles of sustainable development there is still work to be 
done in this regard. Much value would be added by a parallel high level 
process in which the socio-economic impact of strong IP rights is explored 
more broadly. 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
The simple answer to the question ‘how should South African law regulate 
property rights in plant genetic resources?’ is ‘it depends’. At a principled level 
it is clear that PGRs are a vital public resource. This makes the trend toward 
the granting of IP rights in PGRs to the point of excess all the more 
concerning.  Attempts to regulate PGRs should therefore start from the 
premise that these private rights are a privilege, an encroachment on public 
goods. The tragedy of the commons argument was revisited by Hardin himself 
when he subsequently excluded the ‘managed’ commons from his 
argument.144  
While suggestions have been made for a broad theoretical approach to 
regulating property rights in PGRs, the details in a particular scenario will 
depend on many variables – for example, where the centre of origin is, where 
the PGRs are now being cultivated, what social function they perform, 
whether they cause harm (social, economic or health and environment), what 
private rights are being claimed?, and so forth.  There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
answer.  
Developments should not be driven by the desire for economic growth alone 
and should be constrained by the potential impact on the rights and cabilities 
                                                          
143
  Section 25(4)(b). 
144
  Hardin admits that the mistake he made in his initial paper was to omit the adjective ‘unmanaged’. 
Hardin is concerned about unbridled population growth and indicates that this will require 
individual freedoms to be given up. See Hardin, Garrett ‘Extensions of “the tragedy of the 
commons’ (1998) 280 Science 682-683. 
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of the receiving society.145 Caution should be heeded as commodification,146 
as well as environmental contamination, is difficult to undo.  
The thesis explores one particular context being IP-protected GM cotton 
cultivated in the Makhathini Flats. The thesis suggests that, in this case, the 
social cost is untenable and that adjustments to law, policy and practice are 
required.  
Some preliminary suggestions are made in this regard, many of which apply 
to the regulation of PGRs in the broader sense including the role to be played 
by an over-arching Council responsible for policy around ownership and 
management of natural resources and a mandate for NEDLAC to also 
consider these issues, in particular the implications of the IP system on 
sectors of vital importance.  
The prevailing approach to the patenting of plants locks up knowledge and 
drives up prices in a manner that is socially unsustainable. Possibilities for law 
and policy reform and for possible remedies in competition and consumer 
protection law are suggested.  
Finally, the property paradigm assists in making the case by providing a way 
of thinking about the property concept in a more publically minded way 
thereby providing the theoretical tools for permitting restrictions to private 
property. 
                                                          
145
  See Amartya Sen ‘Human rights and capabilities’ (2005) 6 J of Human Development 151-166. 
146
  See Bruce Ziff ‘The irreversibility of commodification’ 2005 Stell LR 283-301.  
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ANNEXURE A 
EXTRACTS FROM THE BILL OF RIGHTS (SS 7-39) 
Rights  
7. (1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. 
It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.  
 (2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of rights.  
(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations 
contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.  
Application  
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
 executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.  
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic 
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right.  
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or 
juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court-  
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if 
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that right; and  
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, 
provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 
36 (1).  
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the 
extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that 
juristic person.  
Equality  
9. (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
 protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative 
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
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categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). 
National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in 
subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair.  
Human dignity 
10. Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
 respected and protected. 
Life 
11. Everyone has the right to life. 
… 
Freedom of trade, occupation and profession  
22. Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or 
profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may 
be regulated by law. 
Environment 
24. Everyone has the right-  
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well- 
  being; and  
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that-  
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
(ii) promote conservation; and  
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development.  
Property  
25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of 
 general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
 deprivation of property.  
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general 
application-  
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the 
time and manner of payment of which have either been 
agreed to by  those affected or decided or approved by a 
court.  
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of 
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including-  
(a) the current use of the property;  
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
(c) the market value of the property;  
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the 
property; and  
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.  
(4) For the purposes of this section-  
(a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to 
  land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable  
  access to all South Africa's natural resources; and  
(b) property is not limited to land.  
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable 
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.  
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure 
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is 
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entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.  
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices 
is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.  
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking 
legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and 
related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions 
of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36 
(1).  
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection 
  (6).  
Health care, food, water and social security  
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to-  
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;  
(b) sufficient food and water; and  
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependents, appropriate social 
assistance.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights.  
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.  
Language and culture  
30. Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the 
cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do 
so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Cultural, religious and linguistic communities  
31. (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community 
 may not be denied the right, with other members of that 
 community-  
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their 
language; and  
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(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
  associations and other organs of civil society.  
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner 
  inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.  
Access to information 
32. (1) Everyone has the right of access to-  
(a) any information held by the state; and  
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is 
required for the exercise or protection of any rights.  
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, 
and may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the 
administrative and financial burden on the state.  
Just administrative action 
33. (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
 reasonable and procedurally fair.  
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.  
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these 
rights, and must-  
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court 
or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial 
tribunal;  
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in 
subsections (1) and (2); and  
(c) promote an efficient administration.  
… 
Limitation of rights  
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law 
 of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
 reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
 based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
 account all relevant factors, including-  
(a) the nature of the right;  
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(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of 
the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill 
of Rights.  
Enforcement of rights  
38. Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent 
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or 
threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a 
declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are-  
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;  
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in 
their own name;  
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or 
class of persons;  
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and  
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.  
Interpretation of Bill of Rights  
39. (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-  
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom;  
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law.  
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights 
or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are 
consistent with the Bill.  
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ANNEXURE B 
MONSANTO COTTON TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT 
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